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ABSTRACT 
This research focused on determining the roles and institutional arrangements for economic 
regulation of urban water services in Sub- Saharan Africa. Urban water service delivery mainly 
supplied by state owned utilities is constrained due to many factors one of which is related to 
insufficient or lack of a clear economic regulatory framework. 
The research used a multiple case study approach and systematically analysed the roles and 
institutional arrangements of economic regulation of urban water services in three countries of 
Ghana, Mozambique and Zambia. Based on literature as the source of information, the research 
developed the existing political and socio-economic environment in the different countries which 
can affect the design and determination of the roles and institutional arrangements for economic 
regulation. A further analysis was made of the perceptions on the roles and institutional 
arrangements of the regulatory framework in the Sub-Saharan African context through a 
questionnaire distributed beyond the three case countries. The study obtained primary data from 
focus group discussions, key informant interviews, official documents and observations. Lessons 
obtained through literature from regulatory institutions in other continents have also been included 
and these are Jamaica, Latvia, Jakarta in Indonesia, and England and Wales. 
The factors which can affect the roles and institutional arrangements of economic regulation of 
urban water services were divided into three groups as: including country govemance, socio-
economic and sectoral factors. Country governance factors, which include political stability and 
fragility, are a key factor in the decision of whether to establish a regulatory agency. On the other 
hand, socio-economic factors influence the focus or areas which must not be ignored by economic 
regulation. The third type of factors which include the robustness of a policy framework, and 
performance levels of utilities, affect the effectiveness and efficiency of an economic regulator. 
Based on the evidence from the research, economic regulation in Sub-Saharan Africa should 
address five key roles, which are [i] approval of tariffs that will lead to service providers achieving 
commercial viability, [ii] consumer protection" [iii] monitoring and enforcing performance standards, 
[iv] setting up of a knowledge bank on urban water services, and [v] ensuring that the poor gain 
sustained access to water services. There are a number of specific regulatory functions within each 
role. Sub-Saharan African countries are in a unique situation where the urban poor comprise as 
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much as 60% of the urban population and so cannot be ignored in the design of a regulatory 
framework. 
The conclusion from this research is that in order to achieve the perceived benefits of economic 
regulation of urban water services in Sub-Saharan Africa, and subject to conducive and 
appropriate political and socio-economic environment, the more appropriate institutional 
arrangements is an autonomous regulatory agency. The autonomy of the regulatory agency will be 
enhanced if it has its own legal status, and is able to develop, manage and control its own budget 
financed from a regulatory fee charged on the regulated water providers. Governments should be 
willing to relinquish regulatory decision making powers to this non-political and non-governmental 
body. The reporting and appointing mechanisms for the board could also have an influence on the 
autonomy of the regulator. 
The research further concludes that economic regulation of urban water services is a necessary 
but perhaps not sufficient condition for efficient and effective delivery of urban water services. It is 
not a panacea to the enormous problems of urban water services but can play a very effective role. 
The research has further found that it is too early to determine the impact of utility regulation on the 
performance levels of utilities in those countries that have a clearly defined regulatory framework. 
Utility regulation is still in its infancy in Sub-Saharan Africa and its impact is therefore a subject for 
further research. 
Key words: Economic regulation, urban water services, utilities, roles, urban poor, institutional 
arrangements. 
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Note on use of terms 
Term Meaning for purposes of this thesis 
Autonomy In this thesis autonomy for a regulator should include organisational 
autonomy i.e. being organizationally separate from existing ministries 
and departments, and autonomy over its internal administration and 
protection from dismissal without due cause. Plus financial autonomy 
where there are earmarked, secure, and adequate source of funding. A 
regulator needs to work in accordance with government policy. 
Commercial viability The ability of a utility to meet its operational costs based on service user 
charges without subsidies from any external source, as well as moving 
towards full cost recovery. 
Commission The board that oversees the functions of the secretariat of a regulatory 
agency. It is like the board of directors 
Commissioner Member of the commission. They may also be called board members or 
directors or councillors 
Economic regulation Economic regulation of water service provision should be understood to 
be the rules and organisations that set, monitor, enforce and change the 
allowed tariffs and service standards for water providers (Groom, 
Halpem and Ehrhardt, 2006). Or stated differently, economic regulation 
of water services consists of ensuring that water service providers 
comply with existing rules with respect to tariffs or quality standards and 
of adapting those rules overtime in order to cope with unforeseen 
events. The objective of regulation is that those services be provided in 
an efficient, fair and sustainable manner, whilst bearing in mind social 
priorities set out by policy makers [both at national and local 
government level} (Tremolet and Halpern, 2006). 
Full cost recovery Pricing structure for drinking water and wastewater service which fully 
recovers all the costs of providing that service in an economically effiCient, 
environmentally sound, and socially acceptable manner, and which 
promotes efficient water use by customers 
Informal settlements These are areas which may be unplanned, with informal housing 
structures, insufficient or lacking in services such as water, sanitation, 
drainage etc, with high density and sometimes may not be legally 
recognized but may have been in existence for many years. Also 
termed as slums or peri-urban settlements 
Institutional The regulatory institutional arrangements refer to how regulatory roles 
arrangements are allocated to various types of institutions, which can include an 
autonomous regulatory agency, a ministry, an asset-holding company, a 
customer group, independent experts, etc. In this thesis the following 
institutional arrangements are examined: legal status, composition and 
appOintment of board, reporting mechanism, funding of the regulator, licensing 
of utilities and number of personnel of the regulator. 
xviii 
Regulatory Framework A regulatory framework is in this case defined as the set of rules and 
institutional arrangements that bind together the water service 
providers, consumers, regulators and policy makers -mainly 
government. The rules may be formal [laws, contracts, bye-laws, etc.] 
and informal [personal commitments, financial incentives, reputation, 
etc.].lt is therefore the totality of regulatory governance '1he how" and 
the regulatory substance -'1he whaf' of economic regulation. 
Regulatory governance Regulatory governance refers to the institutional and legal design of the 
regulatory framework and includes attributes of the regulatory 
framework i.e. autonomy and accountability of the regulator, relationship 
between the regulator and policy makers, transparency. It is the 
framework within which decisions are made. It is defined by the laws, 
processes, and procedures that determine the e actions and 
parameters that are regulated, the government entities that make the 
regulatory decisions, and the resources and information that are 
available to them. 
Regulatory substance Regulatory substance refers to the content of regulation. In other words 
what is the purpose of economic regulation and includes two key roles 
of tariff approvals, protection of consumers, monitoring and enforcing of 
standards. It is therefore the ''what'' of economic regulation 
Sub-Saharan Africa This includes all countries South of the Sahara 
Unit cost of production In this case unit cost includes all operational and maintenance costs 
divided by the total cost of providing water services. It does not include 
cost of capital replacement. 
Urban Includes all areas within the urban framework. This includes all formal 
and informal (peri-urban areas) settlements. Urban may have a differing 
definition from country to country but mainly refers to the principal towns 
of the country. 
Utility Any agency or Company responsible for the provision of water and/or 
sewerage services to a city or town. Words like water service provider, 
company, have been used interchangeably with utility. 
Water Sector Shall generally mean the Water Supply and Sanitation Sector 
Water Services For purposes of this thesis the term water services means water supply 
services and/or sanitation services or any part thereof. In this thesis the 
term is generally used in its inclusive sense. Water Services therefore 
refers to the supply of water to domestic consumers, institutions, 
businesses and industries. 
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CHAPTER 1.0 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction to the study 
Water sector reforms implemented over the last fifteen years in more than thirty seven countries in 
Africa resulted in govemments re-looking at the roles and institutional frameworks for urban water 
services provision. The economic regulation is one such framework that has received some 
attention as a tool for performance enhancement of water service delivery mechanisms in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Economic regulation is seen as one key for "successful development of utility 
infrastructure as it should provide stability, protect consumers from the abuse of market power, 
guard operators against political opportunism, and provide incentives for service providers to 
operate efficiently based on cost recovery tariffs" (Jamison et aI., 2005). In Africa where services 
are largely supplied by state owned enterprises the need for economic regulation of the services 
cannot be over emphasised contrary to some views that regulation should only be undertaken 
when services are provided by private operators. The design and orientation of the roles and 
institutional arrangements of economic regulation in Sub-Saharan Africa are influenced by the 
need to meet the ever growing demand for services from the huge proportion of the urban poor and 
the un-served. 
Using a multiple case study approach, this research fills the knowledge gap by systematically 
analysing the roles and institutional arrangements of economic regulation of urban water services 
in three countries of Ghana, Mozambique and Zambia. A further analysis was made of perceptions 
on the roles and institutional arrangements of the regulatory framework in the Sub-Saharan African 
context through a questionnaire distributed beyond the three case countries. The evidence came 
from focus group discussions, key informant interviews, questionnaire and documents. Lessons 
obtained through literature from regulatory institutions in other continents have also been included 
and these are Jamaica, Latvia, Jakarta in Indonesia, and England and Wales. 
1.2 Background to the study 
This study was undertaken at a time when one of the challenges for the water sector in this 
millennium is how to meet the ever·increasing demand for adequate and efficient water services. 
Though both global and regional frameworks are being established to assist governments to face 
this daunting challenge, a lot still remains to be done. The frameworks that have been established 
include the Millennium Development Goals [MDGs] (United Nations, 2000) by the government 
leaders during the Millennium Summit held in New York in September 2000. The MDGs, among 
other issues, call for the reduction of the proportion of people without access to Water Services by 
50%. The MDGs together with the many efforts by governments to increase accessibility to water 
services, are aimed at reducing the poverty levels which for many Sub·Saharan African countries 
averages 49% compared to the global average [excluding China] of 25% (World Bank., 2003). 
Poverty, in this respect refers to the number of people living on less than one US Dollar per day. 
Another global framework is the declaration by the UN·General Assembly of the period from March 
2005 to 2015 as the International Decade for Action, 'Water for Life" (UNESCO, 2003). At the 
regional level, the sector is being guided by the African Vision (African Development Bank, 2000) 
for the water sector. The vision calls for "an Africa where everyone has access to water services by 
2025". At national levels governments are being advised to put water services as a high priority on 
their government development agendas through such programmes as Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers [PRSPs] and Highly Indebted Poor Countries [HIPC] programmes. 
2 
Water is life, essential for health and human dignity. It is a key to sustainable development and is 
also crucial for socio-economic and environmental development (8jorklunda, 1998; GTZ., 2001). 
Yet accessibility, to this very critical resource for a huge percentage of Africa's population is limited. 
In a continent where there is so much fresh water, only 58 per cent of the enti re population in Africa 
has adequate access to safe water (UNICEFIWHO, 2008). Access to water by the urban 
population is estimated at 81 % (UNICEFIWHO, 2008). Accessibility to sanitation services is even 
worse. Only 49% of Africa's urban population has access to improved sanitation facilities 
(UNICEFIWHO, 2008). Comparatively this shows a declin'e proportionately in accessibility to both 
water and sanitation compared to 20 years ago in 1990 at the end of the International Drinking 
Water Supply and Sanitation Decade [IDWSSSD]. Access by the urban population in Africa to 
water supply in 1990 was 82% and to sanitation was 53% (UNICEFIWHO, 2006). 
The problem of low accessibility to water services in Africa is exacerbated by the ever-growing 
demand because of high urban population grow1h. Africa is urbanising at a higher rate [over 5% in 
some countries] than any other region in the World. It is estimated that around 45% of the people in 
Africa will live in urban areas by 2025, from 36% as of 2007 (UN-DESA, 2007). Most cities in Africa 
have an average annual population grow1h rate of at least 4% as compared to the European city 
average annual urban population grow1h rate of less than 2% (UN-DESA, 2007). The high 
urbanisation has put ever-greater pressure on the already overstretched water infrastructure. As 
already stated the most affected are the urban poor, majority of who live in informal settlements. As 
high as 60% of the urban population or approximately 161 Million out of a total urban population of 
268 Million live in low income or informal settlements (UN-DESA, 2007). Often unplanned and 
sometimes illegal, these settlements share a common problem of inadequate access to basic 
services such as safe water and adequate sanitation. Water services are mainly from unregulated 
alternative service providers at higher prices and at times at lower quality. 
Poverty reduction is not possible without delivery of clean water to the people (World Bank, 2003). 
Therefore increasing access to this most basic social service is one essential element to the 
strategies of poverty reduction. Water and poverty are inextricably linked. Poor access to water and 
insufficient sanitation affect the health of the poor, their food security, and their prospects for 
making a living. 
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The MDGs will not be achieved on the basis of increased investment alone but will require 
institutional reforms which include the introduction of transparent regulatory frameworks. The 
United Nations Millennium Task Force on Water Services (UN-Millennium Task Force on water, 
2004) identified "absence of a sound regulatory system as one of the constraints to expanding 
water services". Adequate regulation of utilities should result in more accountability, transparency 
and efficient provision of services. It is also necessary to ensure that roles of the different key 
players in the urban water services sector are clearly defined. These include separation of policy 
making from regulation and also separation of service provision from policy making and regulation. 
1.3 Utility regulation 
Water services in general have the potential to affect the welfare of society, public health and other 
social concerns as stated earlier. As such water services in turn attract and tend to be subject to 
government control in the name of trying to safeguard the general welfare of the citizenry. Utility 
regulation is therefore justified because of the monopolistic nature of the water services activities, 
by its importance as an essential service, by its relevance to the socio-economic organisation and 
by the limited availability of other formal piped network alternatives. Credible and stable regulatory 
frameworks are critical to attract operators and mobilize financing. Given the weak institutional 
capacity and the limited experience with autonomous regulation of public services, the design and 
implementation of regulatory arrangements has proven to be one of the most difficult aspects of 
water supply and sanitation sector reform in Africa. The scope of this research is limited to 
economic regulation of urban water services in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Economic regulation may be defined as the rules and organisations that set, monitor, enforce and 
charge the allowed tariffs and service standards for water providers (Groom, Halpern and Ehrhardt, 
2006). Economic regulation of water services has proven to be a powerful tool for improving water 
services in more developed economies and can also be useful in developing countries. The most 
traditional economic case for regulation assumes the existence of natural monopoly -that is, where 
economies of scale are so persistent that a single firm can serve the market at lower unit cost than 
two or more firms (Poole, 1985). Examples of monopolistic industries include electric power and 
gas distribution, water and wired telephone services. This study is based on the premise that 
regulation is necessary in such instances to protect consumers from the monopoly pricing 
behaviour. 
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1.4 Rationale for the research 
In Africa, urban water service delivery mechanisms are constrained due to a number of problems. 
There is a wealth of literature linking the poor service provision to inadequate or inappropriate 
institutional, legal and regulatory frameworks (Water Utility Partnership, 2001; UN Habitat., 2003; 
Lenton, Wright and Lewis, 2004; Seppalla, 2004; Baietti, Kingdom and Ginneken, 2006) rather than 
to the commonly accepted reasons of financial or technical inadequacies. In spite of decades of 
govemment and donor supported investments in the urban water services sector, public utilities in 
many African countries have been unable to fully meet the demand for water services. Poor 
performance basically means poor service delivery which leads to lack or inadequate accessibility 
to water services. This further leads to the emerging of alternative service providers. Lack or 
inadequate accessibility to water services has far reaching health implications. This would further 
affect the economic productivity of people in the urban areas. Many factors contribute to the 
inadequacies of urban water services provision. These factors are at every level from the most 
local to the international. The factors in this respect are varied and complex. At the same time most 
of the factors are interlinked. The factors may be categorised as follows (UN Habitat., 2003). 
• Inhabitants using water that may not be of good quality, 
• Ineffective delivery mechanisms, 
• Lack of or inadequate regulatory frameworks and 
• Socio-economic and environmental factors. 
This study is looking at one of the key factors that is linked to inadequate water service delivery, 
i.e. lack of or inadequate regulatory frameworks. Various types of institutional models may be used, 
such as self-regulation, regulation "by agency" or regulation "by contracf'. Regulatory institutional 
models tend to vary depending on the market structure for water service provision [centralized or 
decentralized] and the ownership of the service provider [public or private] (Tremolet and Halpem, 
2006). Although there is an increase of literature on various types of water utility regulation around 
the world, only a small fraction of this originates from Sub-Saharan Africa. There is need to clearly 
understand the appropriate regulatory arrangements in the Sub-Saharan African context that would 
provide the requisite benefits. 
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1.5 Problem Formulation 
The constraints leading to the poor service delivery cannot be solved in isolation. They are 
interlinked to other political, contextual, environmental and socio-economic conditions in a country. 
The socio-political situation of a country also affects how the constraints can be solved. Seppala 
(Seppalla, 2004), in quoting Grigg, stated that "infrastructure, including water services, supports a 
complex socio-economic hierarchy of systems where the social system relies on economic and 
institutional system and the economic and institutional system on the infrastructure, and the 
infrastructure on the natural environment'. 
This study assesses how lack of or inadequate regulatory mechanisms negatively affects service 
delivery in Sub-Saharan Africa. Different stakeholders perceive the problems of water services 
differently. Consumers commonly perceive the problem as that of inadequate coverage and low 
quality, low service level and perhaps high cost. Service providers on the other hand may perceive 
the problems as lack of financial resources leading to low investment, lack of autonomy and 
perhaps general socio-economic environment in which they operate. 
The mapping of the constraints to better service delivery or expansion of services in Sub-Saharan 
Africa results in a multiplicity of issues. These can be broadly classified into internal and external 
factors. The internal factors may further be divided into the following categories; Technical, 
financial, human resources, legal and institutional and policy while external factors may to include 
issues related to external support agencies, economic situation of a country [Poverty levels], 
fragility levels of a country and interest from the international private sector. 
The lack of a clear regulatory framework is just one of the sector constraints. Effective regulation 
can influence other factors to be improved upon, by providing key information, an effective 
framework and incentives for planned improvements in service delivery. While the constraints may 
only be fully resolved by considering all of them, this research focused on lack of or inadequate 
utility regulatory frameworks. 
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1.6 Objective of the research 
The main objective of the research is to assess appropriate roles and institutional arrangements of 
economic regulation of urban water services in Sub-Saharan African. It is aimed at developing a 
clear understanding of the value added of economic regulation to the provision of urban water 
services in Sub-Saharan Africa. The research further considered the existing political and socio-
economic environmental factors that may impact on the determination of the roles and the design 
of the institutional arrangements for economic regulation of urban water services. 
1.7 Research questions 
The research objective was explored through the research questions as outlined below. Further 
discussion is given in Chapter 3 
1.0 What are the existing political and socio-economic environmental factors in a country that 
can influence the design and implementation of the roles and institutional arrangements of 
the economic regulation of urban water services in Sub-Saharan Africa? 
2.0 What roles and requisite functions of economic regulation can enhance better delivery of 
water services in Sub-Saharan African urban areas? 
3.0 What are the appropriate institutional arrangements for the regulator to assure effective 
regulation of the sector? 
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1.8 Outline of the thesis 
The thesis has been structured so as to provide a systematic progression from the introduction 
giving a general overview of the thesis, literature review, research methodology, presentation of the 
case studies up to the discussion and conclusions. This is indicated in the diagram given below. 
The diagram shows the links between the chapters. 
• Conceptual framework 
• Research questions 
• Research design 
• Data collection tools 
• Data analysis 
• Ethical issues 
Brief conclusions relative to the 
research questions and mainly 
implications of the results 
Figure 1-1: Thesis structure 
Source: Author 
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Overview of the whole thesis 
Urban water services 
__ ~ - Water Utility regulation in Africa 
Research problem definition 
• Context for water services 
• Rationale for utility regulation 
• Roles for utility regulation 
• Institutional arrangements for utility 
regulation 
• Lessons from economic regulation 
from outside Africa 
Discussion of the research 
resuhs relative to the research 
I obiiectille and questions 
CHAPTER 2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Chapter Introduction 
This chapter provides a review of the relevant literature on the key issues on the subject of 
economic regulation of water services delivery. It starts with identifying issues related to urban 
water services, water sector reform and finally on regulation. The material was sourced from 
published and unpublished journals, books, conference and workshop papers etc. 
2.2 Challenges of urban water services delivery in Africa 
The urban water services sector in Africa faces many challenges including the increasing demand 
from the ever-growing urban population. This puts growing pressure on already inefficient 
institutions which are unable to meet their running costs as well as have sufficient funds for 
investment, diminishing resources and huge investment requirements (Water Utility Partnership, 
2001). Unfortunately, water infrastructure has not expanded proportionately as population growth 
(Nickson, 1998). 
Africa faces critical financial, technical and human resource capacity constraints to extend water 
services of acceptable quality to a majority of its people (Estache, 2002). Also those charged with 
the responsibility of provision of this basic service have been performing inefficiently (Smith and 
Kerf, 1996; Saghir, Schiffler and Woldu, 2000; Palmer, 2003). The result of these two challenges is 
the statistics on service levels quoted in chapter 1.2. 
In spite of decades of government and donor-supported investments in the urban water services 
sub-sector, state owned utilities in many African countries have been unable to fully meet the 
demand for Water Services (Water Utility Partnership, 2001; Mwanza, 2005). Barriers to improved 
provision of water and sanitation are not so much technical or financial but institutional and political 
(UN Habitat., 2003). 
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Many state owned water utilities are inefficient, at times wasting half of the treated water they 
produce. This may be for technical reasons but also due to management issues such as poor bill 
collections. Often the biggest debts are owed by government departments like schools, police 
camps, hospitals, military establishments etc. Many state owned utilities tend to lack autonomy and 
accountability. This makes them vulnerable to political interference and they do not have the 
incentives or the means to provide adequate services to their existing customer base, let alone for 
the expansion to those not connected. 
The poor who comprise at least 60% of the urban population are in a worse situation because most 
of them do not have direct connections to the utility pipe systems. Yet on a monthly basis they 
often pay more than double what those connected pay but for low quality water with poor service 
levels mainly from non-state providers [NSPsj which are not even regulated. These means of 
delivery could easily be serving up to 47% of the urban poor population (Sansom, 2006). In African 
cities the primary means of delivery of drinking water is the utility. However most of this water is not 
delivered through household connections as only about 35 percent of the urban population of Sub-
Saharan Africa is connected to a piped network (UNICEFIWHO, 2008). Public stand posts, also 
sometimes supplied by utilities, are the second most widely used means of delivery, serving 24 
percent of the population (Banerjee et aI., 2008) . Analysis suggests that the majority of those who 
lack access to utility water by direct network connection either live in informal settlements where 
house connections are very limited or live too far away from the distribution network. The table 
below shows the percentage of city residents served by utility network in a sample of cities in Africa as of 
late 1990s.The city dwellers who do not obtain their water from a utility get it directly from wells and 
boreholes and account for further 24 percent of Africa's urban population. 
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Table 2-1: Percentage of city residents served by utility network in a sample of cities in Africa 
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Source of water to household use [percentage of households] 
In house connection 76 71 71 36 31 29 19 27 23 17 
Standpipe water fetched 2 1 14 5 0 3 30 0 49 19 
by household 
Independent 22 27 15 59 69 68 51 73 28 64 
providers/traditional 
sources 
Means of disposal of household septic waste [percentage of households] 
In-home connection to 25 20 15 6 3 10 4 1 0 2 
piped sewerage 
Family labour or 75 80 85 94 97 90 96 99 100 98 
independent providers 
Near network: connection [45] [35] [25] [9] [6] [17] [4] [1] [0] [2] 
feasible 
Source: (Collignon and Vezina, 2000) 
The second main challenge faced by utilities has to do with availability of water resources. 
According to Grey (2001) 'more than 600 million people in Africa will be living in water stress areas 
by 2020'. This estimation may not be farfetched as the Global Change (Global Change Game, 
2000) has found. 
The third challenge has to do with investment for new infrastructure to expand to the un-served or 
for rehabilitating the old, dilapidated infrastructure. Investment in water services in Africa lags 
behind most other regions globally (Smith and Kerf, 1996). Multi-lateral financial institutions or bi-
lateral organisations provide most of the investment in the water and sanitation sector in Africa. 
Very little is raised from within the countries themselves. Benefit of reforms will not be realised if 
there are no investments. This is the situation in many African countries which have embraced 
commercialisation of services bu1 have not received any investments (Oagdeviren, 2008). 
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As of 2002 it was estimated that Africa would need at least US$6 billion per year to meet the 
challenges of the MDGs for water supply and sanitation (Africa Water Task Force., 2002). In order 
to meet this challenge, governments must ensure that resources are mobilised first from internal 
sources, using public funds, and from private sector funds to meet national objectives. Sometimes 
the debate on whether to engage private sector financing is usually overshadowed with the 
concerns on affordability. The argument is even becoming superfluous as many private sector 
agencies are withdrawing from financing infrastructure projects in Africa (Hall, 2003). With private 
investment in the water services systems on the decline means that Africa will have to depend 
largely on the traditional financial sources of donors and multi-lateral financial institutions, at least 
for the near future. 
To overcome the above three basic challenges will require greater efficiency in the management of 
existing systems, financial viability, and increased capital expenditure (Sansom, 2002). Under 
these conditions, governments must consider what financial, technical and managerial resources 
should be brought to bear on the problem from the private as well as the public sector, and to 
consider how best to define an appropriate partnership between the two (Water Utility Partnership, 
2001). 
2.3 Common Institutional arrangements for water service delivery in Africa 
The common institutional arrangements for water service delivery in Africa are as shown in table 
2.2 below. Governments have over time been grappling with how to resolve the challenges of 
urban water services outlined in the previous section. Until the present time, historically provision of 
urban water services globally has been by public national or local public institutions. Provision of 
water and sanitation services is rightly seen as a responsibility of government (Franceys and 
Sansom, 1999) especially in recent years where governments have committed themselves to 
certain targets i.e. the MDGs. The proceeding sub-sections briefly describe key management 
models shown in Table 2.2. 
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Table 2-2: Institutional arrangements for service provision in Capital Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Institutional structure of Countries where this is predominant 
service provider 
Direct provision by Central Eritrea 
government 
Municipality South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia 
State owned Company Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, DRCongo, Madagascar, Lesotho, 
Swaziland, Mauritius, Tanzania, Kenya, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Sierra 
Leone, the Gambia, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Nigeria, Congo 
[Brazzaville], Liberia, Guinea Bissau, Guinea [Conakry], Sudan, Angola, 
Malawi, Mali, Central African Republic, Chad, Djibouti, the Gambia, 
Ethiopia, Botswana 
Public companies owned by Zambia, Kenya, 
municipality 
Private Sector participation Cote d'lvoire, Senegal, Niger, Gabon, Mozambique, Cape Verde, 
Source: Compiled by Author from various literature 
2.3.1 Central government involvement 
The state is slowly moving out of direct provision of water services in urban areas in Africa. From 
the literature review conducted, there is one country in Sub-Saharan Africa [Eritrea] where a 
government department is directly involved in the day-to-day provision of water and sanitation 
services in major urban areas, especially in the capital city. 
2.3.2 Municipal Operation 
A fully-fledged department of water and sewerage within the local authority is responsible for the 
provision of services [Le. Zimbabwe, Windhoek in Namibia, and in South Africa]. Employment and 
financial management policies are those of the municipality. All the revenue that is realised from 
water sales may be transferred to the central treasury of the municipality while expenditure has to 
be approved by a full council sitting. A council sitting usually comprises of elected representatives. 
Only Namibia and South Africa, which have reasonably good govemance systems, have their 
municipalities performing very well. 
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2.3.3 State owned operators 
As can be seen from the above table, provision of urban water services by state owned utilities is 
by far the most common institutional arrangement of service delivery in Sub-Saharan Africa. This 
affects approximately 230 million people who live in urban areas. 'State owned operators' are 
where either a government department or ministry establishes and owns a company. Such 
companies are usually established by special statues e.g. the NWSC act (Govemment of Uganda, 
2000) in Uganda addressing the special needs of such an operator. Usually the operator is given 
autonomy to raise and utilise all the revenues. While tariff setting is usually the responsibility of the 
operator, they would need to be approved by central government before implementation. On paper 
the state owned utilities are supposed to be run on a cost recovery basis; however they are in most 
cases subsidised by the State because they are not able to meet the cost of supplying the services 
due to either suppressed tariffs [Iow tariffs) or other factors (Water Utility Partnership, 2001). 
Another form of a state owned operator is one where either one municipality or a number of them 
come together and establish a water utility. The utility is given autonomy to operate as a 
commercial entity (Nickson, 1997). This is the case in Zambia and to some extent in Kenya. The 
characteristics are similar to those Companies established by the State. State-owned utilities may 
cover the whole country [Togo, Benin, and Uganda) or may be for a particular region [Tanzania, 
Malawi, Zambia) or for localized municipal areas [Kenya). 
Provision of urban water services in most of Africa is entrusted to the state-owned monopolies 
tasked with multiple, sometimes poorly defined and often conflicting, objectives with weak 
incentives for efficiency i.e. poor human resources policies, unclear financing guidelines etc. (Smith 
and Keri, 1996). Tariff poliCies, especially those related to subsidy structures, typically benefit only 
the more affluent in society who have piped connections, and even when tariffs are reasonable, 
collection has been weak (Foster, G6mez-Lobo and Halpern, 2000). Failure to cover costs through 
tariffs (Seppalla and Katko, 2003) leads to insufficient funds for investment, which is left to already 
over-burdened public budgets (Omar, Antonio and Romero, 1999). Within enterprises, sometimes 
management is appointed on the basis of political loyalty than competence, and excessive staff is 
often employed to benefit favoured groups (Green, 1992). The poorest suffer the most from these 
policies, since they lack access to any services at all, or must bear the high costs for lesser quality 
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of self-provision or supply from the informal sector such as water vendors or other - Non-State 
Providers (Sansom, 2006) 
In general, the state owned utilities have failed to provide consumers with adequate services, and 
their inability in the past to improve services has led governments to institute water sector reform 
programmes. 
2.3.4 Involvement of the private sector 
The private sector's involvement in state owned water companies is usually limited to specialized 
service areas i.e. maintenance works i.e. pipe laying, plumbing works, engineering designs etc, 
including service and management contracts. There are however a few countries in Africa where 
the private sector is engaged beyond management contracts and include Cote d'lvoire, Senegal, 
Niger, Gabon, Mozambique, Cape Verde and in two cities in South Africa. 
Engaging with the private sector could lead to possible increased financing in infrastructure 
investment, management and operation as well as access to private finance for investment (Smith 
and Kerf, 1996). If this was achieved, it would result in the reduction of government over-stretched 
budgets and generate government revenue (Nickson, 1997); According to Judith Rees (1998, p. 4) 
"private sector participation is widely perceived to be the solution to the failure of many state owned 
and managed water utilities to operate efficiently and rnake the investments required to meet 
community needs". However, there are no guarantees that private sector participation will actually 
yield the desired performance improvements. Overall levels of private investment in the African 
water sector have been generally much less than expected. 
2.4 Cause and effect of poor performance 
A number of reasons could be attributed to the poor performance of especially state owned utilities 
including poor sector policy and lack of regulatory framework which results in government 
interference in the operations of a utility (Smith and Kerf, 1996; Nickson, 1997). Any external 
negative forces in utility management lead to a general deterioration of operational efficiencies -i.e. 
high non revenue water, low cost recovery -Iow billing and collection ratio, constant breakdowns 
because of lack of routine maintenance, little or no consumer care, high number of illegal 
connections sometimes as a result of corrupt practices between low calibre of staff and consumers. 
Poor human resource policies leading to over-staffing [this can also be a result of government 
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interference in terms of promoting job creation], lowly qualified staff with low motivation to work. 
They do not have a clear vision of what they are there for (Baietti, Kingdom and Ginneken, 2006). 
The utility ends up with an unreliable budget because it is not able to finance most of its operations. 
The revenue from water sales is not sufficient to meet the operation and maintenance costs let 
alone depreciation (Seppalla, 2004). Usually this is because of suppressed tariff levels not able to 
meet the operational costs. 
Government may promise to provide some financial subvention but in reality this does not come. 
All this leads into lack of funds for upgrading systems, investing in new technologies and improving 
the general performance of the utility. In summary, due to low tariffs, poor commercial habits and 
inefficient production, many state owned utilities are virtually bankrupt and sector infrastructure is 
crumbling as there is no financing to rehabilitate them (Baietti, Kingdom and Ginneken, 2006). It 
must however be acknowledged that there are a number of state owned utilities in Africa which are 
performing reasonably well. These utilities have shown positive growth and have good 
performance indicators and include the NWSC in Uganda (Baietti, Kingdom and Ginneken, 2006), 
Water Utility Corporation of Botswana, WASA in Lesotho, Durban metro in South Africa [part of a 
Municipality] and ONEA of Burkina Faso . Most of these utilities have improved on their 
performance mainly as a result of either national institutional sector reforms or undertaking internal 
organisational reforms as was the case for NWSC in Uganda. 
While the research did not study the perfonmance of utilities it is necessary to detenmine at which 
stage a regulatory framework could assist. Substantial efforts have been undertaken in the past to 
improve the performance of state owned utilities through financial support for infrastructure 
investment, technical aSSistance, and covenants stipulating higher tariffs. In the absence of a 
change in the institutional framework and the incentive system, these efforts have met with little 
success (Saghir, Schiffler and Woldu, 2000). 
There is little prospect for improvement unless the water services sector engages in broad 
institutional reforms with the aim of increasing financial autonomy and providing greater 
transparency and accountability to their consumers (Water Utility Partnership, 2001). At least thirty 
seven countries in Africa recognized this need and embarked on reform programmes of varying 
degrees (World Bank, 2002). It is further agreed that in order to achieve the above, governments 
need to clearly define regulatory frameworks. Effective economic regulation of state owned utilities 
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can lead to more cost reflective tariffs, achieve commercial status and operate more efficiently 
(Groom, Halpern and Ehrhardt, 2006), while improving accountability and transparency in the 
sector. 
2.5 Effects of poor utility performance on the urban poor 
A large proportion of the urban population in most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa live in informal, 
settlements, which account for 40 to 70% of the population (UN Habitat, 2003; Kariuki and 
Schwartz, 2005). Often unplanned and sometimes illegal, these settlements share a common 
problem of inadequate access to basic services such as safe water and adequate sanitation. Poor 
environmental health and hygiene are chronic features of these settlements, contributing 
significantly to rising morbidity and mortality rates. 
While poverty may not be eradicated by merely increasing accessibility to water (Abrams, 1999), it 
nevertheless becomes one contributing factor and is an element in the strategies of poverty 
reduction, dealing with urban environmental problems and enhancing the productivity of cities and 
towns. 
A fully functioning and sustainable water utility is clearly key in any attempt to better serve the poor 
(Water and Sanitation Programme, 2002). Poor utility performance hurts the poor more than 
others because they are usually the first to be affected when service is rationed or if there is low 
water pressure. Studies have shown that the poor may pay up to ten more times than those that 
are connected (Collignon and Vezina, 2000; Foster, G6mez-Lobo and Halpern, 2000). This is 
despite the perception that the poor cannot pay for water. 
Any reform programme undertaken by any country should aim at benefiting the poor as well as 
other urban dwellers. Sometimes the poor are left out and end up accessing water which is at high 
cost but often of low quality. Indeed water utilities are best placed to provide cheaper, better quality 
and more convenient piped water supplies. The challenges of providing water and sanitation 
services to the urban poor relate to a number of issues including pricing, land tenure, allocation of 
scarce water resources and how to lay the necessary pipes in an area of high density housing. 
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2.6 Policy Framework 
Lack of a clear policy framework and a politicisation of management leads to ineffective oversight 
of the utility, which in turn contribute to poor utility performance (Foster, 1996). The diagram below 
shows the inter-relationships of issues leading to poor utility performance. 
sion Transmis 
mechanis ms 
Lack of policy 
framework 
1 
Politicisation of I 
Manaaement 
Lack of effective oversight 
Soft budget constraint 
Absence of efficiency incentives 
• Poor Low efficiency Low tariffs I I Poor quality I Inadequate 
accountabilitv investment 
Figure 2-1: Model of State owned Utility failure 
Source: (Foster, 1996) 
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What the above shows is the need for separation of roles and responsibilities and clearly defining 
them, as well as an adequate policy framework. Activities to be carried out in any urban water 
sector can be broadly divided into four roles (Water Utility Partnership, 2001) as shown below: 
.:. Policy making of water services provision and sector co-ordination -this is usually a central 
government function and covers the general direction pursued by government 
.:. Regulation -as will be explained later this has to do with tariff setting, protection of 
consumers, service quality, environmental and water quality . 
• :. Investments this includes planning, mobilising financial resources, new infrastructure 
.:. Actual provision of services [operations] including production, treatment, distribution of 
water services, billing and collection 
In a few countries in Africa investments is separated from actual provision and is usually done 
through asset holding companies otherwise for most African countries the utility is responsible for 
provision as well as investment planning. 
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Very few countries in Africa have a clear separation of roles as above. A case in pOint is 
Mozambique where provision of services in the five largest towns is entrusted to a private operator 
ADM through the investment authority or asset holding company, policy making function is with the 
central government through the National Directorate of Water [DNA], and all investment issues rest 
with a finance and investment authority [FIPAG] while regulation is with a statutory autonomous 
body -the water regulatory council [CRA] (Govemment of Mozambique, 199B). 
Many countries in Africa do not have national water policies. This is a critical handicap because 
policy is the basis for legislation, strategic planning and operational management (WHO/UNICEF, 
2000). Even when policies exist, they are often inadequate, not easily implementable and water 
legislation is in many cases poorly developed (African Development Bank, 2000). Usually there is 
no clear institutional responsibility for different sub-sectors of the water sector. This situation can 
only be improved by developing an appropriate institutional and legal framework. 
Government taking leadership does not need to be synonymous with the governrnent implementing 
the actual provision of services itself. Indeed, a policy has no value unless there is government 
willingness and commitment to develop and implement the required strategies (Seppalla, 2002). 
This emphasises the point that policy is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for successful 
sustainable reform. 
2.7 The case for reforms 
Introduction of economic regulatory institutions in the urban water sector has usually been part of 
or a result of water services institutional reforms. Reform entails a re-structuring of institutions and 
not just a technical matter of finding the best design solution and applying it (Batley, 2004). 
Reforms are usually undertaken with an aim of making the service providers more responsive to 
particular needs. As already stated above, most state owned utilities have not been able to deliver 
services to their consumers successfully let alone extend the services to the un-served. "Rapid 
urbanization has increased the demand for water while chronic under-investment and inadequate 
maintenance of systems, resulting in excessive water loss through leakage, poor water quality and 
unreliable flow, have made the situation worse" (Nickson, 1997). Poor performance against 
indicators such as high water losses, overstaffing or low cost recovery and under-investment may 
seem to be technical in nature, but they usually need to be resolved by examining the institutional 
framework. In the "Public Sector for New Zealand" Bale and Dale (1993) emphatically state that 
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"Public utilities are generally viewed as bloated, inefficient and poorly managed. They are further 
stated to be highly bureaucratic" (Bale and Dale, 1998). Inefficient public institutions need to be 
reformed to lead to more efficiently run institutions (Dysard, 1999). 
2.8 Economic regulation of water services 
Successful development of utility infrastructure - electricity, natural gas, telecommunications, and 
water - depends largely on the adoption of appropriate public policies and the effective 
implementation of these policies (Brown et aI., 2006). "Central to these policies is development of 
an economic regulatory framework that provides stability, protects consumers from the abuse of 
market power, guards consumers and operators against political opportunism, and provides 
incentives for service providers to operate efficiently and make the needed investments" (Jamison 
et aI., 2004). 
Economic regulation of the water services delivery has usually been confused with control, 
monitoring and even questions of ownership of water utilities. Sometimes insufficient distinction is 
made between economic regulation and other issues such as policy, ownership, governance and 
coordination. Governance in this case refers to the relationship between the owners, directors and 
managers and the rules, laws, policies, and customs that define this relationship. However the 
existence of effective utility regulation promotes good governance of the service provision itself. 
As stated in Chapter 1, economic regulation of water service provision may be defined as 'the rules 
and organisations that set, monitor, enforce and change the allowed tariffs and service standards 
for water providers' (Groom, Halpern and Ehrhardt, 2006). In seeking to understand the subject of 
economic regulation of urban water services further it is important to have another commonly used 
terminology of "regulatory framework". Essentially what are the interrelationships or linkages 
between these three key stakeholders [consumers, the state and the service providers] in the 
delivery of urban water services? The rules may be formal [laws, contracts, bye-laws, etc. ] and 
informal [personal commitments, financial incentives, reputation, etc.]. 
This would better be understood through an accountability framework as defined by the World 
Bank given below. The diagram below see fig 2-2 shows the interrelationships between the 
regulatory framework and the service providers, consumers and the state [government]. 
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Politicians Policy makers 
route of Accountability 
L-____ ----'-_____ .J Slhort route of accountability 
Figure 2-2: Accountability in infrastructure 
Source (Wortd Bank, 2003) 
The diagram above shows that there are four main actors in the service provision of water 
services. The arrows show accountability relationships. The state designs policies and legislation 
on how services are to be provided and how the consumers are to receive these services including 
the need to pay for them. The service providers charge clients or consumers a tariff which has to 
be approved by the regulator. The economic regulator is in the middle as he has to make sure that 
the tariff will help the utility to improve on its commercial viability while at the same time taking into 
account that the consumers do not pay for any inefficiencies of the service provider. The State 
designs the regulatory framework and establishes the regulator. The regulator also develops rules 
for application by the service provider that are consistent with government policies. Application of 
these rules is what defines economic regulation. Respect for the rules or following the rules is 
essentially about accountability. Making service providers accountable for what they are doing and 
ensuring that the consumers are also accountable for their actions i.e. payment or non-payment for 
services they receive. 
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The role of the regulator is to undertake the "subtle and perhaps difficult balancing acf' of these 
different stake holder interests (Franceys and Gerlach, 2008). Governments worldwide may deem it 
their responsibility to provide services, and regulate but these functions are better separated from 
government. Indeed water services are a public service and governments must ensure the services 
are provided for two good reasons; to protect the sector against market failure and also for quality 
concerns. Governments must provide the most appropriate framework for achieving the two 
objectives. 
As stated above, most of the urban water services in Sub-Saharan Africa are provided by state 
owned utilities. While much has been written about economic regulation of privately owned 
utilities, there are many research gaps in the economic regulation of state owned utilities (Vinnari, 
2006). The World Bank, for example, has published a review on the regulation of utility services 
and infrastructure (Vogelsang, 2002; Jamison et ai., 2005), has discussed price regulation of public 
utilities, and an emergent topic is the regulation of investments in public utilities (Hirshhausen, 
Beckers and Brenck, 2004; Holt, 2005). Much research has also been conducted on the issues 
concerning the privatization of water undertakings in England and Wales, such as conflicts 
between regulators and the regulated utilities (Nwankwo and Richardson, 1996), profitability of the 
utilities (Parker, 1997), effectiveness of the regulatory arrangements (Summerton, 1998), post-
privatization performance and regulatory risk (Parker, 2003), and efficiency requirements set by the 
regulator (Cubbin and Stern, 2005). There are also studies describing the inefficiencies caused by 
regulation (Mann, 1993), the need to reform the regulation of state-owned water and wastewater 
utilities (Tupper and Resende, 2004), and the state of post-privatization regulation of the water 
companies in Latin America (Bitran and Serra, 2001; Tavera, 2001; Lin, 2005). The World Bank 
has conducted numerous country studies and extensive research on private water services utility 
regulation with a focus on developing and transition countries, and developed guidelines for 
creating a successful regulatory environment in the sector (World Bank, 1997). The regulation of 
state owned undertakings has been addressed by, for example (Blokland, Braadbaart and 
Schwartz, 1999) and (Koks, 2003) who, using the Netherlands as an example, have made a case 
for the functionality and efficiency of state owned service providers. In all this the researcher could 
not find specific literature on the study of roles and institutional arrangements of economic 
regulation of urban water services in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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2.8.1 The limits of regulation 
It is important to note that economic regulation is not a panacea to the urban water sector problems 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. Expecting that ''better regulation" can solve most problems that exist in the 
urban water sector is ignoring the fact that there are clear limits to what a regulator can and cannot 
do. Regulation is not the answer to all problems. The urban water services sector has enormous 
problems as stated in chapter 1.5. An example of limitation of the regulator is a situation where 
there is high non-revenue water. The regulator can include explicit loss reduction targets in the 
allowed tariffs of service providers. The targets may be designed to create incentives to reduce 
illegal connections and improve collections. The regulatory action by itself, however, will 
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accomplish very little if the government is unwilling or unable to provide effective police and judicial 
backup to support the water service provider in cutting off service to individuals who are stealing 
water. In other words, regulation cannot accomplish very much if basic "law and order" are absent 
(Brown et aI., 2006). The definition of the roles and design of the institutional arrangements of a 
regulatory framework depends on the country's objectives and circumstances. What is important is 
whether existing local conditions are conducive enough to establish an economic regulator. The 
institutional arrangements that enable autonomous decision-making include organisational 
autonomy [organisationally separate from existing ministries and departments], financial autonomy 
[an earmarked, secure, and adequate source of funding], and management autonomy [autonomy 
over internal administration and protection from dismissal without due cause] (Brown et aI., 2006). 
Before establishing a utility regulatory agency on the above basis, it is necessary that a number of 
factors are taken into account. These factors may affect both the design and implementation of the 
regulatory framework. These can be divided into country governance factors, socio-economic 
factors and sectoral factors which government, the utility and indeed the regulator can work on. 
2.8.1.1 Country governance factors 
The country governance factors include: political stability, fragility of the country, respect for the 
rule of law and existence of a reasonable overall quality of country governance. According to 
Franceys (2008, p.34) "If the governance reality in any country can potentially be compromised 
such that autonomy of a regulator is more of a myth than reality it may be better to consider 
building capacity of a govemment department to undertake regulatory functions than put resources 
into an ineffective organisation. Barriers to successful establishment of a regulatory agency under 
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this category could include inability and unwillingness by government to support or hand over 
decision-making powers to a non-ministry and non-political agency, even if it is formally established 
by law (Brown et aI., 2006). The economic regulator should, be free to make decisions within the 
laws that established them without any prior approval from central govemment or indeed anyone 
(Ehrhardt et aI., 2007). A regulator must be free from short term political pressure and interference, 
in order to regulate effectively in accordance with broader govemment policy. 
Fragility levels of a country 
According to the World Bank classification system of state fragility (World Bank, 2004), Africa at the 
time had 20 Countries out of 30 [two thirds] listed as fragile states [See attached list in Appendix 
9]. The level of fragility is derived from the World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessments [CPIA]. The CPIA is a diagnostic tool that is intended to capture the quality of a 
country's policies and institutional arrangements i.e. its focus is on the key elements that are within 
the country's control [including delivery of public services, governance of institutions etc.], rather 
than on outcomes [such as growth rates] that are influenced by elements outside the country's 
control. More specifically, the CPIA measures the extent to which a country's policy and 
institutional framework supports sustainable growth and poverty reduction, and consequently the 
effective use of development assistance. This assessment is therefore useful in terms of provision 
of basic services such as water to the urban population in Africa. 
Fragile states are characterized by weak policy and institutional framework and their governance is 
very poor. On average there tends to be little regard for the law or institutions that they themselves 
may have established, especially regulatory institutions. Fragility is also an obstacle to the 
implementation of water sector reforms programmes which could normally lead to the 
establishment of regulatory institutions. 
Corruption and transparency levels in a country 
Linked to the fragility of country is the issue of corruption. In its simplest terms, corruption may be 
defined as the "abuse of public position for personal gain or for the benefit of an individual or group 
to whom one owes allegiance" (Parliamentary Centre of Canada, 2000). Corruption occurs when a 
public official accepts, solicits, or extorts a payment, or when private agents offer a payment to 
circumvent the law for competitive or personal advantage. 
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Corruption can reduce the effectiveness and efficiency of service delivery and often leads to 
inequity in service provision (Soh ail, 2006). Because corruption tends to siphon off some resources 
it means that the efficiency of service delivery is reduced as there are not sufficient funds for 
maintenance or rehabilitation of systems, the extension of service provision and no public 
confidence in the service provider. In most instances the poor suffer the most from corrupt 
practices. 
All the 20 Sub-Saharan African countries considered to be fragile in the CPIA were among the 
worst in terms of corruption according to the Corruption Perception Index of 2007 (Transparency 
International, 2007). They all scored less than 3 in a 10 scale corruption Perception Index [CPI] 
with Chad being perceived to be the most corrupt country in the world. Unfortunately the 20 are 
among the poorest countries in the world as well, except for Angola and Nigeria. 
2.8.1.2 Socio-economic factors 
These are factors which may be external to the water sector and may include the high percentage 
of the urban population living in informal settlements; high poverty levels; high urbanisation rates 
and the structure of housing in the informal settlements. Others include economic situation, 
including any possible macro-economic crises [or fears of rapid inflation, currency devaluation] and 
their aftermath (Brown et aI., 2006). These factors could impact on the design and orientation of 
the regulatory framework. 
High poverty levels 
It is estimated that Africa is home to one third of the world's poorest population (World Bank, 2006) 
and this ratio is expected to increase to half by 2025. This high proportion of the poor in Africa 
makes the service delivery institutions vulnerable economically and brings its own challenges to 
regulation. One major challenge is to strike a balance between economic tariffs and tariffs that do 
not hurt the urban poor. And this is only for those poor people that access their water directly from 
the service provider. 
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Economic situation in Sub-Saharan Africa 
While there was sustained economic growth in most Sub-Saharan Africa in recent years until the 
end of 2008 when there was a global economic crisis, the countries continue to face a perennial 
shortage of resources to finance public investments, especially infrastructure including water 
services, and government institutions. This limits the funding available for regulation. 
2.8.1.3 Sectoral related factors 
Sectoral related factors are those which affect regulation but the government, the regulator and the 
utilities can work together to mitigate them. These factors include capacity of government to make 
water policies and willingness to ensure that water service providers move to full cost recovery in 
the short to medium term; poor performance of public utilities with little or no incentives to improve 
on key performance indicators; limited availability of regulatory resources including financial and 
specialised and experienced staff such as economists, lawyers, engineers and accountants; and 
lack of trust from consumers that their interests will be ignored to favour the government created 
utilities and also to provide large profits to private investors [particularly when private foreign 
investors are significantly involved]. 
2.8.2 The roles of economic regulation in urban water services delivery 
It was during the early 90s that the impetus for establishment of economic regulatory institutions in 
Sub-Saharan Africa was delivered essentially through the wind of institutional reforms that at the 
time concentrated on involving the private sector (Franceys and Gerlach, 2008). The primary role 
of an economic regulator should be to ensure that utilities operate efficiently, achieve commercial 
viability and provide water services in a sustainable manner. This can be achieved through 
approval of economically viable tariffs. (Franceys and Gerlach, 2008). Another role of economic 
regulation of water services is to protect consumers from the effects of monopolistic behaviour of 
the service providers (Groom, Halpern and Ehrhardt, 2006), poor quality of services and cartel 
behaviour (Smith, 1997; Brown et aI., 2006). While the objective of economic regulation in 
developed economies seeks to curb the profit margins of utilities, the reality in Africa is to ensure 
that tariffs are at appropriate levels, high enough to meet the cost of service but at the same time 
affordable by the consumers (Brown et aI., 2006). 
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The distribution of water services are natural monopolies (Cowan, 1997; Lorrain, 1997; Beecher, 
1999; Harris, 2003; Groom, Halpern and Ehrhardt, 2006; 2006). Unlike telecommunication, gas 
and electriCity there are no immediate prospects of widespread competition in the water sector 
apart from small infonnal providers. Another possible competition is that of entry into the industry 
by the Private sector (Haanneyer and Mody, 1998). 
Since utilities are natural monopolies they can charge higher prices than it actually costs them to 
produce. This could lead to providers taking advantage of the monopoly situation to make high 
profits at the expense of consumers. Because of these special characteristics of water and 
wastewater services production, the utilities rarely engage in competition, and some claim that at 
the moment there are no successful models of competition in the sector (Ballance and Taylor, 
2005). Thus, social and economic regulations are considered necessary to ensure fair treatment of 
customers who lack the protection that cornes with competition (Kessides, 2004). For mainly Sub-
Saharan African water utilities - the majority of which are owned by the state, providers might also 
take advantage of the consumers and charge high tariffs to dissipate the inefficiencies [such as low 
labour productivity or corruption). Or they may charge low prices for a poor service, when 
consumers would prefer a good quality service, perhaps due to a lack of 'willingness to charge' by 
politicians. This is very common in many Sub-Saharan African utilities. 
Other roles of economic regulation include: 
• Promoting economic efficiency of utilities (Smith, 1997) 
• Determining [or advising policymakers on) appropriate service standards. (Brook-Cowen, 
2003) 
• Monitoring utility performance and contractual compliance. (Smith, 1997) 
In the absence of a competitive market, there are considerable concerns about the tendency of 
monopoly service providers to deliver services of low quality with high prices to customers. Natural 
monopolies should be constrained by rules covering areas such as quality, pricing and access 
(Swift, 1997) thereby protecting consumers. Richard Green (1999) agrees with Warick Smith 
(1997) that "one of the major tasks for a utility regulator is to ensure that customers are protected 
from exploitation by a monopoly supplier". This generally means the regulator has the right to set 
limits on the supplier's prices or profits.(Green, 1999). Key to the successful implementation and 
enforcement of rules is an effective regulatory system, which ideally requires the establishment of 
an independent regulator (Smith, 1997). 
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Economic regulation of utilities is further complicated by three related considerations (Berg Sanford 
V., 2001). First, prices for utility services are usually political. Raising utility prices could lead to loss 
of the electorates' votes, and history is replete with examples of justifiable price increases being 
withheld at the expense of investors and the long-term interests of consumers (Menard and Clarke, 
1999). Secondly investors are aware of these pressures and of the vulnerability of their usually 
large, long-term and immobile investments. Third, the long-term nature of most infrastructure 
investments makes creating credible commitments difficult. Highly specific rules, if considered 
sustainable, can provide assurance to investors and lower the cost of capital. 
2.8.2.1 Approving of tariffs that ensure commercial viability of utilities 
This is an important role especially for utilities in Sub-Saharan Africa where tariffs remain low in 
most cases. Despite the prospect of some competition being introduced into the water sector, the 
need for regulation of prices and service performance remains. The appropriate pricing of services 
has been a key concern for water sector reform (Mwanza, 2005), and a trade-off needs to be made 
between the principle of ensuring cost recovery for the service provider and providing services to 
as many customers as possible at an affordable rate. 
Africa may not be ready to develop regulatory mechanisms such as rate-of-return or price-cap 
regulation, used to determine the allowed level of charges (Water Utility Partnership, 2001). It may 
be more appropriate to consider incentive based economic regulation as a way of minimising the 
monopoly abuses and ensuring that consumers do not pay high tariffs to meet the costs of 
inefficiency of a service provider (Franceys and Gerlach, 2008). 
In addition to setting the appropriate level of tariffs, regulators may also influence the appropriate 
structure of individual tariffs. Here, decisions relate to environmental and social objectives. In 
particular, tariff structures are developed which allow for low-income customers to pay 
proportionately less than better-off customers. A tariff structure can also be used as a means of 
ensuring that customers use water in an efficient manner (Kauffman, 1999). This is done by 
increasing the cost per unit of water above a specific threshold, so that larger, perhaps richer, 
consumers of water pay more, assuming water meters are in operation. 
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2.8.2.2 Protecting consumers 
According to Franceys (2008, p.21) "Economic regulation should aim at ensuring that consumers 
are protected against paying high prices to an inefficient and monopoly service provider". The aim 
of this is to protect consumers from monopolistic behaviours of network industries. The 
monopolistic behaviour could result into exploitation of consumers as they would have no choice of 
altemative providers. For many Sub-Saharan African countries where the tariffs are rather low, the 
exploitation is through consumers paying for inefficient and very poor services. The economic 
regulator should therefore protect consumers against these two vices. 
2.8.2.3 Monitoring and enforcement of standards of performance 
In order to ensure that service providers perform well, economic regulators are expected to 
develop or select key performance indicators which can form the basis of targets to be achieved. 
This can also enable bench marking of utilities, as a means of promoting some form of comparison, 
competition and learning lessons from other utilities. 
2.8.2.4 Knowledge base on water services 
Economic regulators generally have a broad overview of the urban water services in any country. 
They collect a lot of performance information which should be made available to stake holders and 
govemments. In this respect the economic regulator should be able to provide advisory services to 
governments, municipalities and any other interested parties. Regulators could also undertake 
studies on utility operations (GTZ, 2003). 
2.8.2.5 Regulating for the benefit of the poor and the unserved 
Africa is home to more than 30% of the world's poor (World Bank, 2006). Regulatory institutions 
cannot therefore ignore this reality in which they find themselves. One concern however for 
regulatory institutions is that they usually regulate the main operator who only serve those with 
network connection in a way that overlooks the needs of the poor (Water and Sanitation 
Programme, 2002). Yet widespread poverty normally pushes social objectives higher onto the 
political agenda. This should further result in the issues of services to the urban poor being higher 
on the regulatory agenda (Franceys and Gerlach, 2008).The current approach to quality regulation 
of infrastructure services in developing countries is often too rigid, to the extent that it focuses on 
the quality of the services provided to those who are already connected to the network and those 
who have higher expectations in relation to quality (Brook-Cowen, 2003). Regulators should be 
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equipped with capacity to deal with or have an interest in the poor (Baker, 2000). There are a 
number of ways by which this can be achieved. It has to be recognised in the first instance that the 
main sources of water services for the poor are usually small scale providers, NGOs and CBOs 
generally the NSPs [Non-State Providers]. The regulation of formal utility water services lends itself 
to more comprehensive and independent regulation because service levels and costs are relatively 
easy to measure (Sansom, 2006). This therefore is the first challenge of regulation of services that 
would benefit the poor. 
The scope of the regulator should be defined in the legislation to include both the main operator 
and alternative service providers. However regulation of smaller NSPs such as informal private 
providers and community groups in the water sector, presents challenges due to their small scale, 
informal characteristics and numerousness. NSPs such as water vendors often charge high water 
prices, so it is tempting for government agencies to try and regulate their prices [economic 
regulation] (Sansom, 2006). Economic regulation of smaller informal NSPs is unlikely to be an 
efficient use of resources because of their large numbers. 
In order to benefit the poor, regulatory frameworks should increase access to water and sanitation 
services and improves the availability, affordability, and sustainability of these services. In order to 
achieve this the regulatory framework should have the following objectives (T remolet and Hunt, 
2006): 
• Provide a framework for competition so that a wide range of service solutions are possible 
and able to compete within a level playing field. 
• Create incentives [or obligations] for the dominant operators to extend services. 
• Allow a flexible approach to service quality in order to give incentives to service providers for 
experimentation while respecting basic quality requirements. 
• Establish a tariff level and structure that encourages higher access to services without 
jeopardizing financial stability. 
• Establish a framework to deal with the needs of all customers. 
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Regulating non-state providers 
Another challenge in dealing with services to the urban poor and the un-served is how to regulate 
the numerous non-state providers who are meeting the huge accessibility gap. There is general 
consensus that economic regulation should encompass both the formal utilities and Ihe non-state 
providers or alternative service providers (Kayaga, 2004; Franceys and Gerlach, 2008). One 
possible way is to allow for competition practices which are evident in small-scale relail activities in 
some African countries, particularly in low-income urban areas, to prevail (Sansom, 2006). 
According to Collignon (2000), studies of water supply services in Ethiopia, Mali, Nigeria and 
Senegal suggest that private entrepreneurs, responding to local conditions and competing for 
market niches, provide a range of water and sanitation services, and compete actively with each 
other for market share in the locality. For example, small-scale operators that own or manage 
water points, 'kiosks', latrines, pipelines, storage tanks and filters, are thought to provide more than 
half of the supplies in Nairobi, Kenya, and a third of supplies in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (Collignon 
and Vezina, 2000). Regulation can provide an opportunity for competition for these non-state 
providers. 
According to the WUP (2001), regulatory agencies may wish to consider being more proactive in 
this area, notably by legalising reselling arrangements in regions where the national or local 
public/private operators are not yet able to reach. 
Regulation of state owned utilities 
While regulation tends to be considered synonymous with Private Sector Participation (PSP) 
(Rees, 199B; Guillermo, 2003) the regulatory roles listed above should also be undertaken when 
services are provided by a public body (Werchota, 2003). In the past, the identified failures of state 
owned utilities to provide adequate services have related to the failure of government departments 
to instigate appropriate regulatory mechanisms to ensure that standards are met (Water Utility 
Partnership, 2001). What would help in such circumstances would be the setting of performance 
targets for public operators, thereby encouraging them to deliver services of a particular quality to a 
wider number of customers in a more efficient manner. However the targets must be achievable 
and agreed with the regulated utilities. This further justifies the need for autonomous regulation of 
public utility service providers as well. While the type of regulatory organisation varies by country, 
the roles of the regulatory bodies tend to be very similar. 
31 
2.8.3 Institutional arrangements for undertaking the regulatory roles 
As stated earlier, economic regulation in the water sector is meant to put legal limits on water 
service providers to control monopoly power. In theory core regulatory roles should include setting, 
monitoring, enforcing, and changing the maximum tariffs that water providers are allowed and the 
service standards that they are required to provide (Groom, Halpem and Ehrhardt, 2006). However 
utility tariffs in many African countries are still very low. The challenge of the regulator is to 
increase tariffs in conjunction with service improvements, bearing in mind the changing willingness 
to pay for utility services. 
While appreciating the fact that economic regulation can be undertaken through different possible 
institutional arrangements there seems to be general agreement in literature that the more 
appropriate institutional arrangement is to have a non-government, non-political regulatory agency 
subject to the local political and socio-economic conditions (Brown et aI., 2006; Ehrhardt et aI., 
2007; Franceys and Gerlach, 2008). 
Apart from the political and socio-economic factors stated above, the design of the institutional 
arrangements is affected by other influencing factors related to the legal traditions that exist in the 
different countries. Countries in continental Europe [Le France, Spain] and their former colonies-
mainly in West Africa -follow the civil law while the United States and the United Kingdom and their 
former colonies tend to use the common law (Groom, Halpern and Ehrhardt, 2006). These different 
traditions give rise to two distinct forms of institutional arrangements for undertaking regulatory 
roles. In the case of civil law, as has evolved in the French system a model of private participation 
contracts operates under a specialised administrative law while the common law or the Anglo-
American model follows a tradition of independent regulatory framework that exercise discretion in 
the public interest. 
It is important to have a proper institutional design for undertaking regulatory roles. This is in order 
to provide confidence to investors and customers that the regulatory process is credible, legitimate, 
and predictable (Jamison and Berg, 2008). Regulation is credible if stakeholders can trust that 
commitments will be kept. Legitimacy means that the regulator is not captured or controlled by the 
operator or other special interests. Regulation is predictable if regulatory decisions are consistent 
over time so that stake holders are able to anticipate how the regulator will resolve issues (Better 
Regulation Task Force, 1997; Jamison et aI., 2004). Three main elements of institutional design 
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are [lJ the regulatory mechanism, [2J the existence of an independent, economically autonomous, 
well-funded and technically qualified regulatory agency, and [3J accountability mechanisms to 
prevent favouritisms (Foster, 1996). 
While regulation can be or has been undertaken by govemment departments, a number of authors 
advocate for establishment of autonomous regulatory agencies (Smith, 1997; Brown et al., 2006; 
Groom, Halpern and Ehrhardt, 2006). Autonomy in this respect should consist of an arm's length 
relationship with regulated firms, consumers, political authorities, and other private interests. 
Another element is that the there should be attributes of financial autonomy - such as earmarked 
funding and exemption from restrictive civil service salary rules -necessary to foster the requisite 
expertise and to underpin those arm's-length relationships. 
Regulatory agencies are held accountable by having transparency in the processes and through 
appeal processes. Commissioners or directors should be in non-political positions. Any design of 
institutional arrangement for the provision of urban water services should have an autonomous 
technical and economic regulator incorporated. A regulator can play multiple roles: reduce the 
chance of political capture, promote efficiency and guard against mismanagement of the water 
utility (Blokland, Braadbaart and Schwartz, 1999). 
2.8.3.1 Sector regulatory options 
In deciding which type of regulatory institution to design it is important to note that utility Regulatory 
agencies can be any of the different types (Jamison et aI., 2004) including multi-sectoral, industry 
specific and sector wide. 
There is no clear agreement in literature as to whether multi-sector or single sector regulatory 
agency is a better arrangement (Brown et aI., 2006). The type of regulatory body depends on a 
number of factors including the size of the industries, availability of human resources, political risks, 
imperfection of decision making process, coordination capacities and the relevance of industry 
boundary problems (Groom, Halpern and Ehrhardt, 2006). Regional [within the countryJ regulatory 
agencies exist in some countries where legal traditions or a desire to be close to local conditions 
makes regional bodies desirable. Regulatory agencies are administrative regulatory bodies that act 
on behalf of the government to prevent market failure. Basically regulatory agencies implement 
policies set by government but do not design policies because that is the function of governments 
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(Werchota, 2003). A brief description of each type of regulatory agency including the benefits of 
each one is given below 
2.8.3.2 Multi-sector regulation 
There are agencies that regulate more than one sector, such as water and electricity. This tends to 
be more evident in countries with smaller populations. Making an agency responsible for more than 
one industry offers several potential advantages including: 
• Sharing resources - Financial and human resources i.e. economists, administrative staff, 
financial vanalysts, in order to reduce costs and achieve some economies of scale. 
• Facilitating learning across industries - all utility industries have unique features, but the 
main issues in their economic regulation are substantially the same: administering tariff 
adjustment rules, managing the introduction of competition into traditionally monopolistic 
industries and managing relationships with stakeholders. 
• Reducing the risk of industry capture - a key challenge in utility regulation is to guard against 
the agency's capture by the regulated industry. The broader responsibilities of a multi-
industry agency help to reduce this risk. 
• Reducing the risk of political capture - agencies intended to operate at arm's length from 
political authorities remain vulnerable to interference from them. Placing responsibility for 
several industries in one agency may make it a less attractive prize for political authorities 
• Reducing the risk of economic distortions - many issues such as the valuation of capital and 
the treatment of inflation, are common to all industries. Inconsistent approaches to these 
issues in competing industries can create economic distortions hence having a single agency 
makes it easier to adopt consistent approaches. 
• Dealing with blurred industry boundaries - traditional boundaries between utility industries 
are rapidly blurring especially with service providers merging i.e. water and power utilities 
can potentially merge in view of a number of common issues. Such developments can pose 
important regulatory challenges (Karnitis, 2004). 
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2.8.3.3 Industry specific regulators 
Industry specific regulators are strong in their quest for specialised services. This also negates the 
placing of responsibility for regulation of several industries under one agency which may be 
tantamount to "putting all your eggs in one basket' - the regulatory agency's failure would have 
costs for all industries. Having a number of agencies allows experimentation with different 
approaches. One of the main benefits of sector-specific regulation is the opportunity to focus on 
water issues only and ensuring that trade-offs across sectors are not made (Water Utility 
Partnership, 2001). Water-only regulatory agencies would also have the advantage of being 
resourced with individuals who have an in-depth knowledge of the sector (Werchota, 2003). This 
in-depth knowledge is particularly important when dealing with the range of alternative providers 
and consumer coping strategies of households in informal settlements. There is need for personnel 
with suitable skills and knowledge especially in African countries. 
One weakness of a single sector regulatory body is that it is usually small and would be vulnerable 
and weaker financially and also not being able to attract and retain good specialists. Another 
weakness is a possibility of staff in a single sector regulatory body in a developing country 
[especially a small country] to be made up of more politically and seemingly socially responsible 
and professionally skilled people than when human resources are distributed across a number of 
sectoral regulators. Another weakness is that single sector regulatory bodies are more vulnerable 
to regulatory sector capture 
2.8.4 Regulation and policy making should not be mixed 
It is generally agreed that regulation would be better achieved by separating the responsibility for 
policy development and regulation (Foster, 1996; Groom, Halpern and Ehrhardt, 2006). These two 
important roles should not be mixed (African Development Sank, 2000). The two roles should be 
undertaken separately with central government undertaking the policy making function and the 
regulation by an autonomous body. 
The Director General of water services in England in his review of utility regulation noted 'that the 
autonomy of economic regulation should not be in question let alone compromised" (Director 
General of Water Services., 1997). Autonomy of the regulatory framework tends to strengthen the 
argument for separation of regulation from policy-making (Srook-Cowen, 2003). While economic 
regulators are not immune from the political pressures that governments face, they are better able 
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to cope with them while retaining the focus on the longer term issues if separated from policy-
making roles (Director General of Water Services., 1997). 
Ofwat has been able to develop processes and procedures to achieve more transparent and open 
decision-making, involving consultation and public debate on the key decisions, in a way that is not 
always possible for govemment departments. Much more information is now publicly available 
about the water industry and the issues it faces. 
Based on these considerations, there is general consensus that government should retain 
responsibility for broad sector policy, including public investment, private sector participation, 
sector restructuring, taxation, subsidies, intergovernmental relations and the legislative framework 
(Groom, Halpern and Ehrhardt, 2006). Actual economic regulation issues should be given to a 
separate body. 
2.8.5 Regulatory principles for the Water Sector 
Success of any regulatory framework can be measured against some regulatory principles as 
outlined below (Better Regulation Task Force, 1997). These principles could be used to evaluate 
the potential effectiveness of any regulatory framework - whether an autonomous regulatory 
agency or not. 
Proportionality: this relates to the level of intervention by the regulator in relation to the risk posed 
and the level of costs anticipated to be incurred (Better Regulation Task Force, 1997). In other 
words the regulatory intervention should be just sufficient to remedy the problem being addressed 
and should be undertaken only if the likely benefits outweigh the expected economic and social 
costs (Brown et aI., 2006). The regulator should consider an educational rather than a punitive 
approach. 
Accountability: this principle promotes the need for utility regulators themselves to be able to 
justify their decisions (Better Regulation Task Force, 1997). This principle can be measured by 
determining on whether the regulated entities are clear on why certain regulatory decisions are 
made and whether there are any clear procedures for appeal. Accountability is about participation 
so another measure is on how the consumers are involved in the regulatory framework. The 
regulator should also have clear lines of responsibility or reporting mechanisms with oversight 
36 
performance reviews (Brown et aI., 2006). There should be clear reporting and audit requirements 
on the regulatory agency. 
Consistency; there should be consistency in the way the regulatory rules are applied across the 
country and also over time -based on the common law principle of precedence (Brown et aI., 2006) 
. This calls for the application of the rules and regulations in a fair way and helps in ensuring that 
regulations are predictable -there should be no surprises. 
Transparency; this is one of the key ingredients for success of a regulatory framework and hinges 
on effective communication. Transparency of the regulatory framework should be measured in 
terms of how clear the objectives of regulation are made to the regulated industries as well as the 
public, availability of all the regulatory decisions in the public domain and consultations with the 
regulated industries on major policy changes. There should be open and meaningful opportunity for 
public participation in the regulatory process (Brown et aI., 2006). Regulations should be clear and 
simple (Better Regulation Task Force, 1997) without any ambiguity. 
2.9 Lessons from economic regulators outside Africa 
This section presents lessons from intemational regulatory frameworks selected from four 
countries that have established autonomous regulatory agencies outside Africa. The four 
regulators were selected either because of similarity of socio-political contexts i.e. Jamaica; from a 
developing country i.e. Indonesia or from one that has been well documented - the water sector 
regulatory framework in England and Wales. Latvia was selected to highlight the reasons they 
selected a multi-sectoral regulatory approach. 
Tables 2-3 and 2-4 show a summary of the roles and institutional arrangements from these four 
regulators. Further lessons can be learnt from these two tables. 
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2.9.1 The Jamaican Water Sector regulatory framework 
Economic regulation of water services in Jamaica is undertaken by the Office of Utilities Regulation 
[OUR]. The urban water services in Jamaica are provided by a state owned company the National 
Water Commission. The OUR was established as a statutory multi·sectoral regulatory body by an 
Act of Parliament in 1995 (Govemment of Jamaica., 1995). The main objective of the regulator was 
to create an environment for the efficient delivery of utility services to the customers whilst ensuring 
that service providers have the opportunity to make a reasonable return on investment. The main 
roles of the OUR include establishing and maintaining transparent, consistent and objective rules 
for the regulation of utility service providers, promoting the long term, efficient provision of utility 
services for national development consistent with government policy, providing an avenue of 
appeal for consumers in their relationship with the utility service providers and working with other 
related agencies in the promotion of a sustainable environment. 
The main lesson from this regulatory framework is related to the institutional arrangements of the 
OUR. Economic regulation in Jamaica is entrusted in the hands of the Director General appOinted 
by the Governor. There is no Board or Council. While this one tier organisational structure is 
working in Jamaica, there is no clear indication that this can easily work in Africa. As has been 
mentioned before about 20 Countries in Africa are fragile states where the respect for the law is 
very low. Jamaica is certainly not a fragile state and its Corruption Perception Index is much higher 
than most African countries at 3.7 (Lambsdorff, 2007). Only four countries in Africa had a higher 
CPI in 2006 than Jamaica i.e South Africa, Botswana, Tunisia and Namibia. 
The second lesson from this regulatory framework is the basis for selecting multi·sectoral 
arrangement. Though its economy is much larger than an average African country measured by 
the Gross National Income per capita [for Jamaica it is US$2,900 while the average GNI per capita 
for Sub·Saharan Africa is US$600] it seemed justifiable to establish a multi-sectoral regulatory 
agency to shield the regulator from industry capture. The size of the consumer base rather than the 
size of the economy was yet another factor in the government deciding to go for a multi·sectoral 
regulatory agency. A number of Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have small consumer base and 
are geographically smaller. When this is combined with a small economy, it strengthens the 
argument for establishing a multi·sector regulatory agency. 
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2.9.2 The Utility regulatory framework in Latvia 
The government of Latvia weighed the advantages of a multi-sector regulator against those of a 
single sector regulator and found it more advantageous to have a multi-sector regulator. Water 
services in Lativia are provided by the municipalities. Other regulated industries include 
telecommunication, electricity, transport etc. 
One key lesson from Latvia is that a unified regulatory system provides an opportunity to develop a 
single regulatory strategy, with uniform requirements for information required from the service 
providers. This also means that instead of having each sector making public consultations these 
can be done as a unified activity (Kamitis, 2004). This in turn leads to having a uniform approach 
to the issuance of operating licences, tariff setting and dispute resolution. 
The Latvian government found that the unified regulation framework is more competent [taking 
advantage of mixed skills of personnel] and cheaper [a particular and strong advantage for small 
countries with small economies]. The resulting concentration of knowledge and competence in 
multi-sectoral regulators brings about a higher quality of regulation which takes into account 
sectoral similarities. Latvia found that the multi-sector regulatory model created an advantage by 
concentrating human resources and expertise in one institution, especially in such a small country. 
The second lesson is related to the reporting mechanism of the regulator. The PUG reports to 
Parliament [Saeima], though for purposes of supervision, communication with Parliament i.e. for 
presentation of any drafts of laws the PUG reports to the Ministry of Economy. Efforts are even 
being made for a possibility of adopting a PUG's full legal autonomy to be provided for in the 
constitution in order to strengthen its independency level and also to achieve full, formal autonomy 
of the PUG from the government administration. This high level of reporting mechanism was 
achieved because of it being a multi-sector regulator and no sectoral Ministry could claim it. 
The concentration of economists and lawyers unified for all sector divisions of the PUG has shown 
positive results in solving many problems that are common to all sectors [market analysis, tariff 
methodology, legal substantiation of decisions, representation in legal proceedings, etc.] (Karnitis, 
2004). This level of performance cannot easily be achieved by the distribution of specialists in 
sectoral regulators. 
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2.9.3 The regulatory framework in Jakarta, Indonesia 
Water services in Jakarta are supplied through two private operators that entered into a concession 
contract with government. The regulator was only introduced in a predominately advisory role with 
regard to tariff setting (Gerlach and Anwar, 2008), after the concessions had already been signed. 
Reasons for seeking to establish a regulatory board, apart from the fact that it was provided for in 
the two concession contracts, were the perceived risks hampering the effective operation of 
Jakarta's waterworks. The first issue that was perceived to be addressed by the regulatory body 
was to reduce the potential abuse of market power/monopoly which is commonly the reason for 
introducing a regulatory framework in the water sector (Nickson and Iwanami, 2008). The second 
reason was a way of reducing the impact of political power and corruption which had become quite 
evident in the country at the time and thirdly, less access to piped water for the poor. 
The involvement of the private sector in the provision of water services in Jakarta was believed as 
a promising solution for water problems (Kessides, 2004) and as a necessity to fulfil the need of 
large investments for water infrastructure (Lee and Floris, 2003). The private sector was 
considered to have better managerial efficiency, stronger financial capacity, and better experiences 
and technological capacity to solve the problems of water supply to Jakarta. It has become evident 
in Jakarta, however, that these assumptions were not realised, and problems continued despite 
more than a decade after privatization (Kurniasih, 2008). The involvement of the private sector 
instead exposed it to many risks - such as abuse of market power, corruption, and less access for 
the poor. 
The lesson here is that of a need to have a clear institutional and regulatory framework for urban 
water service provision before engaging with the private sector. The Jakarta concessions have 
demonstrated the risks of relying on political support rather than a clear regulatory framework 
(Jensen, 2005). 
The Jakarta contracts were intended to raise investment and to increase efficiency by bringing in 
the private sector, but the local political economy and ad hoc regulatory framework generated the 
opposite results, discouraging investment and providing weak incentives for efficiency (Jensen, 
2005). The key emerging recommendations are for a clearly specified contract based on a sound 
regulatory framework, competitive tendering and the creation of an autonomous regulator. 
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It is necessary to ensure that the regulator has powers to set and approve tariffs for water services, 
not just be an advisory body. The Jakarta Water Services Regulatory Board [JWSRB] has no 
decision making powers regarding tariff selling and approval which puts it in a rather weak position. 
Yet tariff selling is seen to be one of the key and important role of any economic regulator in the 
urban water sector (Nickson and Iwanami, 2008) especially if it is to push for efficiency and 
economy of utilities. 
2.9.4 The water services regulatory framework in England and Wales 
The water industry in England and Wales operates under a strong regulatory framework covering 
three aspects. The water quality is regulated by the Drinking Water Inspectorate while wastewater 
discharged into rivers or any other type of water bodies is regulated by the Environment Agency. 
Economic regulation of water services including quality of service provision is undertaken by the 
Water Services Regulation Authority [usually known as the OFWAT]. The economic regulatory 
framework is clearly spelt out in the Water Act 2003 (Acts of Parliament, 2003). 
The main role of the Water Services Regulation Authority is to protect consumers, promote value 
for money and safeguard the future in terms of beller services (OFWAT, 2008). Another role is to 
ensure that water companies can finance their operations [they must be commercially viable] and 
be able to meet both their operating and capital costs efficiently. Since establishment the regulatory 
roles were vested in the Director General of Water Services. This framework however changed 
with effect from 1 sI April 2006 when a Board rather than a Director General was appointed by 
government. The Board is appointed by the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs. Non-executive members of the board are appointed for periods of up to 5 years and may 
be re-appointed for a further maximum of 5 years. OFWAT is financed through a license fee set at 
approximately 0.15% of the turnover of the service provider (OFWAT, 2008).The key lessons from 
the regulatory framework in England and Wales include the following: 
Promotion of transparency and accountability in utility operations: The Water Services Regulation 
Authority makes available to the public all information that is required by consumers to have a clear 
understanding of the roles of a regulator and operations of the companies. The guaranteed 
standard of service scheme set by government is one very good example of how a regulator can 
help consumers make a water company be accountable for its actions. 
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Incentives are given to better and more efficient companies making comparative regulation easier. 
African utility regulators may wish to exploit this emerging method of performance improvement. A 
number of initiatives on the continent have aimed at making the utilities efficient by using a 
benchmarking approach. 
The other lesson is that of involvement of an institutionalised framework of consumer involvement. 
As part of the regulatory process the government established 10 regional customer service 
committees [CSCs], under the direct control of Ofwat, basically to give customers a voice in the 
provision of services on one hand and regulation on the other. This was later changed with the 
establishment of the Consumer Council of Water [CCW]. The CCW which was established in 2005 
as the industry watchdog, set up to represent customers of water and sewerage companies in 
England and Wales (Acts of Parliament, 2003). The main priorities of the CCW include: 
1. Ensuring that customers are charged a fair and affordable price for water services 
2. Ensuring that problems are sorted out quickly without hassle as provided for in the 
guaranteed standards of service 
3. A safe, secure, reliable supply of water used wisely is available all the time 
4. Safe removal of sewage, preventing sewer flooding and reduction in persistent smells from 
sewage treatment works; 
The table below gives roles of economic regulation from the four regulators. Apart from the 
generally accepted roles i.e. consumer protection, tariff approval, monitoring performance of 
utilities, Africa could also adapt some of the roles. These roles could include desire for the 
economic regulator to promote long term, efficient provision of utility services for national 
development consistent with government's policy, promoting effective competition, and facilitate 
the establishment of consumer conSUltative mechanisms. 
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-Table 2-3: Lessons learnt: Roles of economic regulation of water services outside Africa 
Role Jamaica Jakarta-Indonesia Latvia England and Wales 
1 Protection of Protect the interests of Protect the interest of the Protect the interests of users and Protect the interests of 
consumers consumers in relation to the consumers through promote the development of consumers, 
supply of a prescribed utility establishment of key providers of state owned utilities; 
service; performance indicators 
2 Promoting Promote the long term, stimulate efficiency and sustainable Promote economy and 
efficiency efficient provision of utility development of state owned utilities efficiency by companies 
services 
3 Promoting Provide an avenue of appeal Establishment of consumer Receive rights from consumer rights Sign memorandum of 
consumer voice for consumers in their voice mechanisms. protection centre understanding with the 
relationship with the utility Developing mechanisms to independent consumer council 
service providers resolve customer complaints of water 
4 Approval of Approval of tariffs for utility Proposing tariff adjustments Determine and approve tariffs Setting price limit that 
tariffs services to government for operators sectors companies can charge 
consumers 
5 Promoting Encourage competition in the Promote competition in regulated Promoting effective 
completion provision of prescribed utility competition 
services; 
6 Monitoring inspection and testing of any Monitoring and enforcing Monitor the compliance of the state Monitoring performance 
performance of prescribed utility services compliance of contractual owned utilities with the conditions of activities of the water 
utilities performance levels the licence, companies 
7 Licensing of Process applications for Arranging coordination of License the provision of state owned Enforce license conditions 
utilities licenses of utility providers and relevant government utilities 
recommend to Minister for agencies to help in operation 
actual issuinQ of licenses of the contract aQreements. 
8 Providing Advise the responsible Provide information to Ministries on Produce annual report to 
advisory services Minister on utility service reQulation of state owned utilities; Minister of state 
9 Other functions Promotion of a sustainable Ensure compliance by utilities on 
environment environmental protection 
requirements, 
Source: Author's analYSis of data 
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Table 2-4: Lessons leamt: Institutional arrangements 
Jakarta Jamaica Latvia England and Wales 
Leadership Executive board [5 Director General Board [5 members] Board with 9 members 
members] [6 non-executive and 3 
executive] 
Duration oltenm 01 3 year term 7 yrs [renewable] 5 years 
office 
Appointed by Governor 01 Jakarta Governor General on Minister 01 economy Secretary 01 State lor 
recommendation of the DEFRA 
Prime Minister 
Reporting to Governor Governor General Minister of economy Secretary of 
State/Parliament 
Funding mechanism Regulatory service fee 0.2% of turn over of License fees of 
from the licensees the regulated utilities approximately 0.15% of 
regulated industry 
Involvement 01 Customer and Consumer advisory Through the consumer Memorandum of 
consumers community committee appointed by righls protection understanding with the 
communication forum OUR centre Consumer council for 
through the water water 
customer committee 
Autonomy 01 Though stated in the Stated in the Act - Independence 01 Clearly spelt out that 
regulator Act in reality it provides regulator clearly spelt they make decisions 
advisory services out in Act independent of 
government 
Single/multi-sector Single sector Multi-sectoral Multi-sector Single sector 
Criteria lor removal Found guilty of neglect Illness or some other Based on proven 
Irom office of duty, inefficiency, reason making him ground of incapacity or 
incompetence, unable to pertorm his misbehaviour. 
misconduct or duties of office for 
malfeasance more than six 
successive months; 
convicted of a criminal 
offence, commercial 
activity with a 
reQulated entity 
Service providers Two Private operators National water Municipal authorities Private operators 
for the city of Jakarta company responsible 
on concession contract 
Legal Status 01 Established by decree Office of Utilities Law No. 394/395 of Water Act 2003 
agency of the Governor Regulators Act of No. 2000 
130f1995 
Decisive or advisory Advisory on tariffs but Advisory on issuing Issue operating Fix price cap 
decision on other licenses licenses Enlorce provisions in 
regulatory functions; Fixes tariffs of regulated Fix the tariff 01 service the license. 
enforcing provisions of industry providers 
the contract 
Source: Author's analysis of data 
The institutional arrangements for the four regulators outlined in Table 2-4, are worthy of consideration for 
regulators in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly the arrangements in Jamaica, Latvia and England and Wales. 
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Their suitability for adoption should be assessed against the existing socio-political, economic and 
institutionaVpolicy framework. 
2.10 Regulation in the African water sector 
As already stated, utility regulation in the water sector has usually been associated with involvement of the 
private sector (Walker, 2002; Guillermo, 2003). It is widely accepted that private sector operators requires 
regulation of some form, it is often simply assumed that state owned utilities will automatically operate in 
the public interest because they are publicly owned; unfortunately all too frequently this is not the case 
(Rees, 199B). Regulation is required whether services are provided by the private or state owned (Molle, 
2001; Werchota, 2003). 
The key challenge in many African Countries is similar to those identified by the Water Services 
Department of the Maharashtra State in India (Water Supply and Sanitation Department, 2001) in which 
they identified the key challenges of moving to a market driven model of water service provision in the 
urban sector. The identified challenges are: 
• Lack of a paying culture among users; 
• Utility managers not being customer focused and 
• Lack of transparency in operations. 
The regulator would need to play a key role in meeting these three challenges. 
The question now is what institutional arrangement should be in place to ensure adequate regulation of the 
water services sector. Most countries in Africa had never considered the issue of economic regulation as 
part of their institutional framework until the early 1990s when the wind of reforms in the water sector came 
on the scene. Regulation was mainly done by central government by default. 
Some aspects of economic regulation in most Sub-Saharan Africa are undertaken by central government 
departments. These aspects mainly include tariff approvals and monitoring the performance of the public 
utility. The same government department would also be responsible for appointing the board of directors of 
a utility -a utility governance role. This of course is not in line with international practice and 
recommendations of separating policy-making function with regulation (Foster, 1996; Smith, 1997). 
In some countries like Senegal, the state owned company [an asset holding company) regulates the private 
operator's activities using the contract. This was also the case in Guinea where the asset holding company 
- SONEG was also responsible for regulating the private operator (Menard and Clarke, 1999). 
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Three countries in Africa have established autonomous sector-specific water utility regulators to monitor 
and regulate the activities of both state owned as well as private operators. These are Kenya, Mozambique 
and Zambia. Six countries have established autonomous multi-sector regulators, with the purpose of 
monitoring and regulating the activities of the service providers, both private and state owned operators. 
The table below [see table 2.5J shows the regulatory framework for urban water services in Africa. As can 
be seen from the table, less than 10 countries out of 53 countries in Africa have established au1onomous 
regulatory bodies. 
Table 2-5: Water services economic regulatory institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Type 01 autonomous regulatory body Countries with type 01 regulation 
Single sector [water only] Kenya, Mozambique, Zambia 
Multi-sectoral Ghana, Rwanda, Mali, Niger, the Gambia, 
Tanzania 
Source: Compiled by Author from multiple literature 
As can be deduced from the international experiences there is still some considerable debate in Africa as to 
which form of regulatory organisation is most appropriate. What seems important however are the ideal 
characteristics of a regulatory body which suggest that the establishment of an autonomous agency, with 
clearly defined tasks and responsibilities, its own dedicated but stable funding is the preferred type of 
regulatory organisation. When regulation is carried out under the auspices of govemment, it is susceptible 
to frequent alterations in policy objectives when government changes, or even when personnel within a 
ministry change. Such problems would still exist with an independent regulator, but they are on a reduced 
scale. The problem in a number of African countries arises when the body responsible for setting tariffs is 
also the client most likely to default on water bill payments - government. African regulators also need to 
determine what roles they need to undertake based on best practice elsewhere and what roles they need to 
be undertaken given the specific Sub-Saharan African context. 
2.11 Chapter Summary 
The Chapter has presented a review of the literature that exists on the subject of utility regulation. Efforts 
were made to explain the challenges facing service providers especially the state owned ones. The 
weaknesses and reasons for failure of many state owned utilities have been given and these include lack of 
a clear regulatory framework. Acknowledgement was made of some publicly run utilities in Africa that are 
currently performing reasonably well, with no in-built mechanisms to ensure that the performance gains are 
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sustainable. The reforms should lead to establishment of some new institutions including economic 
regulators, where the local country context is conducive to their effective functioning. 
The Chapter also presented the reasoning behind establishment of an economic regulatory framework, the 
need to understand the political and socio-economic environment before establishing a regulator, the roles 
and functions that a regulator should undertake and the institutional arrangements for the regulatory 
framework. 
The literature review has brought out elements on the general roles and institutional arrangements for 
economic regulation of urban water services, particularly for developed countries. There is limited literature 
on regulation of urban water services in Sub-Saharan Africa with some notable exceptions such as 
Franceys and Gerlach, 200B. 
The specific gap in the literature that this research seeks to fill is determining the most appropriate roles 
and institutional arrangements for economic regulation of urban water services, in the varied Sub-Saharan 
Africa contexts. 
The challenges of improving services for the urban poor and the role that economic regulation can play, 
has not been explored thoroughly in the literature. To address these gaps, the researcher has developed a 
framework which can be used to analyse an economic regulatory body with respect to good principles of 
economic regulation for Sub-Saharan Africa. This framework is presented in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This chapter describes the research methodology, which provides a broad structure for linking the research 
questions to the data collection and analysis methods. The chapter outlines the conceptual framework of 
the research and how the research was undertaken. This framework is based on lessons drawn from the 
literature review, which also identified specific gaps namely scanty literature on the roles and institutional 
arrangements for economic regulation of urban water services in the Sub-Saharan African context. These 
issues are addressed in the research questions that are set in section 3.3. The research design involved 
five key stages: 
• The literature review helped the researcher to understand urban water services, water utility 
regulation and the relationships between the two. It also disaggregated utility regulation into the 
need to understand the political and socio-economic contextual framework, the roles and 
institutional arrangements for the economic regulation globally and in Sub-Saharan Africa. It further 
expanded on the identified sources of poor service delivery including lack of autonomy of the 
service providers, low tariffs and generally low operational efficiencies. 
• The conceptual framework was developed to identify the objective of the research and the forgoing 
research questions. 
• The next stage was to develop or select the most appropriate research strategy and methodology 
to adequately respond to the research questions. The research strategy selected assisted in 
determining the data gathering techniques employed in the research. 
• Thereafter data was collected using the different data-gathering techniques that were found to be 
appropriate for the research strategy. 
• Finally the results were evaluated and analysed to answer the research questions, and to formulate 
conclusions and recommendations. 
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3.1 Conceptual Framework 
As stated above in Chapter 1.6, the objective of this research was to assess appropriate roles and 
institutional arrangements for effective economic regulation of urban water services in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Below is a matrix of identified issues from the literature, and how this research makes a contribution. 
Table 3-1: Issues to be investigated in the research 
Factor of effective utility Issue investigated in this research 
regulation 
1 Existing political and socio- The research examined existing contextual factors that could possibly 
economic environment for affect the roles and design of institutional arrangements of economic 
regulation of urban water regulation of water services in Sub-Saharan Africa. These include the 
services country governance, general socio-economic situation of a country 
and sector related issues 
2 Roles of utility regulation Generic roles which may include approval of tariffs, general protection 
of consumers against monopoly and arbitrary tariff adjustments, 
monitoring quality of service, advising government on urban water 
services, capacity building of the regulated industries, targeting of 
regulations, incentives for services to the urban poor, information 
gathering and dissemination 
3 Institutional arrangements This research sought to establish the more appropriate institutional 
of the regulatory arrangements subject to political and socio-economic environment 
framework that gives higher promise to achieve the objectives of regulatory 
framework; this includes autonomy, transparency and accountability. 
The level of autonomy of the regulator from govemment will more 
likely be achieved with clear; reporting mechanisms for the regulator, 
appointment mechanisms of the members of the commission 
including security and tenure of office, funding arrangements etc. 
Source: Author 
The research also undertook a subjective analysis of how well the regulators were doing in the three main case 
studies, using an adaptation of the BRTF framework, as is set out in the Better Regulation Task Force, 1997). 
The adaptations of the BRTF that take into account the Sub-Saharan African context, are set out in section 
3.12. 
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3.2 Delimitations of the research 
This research is limited to the economic regulation of urban water services in Sub-Saharan Africa. It does 
not include environmental regulation or drinking water quality regulation or indeed any other type of 
regulation. It investigated the roles and the institutional design of the economic regulatory system and the 
framework within which decisions are made. It assessed the "how" of economic regulation. The elements 
considered include decisions about the autonomy of the regulator, the relationship between the regulator 
and policymakers; the organisational structure and resources of the regulator. It also considered the 
regulatory substance i.e. the content and key roles of regulation. 
The study is further limited to the Sub-Saharan Africa continent [only African countries south of the Sahara] 
based on the experience of three countries of Ghana, Mozambique and Zambia that have autonomous 
economic regulatory bodies in the water sector. In seeking to understand the institutional arrangements and 
the roles, it was also necessary to study literature on the existing political and socio-economic 
environmental context in which economic regulation would be undertaken. The research did not consider 
methodologies of undertaking regulation or the tools for effective regulation including legal instruments 
such as contracts, licenses, statutes or any such regulatory tools. It also did not consider the different basis 
of determining tariffs i.e. whether on price cap mechanisms as applied to the water regulatory framework in 
England and Wales or rate-of-return regulation or indeed the revenue-cap regulation. In summary therefore 
the research is about the roles and functions, the institutional arrangements for the regulatory framework 
and the importance of taking into account country socio-economic and environmental context. 
3.3 Research objective and questions 
This research did not use hypothesis testing but rather used research questions. Research questions were 
chosen on the basis that hypothesis states predicted relationships between variables while research 
questions ask if a relationship exists (Sproull, 1995). The research sought to establish a relationship 
between roles and institutional arrangements of economic utility regulation on one hand and potential 
influence on the urban water service provision including the performance of service providers on the other. 
Research questions are also interrogative while the hypothesis is a statement. The primary question 
addressed in this research is: 
How can the roles and institutional arrangements of economic utility regulation enhance the 
provision of urban water services in Sub-Saharan Africa? 
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The objective of this primary question was to determine the role of utility regulation in relation to water 
service provision in urban areas by utilities, including aspects such as: tariff setting, ensuring commercial 
viability (Esteban, 2006) and consumer protection [including the poor]. The objective of the question was to 
further determine the most appropriate institutional arrangements that will give more promise to the 
effective execution of the roles of economic regulation. 
The primary question was further broken down into supplementary questions. All the research questions 
were developed on the basis that they must be clearly formulated, intellectually worthwhile and 
researchable. It is through these research questions that linkages are made between what is to be 
researched and the research methodology (Weisberg and Bowen, 1977; Vaus, 1990). 
The following research questions therefore emerged as needing further investigation. 
1.0 What are the existing political and socio-economic environmental factors that can influence 
the roles and institutional arrangements of the economic regulation of urban water services 
in Sub-Saharan Africa? 
The main objective of this question was to facilitate an understanding of the existing political and 
socio·economic situation in the case countries. The governance context may include political 
stability, fragility level of a country, corruption levels and indeed promotion of good corporate 
governance, respect for the rule of laws while the socio·economic context may include the general 
economic situation of a country, poverty levels, urbanisation rate and at the sectorallevel • the 
policy, legal and regulatory framework of a country including as to whether government has any 
policy framework for service delivery well defined. 
51 
2.0 What should be the roles and requisite functions of economic regulation to enhance the 
better delivery of water services in Sub-Saharan African urban areas? 
The objective of this question was to determine the roles and requisite functions of economic 
regulation of water services in relation to the clients/consumers protect consumers from abuse of 
monopolistic power of the water services, setting economic tariffs that promote commercial viability 
of the service providers, promoting competition, monitoring, transparency, performance 
measurement of the utilities and good governance of the service providers. Do utility regulators in 
Sub-Saharan Africa need to play roles that are not necessarily considered as key regulatory roles 
in developed countries i.e. services to the poor, capacity development, awareness raiSing on key 
water services delivery issues, undertaking studies etc. 
3.0 What are the appropriate institutional arrangements for the regulator to assure effective 
regulation of the sector? 
The objective of this question was to determine the more appropriate institutional framework of the 
regulator so that it is efficient, effective and has a high level of op_~rational autonomy. Determine 
appropriate institutional arrangements that give higher promise to achieve the objectives of 
economic regulation and also meet the regulatory principles applicable to Africa and based on the 
Better Regulation Task Force. Determine whether economic utility regulation by an autonomous 
body would be the more appropriate solution than a government ministry or department. Should 
the regulator be single sector or mUlti-sector, what assures greater autonomy of the regulator i.e. 
funding mechanisms for the regulatory framework, appointment mechanisms of the 
commissioners, role of consumers in the regulatory framework, reporting mechanism of regulator-
to a Sector Minister, to Parliament, to a committee appOinted by government -assess different 
possibilities, answer to the question or problem of regulatory capture -whether by state or the 
service providers. Also assess what would provide promise for achieving more autonomy based on 
appointment mechanisms and security of tenure for the head of the regulatory agency. 
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The above research questions were addressed through different research techniques as shown in the table 
below. 
Table 3-2: Research and data analysis techniques employed in the research 
Research question Research Issues under consideration Data analysis 
technique technique used 
What are the existing Documents • Political stability and the fragility level of a Explanation building 
political and socio- Questionnaire country from literature and economic • Respect for the rule of laws? Cross case analysis 
environmental factors Key informant • Transparency/corruption levels in the country in a country that can interviews • Socio-economic situation of the country influence the roles 
• What are the poverty levels in the country 
and institutional 
• How is urbanisation rate arrangements of the 
• Policy, legal and regulatory framework for urban economic regulation of water services 
urban water services Performance levels of the water service in Sub-Saharan • 
Africa? providers 
What should be the Documents What should be the roles of utility regulation based Pattern matching, 
roles/functions of utility Questionnaire on the sources of data? explanation building, regulation to enhance 
• Protection of consumers from abuse of market 
using SPSS release 
the performance of Key informant 16.0 and cross-case 
water utilities in Sub- interviews monopolistic power of the industry analysis 
Saharan African urban • Approval of tariffs 
areas? Focus Group Ensuring commercial viability of the service discussions • 
providers 
Observation 
• Monitoring and performance measurement of 
the utilities 
• Knowledge bank on urban water services 
• Services to the urban poor 
What is the most Documents • Structure of the regulatory framework i.e. single pattern matching, 
appropriate Questionnaire or multi-sector explanation building, institutional structure • Separate institution or part of government or using SPSS release 
for the regulator to Key informant regulation by contract 16.0 and cross-case 
assure effective Interviews • Reporting mechanism of the regulatory body analysis 
regulation of the Focus Group • Appointment mechanism for the regulatory staff sector? Discussions especially the head of the agency 
• Security and tenure of office of the Observation commissioners 
• Funding arrangements for the regulator 
• Involvement of consumers in the regulatory 
framework 
Source. Author 
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3.4 Framework of the research methodology 
Figure 3.1 below gives the outline or framework of the process followed in determining the research 
methodology and fieldwork. 
---lldentify the general research problem 
Literature review conclusions on economic 
.1 Defining aims and objectives of the I-
f-- regulation and conceptual framework 
I research H Formulate research objective 
Set the main research question and sub· 
auestions 
.1 Determination of research strategy I Selected the Multiple case study strategy 
Ghana -multi-utility regulatory body regulating one national 
- public utility 
Mozambique -single sector regulator regulating private operator ~ Selection of cases I through a state owned asset holding company 
Zambia Single sector regulator regulating publicly owned 
utilities 
-1 Document reviews I 
IKey Informant Interviews I 
Selection of data collection : Questionnaires I techniques 
Focus Group discussions I 
IObservations I 
Figure 3-1: Selecllon of research methodology 
Source: Author 
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3.5 Selection of the research strategy 
A research strategy is a plan of action that gives direction to the researcher's efforts, enabling the 
researcher to conduct research systematically rather than haphazardly (Fergusson, 2005). Research 
strategy [sometimes referred to as research design] is sometimes confused with research methods. These 
two are different but linked. Research strategy is the technique used to collect evidence and can be 
surveys, case studies, experimental or historical while the research method is the application of the 
research strategy and could be qualitative or quantitative or both (Vaus, 2001). 
In order to decide on which of the above strategies was to be used in this research, a general guide was 
developed based on a table produced by Yin (Yin, 2002) see below Table 3-3 
Yin proposed three conditions that assist in deciding on which strategy to use in undertaking a research. 
These include: 
• The type of the primary and secondary research questions posed 
• The extent of control a researcher has over actual behavioural events 
• The degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical events. 
Table 3-3: Relevant situations for different research strategies 
Research strategy tForrn:6f1r~s~~rch .... ! ,Requires.cdntrolover' . Focuses on contemporary ; 
question" . . behavioural events? events? 
., ... , . . .. 
Survey Who, what, where, No Yes 
how many, how much 
Case studies How, why No Yes 
Experiment How, why Yes Yes 
Archival analysis Who, what, where, No Yes/No 
[e,g, economic how many, how much 
study] 
History How, why No No 
Source: (Yin, 2002) 
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3.5.1 Research strategy selected 
Considering the above criteria for selecting a research strategy and especially in relation to seeking a 
strategy that could assist answer the research questions the research strategy found to be most 
appropriate was the multiple case study research strategy. According to Yin (Yin, 2002) as a rule of thumb 
he suggests that "how" and 'why' questions are often suited for case studies. 
Other reasons for selecting the case study research strategy: 
1. Case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real·life 
context. This research sought to understand the role of and appropriate institutional arrangements 
for economic utility regulation of urban water service delivery. The study was around the three 
identified cases of autonomous regulatory institutions in 3 countries of Ghana, Mozambique and 
Zambia. 
2. Case study relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating 
fashion (Hakim, 1997). The use of multiple sources of evidence is a key characteristic of case 
study research. As will be explained later, the research used multiple sources of data including 
questionnaires, key informant interviews, focus group discussions, observations and documents. 
Employing multiple methods provided the opportunity for data triangulation, with the attendant 
effect of enhancing the study's validity. 
3. Case study as a research strategy can be linked to various types of theories such as organisational 
theories, group theories, individual theories, societal theories (Yin, 2002). This is very relevant in 
this research as to some extent the research is about organisational theories. 
4. The third reason is that according to Yin (Yin, 2002) case study strategy benefits from the 
development of some theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis. The 
propositions in this research were developed in an interrogative manner as research questions. 
5. The specific issues [utility regulatory framework] around which the study was organised operate 
within a physical, social and economic context, and so required multiple case study strategy to get 
a good understanding of the issues and draw good inferences. 
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Evidence from multiple cases is considered to be more compelling and the overall study regarded as more 
robust (Herriott and Firestone, 1983). Arriving at common conclusions from two or more cases leads to a 
higher chance of replicability of the findings compared to those of the single case(Yin, 2002). Case studies 
should in this respect lead to analytic generalisation as opposed to statistical generalisations which usually 
results from such research strategies as surveys. The only requirement is that each case should serve a 
specific purpose within the overall scope of the enquiry. Multiple cases also promote replication logic. One 
commonly cited disadvantage of case studies is that they do not easily allow a generalisation to larger 
populations or general situations (Slack, 1999) . While this may seem to be a problem, it should not 
necessarily be an issue especially that case study is usually meant to find out something about a particular 
case or cases. The aim is not necessarily to generalise the results but to understand the context in which 
the case is operating well and based on this evidence seek to apply it under similar circumstances 
elsewhere. Although each case is in some respects unique, it is also a single example of a broader class of 
things (Vaus, 2001). In this research the cases are autonomous economic regulatory institutions then the 
results should apply to all regulatory instttutions that are autonomous in nature (Regin and Secker, 1992). If 
two or more cases are shown to support the same theory, then replication may be claimed. 
3.6 Validity and Reliability in the Research 
For any research to be of any use it is important that the data or evidence collected is credible enough and 
reliable. Two qualities that help assess the 'goodness' of research are its reliability and validity (Yin, 2002). 
However, few scientific techniques have been developed to address the scientific worth and rigour of case 
study research strategy (de Ruyter and Scholl, 1998). A high degree of validity and reliability provides not 
only confidence in the data collected but more significantly, trust in the successful application and use of 
the results for decision making (Riege, 2003). The level of reliability or validity of a piece of research has 
repercussions on the credibility of the findings and conclusions and thus need to be considered throughout 
the research process (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). It was therefore important that in undertaking this 
research, whatever was used as sources of data was reliable and that the data used was also valid. 
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Reliability in this case refers to the possibility of replication of the study under similar circumstances 
(Rudestam and Newton, 2001) and also the possibility of the evidence being cross checked through 
triangulation (Vin, 2002). It further refers to the demonstration that the operations and procedures can be 
repeated by other researchers which then achieve similar findings, that is the findings can be replicated 
assuming that, for example, interviewing techniques and procedures remain constant. Reliability in this 
respect is defined as '1he extent to which a measurement procedure yields the same answer however and 
whenever it is carried our' (Gonman and Clayton, 1997). The idea is that if a later investigator followed the 
same procedure as described by an earlier investigator and carried out the same case study all over again, 
the later investigator should arrive at the same findings and conclusions 
A member check is another way of validating results especially with key informants. Member checks 
implies going back to key informants and present the entire written narrative of either a focus group 
discussion or an unstructured interview. Basically the idea is to validate the interpretations, by the 
researcher, of what was presented by the respondent. This helps in confinming the accuracy and credibility 
of the findings. Interesting enough most key informant respondents actually requested to be availed with 
copies of the results of the research. 
Triangulation is also widely used in qualitative methods, as a strategy for achieving 'validity' and 'reliability'. 
The use of two or more methods in research enables the researcher to address different aspects of the 
same research question thereby extending the breadth of the study (Healy and Perry, 2000). Indeed any 
conclusions arrived at by using several different means of data collection are more likely to be correct and 
accepted as valid (Gorman and Clayton, 1997). The logic of triangulation was based on the premise that 
no single method adequately solves the problem of rival causal factors. Because each method reveals 
different aspects of empirical reality, multiple methods of observation must be employed (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 1994); This research applied different methods of data collection including questionnaires, key 
informant interviews, focus group discussions, observations and documents. This therefore increased the 
likelihood of achieving greater validity. Further to this different units of analysis were used to increase the 
validity of the research. The units of analysis included government, regulatory institutions, service 
providers, NGOs and documents in the different countries. 
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In carrying out this research, all the issues discussed above were taken into consideration to enhance the 
validity and reliability of the research results and conclusions. All the data collection tools were reviewed by 
the researcher's supervisors, colleague researcher students, and a social scientist before being used in the 
field. The data collection tools were also pilot tested by 10 different people before being used for the actual 
data collection exercise. The final version of the data collection tools were based on outcome of the pilot 
testing phase. 
3.7 The research setting 
As already explained in section 1.2, Sub-Saharan Africa is urbanising at a very fast rate. The infrastructure 
is not expanding at the same pace as the population grow1h in these areas. This is compounded by the 
poor performance of the urban water services sub-sector as evidenced by the poor performance indicators 
of a number of utilities. 
Sub-Saharan Africa comprises of 48 countries with an approximate total population of 664 million people of 
which 229 million live in urban areas (UN-DESA, 2003) implying that approximately 35% of the Sub-
Saharan population lives in urban areas. The urbanisation rate on average for Sub-Saharan Africa is 
around 4%. 
In the Sub-Saharan Africa water, services are predominantly provided by the state owned utilities and non-
state providers such as informal private water providers. The different institutional arrangements for water 
services provision in Sub-Saharan Africa were already outlined in the literature review in Chapter 2.3. The 
information therefore explains the contextual setting of water services provision. 
Section 2.10 outlined the existing regulatory framework in sub-Saharan Africa especially in relation to 
autonomous regulatory institutions. These institutions only exist in nine countries of December 2009. 
59 
3.8 Selection of the cases 
In multiple case design each case is selected so that it either predicts similar results [literal replication] or 
predicts contrasting results but for predictable reasons [theoretical replication] (Bryman, 2001). In this 
research multiple cases were selected to achieve replication of the same study [utility regulatory 
frameworks] in different settings (Hakim, 1997) and also to compare and contrast these cases. Multiple 
cases can also be used to help specify the different conditions under which a theory may hold or not hold. 
The key point is that the selection of cases should strengthen both internal and external validity as 
explained above. As stated by Yin (2002) some of replication logic must exist for the cases to be valid, in 
which case they should produce similar results from similar variables and conditions. 
It must be stated however that in multiple case studies the researcher must endeavour to treat each case 
as a single case before engaging in cross·case comparisons. Once the multiple case strategy was adopted 
it was necessary for the researcher to select the cases. Multiple case studies generally call for the 
researcher to make choices from among a number of possible events, organisations, people, regions etc. 
In this research the choice to be made was from the nine countries in Sub·Saharan Africa that have 
autonomous economic regulatory institutions as listed below. 
Table 3·4: Countries in Africa with autonomous regulatory agencies 
Country Type of regulator Type of regulated utility 
1 Ghana Multi·utility regulator Publicly owned national utility 
2 Kenya Water only regulator Publicly owned companies through regional asset holding 
companies 
3 Mali Multi·utility regulator Private operator [multi-utility -water and electricity] 
4 Mozambique Water only regulator Private operator through asset holding company 
5 Niger Multi-utility regulator Private operator through asset holding company 
6 Rwanda Multi-utility regulator Publicly owned mUlti-utility corporation [water and 
electricity] 
7 Tanzania Multi-utility regulator Publicly owned utilities 
8 The Gambia Multi-utility regulator Publicly owned multi-utility corporation[water and 
electricity] 
9 Zambia Water only regulator Publicly owned companies 
Source: Author 
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Since the three cases that were selected are all autonomous regulators they are therefore typical cases 
which have high potential for bringing results that can be replicated. However that the cases have some 
differences either in the institutional set-up, reporting mechanisms or funding arrangements as can be seen 
from the table No. 3.5 below. 
Table 3-5: Profile of the selected cases 
Country case Specific difference as an autonomous regulator 
Ghana Multi-utility regulator, Chairman of the regulator appointed by the 
President, Executive Secretary is a statutory position -Le. sworn in by 
the State President, funded by Central government, regulates one 
national water service provider, has regional offices 
Mozambique Water only regulator, Chairman of regulator reports to the Prime 
Minister, Regulatory Board consists of 3 panel of experts, Executive 
secretary appointed by the Chairman through competitive means, 
funded through percentage of concession fees paid by the private 
operator, regulates private operators through a national state owned 
asset holding company 
Zambia Water only regulator, Chairman reports to the Minister for water 
resources, regulatory board comprises of 7 appointed from different key 
sector institutions, Executive Director appointed by the Board after 
competitive selection, funded through licence fees based on 1.5% of 
billed revenue of each regulated utility, regulates state owned water 
companies 
Source: Author 
Another reason for selecting the three cases with autonomous regulatory framework is that the French 
speaking countries follow a slightly different legal system from the English speaking and so would not 
respond to the general rules of replicability Le. Niger, Mali, Rwanda. The regulators in Kenya and the 
Gambia had been in operation for less than 5 years at the time of the research and this was not considered 
sufficient time to draw any lessons from their operations especially to lead to replicability. During the time of 
the research the Tanzanian regulator was going through immense changes in view of the problems with the 
private water company contract in the capital Dar es Salaam. Data collection from this regulator would have 
been very difficult. 
The selected countries are pioneer countries in terms of establishing autonomous regulatory framework in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. The regulators in the tlhree Countries were all established between 1997 and 1999. 
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3.9 Research Design 
A research design is basically a technical plan that attempts to link the beginning and end of a study. It is 
therefore more like an action plan (Yin, 2002). It is a plan, a structure and a strategy of investigation to try 
and get answers to the research questions (Kumar, 1999). The research design should guide the 
researcher in such a way that the evidence or data to be collected is relevant to the research questions and 
the strategies to be used in the analysis. It should also help the researcher answer the research questions 
validly, objectively, accurately and economically. The purpose of the research design is also to ensure that 
the logic of the study's approach is maintained, so that the evidence does not fail to address the initial 
research questions. A research design should therefore have the following elements: 
3.10 How the data was collected 
In keeping with the case study strategy various methods were used to gather evidence or data. The data 
collection techniques therefore were through primary means [key informant interviews, observation, focus 
group discussions and surveys through questionnaires] and secondary sources. The data collection 
techniques were chosen after analysing the different possible and applicable methods of gathering data 
that can be used in research. Examples of secondary sources include the use of documents i.e. 
government publications, earlier research, census, personal records. Secondary sources include use of an 
organisation's records to ascertain its activities, the collection of data from sources such as articles, 
journals, magazines. On the other hand finding out first·hand the quality of services provided by a worker, 
job satisfaction of the employees of an organisation, ascertaining the water needs of a community all 
comprise primary sources of data. In summary primary sources provide first·hand information and 
secondary sources provide second· hand data. (Kumar, 1999). 
Some of the data collection methods are shown in the chart below. 
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Possible Methods of data collection 
l Secondary sources J 
• • Govt publications I 
• Earlier research 
• Census I Observation 
• Personal records I 
I Participant I 
I I Semi-structured 
Figure 3-2: Data collection techniques 
Source: (Kumar, 1999) 
I 
I Primary sources I 
I 
I I InterviewinQ I I Questionnaire 
11 I I Non-participant I Mailed I I Collective 
I I I I Structured I Unstructured I I Focus Group I 
I 
I 
None of the methods of data collection provide 100 percent accurate and reliable information. Each method 
has its own advantages and disadvantages. This is one justification for using many methods of data 
collection. However the key in case study technique is to choose data collection techniques that have better 
prospects for achieving replicability. 
Methods used for data collection in this research include the use of primary sources such as focus group 
discussions, key informant interviews, a questionnaire and observation. The researcher also spent some 
time observing the operations of the regulators in Zambia, Mozambique and Ghana. The observation 
method was not very detailed as this was not the only method of data collection. 
3.10.1 Focus Group Discussions 
The researcher organised three focus group discussions in the three case countries - Ghana, Mozambique 
and Zambia. The main aim of the focus group discussions was to get further understanding on the design 
and role of economic regulation of water services in the three countries. A sample letter of invitation to the 
focus group discussion is in Appendix 1 and reports from all of the focus group discussions are given in 
Appendices 2, 3 and 4. 
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The focus group discussions allowed the researcher to have open discussions on the different aspects of 
the research topic. The use of focus group discussions increased the validation of the research results from 
other sources, through triangulation achieved by using different methods of collecting data. 
In all the three countries the focus group discussions were organised in collaboration with a local regulatory 
body. In Ghana the meeting was called in collaboration with the Public Utility Regulatory Commission but 
facilitated by one of the well experienced and knowledgeable consultants in Ghana. Invitations were sent to 
the four main institutions in the water sector in Ghana and included the water utility -Ghana Water 
Company, the regulator itself -Public Utility regulatory Commission, the government -ministry of public 
works and housing, the electricity company, the labour movement, and some consumers -identified by the 
facilitator. 
In Zambia the water and sanitation association facilitated the organisation of the focus group discussion. An 
open invitation was made through the press for any interested to attend. Direct individual invitations were 
also sent to some key institutions like the Lusaka Water and Sewerage Company, the regulator -National 
Water and Sanitation Council-NWASCO, government -the department of water affairs and the ministry of 
local government and housing, a consumer watch group. All the key institutions in the urban water sector 
were represented. 
The Mozambique focus group discussion was a bit difficult because of language barrier. In any case the 
local regulator -CRA -Regulatory Council of Water- was very helpful in mobilising participants. Participants 
came from the regulator itself, the government, FIPAG and two NGOs. There were no representatives from 
the operator -AdeM. 
In all cases efforts were made to ensure that adequate notice for the focus group discussion was given. 
The local institutions were advised to send the notice of the meeting with all the details including time, date 
and venue so that they could be received by the participants at least three days before the focus group 
discussion. The researcher drafted the general notice for the focus group discussion and also stated the 
purpose of the focus group discussion, the time and venue of the discussion and other relevant information 
for them to come to the meeting. 
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Table 3-6: Summary information on focus group discussions held 
Country Date of FGD Venue of the FGD General description ofJ)articipants 
Ghana 27 November 2003 Novotel Hotel, • Public Utility regulatory Commission 
Accra • Ghana Water Company Limited 
[18 participants] • Consumers association 
• Ghana Electricity Company 
• ISODEC [NGO] 
• Two research students [one PhD student 
from WEDC] and the other was a PhD 
student from I H E -Netherlands. 
Mozambique 26~ April 2004 Holiday Inn hotel, • Water Regulatory Council 
Maputo [9 • FIPAG 
participants] 
• DNA 
• Water Aid 
Zambia 101h June 2004 Pamodzi hotel, • NWASCO [the regulator] 
Lusaka • Lusaka water and sewerage company 
[50 participants] • government [Ministry of Local government 
and housing and Energy and water 
development] 
• NGOs [Care, Water Aid] 
• Consultants 
• Academicians and students 
• Donors [World Bank, GTZl 
Source: Author 
3.10.2 Key Informant Interviews 
The second method applied for data collection in this research was the key infonmant interviews. The most 
positive feature of the interview is the richness and the vividness of the material that comes out. Key 
informant interviews were used in getting first hand infonmation on the perception of respondents towards 
economic regulation of urban water services in Sub-Saharan Africa mainly from some identified policy 
makers in the three case study countries. Interview in research terms involves a meeting between a 
researcher and a respondent [sometimes termed as a key informanfj. 
This data collection method can be undertaken in three ways structured, semi-structured or unstructured 
(Denscombe, 2001). The dividing line is the degree of flexibility of undertaking the interview. In order to 
secure as much first hand information and to allow for flexibility from the respondent, the interview guide 
used in this research was semi-structured. A checklist was prepared to guide the interviews. It was built 
around the research questions. 
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The respondents had the freedom to express themselves, while at the same time ensuring that all the 
relevant issues of concern to the study were adequately covered. The semi-structured interviews also 
allowed the interviewer to investigate further other interesting issues that came up. The interviewer could 
ask questions not necessarily covered in the interview guide but within the subject of the research. Even 
researchers like Gilham (2000) explain that semi-structured interviews provide an opportunity to the 
respondents to narrate their experience in a less structured manner hence bringing in the elements of new 
discoveries and understanding in research. 
The interviews generated qualitative data in sufficient depth to provide a detailed understanding of the 
relevant issues on economic regulation in the urban water services delivery. The insight gained, together 
with some of the issues that came up during the interview [which were not originally in the questionnaire] 
were incorporated in the subsequent data collection phases of the research. 
Interviewees were carefully selected primarily to generate data for understanding the phenomena of 
interest, rather than for making generalisations. It was therefore essential and necessary that particular 
attention was given to selecting the right people who knew the subject and were likely to provide adequate 
answers to the questions asked. In this respect therefore the sampling was focussed, and so justified the 
use of a small sample size. 
The key informant interviews were conducted face to face with people in senior positions in government, 
regulatory institutions, water utilities or NGOs. These people held strategic positions in their respective 
institutions and had knowledge and experience on issues affecting effective delivery of urban water 
services. 
Key informants [respondents] identified to be interviewed were contacted personally by the researcher and 
a time for the interview arranged. Each respondent was briefed on the aim of the research and the key 
areas to be covered by the interview. The researcher further stated that results of the interview would be 
used solely for academic purposes and would not be given to any other person without the permission from 
the respondent. The researcher personally conducted all the interviews. 
Having received the go ahead from the respondent the interview then started. Each interview started with 
an ice breaker -any item that was current at the time of the interview i.e. soccer, poor urban services in 
different African countries, conflict in African countries etc. The researcher then slowly brought the 
respondent into the subject by first discussing how poor services can be improved especially in relation to 
water services. 
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All the respondents were willing to participate and provided the answers satisfactorily. The respondents 
were of high standing within the water sector either in Africa or in their own countries. True to their positions 
the answers given were consistent and with sound reasoning. When asked for permission to record the 
interviews using a voice recorder, none expressed any problems or difficulties. Each interview was 
therefore recorded using a voice data recorder. While the interviews were meant to last only about 30 
minutes they all ended up lasting at least forty five minutes with one or two going to one and half hours. In 
view of this and also due to time constraints and the fact that multiple data sources were used in the 
research, only a total of 28 key informant interviews were conducted in the three case countries and five 
from different non-case countries. The list of people interviewed is attached in Appendix 5.0. 
Efforts were made to transcribe the interview summaries the same day of the interviews. These were based 
on the notes taken during the interview and listening to the voice recorder. 
3.10.3 Questionnaire 
The use of the questionnaires is an acceptable data collection technique within case study strategy (Yin, 
2002), provided it is used in addition to or in relation to other forms of evidence rather than a stand alone 
assessment of a situation. The questionnaire in this respect was used to re-enforce the validity of the data 
collected through the other sources. 
Respondents to the questionnaire from the non-case countries were selected from the relevant workshops 
and seminars organised by different organisations. Also used was the database of the African Forum for 
Utility Regulators [AFUR]. Below is a table [see table 3-7] giving a summary of the respondents and how 
they were selected. The questionnaires were self administered in most instances as this increased the rate 
of retum from the respondents. The key point in the selection of respondents is that of replication rather 
than generalisation in research. Hence the respondents were selected based on increased possibility of 
replication of this study. The table below shows the captive audience used to choose the respondents to 
the questionnaire from the non-case countries. Though the activities were in specific countries mentioned 
below, the conferences or seminars were intemational and so brought together participants from different 
countries. 
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Table 3-7: Selection of respondents to questionnaire from non-case countries 
Activity Dates Venue Questionnaires No 01 % response 
distributed reSDonses rate 
Utility Leaders Forum 15" to 16" Cape Town, 18 11 61 
Sept 2003 South Africa 
Workshop to launch Water 5" to 6" Nairobi, Kenya 46 25 54 
Services Regulatory Board - February 
Kenva 2004 
Workshop on toolkit and good 9" to 10" Nairobi, Kenya 25 17 68 
practice for services to the February 
urban DOor 2004 
Course on infrastructure 29" Feb- Bobe 33 18 55 
management 19" March Dioualososo, 
2004 Burkina Faso 
Short course on water sector 10" to 14" Johannesburg, 26 19 73 
reforms Mav2004 South Africa 
Training course on utility 2" to 6" Cape Town, 27 15 56 
reaulation bv AFUR Auqust2004 South Africa 
Training course on utility 23" to 27" Accra, Ghana 29 11 38 
requlation bv AFUR AUQust2004 
Total resDonse received 204 116 57 
Source: Author 
3.10.3.1 Development of the questionnaire 
For this research a questionnaire was designed on the basis that it could be answered by the respondents 
without any assistance (Monette, Sullivan and DeJong, 2002). The role of the questionnaire is to solicit the 
information that is required to enable the researcher to answer the objectives of the research (Brace, 2004). 
The first step undertaken in the questionnaire design and development was determining what the questions 
are that needed to be asked in relation to the research objective and the research questions. Care was 
taken to improve response rates by starting with the general questions on policy framework and 
identification of the general problems of provision of urban water services. The first few questions also 
concentrated in identifying the reasons for poor performance by public utilities. The questionnaire had both 
close-ended and open-ended questions. This allowed a flexibility or possibility where respondents could 
explain the reasoning behind some of the responses they gave Le. why they were in agreement or 
disagreement with certain statements. 
The close-ended questions used the Likert scale to measure the level of agreement of the respondents to 
propositions in the questionnaire. The three dimensions were on the level of agreement [strongly agree or 
just agree], disagreement [strongly disagree or just disagree] and uncertainty. 
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The questionnaire was pre-tested to make sure that the questions were understandable, eliminating any 
embarrassing and ambiguous wording and a suitable length of interview. Pre-testing helped in refining the 
questionnaire so that both the researcher and the potential respondents may be confident of this research 
tool. The process of determining as to whether the questionnaire was valid started with discussion with the 
research supervisors. Once the questionnaire was approved by the supervisors the author sent the 
questionnaire to 10 people. The 10 reviewers had different backgrounds with two of them working for a 
utility regulator, 3 research students, one consultant, three lecturers and one working for a Development 
Agency. They were asked to respond to the questionnaire and give comments on the questions. They were 
also asked to advise how long it took them to answer the questionnaire. This gave some assurance that 
they understood the questionnaire and could tell what would be required for anyone to answer the 
questionnaire. They were requested to give their comments on the following points: 
1. Do the questions sound right -a question may look acceptable when written on paper but sounds 
false when read out. 
2. Ambiguity or Clarity of the questions -are the questions clear and not ambiguous? 
3. Content - are the statements/questions valid to the subject matter? 
4. Length of the questionnaire. Long questionnaires tend to discourage respondents. A compromise 
had to be struck between long questionnaire [hence losing a number of potential respondents] and 
a questionnaire with sufficient questions to respond to the research objective and the research 
questions. 
5. Presentation/layout -am one easily follow the questions including numbering? 
6. General perception of the questions 
7. Level in relation to the target audience. Will the respondents easily understand the question and 
the response being sought? 
All the 10 people responded and gave very helpful remarks on the questionnaire in relation to the above 
seven points. Most of the comments were taken into consideration before finalising the questionnaire. The 
list of the people that reviewed and commented on the questionnaire is attached as Appendix 6.0 
When the questionnaire was finalised it was administered to the potential respondents based on the 
sample population. A copy of the final questionnaire is included in Appendix 7.0. 
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3.10.3.2 Administration of the questionnaire 
This research used the self-administered methods which yielded a higher response rate i.e. the researcher 
personally administered the questionnaire. Mailing of the questionnaire could either be through the 
traditional postal system, or bye-mail. A covering letter [sample provided iri Appendix 7.0 as part of the 
questionnaire] was written and given to the respondents together with the questionnaires. The covering 
letter described the objectives of the study, its relevance and conveyed general instructions. The letter also 
stated that participation in the study was voluntary but also gave assurance of the anonymity of the 
information provided by the respondents. 
3.10.4 Archives 
One of the methods identified in this research for data collection was the use of archives. These are 
government documents i.e. reports, legislation, project documents. The reports and studies used were 
mainly on water sector reforms including rationale behind the establishment of utility regulators as was the 
case in Zambia, Mozambique and Ghana. Another source of information based on archives were the 
different legislation that served as the legal basis for the establishment for the regulators. In Zambia and 
Ghana it was easy because all the documents were in English while in Mozambique the documents were in 
Portuguese. There was a selected few documents which were in English and these were the ones used 
while those in Portuguese were discarded. 
3.10.5 Observation -the role of the Researcher 
In quoting Creswell, Kayaga (2006) states that the qualitative methodology acknowledges that the 
researcher is usually' involved in a sustained and intensive experience with the participants' and should 
therefore clarify his/her biases, meanings, values, and personal interests. My interests in the research topic 
stem from over two decades of experience having been the architect and implementer of the water sector 
reforms in Zambia. I was instrumental in designing the regulatory framework for the urban water services in 
Zambia including defining the institutional arrangements and identifying the roles of the regulator 
I further had experience in running a regional capacity building programme for water service providers -the 
water utility partnership [WUP]. This gave me a further understanding of the challenges service providers 
face and how lack of economic regulation impacts on their operations. Finally I run a utility as managing 
director that operates under a regulated environment -the Lusaka water and sewerage company [LWSC]. I 
was able to have a greater insight into operating within a regulated framework. My regional experience 
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gave me a clear understanding that economic regulation is a necessary tool for performance enhancement 
of the service providers. 
3.10.6 Data base summary 
All evidence is of some use to the case study. This therefore usually results in case studies obtaining 
enormous amount of data. Part of the case study strategy therefore is to keep a database (Gilham, 2000) of 
all the data that has been obtained including the sources of the data. This is in fact one other way of 
increasing reliability in case study strategy. In this research a record was kept of all the information 
collected and notes made during the research in the fonn of a case study database. The database would 
allow for a critical reader to inspect raw data that led to the case study's conclusions (Yin, 2002). 
The table below provides a summary of the research database. 
Table 3-8: Summary of database 
Case Focus group Key informant Questionnaire 
discussions Interview 
Ghana 2 10 35 
Mozambique 1 8 20 
Zambia 1 10 34 
Other non-case 116 
countries 
Totals 4 28 205 
Source: Author 
3.11 Data Analysis 
The aim of data analysis is to address the research questions by examining, categorising, tabulating, 
testing or otherwise recombining both qualitative and quantitative evidence (Vin, 2002). This is a very 
important and critical stage of any research and permeates all stages of a study. There are a number of 
techniques that can be used to analyse data in case study methodology and these include pattern 
matching, explanation building, time-series analysis, logic models, and cross-case analysis. As already 
stated this research was guided by research questions rather than hypothesis. The techniques are to assist 
respond to the research questions. This research used the pattern matching for the individual cases and 
cross-case analysis. 
71 
The analysis and interpretation phases are also dependent on the researcher's knowledge of the subject 
and the sector. The researcher's previous experience both at country level and regional levels on issues 
related to urban water service delivery including regulation, equipped the researcher with great depth of 
knowledge. The data collected from this research comprised of both qualitative and quantitative type. 
Quantitative data resulted from the use of the questionnaire while qualitative data mainly came from the key 
informant interviews, the focus group discussions, questionnaires, documents and participatory 
observations. 
The table below shows which research technique was used to answer each research question. 
Table 3-9: Research techniques used to respond to the research questions 
Research question Questionnaire Key informant Focus Group Document Observation 
interview discussion review 
The existing political and socio-economic 
environmental factors in a country that can 
influence the roles and institutional 
" " arrangements of the economic regulation of urban water services in Sub-Saharan Africa? 
What should be the roles/functions of 
economic regulation to enhance the better 
" " " " " 
delivery of urban water services in Sub-
Saharan African urban areas? 
What are the appropriate institutional 
arrangements for the regulator to assure 
" " " " effective regulation of the sector? 
Source: Author 
Given below is the description of how both data sets [qualitative and quantitative] were analysed to respond 
to the above research questions. 
Interviews were transcribed from notes and the voice recorders. This helped in getting the data as much 
verbatim as possible especially from key informant interviews and focus group discussions. The transcribed 
reports were then saved in Microsoft word different files for each interview. The reports from the focus 
group discussions were also saved in different files using the Microsoft word software. Responses to the 
open ended questions in the questionnaire were reviewed especially for purposes of making any 
corrections to ensure that the notes made sense and written down in a spread sheet using the excel 2003 
software. This allowed for easy grouping of all the answers according to emerging themes and patterns. 
The patterns were then matched from the different data sources to check for triangulation of the 
72 
- --~ --------
information. Where a respondent made a more unusual or strong point, these were all noted down. All the 
write ups -from the key informant interviews, the focus group discussions and the questionnaires were all 
saved and would be available for verification. all the focus group reports are presented in Appendix 3.0. 
The last phase is the Interpretation phase and this was undertaken in order to have a clear understanding 
of the analysis. Do the results of the analysis make any sense? What is the meaning of the results? This is 
what leads to the conclusion of the research. 
Responses to the closed ended questions yielded the quantitative data. The data was therefore checked 
for errors and coded before being analysed using the Statistical Package for Social Scientists [SPSS] 
software [version 16]. The SPSS package was used to provide descriptive statistics. Cross tabs were also 
run for some situations where there was a clear difference between respondents from different units such 
as regulatory institutions, government, service providers and NGOs. 
3.12 Subjective analysis of the cases using the BRTF framework 
The researcher developed a framework to analyse how well the three regulatory bodies [Ghana, 
Mozambique and Zambia] adhere to key regulatory principles. The regulatory principles were developed 
based on the BRTF framework. Two additional principles were developed which may be considered as 
priority issues for water sector regulatory institutions in the African context. These are 'services to the urban 
poor' and the 'level of independence or autonomy' of a regulator. The principles on which the subjective 
analysis was made are given below: 
i. Proportionality 
ii. Accountability 
iii. Consistency 
iv. Transparency 
v. Services to the urban poor 
vi. Independence/autonomy of the regulator 
Details on the first four principles which were developed from the BRTF were given in chapter 2.6.6. Below 
is the explanation of the basis for the two additional principles that the researcher is adding to the analysis. 
Services 10 Ihe urban poor; As already highlighted the majority of the urban dwellers in most sub-
Saharan African cities are considered poor hence the need to ensure that regulatory decisions also benefit 
this segment of the population. Means by which the achievement of this principle can be measured include: 
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availability of an up to date policy and strategy on regulating for the benefit of the urban poor, special 
programs to increase accessibility i.e. subsidies or free connections, special funding mechanisms, special 
tariff or pricing and payment mechanisms for the poor, incentives to the utilities to provide services to the 
urban poor, any special programs or initiatives targeting the urban poor and specific performance targets 
for services to the urban poor. 
Independence/autonomy: -Autonomy of the regulator should be understood to be one where the regulator 
has "organisational autonomy [organisationally separate from existing government ministries and 
departments], financial autonomYlwith an earmarked, secure, and adequate source of funding mainly 
through a regulatory fee], and management autonomYlautonomy over internal administration and protection 
from dismissal of the regulatory council and executive secretary without due cause]. The measure of 
achievement of this principle include as to whether the regulatory agency was established by law and has 
its own legal status giving clear guidance on appointment mechanisms of the regulatory commission, roles 
and functions of the agency clearly stated. Security of tenure of the regulatory commission members 
provided for in the law. Whether there is earmarked and secure funding source [mainly from regulatory fee] 
and no requirement for prior approval of regulatory decision including on tariffs by a government 
department or ministry before being implemented. Protection from dismissal of the commissioners and the 
executive secretary without due cause provided for in the law 
The framework used for analysing the cases is given in Table 3.10 
The research did not undertake a detailed impact analysis hence the scoring used is based on the ranking 
that the researcher did based on the interpretation of the research findings. A four scale scoring was used 
in the analysis. While no attempt was made to rank the regulatory institutions on which one is doing better 
in general, a comparison was made for each individual principle. Possible reasoning was given for each of 
the sub-principles. The scores for assessing levels of achievement were as follows: 4 is very high in 
relation to level of achievement of the principle, 3 is high, 2 is limited and 1 is low. 
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Table 3-10: Framework for analysing achievement of the principles of regulation in Africa 
Regulatory Definitions or aspects used for measuring level of achievement against the principle 
Principle 
The regulatory cost of addressing the perceived problem or risk compares favourably 
Proportionality with the services being regulated 
'Severity' of interventions compares favourably with the risks and costs of compliance 
Regulation seeks to be educational -rather than on a punitive approach. 
The regulator clearly explains to the regulated entities how and why certain final 
decisions were taken. 
There a clear appeal procedure with independent adjudication-if a utility is not satisfied 
with a regulatory decision 
Accountability The complaints' procedures are well publicised, fair and effective for consumers 
The regulator has clear lines of responsibility i.e. to Ministers, Parliaments and the 
public, as described in the law 
There exists a consumer consultative committee or council with opportunities to hold the 
utilities and regulator to account 
The regulator has substantive reporting and accounting audit obligations 
Principles of precedence (over time) apply as much as possible to enhance predictability 
Consistency and reduce uncertainties among the regulated 
Service providers are treated consistently across the country 
Clear objectives of regulation effectively communicated 
Consultation with stake holders on major policy changes 
The regulated entities have a clear understanding of their obligations 
Transparency There are clear decision making processes with all major decisions being made public 
e.g. through websites 
Documents and information used for decision making are available for public inspection. 
Performance data of the regulated entities are available to the public 
There are clear appointment processes of the regulatory commission members 
An up to date policy or strategy on regulating for the benefit of the urban poor is 
available 
There are suitable incentives in place for serving the poor [e.g trust funds, making it 
easier to connect] 
Services to the There are special programmes managed by the regulator that would benefit the urban 
urban poor poor i.e. advocacy programs 
There are special tariff provisions that are pro-poor 
There is evidence of ongoing improvements to services in informal settlements 
There are specific and effective performance measurement and targets for services in 
poor communities and informal settlements 
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Independence! There is a separate regulatory agency with its own legal status 
autonomy Roles and functions of the agency are clearly stated in the law Security of tenure of the regulatory commission members is provided for in the law 
Protection from dismissal of commissioners and Director without due cause is provided 
for in the law 
There are no requirement for regulatory decision to be approved by a govemment 
department or ministry before being implemented. 
The regulator has full authority to set and approve tariffs 
Source: Author's analysis 
3.13 Ethical considerations in the research 
In undertaking any research it is necessary to follow what is morally correct. In this respect ethical 
considerations are issues related to the moral rightness of the research .. This research was undertaken 
after taking into consideration a number of ethical issues in relation to the respondents to the 
questionnaires or interviews or that participated in the focus group discussions. Some of the issues that 
were taken into consideration include the following: 
• Respondents to the questionnaire were clearly advised that the research was purely academic and 
was not making implementation of any proposals related to policy changes. 
• All respondents who participated in the research did so voluntarily. No one was forced or coerced to 
take part in the research. 
• Any recording of the interviews was undertaken with permission of the respondent. In other words 
before undertaking any recordings the respondents were asked if they were comfortable to be 
recorded. 
• Care was taken to ensure that the respondents were not exposed to any undue danger as a result of 
participating in the research. 
• All responses were treated as confidential and their identity was kept anonymous. This was achieved 
through identifying the respondents by codes rather than their names. 
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3.14 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented the conceptual framework, the research strategy and the overview of the research 
methods that were used. The strategy that was selected is the multiple case study approach. Justification 
for adopting the multiple case study strategy was given and includes the robustness of the approach and 
the possibilities of replicability rather than generalisation. The research further provided information on the 
research setting from the three case study countries of Ghana, Mozambique and Zambia. Also discussed 
were the issues of reliability and validity of the data and how they were applied in this research through the 
use of multiple sources of data and triangulation of the results. The different data collection techniques 
employed in the study were presented and discussed together with the procedure by which the data was 
collected. The research utilised multiple sources of data including focus group discussions, key informant 
interviews, the questionnaire and documents. The questionnaire was semi-structured and had both closed 
ended and open ended questions. The chapter further stated how the research respondents to the 
questionnaire and the interviewees were selected, together with the reasons for their selection. In terms of 
analysis the research used the pattern matching for the individual cases and a cross case analysis for all 
the three cases brought together. A framework, based on the BRTF to undertake a subjective analysis of 
the three case study economic regulators, was developed and presented in the chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4.0 FIELD RE5UL T5 
This chapter presents the case studies of economic regulatory framework for urban water services in three 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The countries are Ghana, Mozambique and Zambia. It also presents the 
results based on responses to the questionnaire from the rest of the continent. 
Each case sought to respond to the three research questions albeit from the perspective of that particular 
case. Additional analysis using descriptive statistics was made for the data obtained from responses to the 
questionnaire from non-case countries. 
The general framework of each case is as follows: 
• Based on the evidence from literature a brief introduction to the case is given including the socio-
economic environment general country information i.e. location map, population, size, poverty 
levels, urbanisation rates. 
• Urban water sector -brief description of the arrangements for urban water services delivery, main 
causes of the poor service delivery and link to utility regulation. The source of the evidence on the 
urban water sector came from documents. 
• Regulatory framework -based on documents a description of the regulatory framework, legislative 
provisions, roles of the regulator as provided for in the legislation, and institutional arrangements of 
the regulator is given. 
• Evidence from the research -the research questions are answered using a comprehensive 
summary of the qualitative and quantitative findings. Where there were significant differences from 
different units of analysis -this is stated. The summaries are based on the data analysis from the 
different sources including the focus group discussions, key informant interviews and the 
questionnaire which were filled in by respondents from the respective case countries. 
• A summary of the findings from each case in response to the research questions is given in a table 
and a chapter summary gives a general finding from the case. 
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4.1 The Public Utility Regulatory Commission [PURC], GHANA 
4.1.1 Introduction 
The Public Utilities Regulatory Commission [PURC] is a multi-sector utility regulator and regulates three 
service providers -the Aqua Vittens Rand Limited [AVRL] as the service provider and the Ghana water 
company limited [GWCL] as the asset holding company, the Electricity Company of Ghana [ECG] and the 
Voila River Authority [VRA]. PURC is a statutory body established by an Act of Parliament No. 538 of 1997 
and started operations in 1999. The head of the PURC -the Executive Secretary holds a constitutional 
position sworn in by the State President after being selected competitively for the position. 
4.1.1.1 Data sources 
The evidence in this case study was from documents, responses from the focus group discussions, key 
informant interviews and the questionnaire. A focus group discussion was held in Ghana with key 
stake holders in the urban water sector. The report of the focus group discussion is presented in Appendix 
2. 
Key informant interviews were undertaken with 10 people from different institutions, i.e. three from the 
regulator, three from the water company, two from NGOs, one from the water resource commission and 
one from the government. The list of the key informant interviewees is given in Appendix 6. 
There were a total of 35 respondents to the questionnaire from Ghana of which 28 were from the water 
sector and 7 from the energy sector. 43% of the respondents were from the regulator, 17% from 
government and 40% were from the service provider. Eighty percent of the respondents were in senior 
management positions at the time of responding to the questionnaire. There was a fair distribution of the 
number of years respondents had spent in the water sector wtth the highest percentage being those with 
more than 15 years experience at 44% of the respondents. 
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Table 4-1: Ghana case -Data source for each research question 
Source of the data 
Item Quest. Doc. FGD Interviews 
-g- Population and population growth -.J 
",.l!l Poverty levels -.J 
'" 5i 
.aE Fragility level ..J x c: en CD 0 ~ 
'E .:: 0 
0>(3 Policy framework ..J ..J ..J uC:", CD _ 
Protecting consumers and service providers ..J ..J ..J ..J 
Providing guidelines on tariff setting ..J ..J ..J -.J 
Approval of tariffs -.J -.J -.J -.J 
Monitoring standards of performance ..J ..J 
c: 
Promoting competitive spirit in the sector ..J ..J ..J ..J 
~ Valuation of assets -.J -.J 
"S 
0> Advising government and the general public on -.J ..J ~ 
.~ water sector issues E 
0 Studies on economy and efficiency of GWCL ..J c: 0 
u 
CD Capacity building ..J ..J ..J "0 
en 
CD Information awareness on regulation and general 
-.J -.J 0 
er: service provision 
Incentives on services to the urban poor -.J -.J -.J -.J 
Ensuring GWCL achieves commercial viability ..J ..J 
Promotion of accountability of the utility -.J -.J 
Transparency in service delivery -.J -.J 
Autonomous regulatory institution ..J 
Multi-sectoral regulatory body ..J ..J 
en 
","E Reporting mechanisms of the regulator -.J -.J -.J -.J c: CD 
~ ~ 
.a c Funding mechanisms for the regulator -.J -.J ..J -.J :.;:: c 
en '" 
.E t:: Appointment of commissioners ..J ..J ..J ..J 
'" 
Appointing staff on competitive basis ..J ..J ..J ..J 
Involvement of consumers in regulation process -.J -.J -.J 
The columns in the table: Quest. refers to the questionnaire while Doc. refers to documents and FGD refers to the 
Focus Group Discussions 
Source: Author 
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4.1.2 General country information 
With an estimated population of 22.5 million 01 which 10.8 million was urban population (UN-OESA, 2003) 
Ghana is one of the most densely populated Countries in Africa. 
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Figure 4-1: Map of Ghana 
[source http://mapsol.netlghana] 
Like in many African countries, about 60 to 70% of the urban population in Ghana lives in informal 
settlements with little or no access to basic services such as water, electricity, sanitation etc. Most of these 
low-income dwellers live in the mUlti-occupancy building with single meters also known as the tenement 
houses or the "compound house" (UN Habitat, 2003). 
4.1.3 Existing environmental and socio-economic context in Ghana 
Ghana is generally considered an 'Island of peace and stability in the West Africa Sub-Region. The country 
has had four consecutive free and fair elections and democracy and freedom of expression is deepening. 
There is general respect for the rule of law in the country. 
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According to the Ghana Living Standard Survey poverty level was around 28% in 2005/6. It defined poverty 
as an economic index, characterising the poor as those subsisting on a per capita income of less than two-
thirds of the national average (OFIO, 2008). This works out to about US$126 per adult per year or 0.35 US$ 
per adult per day. The high level of political stability and the general good governance in the country are 
conducive for benefits of economic regulation of urban water services to be realised. 
4.1.4 Policy and institutional framework for urban water services 
The Ghanaian water sector operates under a policy framework developed through a consultative process 
which was adopted in June 2007 (Government of Ghana, 2007). The policy recognises water as an 
economic good and defines the institutional framework for the provision and regulation of urban water 
services. This was echoed by the respondents to the questionnaire who agreed that one of the reasons for 
poor performance of the water sector in many African Countries including Ghana has been lack of a clear 
and coherent policy framework. 
Water services in the urban areas in Ghana are provided by the Ghana Water Company Limited. This is a 
state owned organisation which became a company limited by shares in 1998. It provides water services in 
82 centres that have been defined as urban areas in Ghana thereby serving a population of about 6 million 
(Nyarko, 2007). In June 2006 the GWCL signed a 5 year performance based management contract with 
Vitens-Evides International in a joint venture with Rand Water Services [a South African bulk water 
supplier] forming the Aqua Vitens Rand Lld joint venture [AVR Itd]. GWCL retains the asset management 
and asset development responsibilities (Nyarko and Odai, 2008). 
GWCL has approximately 404,080 connections in the 82 towns that it provides water to. In the five year 
performance review of the company by the PURC of 2003, the water production had increased by 11.8% 
between 1998 and 2003. Unfortunately water sales remained static implying the company lost more water 
during the period. (PURC, 2005). 
Since establishment of the PURC the first major tariff approval was in 2002 when the tariff increase leaped 
from 2,284 cedis [US$0.28] per m3 to 4,813 cedis [US$0.60] per rn3. The operational unit costs were 
around 3,613 cedis [US$0.45] per m3(PURC, 2005). Unfortunately because of the low billing and collection 
rates the revenue was still not sufficient to meet the operational costs of the GWCL. In any case PURC 
policy is to assist GWCL to fully cover its costs through approving cost reflective water tariff, the efficient 
costs of operating and maintaining the assets of GWCL. PURC further undertakes major tariff reviews 
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every five years but monitors general country economic trends so that any signs of some negative impact 
i.e. inflation, exchange rate fluctuations etc. on the water company would be addressed at any time. 
4.1.5 Roles of the PURe 
Based on the different sources of data the roles of the PURC are generally grouped into five categories: 
• Approval of cost reflective tariffs 
• Protection of consumers 
• Development and enforcement of standards and monitoring the perfomnance of the GWCL 
• Providing knowledge base on urban water services 
• Enhancing water and sanitation services to the urban poor. 
4.1.5.1 Functions of the PURe based on the Act (Government of Ghana, 1997) 
According to the Act of Parliament the functions of the PURC are listed as follows: 
[a] To provide guidelines on rates chargeable for provision of utility services; 
[b] To examine and approve rates chargeable for provision of utility services; 
[cl To protect the interest of consumers and providers of utility services; 
[d] To monitor standards of performance for provision of services; 
[e] To initiate and conduct investigations into standards of quality of service given to consumers; 
[fj To promote fair competition among public service providers; 
[g] To conduct studies relating to economy and efficiency of public service providers; 
[h] To make such valuation of property of public service providers as it considers necessary for the 
purposes of the Commission; 
[i] To collect and compile such data on public service providers as it considers necessary for the 
performance of its functions; 
Ul To advise any person or authority in respect of any public utility; 
[k] To maintain a register of public service providers; and 
[I] To perform such other functions as are incidental to the foregoing. 
83 
Results from the questionnaire showing perception of respondents on roles of PURe 
The table below presents results from all the questions and sUb-questions that sought to establish the roles 
of economic regulation of urban water services. The table has responses to questions related to why 
establish a regulator i.e. promoting economic regulation since urban water service provision is monopoly 
industry as well as to the actual roles or functions of the regulator. The results in the tables show general 
support for establishment of a regulatory framework that can lead to efficient and effective service 
provision. The results also show that economic regulation is not the only type of regulation as there are 
other types of regulation i.e. environmental, social, water quality and technical standards regulation. No 
further elaboration is given on the different types of regulation as these are not the main subject of the 
research. There were a total of 35 respondents from Ghana and the table shows the percentage of these 
respondents that had a certain level of agreement with a particular assertion. 
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Table 4-2: Roles of Economic regulation from questionnaire responses from Ghana 
Strongly Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly No of Valid 
RolelLevel of agreement in % agree disagree responses 
1 Protecting the interest of consumers 91 9 0 0 0 32 
Setting standards for the pertormance of service 
2 providers 82 18 0 0 0 33 
3 Advise govemment on water and sewerage matters 73 27 0 0 0 34 
4 Development of guidelines on setting of tariffs 50 50 0 0 0 34 
5 Ensure sustainability of the water sector 79 15 6 0 0 34 
6 Correct any market failure in the water sector 34 63 3 0 0 34 
Participate in contract negotiations to do with the 
involvement of the private sector in the management 
7 of water service delivery. 55 39 6 0 0 32 
8 Promoting competition among utility providers 55 36 9 0 0 33 
9 Issuing licences 67 21 9 3 0 34 
Protect the interests of service providers from arbitrary 
10 government intervention 58 18 6 18 0 34 
Develop subsidy guidelines for services to the urban 
11 poor. 33 24 6 36 0 34 
Ensure that government and any public institution pays 
12 for the services they receive 42 12 39 6 0 34 
Conducting studies related to economy and efficiency 
13 of the service providers 27 18 48 6 0 35 
Keep an accurate value of the property or assets of 
14 the service providers. 15 24 27 33 0 35 
Develop the operational guidelines for the service 
15 providers. 18 12 33 36 0 35 
16 Provide guidelines on Governance structures 21 9 18 52 0 35 
Because provision of urban water supply and 
sanitation services tends to be monopolistic in nature 
there is need to introduce adequate regulatory 
17 frameworks in order to promote competition. 63 29 5 3 0 35 
Regulation of the provision of urban water supply and 
sanitation services would reduce the abuse of 
18 monopoly power. 66 28 6 0 0 35 
In order to have an efficient water supply and 
sanitation sector it is necessary to introduce an 
autonomous regulator in the Water Supply and 
19 Sanitation Sector? 57 43 0 0 0 35 
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Strongly Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly No of Valid 
RolelLevel of agreement in % agree disagree responses 
Regulation may be needed for various purposes. What type of regulation is mostly needed in developing countries 
20 especially in Africa for the water supply and sanitation sector? 
a Economic regulation including service quality 69 31 0 0 0 35 
Social regulation (access to water and sanitation 35 
b services) 27 19 0 0 0 
c Environmental regulation 85 11 4 0 0 35 
d Water quality regulation (basically health regulation) 42 58 0 0 0 35 
e Technical standards regulation (standards bureau) 15 15 70 0 0 35 
Countries in Africa need clear regulatory framework, 33 
because of poor transparency, accountability, and high 
21 corruption, etc. 64 29 4 3 0 
Adequate utility regulation should assist utilities secure 34 
22 financial and management autonomy 73 15 12 0 0 
Establishment of appropriate independent economic 34 
23 utility regulation promotes accountability of utilities? 40 57 3 0 0 
Establishment of Autonomous utility regulation 34 
24 promotes transparency of utilities 40 57 3 0 0 
Autonomous economic utility regulators should ensure 34 
25 that utilities achieve commercial viability. 74 26 0 0 0 
Autonomous economic regulation should result in 34 
26 general performance improvements of utilities. 71 26 3 0 0 
The regulator should promote the social values of 32 
water with a need to ensure that utilities provide water 
27 services to the urban poor 35 65 0 0 0 
Utility regulators of the water sector should regulate 35 
28 the small-scale water providers directly 33 19 44 4 0 
Autonomous regulators should be party to negotiation 35 
of contracts with private operators i.e. management, 
29 lease or concession contracts. 26 11 7 56 0 
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YES/NO QUESTIONS YES NO No of Valid 
responses 
30 In order to have improved and efficient provision of services, regulators should 35 
a Penalise utilities for non-compliance 93 7 35 
b Take utilities that do not comply to courts of law 70 30 35 
c Use the National police service to enforce the regulations 23 77 35 
31 How should regulators deal with issues of services to the urban poor 34 
a Develop tariff regime that encourages utilities to serve the urban poor 75 25 34 
b Develop and enforce regulations that aim at protecting the urban poor 39 61 34 
c Encourage utilities to provide services 14 86 34 
d Provide guidelines on innovative ways of providing services to the urban poor. 93 7 34 
32 How should small-scale water providers be regulated? 33 
a Establish regulations specifically for small scale Autonomous water providers 30 70 33 
b Develop technical standards which are only suited for the Small Water Enterprises 22 78 33 
c Only regulate through the main utility operator 74 26 33 
What do you think would be the influence of utility regulation on the business strategies of the water utilities i.e. 34 
33 employment policies, tariff structures e.t.c. 
a Promote openness in recruitment and financial management 74 26 34 
b Reduction on the operational costs of utilities 63 37 34 
c Cut down on staff numbers 11 89 34 
Source: Author's analysis of data 
The above table presents the perception of the respondents to the various questions on the roles of 
economic regulation in Ghana. The last column represents the number of valid responses received to the 
specific question out of the total number of respondents. The results show a general agreement to most of 
the assertions proposed in the questionnaire. There was however the following points where there was no 
clear agreement. These questions related to whether the regulator should develop subsidy guidelines for 
services to the urban poor, ensure that govemment and any public institution pays for the services they 
receive, conducting studies related to economy and efficiency of the service providers, keep an accurate 
value of the property or assets of the service providers. There was also no general agreement on whether 
the economic regulator should develop operational guidelines for the service providers, provide guidelines 
on Governance structures and develop technical standards regulation [standards bureau], and whether 
utility regulators of the water sector should regulate the small-scale water providers directly. Detailed 
explanation of the results is given below in relation to the different perceptions. 
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4.1.5.2 Approval of tariffs leading to commercial viability 
This role is achieved through ensuring that the tariffs are cost reflective. Since establishment it was only in 
2005 that the PURC developed a water tariff policy. The main objective of the tariff policy is to ensure that 
GWCL achieves commercial viability through allowing them [GWCLj charge tariffs that are cost reflective. 
The tariff policy advocates for uniform rising block tariffs for all domestic consumers with a lifeline tariff 
meant to assist the urban poor that have house connections(PURC, 2005). The lifeline tariff is set to cover 
6m3 the costs of the basic minimum household requirements at a rate that reflects affordability by the 
poorest section of the served community. Non-domestic consumers have a higher single band volumetric 
tariff. 
During the focus group discussions one of the GWCL employees supported the idea that one of the roles of 
the regulator should be to ensure that the GWCL achieves commercial viability. Consumers are ready to 
pay for water as long as it is there; the regulator should therefore allow the GWCL charge tariffs that will 
help them provide sustainable water services, while taking into account the affordability of different sections 
of society. In this respect the regulator must work like an arbiter between the utility and the consumers, 
ensuring that the interests of both parties are protected. During the key informant interviews one of the 
consumers felt that consideration should be given to ensuring that the tariffs are affordable and that there is 
no exploitation by the GWCL of the consumers especially being asked to pay for services that are not 
there. Sometimes consumers receive fixed bills for a full month and yet water could have only been 
received for one full week. 
All the respondents to the questionnaire agreed that one of the roles of utility regulation should be to help 
service providers achieve commercial viability as per the results in row number 25 of table 4-2. They were 
further of the view that economy and efficiency should be achieved through appropriate tariffs also reflected 
in the results in line 4 in table 4-2. 
The above shows a general perception that one of the roles of economic regulation should be to assist 
service providers achieve commercial viability through approval of appropriate tariffs. The graph below 
shows that before 1999 the tariffs were below the unit cost of production but the picture changed from 
2000. The figure below only reflects the average unit cost of operation and maintenance. 
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Figure 4-2: Ghana case - Average tariff versus average unit supplied cost 
Source: PURC 
PURC has over the years been making every effort to help GWCL achieve cost recovery. This is evidenced 
from the tariff adjustment progression that was approved up to 2003 and shown in the figure above. No 
operation and maintenance cost data was available for the years 2004 to 2007 at the time of data 
collection. While PURC has made the efforts, GWCL had not exploited the opportunity to achieve cost 
recovery based on these favourable tariffs which are higher than the operational and maintenance unit cost 
up to 2003 when the review by PURC was undertaken. With the recent signing of a performance 
management contract with AVR Ltd, there is promise that the company will progress towards achieving 
cost recovery. The problem of achieving cost recovery is not only with the tariff level but the ability of the 
GWCL to collect. Even if a tariff may be high, if the billing and/or collection level is low then the benefit will 
not be realised. Cost recovery is also about operational efficiency. A utility should be able to bill and collect 
the higher tariff in order to achieve cost recovery. The functions to support the role of assisting the GWCL 
to achieve commercial viability include the following: 
• Developing clear guidelines on tariff setting also reflected in line 4 on table 4-2 on the table above 
• Approval of tariffs which are aimed at assisting GWCL but at the same time affordable by the 
different type of consumers. 
• Capacity building of the GWCL 
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4.1.5.3 Consumer protection 
The PURC undertakes protection of consumers through ensuring that the tariffs reflect the actual cost of 
providing the water services and that the utility provides the services according to agreed standards. It also 
analyses complaints that it receives from the consumers and tries to ensure that the tariffs are also related 
to the affordability levels of the consumers. The Bureau of Consumer Services [BCS] within the PURC 
Secretariat has the responsibility of ensuring that the GWCL delivers good quality of service to meet 
consumer expectations. 
During focus group discussions one of the consumers suggested that the PURC should ensure that 
provision of services is done in an efficient and cost effective manner. Another consumer from an NGO -
ISODEC specifically stated during the focus group discussion that "One of the main roles of the PURC 
should be to ensure that the monopolistic tendencies by the provider are curtailed through ensuring that 
tariffs reflect actual costs of provision of water services rather than having consumers paying for their own 
inefficiencies. Even though Ghana has only one national urban water service provider, there is need to 
introduce a kind of competitive spirit in the sector". The regulator should develop an information system that 
shows transparency in terms of information related to performance of the service providers. There must be 
clear explanations on the tariff structures which most consumers do not know about. The consumers during 
the focus group discussions stated that they "are not against public service providers achieving cost 
recovery based on higher tariffs but they must be given the explanations of how the tariffs are arrived af'. 
The above point was agreed upon by one of the interviewees. He felt that the regulator should assist in 
"killing off the mentality that consumers have little choice but to deal with Ghana Water Company. Such 
mentality only makes the company be complacent in its operations'. The regulator should therefore protect 
the consumers from the poor services that they have been subjected to for a long time. 
From the responses to the questionnaire there was similar agreement that one of the roles of a utility 
regulator should be to protect consumers. As can be seen from the above table 4-2 in the first row 91 % of 
the respondents to the questionnaire were in agreement that one of the regulatory roles should be to 
protect consumers. 
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Based on the different sources of data and in relation to the role of consumer protection the regulator is 
expected to perform the following specific functions: 
.:. Designing appropriate consumer complaints mechanisms by the PURC 
.:. Ensuring that the AVRL has adequate tariffs that cover their operational costs but reflect 
affordability levels of the consumers 
.:. Dissemination of all information on water services including clarifying the role of the PURC and 
performance of the service providers, 
.:. Requiring the service providers to develop customer charters and other relevant documents on 
rights and obligations of service providers and consumers and having them displayed in open 
places 
.:. Advising service providers on procedures for handling complaints from consumers 
4.1.5.4 Monitoring performance of the GWCL through AVRL 
PURC monitors the performance of the GWCL through its management contractor the AVRL annually with 
a substantive review undertaken every five years. According to the first five year review of PURC the 
GWCL failed to achieve the targets set by PURC. One example is on the main targets that GWCL was 
expected to achieve in 2002 which included unaccounted for water of 45% and a collection efficiency of 
95%. Between 2000 and 2002 the situation even deteriorated with NRW remaining at 51% and a collection 
efficiency dropping from 86% in 2000 to 77% in 2002 (PURC, 2005). Nevertheless, PURC sees no need to 
define and apply specific incentives or penalties if GWCL does or does not achieve the performance 
targets. According to PURC these penalties are included in the tariff approval process. Upward tariff 
adjustment cannot be approved as long as the GWCL has poor collection and high NRW. 
During the focus group discussions with the PURC, they stated that the Commission uses three main 
approaches for monitoring the performance of GWCL, namely: 
.:. Auditing approach where performance reports based on formats agreed with GWCL are presented . 
• :. Physical Approach/Inspection where the PURC physically and routinely inspects operators' 
premises, plants equipment and their areas of service . 
• :. The third monitoring mechanism is undertaken through consumer feedback obtained through 
holding of public fora and surveys. 
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One of the interviewees from the GWCL felt that the PURC should develop clear guidelines on general 
utility operations. The guidelines should have clear indicators to be achieved. The PURC should also 
develop capacity building programmes to help the employees of the GWCL understand and implement the 
measures proposed in the guidelines. 
During the focus group discussions there was a general agreement that PURC should monitor the 
performance of the GWCL. There was a strong recommendation that the PURC should produce a 
performance report on GWCL on annual basis as opposed to the current situation where the PURC only 
produces review reports on five year cycles. The reports must be made available to the public as this will 
enhance the transparency of the systems. 
From the questionnaire responses the role came out clearly as shown in line 8 on promoting competition. 
Other roles related to monitoring the performance include those roles where the regulator is required to 
ensure utilities achieve i.e. sustainability as in line 5 of the above table, conducting studies on efficiency of 
utilities in line 13 of table 4·2. 
Promotion of competition in the urban water services delivery 
According to the results of the questionnaire [based on quantitative analysis] most of the respondents were 
in agreement that it is necessary to introduce some regulatory framework in order to curb the monopolistic 
tendencies of the urban water services delivery. This is reflected in line 8 of Table 4·2. 
The results show all the 35 responses to this question were valid of which 94% were in agreement with the 
proposition that introducing a regulatory framework would reduce the abuse of monopoly power by service 
providers. This is reflected in the 18th line of the same table. 
Based on the evidence from the focus group discussions and also from the key informant interviews and 
the questionnaire the following came out as specific functions to support the role of monitoring the 
performance of GWCL. 
i. Development of guidelines on the utility operations to be achieved by the GWCL including water 
quality, human resources development and general technical operations 
ii. Develop and enforce standards for water services. 
iii. Production and dissemination of annual performance reports of the GWCL 
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4.1.5.5 Advisory services and know/edge base on urban water services 
Another role of the PURe that came out of the focus group discussion was that of providing advisory 
services to government. A regulator should normally have a clear overview of how the urban water sector is 
performing and so is well placed to provide advice to government or indeed any other person requiring 
information. 
A government representative during the focus group discussion was in agreement with this role being 
played by the PURe. He further stated that it is very difficult for government to obtain the necessary 
elements of information to help it make informed decisions for any policy adjustment. Based on the 
questionnaire responses there was 100% agreement that the regulator should provide advice to 
government on water and sewerage matters as shown in line 3 of the table above. 
Based on the above perceptions and in support of the advisory role of the PURe it should undertake the 
following functions: 
i. Being a repository of knowledge on general urban water supply and sanitation issues 
ii. Undertaking studies on economy and efficiency of water service providers 
4.1.5.6 Services to the urban poor 
While the PURe act does not give specific role of regulating services for the benefit of the urban poor, this 
could be covered under the role of consumer protection. However this may not be sufficient because the 
consumer protection role relates mainly to those that receive water directly from the AVRL. The regulatory 
role of the PURe is therefore skewed towards regulating services by the main service provider. According 
to the PURe only 15% of the urban poor population are actually on the network (PURe, 2005).The PURe 
developed a social policy which outlines its role and intervention on services to the urban poor (PURe, 
2005). 
The intervention of the PURe as far as water services for the urban poor is concerned includes the use of 
lifeline tariffs and the provision of water using public standpipes. The lifeline tariff "reflects affordability but is 
not less than basic operational unit costs excluding depreciation and return on capital" (PURe, 2005, p. 7). 
The lifeline tariff is limited to the first 6m3 of water consumption per household per month. While the policy 
of lifeline tariffs is for good intentions to meet the needs of the poor, they only benefit the 15% of the urban 
poor mentioned above that have house connections. 
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In Ghana the barrier for the poor having a house connection is not so much prohibitive connection fees but 
a result of a lack of adequate infrastructure or network. This is despite the fact that the PURC does not give 
concessions on connection fees to the urban poor (PURC, 2005). Notwithstanding this position PURC 
promotes and supports any strategies by the GWCL designed to assist the poor to gain access to the piped 
water supply system through funding mechanisms specifically designed to help the urban poor. One 
example that is supported by the PURC is the recent Ghana urban water project mainly financed by the 
World Bank. Out of US$130 million a total of US$10 million was earmarked for pro-poor activities (Nyarko 
and Odai, 2008). 
Since the poor are not usually connected to the main supply their principal source of water is alternative 
service providers. PURC in its tariff policy recognises the existence of alternative service providers but felt 
that their water tariffs could not be regulated as this could be achieved through market forces. However, the 
prices charged by GWCL to the water tankers are subject to PURC price regulation (PURC, 2005). There 
are numerous water tanker operators in the larger towns like Accra, Kumasi, and Tamale. The water tanker 
operators are self regulated through the tanker association to which they all belong. Their tariffs however 
remain unregulated except for those that get their water from the AVRL. 
During the focus group discussions there was a feeling that the urban poor are neglected in the whole 
regulatory framework as the PURC is mainly concerned with regulating services provided by the AVRLL. 
The focus group felt that the PURC needs to do more by developing rules or regulations for the alternative 
service providers including tanker operators. According to one of the respondents tanker operators do not 
even follow the water tariff that is approved by PURe and instead charge higher prices usually giving 
reasons of high fuel prices. Another participant felt that the PURC Act should clearly define the issue of 
promoting services to the urban poor as one of its roles. 
The perception from the PURC respondents to the questionnaire is that it is the role of the utility regulatory 
framework to ensure that the urban poor have access to water regardless of whether the services are 
provided by the AVRL or alternative service providers. The responses to the questionnaire are indicated in 
Table 4-2 through line 27 where all the respondents were in agreement with the assertion that the 
regulators should promote social values of water with a need to ensure that utilities provide water services 
to the urban poor. The research recognises that it may not be possible for utilities to provide services 
directly to the urban poor but would need to build partnerships with small scale water providers. The results 
reflected in the 38th line that 52% of the 35 respondents were in agreement with the assertion that small 
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scale water providers should be regulated directly while 44% were uncertain. The respondents further 
provide useful suggestions on how services to the urban poor can be regulated including developing tariff 
regimes that encourages utilities to serve the urban poor as given in line 31 [a], develop and enforce 
regulations aiming at protecting the urban poor as reflected in line 31 [b] and providing innovative ways of 
providing services to the urban poor. Another relevant response was on how small scale water providers 
are to be regulated. About 74% of the respondents suggested regulating of the small scale providers 
through the main service provider as reflected in line 31 [cl and that there is no need to have specific 
technical standards for the small scale providers only -see line 32[b] in table 4-2 
Based on the three sources of data there is general agreement that one of the roles of PURe should be to 
regulate services to the urban poor. To require service providers like AVRL to design innovative 
programmes on extending services to the urban poor. But it is also important that the regulator is involved 
in the regulation of alternative service providers though there was no agreement how this should be 
achieved. PURe act should clearly provide for regulation of services to the urban poor as this will oblige it 
to develop pro-poor regulatory tools. 
The functions to support the role of regulating services to the urban poor should include: 
i. Developing regulatory tools for alternative service providers including licensing procedures 
ii. Develop guidelines for subsidies on services to the urban poor 
iii. Approve tariffs that alternative service providers should change regardless of their source of water 
iv. Develop consultation mechanisms with the urban poor 
4.1.6 Institutional arrangements of the PURe 
This section therefore presents results on the perceptions on the institutional arrangements for the PURe 
from the documents, focus group discussions, key informant interviews and questionnaire. PURe was 
established under the PURe Act No. 538 and is a statutory body corporate with perpetual succession and a 
common seal and may sue and be sued in its corporate name (Government of Ghana, 1997). 
There was general agreement from the respondents to the questionnaire with the decision taken by 
government to establish an autonomous regulator for the two monopoly services -water and electricity. 
They were further in agreement with the assertion that if the regulator was part of a government Ministry 
then it would not be very effective as it would not be autonomous. 
95 
The results indicate that 77% of the respondents were in agreement that if the regulatory function lay within 
the political sphere of govemment there is a risk that water tariffs, service standards and investment 
priorities could be manipulated to serve the short term interests of the political systems. The results are 
shown in the table below 4-3. 
The question on whether to establish a separate institution to perform regulatory function was also asked in 
a different way. A statement was made that the institutional arrangements of the regulalory body has an 
effect on its operational efficiencies. Respondents were asked to state yes or no if they agree with the three 
proposals given. The three proposals were: 
• Create a regulator as a Department within the "Ministry responsible for Wate( 
• Establish a totally new regulatory body [with own new resources]-whether single or multi-sector 
regulator. 
• Contract out some elements of regulation to reputable, technically competent private sector firms. 
All the 35 responses to this question were valid of which 77% said they did not agree that to perform the 
regulatory functions a Department within the Ministry responsible for Water should be established. Instead 
all the 35 respondents agreed with the establishment of a separate agency to perform regulatory functions. 
The table below presents responses to the questionnaire on all the questions related to the institutional 
arrangements for the regulator. The results generally are in support of establishment of an autonomous 
regulatory body. All 35 respondents agree that if the regulatory authority was within the political sphere of 
government there is likelihood that sector priorities can be manipulated to serve short-term electoral 
interests. Respondents further agree that regardless of the institutional arrangements of the service 
provider, economic regulation should still be provided. These are reflected in lines 2, 3 and 4 in the table 
below. 
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Table 4-3: Questionnaire responses on Institutional arrangements for the regulator in Ghana 
Strongly Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly No 01 valid 
Institutional arrangemenVLevel 01 agreement in % agree disagree responses 
If regulatory authority lies within the political sphere of 
government, there is likelihood that sector priorities 
can be manipulated to serve short-term electoral 
1 interests. 85 15 0 0 0 35 
It is not necessary to establish a regulator in a 
situation where water services provision is entrusted 
to the private operator through a concession or lease 
contract as the regulatory issues can be included in 
2 the contract. 0 0 4 52 44 34 
There should be different regulatory mechanisms for 
different type of Private Sector Participation contracts 
Le. for a management contract, lease contract, 
3 concession 0 18 4 59 19 34 
Where municipalities have contracted another 
organisation to manage the provision of services, 
there is no need to have a separate regulator as the 
regulatory functions can be carried out by the 
4 municipality. 0 15 7 37 41 35 
In order to ensure independence in its operations, the 
5 regulator should be an autonomous statutory body. 79 21 0 0 0 35 
The regulatory body should have a two tier system of 
Governance. A regulatory CounciVcommission and 
6 the executing body or secretariat. 68 26 6 0 0 35 
The members of the regulatory council should be 
7 appointed by government. 3 64 15 15 3 35 
Employees of the executing body [the secretariat} 
including the Executive Director should be appointed 
by the Regulatory council through a competitive and 
8 transparent process. 59 41 0 0 0 34 
In order to have a well informed regulatory council 
the Executive Director must be a full member of the 
9 council. 35 24 3 38 0 24 
Consumers should be represented on the regulatory 
10 council. 62 35 3 0 0 31 
In order to have an effective follow up of the 
implementation of the regulations, consumer watch 
11 groups must established. 68 29 3 0 0 32 
Autonomy of the regulator is strengthened if he is 
12 resourced [financially] by a regulatory fee 68 29 3 0 0 34 
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Strongly Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly No of valid 
Institutional arrangemenVLevel of agreement in % agree disagree responses 
For most African Countries, multi-sectoral regulatory 
framework is more appropriate as it is more cost 
effective and has reduced likelihood of industry 
13 regulatory capture. 22 56 16 6 0 29 
Yes No No of 
valid 
Questions seeking YES/NO answers responses 
The institutional arrangements of the regulatory body can have an impact on its operational efficiencies. 
14 What do you think should be the institutional framework for the economic regulator 34 
a Create a regulator as a Department within the "Ministry responsible for Water' 41 59 35 
Establish a totally new regulatory body [with own new resources]-whether single or 
b multi-sector regulator. 57 43 35 
Contract out some elements of regulation to reputable, technically competent private 
c sector firms 11 89 35 
15 The utility regulator would enjoy greater autonomy in its operations if the regulator: 27 
a Reports to a sector Ministry 0 100 27 
b Reports to a completely non-sectoral Ministry i.e. the Prime Ministers office 11 89 26 
c Reports to Parliament just like other statutory bodies like the auditor General 96 4 27 
If government was to establish a multi-sector regulator which other sector do you think the water regulator 
16 should be partnered with? 32 
a Telecommunication 33 67 33 
b Electricity 96 4 33 
c Banking 4 96 33 
d Railway 4 96 32 
Source: Author's analysis of data 
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4.1.6.1 Structure, composition and reporting mechanism of the PURe 
The PURC Act does not only define the establishment of PURC but also outlines the composition of the 
commission, appointment mechanisms for the commissioners and gives their functions. The autonomy of 
the commission is enshrined in the same Act which states that the Commission shall not be subject to the 
direction or control of any person or authority in the performance of its functions. 
According to the PURC Act the Commission comprises 9 persons appointed by the State President in 
consultation with the Council of State and are as follows: 
[a] a chairman; 
[b] One person nominated by the Trades Union Congress; 
[cl One person nominated by the Association of Ghana Industries; 
[d] One representative of domestic consumers; 
[e] The Executive Secretary appointed through the public service commission 
[~ Four other persons with knowledge in matters relevant to the functions of the Commission. 
Commissioners are appOinted on five year renewable terms and can only be removed on very solid 
grounds such as insolvency, illness that leads to incapacitating the commissioner in the delivery of 
functions as commissioner or for other un-stated just cause. The executive secretary is appOinted by the 
President on recommendation from the public service commission identified through a competitive selection 
method. The Executive Secretary is protected by law from arbitrary dismissals and enjoys a security of 
tenure of office spelt out in the legislation. All the commissioners take oath of office before the President 
thereby elevating the importance of the office of commissioner. 
During the key informant interviews and on the appointment mechanisms of the commissioners for the 
PURC, the NGOs clearly stated that "the commissioners including the chairman should not be appointed by 
government as this reduces their level of independence in making regulatory decisions". They proposed 
that commissioners should be appointed after a public call for candidature. The Chairman of the regulatory 
commission on the other hand felt that there is need to de-link the appointment of the commissioners by 
government with the level of autonomy. The fact that the commissioners are appointed by govemment 
does not and should not in any way dilute the autonomy that the regulator has or should have in regulatory 
decision making. The NGOs were further not happy that there are some discretionary powers for the 
President through the council of state to appoint up to 4 commissioners with knowledge in matters relevant to 
the functions of the Commission but with no institutional linkages i.e. do not represent any institution. 
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According to them these powers could easily be abused as people may be appointed as commissioners 
based on political linkages rather than their professional competencies. 
The Chairman of the PURC reports to the office of the President. Annually the PURC presents a 
performance report to Parliament. It is legally bound to provide annually audited accounts to the Auditor 
General within six months of the end of a financial year. 
During the key informant interviews, the PURC expressed agreement with the reporting mechanisms. One 
of the interviewees felt that this somehow shields the commission from potential sectoral ministerial capture 
and also assures higher levels of operational autonomy. The Chairman of the commission only reports 
according to the statutory requirements. For al/ intents and purposes therefore the commission operates 
independently. The results from the questionnaire indicate that the PURC enjoys a higher degree of 
autonomy because it does not report to a sector Ministry. There was however some different thoughts of 
the respondents from the regulator who felt their autonomy would be enhanced if they reported to 
Parliament directly rather than through the office of the President. 
On the reporting mechanism, out of the 35 responses only 27 were valid for this question and all of them 
were in agreement with the PURC reporting to the office of the President. This is reflected in line 15 of the 
table 4.3. On the question of autonomy, all the 34 responses which were valid to this question out of the 35 
that were received were in agreement with the perception that the PURC is more autonomous in its 
operations because it does not report to a sectoral Ministry. 
However with an additional suggestion of a possibility of reporting to Parliament, the respondents favoured 
this to reporting to a non-sectoral Ministry. 
100 
The responses are summarised in the table below: 
Table 4-4: Reporting mechanism for the regulator 
Reporting mechanism More likely of achieving Less likely [%] 
greater autonomy [%] 
Reporting to a sectoral Ministry 0 100 
Reporting to a non-sectoral ministry i.e. Prime 11 89 
Minister's office 
Reporting to Parliament like the Auditor General 96 4 
Source: Author's analysis of data 
The table shows that most of the respondents were in agreement that autonomy of the regulator would be 
enhanced if PURC was reporting to Parliament rather than to a sectoral Ministry or even to a non-sectoral 
Ministry i.e. the President's office. While this assures greater autonomy, PURC currently reports to the 
office of the President. 
4.1.6.2 Multi-sectoral regulatory body 
The Public Utilities Regulatory Commission [PURC] was set-up as a multi-sector regulatory body for energy 
[excluding petroleum products] and water. Though establishment of a water regulator was envisaged, the 
establishment of PURC was accelerated due to rising public opposition against planned tariff increases of 
electricity by government of up to 300% in July 1997 (WSRS, 2000). 
The participants in the focus group discussions were requested to state as to whether they were in 
agreement with the current institutional arrangements of the PURC. The PURC felt their multi-sectoral 
nature means they are shielded to some extent from regulatory capture by the regulated companies or 
indeed by government sector ministries as they report to a non-sectoral ministry. They can make more 
prudent use of the resources available to them through using common services i.e. legal, consumer care 
etc. This was further supported by the GWCL which was also in agreement with the current institutional 
arrangement of the PURC as a multi-sectoral regulator reporting directly to the office of the President. They 
however felt that the PURC seems to pay more attention to the electricity sub-sector. One of the 
participants stated that 'This influence was evident even after more than 5 years of operation, as electricity 
regulation clearly overshadowed the regulation of the water sector in Ghana". 
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Respondents to the questionnaire were requested to state if they were in agreement with the idea that for 
Ghana, multi-sectoral regulatory framework is more appropriate. Out of the 35 responses received 32 of 
them were valid for this question of which 78% were in agreement that multi-sector regulatory framework is 
appropriate as it is more cost effective and has reduced likelihood of industry regulatory capture. This is 
shown in the figure below 
Perception on whether single or multi-utility 
regulator 
56% 
D Strongly agree 
• Agree 
o Lh1certain 
o Disagree 
Figure 4-3: Ghana case -perception on multi-utility regulator 
Source: Author's analysis of data 
Essentially what the above section has shown is that the perception from all the sources of data -triangulate 
towards encouraging establishment of a separate institutional body to undertake regulatory functions. 
4.1.6.3 Funding arrangements for the PURe 
The Act defines the funding arrangements for the PURe. The main source of funding for the PURe is the 
government annual budgetary allocation. Funds for the PURe can come from any of the following sources 
[a] government subvention; 
[b] Any loans granted to the Commission; 
[cl Any monies accruing to the Commission in the course of the performance of its functions under the Act; and 
[d] Grants. 
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There is no regulatory fee charged on the regulated industries. This funding mechanism has made the 
operations of the commission rather difficult. According to its annual report of 2006, the Commission's 
funding difficulties had not been resolved. The financial difficulty had "become an annual ritual of arbitrary 
imposition of a budgetary ceiling bearing no relation to the Commission's requirements for effective 
operatiori'. For example the Commission's submitted proposed total budget [for operations in regulating 
both the water and energy sectors] in 2001 was C:8.0 billion [approximately 1 million US$] and what was 
approved was only c:2, 057,327,346 [approx 250,000 US$]-barely a quarter of what the PURC had asked 
for. This reduction was based on an arbitrarily imposed ceiling by the government. The report further stated 
that "the effect of this is to deny the Commission the opportunity to carry out projects and activities which 
are considered critical if the PURC is to fulfil its statutory and regulatory responsibilities'. 
The annual report further states that "the Commission would continue to seek to secure its own funding 
through the imposition of a levy or regulatory charge on the service providers". This would relieve 
government of the burden on the central budget, and provide more flexibility for PURC. 
During the focus group discussions the PURC advised that they felt constrained with the current funding 
arrangements and their autonomy from government is compromised. The intermittent funding from 
govemment has resulted in a lot of operational problems as they do not usually receive the full allocation 
provided in the approved budget. Even when a budget is approved by Parliament, there is no assurance 
that the funds will be released according to the approved budget. It all depends on government's liquidity 
situation during the financial year. Unfortunately PURC had experiences of budget cuts at both levels. 
During the focus group discussions PURC advised of instances when the regulator would request for a lift 
from the utility Company in order to conduct an inspection. This can easily result in compromise in 
undertaking regulatory functions. There were a number of times when the PURC did not receive the whole 
budget allocation that was approved by the government. The funding for the commission is certainly one of 
the constraints in its operations. During the time of the research, there were efforts to introduce a regulatory 
fee in Ghana. The PURC is not able to meet most of its operational costs and can not retain key staff due 
to low salaries. The commission had as a result lost 4 key staff through resignations for the reason of low 
salaries. From the 35 questionnaire responses received, the research results show that 97% of the 34 valid 
responses to the question on funding mechanisms were in agreement that autonomy of the regulator is 
enhanced if the regulator is resourced through a regulatory fee rather than from government budgetary 
allocations. 
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Respondents to the questionnaire on funding of the regulator were of the view that PURe should be 
financed through a regulatory fee charged on the regulated service providers as reflected in line 12 of the 
table below. They felt this enhances the autonomy of the PURe. 
4.1.7 Subjective analysis towards achievement of the regulatory principles of the PURe 
A subjective analysis was undertaken on the level of achievement of the PURe to the principles of 
economic regulation in sub·Saharan Africa. Below is a subjective analysis which gives the researcher's 
evaluation based on the research findings with respect to the level to which the PURe adheres to the 
principles. 
The scoring is based on the framework given in chapter 3.12 under the research methodology. The level of 
scores are: 4 is [very high], 3 is [high], 2 is [Iow] and 1 is [very low] 
104 
Table 4-5: Analysis of level of achievement of economic regulatory principles: PURC 
Regulatory Definition of the principle Level of Comments 
principle achievement 
The cost of regulation as 1 [very low] There is un-proportionally low cost 
compared to cost of services spent on regulation, making it 
being regulated. ineffective 
'Severity' of interventions 2 [Iow] Number of connected consumers is 
Proportionality compared to the risks and costs low 
of compliance 
Regulation should also seek to 3 [high] PURC has some capacity building 
be educational -capacity building activities especially related to 
rather than a punitive approach. customer care 
The regulator should clearly 1 [very low] Tariff guidelines for water services 
explain to the regulated entities not available. 
how and why certain final 
decisions were taken. 
How clear are the appeal 1 [very low] There is no provision for appeal by 
procedures -if a utility is not the regulated entity if it is not 
satisfied with a regulatory satisfied with a regulatory decision 
decision 
There should also be well 3 [high] This is clearly spelt out in the 
publicised, fair and effective legislation. Question of how effective 
Accountability complaints procedures for the system is. 
consumers 
The regulator should have clear 1 [very low] Though in practice, PURC reports to 
lines of responsibility i.e. the office of the President, this is not 
Ministers, Parliaments and the clearly stated in the Act 
public 
Inclusiveness of the regulatory 2 [Iow] Consumers are represented on 
framework i.e. role of consumers PURC, law provides for 
establishment of consumer services 
committees 
The regulator should have 4 [very high] This is a requirement provided for in 
substantive reporting and the Act and is also done in practice 
accounting audit obligations 
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Regulatory Definition of the principle Level of Comments 
principle achievement 
Over time [principles of precedence 3 [high] Based on the information available, 
should apply as much as possible] PURC has been consistent over 
to enhance predictability and time in their regulatory decisions 
reduce uncertainties among the 
regulated 
Consistency Service providers treated 1 [very low] Electricity receives more regulatory 
consistently across the country focus than water. Evident even on 
website where tariff guidelines are 
available for electricity but nothing 
for water 
Clear objectives of regulation 3 [high] These are stated and available on 
effectively communicated the website 
Consultation with stake holders on 1 [very low] There is no clear evidence that 
major policy changes PURC consults stakeholders for a 
major policy change 
The regulated entities have a clear 1 [very low] No clear information on this 
understanding of their obligations 
Clear decision making process with 1 [very low] The process is not clearly stated in 
Transparency all major decisions being made the Act. Major decisions not being 
public published 
Availability of documents and 3 [high] Regulatory tools are available on 
information used for decision the website. Not much on water 
making for public inspection. services 
Performance data of the regulated 2 [Iow] Performance reports are produced 
entities also available publicly every 5 years and available 
publicly. 
Clear apPointment processes of the 2 [Iow] Spelt out in the legislation. But 
regulatory commission members should be more competitive 
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Regulatory Definition of the principle Level of Comments 
principle achievement 
Availability of an up to date policy 4 [very high] A policy paper exists on 
or strategy on regulating for the services to the urban poor 
benefit of the urban poor 
Suitable incentives for serving the 2 [Iow] There is no incentives or special 
poor [e.g trust funds] availability of focus organisationally on 
social connection programs [free or services to the urban poor 
subsidised connections] 
Special programmes managed by 3 [high] Part of the funding from World 
the regulator that would benefit the Bank goes to extending services 
Services to the urban poor i.e. advocacy programs to the urban poor 
urban poor Special tariff provisions which are 3 [high] There is a social tariff which 
pro-poor benefits those with connections 
Evidence of ongoing improvements 1 [very low] Apart from WB funding, there 
to services in poor communities are no special activities or 
and informal settlements improvements on services to the 
urban poor 
Specific and effective performance 1 [very low] There are no targets which 
measurement and targets for could be used to measure 
services in poor communities and performance 
informal settlements 
Separate regulatory agency with its 4 [very high] PURe is a statutory body 
own legal status 
Roles and functions of the agency 4 [very high] The functions of the PURe 
clearly stated in the law stated in law 
Security of tenure of the regulatory 4 [very high] Security of tenure provided for 
commission provided for in the law in the legislation 
Autonomy Protection from dismissal of 4 [very high] No commissioner can be 
commissioners and Director without dismissed unless as provided 
due cause provided for in the law for in the law 
No requirement for prior approval of 4 [very high] Decisions made are final without 
regulatory by government dept any reference to government 
before implementation. 
Tariff approval without reference to 4 [very high] PURe approves tariffs without 
a government ministry prior authority from government 
Source: Author 
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4.1.8 Ghana Case Summary 
Political and sociCH!conomic environment 
Ghana is a politically stable country and is not a fragile state. It portrays a high level of respect for the rule 
of laws and has a respectable judicial system. The high level of political stability, non-fragility and the 
general good governance in the country was conducive environment for benefits of economic regulation of 
urban water services to be realised. 
It is recommended that for a country like Ghana with high poverty levels one of the roles of the water sector 
economic regulator should have regulatory functions that benefit the urban poor clearly stated in the Act. 
The PURC Act should have a specific provision for this. 
Roles and functions of the regulator 
Based on the focus group discussions, key informant interviews and responses to the questionnaire the 
research identified five roles of economic regulation as being relevant to the Ghanaian context and are 
listed below 
a] Tariff setting and approval that would lead to commercial viability 
b] Protection of consumers from poor and inefficient services including 
c] Developing and enforcing standards and monitoring the performance of the GWCL 
d] A repository of knowledge on urban water services. 
e] Services to the urban poor including alternative service providers. 
Institutional arrangements of the regulatory framework in Ghana 
Key stakeholders in Ghana consider an autonomous multi-sectoral regulatory body to be the most 
appropriate for Ghana. There was general agreement on the appointment mechanisms for the 
commissioners by government but that this may be done in a more transparent manner. The research 
results have further shown that the PURC current reporting arrangements were appropriate and promoted 
autonomy of the regulator. However the results indicate that the autonomy of the PURC could easily be 
compromised as its funding source is not secured and stable especially as it comes from a government 
budgetary allocation. The financial autonomy of the regulator could potentially be improved if the PURC 
was financed through a regulatory fee levied on the regulated companies. 
The subjective analysis of the PURC has shown a number of strengths and weaknesses. PURC scored 
very low on how it can regulate for the benefit of the urban poor. 
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4.2 The Water Regulatory Council [CRA], MOZAMBIQUE 
4.2.1 Case Introduction 
In 1995, the Government of Mozambique [GoM] initiated a wide ranging reform of the water sector, which 
aimed at improving the quality of services in the major towns. A set of Cabinet Decrees, known as the 
Delegated Management Framework [DMF], were approved and were enforced from 1998. The DMF 
Decrees provide the guidelines for the institutional arrangements of urban water supply service by setting 
the Water Supply Investment and Asset Holding Fund [FIPAG], the Water Regulatory Council, [CRA], an 
autonomous regulatory agency, the private operator and the terms of their involvement in the water supply 
services to the urban population. CRA was established as a statutory institution with financial and 
administrative autonomy. The main duties of CRA are the economic regulation of urban water services 
including the approval of tariffs, the safeguarding of the consumers' interests, and the mediation between 
the private operators and FIPAG as an investor. 
The motivation for the establishment of CRA came as a result of engaging a private operator for the 5 
largest towns in Mozambique. The government through FIPAG had just entered into a PSP contract [15 
year lease for Maputo and Matola and 5 year management contracts in four other largest cities] with a 
consortium of Agua de Portugal and Saur International of France. The lease and the management 
contracts since expired in 2008 and efforts are being made to work on a new contract. 
As stated above, CRA used to regulate only the systems under the Delegated Management Framework 
[DMF]. But recently in May 2009 its mandate was extended to regulate provision of water services to all 
urban areas in Mozambique (Government of Mozambique, 2009). These were defined as primary towns 
[the 20 largest towns including Maputo] and secondary towns -numbering about 80 water systems as well 
as regulation of urban sanitation services. However this new mandate is not yet effective as the necessary 
legislative changes have to be put in place. It is envisaged that regulation in the secondary towns [also 
generally known as small towns] will take the form of advisory. Under the new framework CRA will 
undertake its regulatory functions in the secondary towns through local commissions. 
4.2.2 Data sources 
There was only one focus group discussion held in Mozambique. Key informant interviews were 
undertaken with 8 people from different institutions as follows 3 from the regulator, 2 from the asset holding 
company [FIPAG]2 from government and 1 from an NGO. The list of the key informant interviewees is 
given in Appendix 5 
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There were a total of 20 respondents to the questionnaire all of which were from the water sector. Seventy 
percent of the respondents were in senior management positions at the time of responding to the 
questionnaire. There was a fair distribution of the number of years respondents had spent in the water 
sector with the highest percentage being those with 11 to 15 years experience at 35% of the respondents. 
35% of the respondents were from government while 25% came from the regulator. Another 25% were 
from the asset holding company -FIPAG and 10% came from the utility -AdeM. The last 5% were from the 
NGOs. 
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Table 4-6: Mozambique case - Data sources 
Source of the data 
Item Quest. Doc. FGD Interviews 
u Population and population growth v 
·E 
"0 0 Poverty levels v c: c: 
'" 0 _ u 
~<Px Fragility level v 
.- 0 Q) 
:= ·0 1:: 
000 Policy framework v v v c..",u 
Protecting consumers and service providers v v v v 
Providing guidelines on tariff setting v v v v 
Approval of tariffs v v v v 
Monitoring standards of performance v v 
c 
0 Promoting competitive spirit in the sector v v v v ~ 
"S Valuation of assets v v Cl ~ 
.9 Advising government and the general public on v v E 
0 water sector issues c 
0 
to Studies on economy and efficiency of utilities v Q) 
'0 Capacity building v v v en 
Q) 
0 Information awareness on regulation and general v v c: 
service provision 
Incentives on services to the urban poor v v 
Ensuring water utilities achieve commercial v v 
viability 
Promotion of accountability of the utility v v 
Transparency in service delivery v v 
Institutional framework of the urban water sector v v 
!!l 
c 
Autonomous regulatory institution v 
Q) Single sector regulatory body v v E 
Q) 
Cl Reporting mechanisms of the regulator v v v v c ~ 
~ 
Funding mechanisms for the regulator v v v v co 
co 
c AppOintment of council members v v v v .2 
"5 
."!:: Appointing staff on competitive basis v v v v en 
oS Involvement of consumers in the regulatory v v v 
process 
The columns in the table: Quest. refers to the questionnaire while Doc. refers to documents and FGD refers to the 
Focus Group Discussions 
Source: Author 
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4.2.3 General country information 
Mozambique has a population of 20 million 
(Government of Mozambique, 2008) of which about 
6.7 million or 34% is urban (UN-DESA, 2003). This has 
grown from 8.7% in 1975 [at the time of independence] 
to 33.7% in 2004. The urbanisation rate is 5.09% 
against the Continenfs average annual urban 
population growth of 3.56% (UNDP, 2006). Like many 
African cities more than 60% of the urban population 
lives in informal settlements. 
4.2.4 Existing Environmental and Socio-
economic context in Mozambique 
Mozambique has over the last ten years risen from a 
war ravaged country to one registering an impressive 
economic growth. In many ways Mozambique is still a 
'fragile state' based on the principles of fragility. While 
the country has made a lot of economic progress, the 
governance systems still remain highly of patronage 
and centralised which are some of the key features of 
fragility of a country as identified by a DflD team (Vaux 
et aI. , 2006). 
The unprecedented annual economic growth 
ZIMBABW 
.. 
INDIAN 
OCEAN 
o . )1,) zuo'" 
Figure 4-4: Map of Mozambique 
[source: 
http://mapsof.neVmozambique] 
exceeded 7% in the mid-1990s up to about 9% since 1997. In fact it was said then that Mozambique 
recorded the highest economic growth among the developing countries (Ardeni, 1999) in the world. Despite 
the impressive annual economic growth, Mozambique remains one of the world's poorest countries, with a 
GDP per capita of $210 and is ranked as 172 out of 177 Countries that the UNDP has data for in the 
Human Development Index table published in 2006 (UNDP, 2006). The poverty level fell to about 54% in 
2002 (James, Arndt and Simler, 2005). 
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4.2.5 Policy framework for urban water services 
Mozambique has a national water policy approved by Cabinet in 1995 which was updated in 2007. The 
policy recognises water as an economic and social good. It recognises the need to balance any investment 
in the water sector to the economic development and poverty alleviation and improvement of public health. 
This means the price for water service delivery in the urban areas should reflect its economic value in order 
to cover the costs of supply. In order to implement the above pOlicies the GoM undertook a sweeping 
reform of the urban water supply provision. This started with moving away from central govemment 
management, and towards more decentralised management involving better regulation and financial 
planning. Specifically, GoM took steps to provide for tariff reforms aimed at full cost recovery and 
devolution of service delivery functions to the private sector. The revised policy of 2007 includes services to 
small towns, recognises sanitation as a subject within the water services sector and has provisions on 
services to the urban poor. 
4.2.6 Institutional framework for urban water services 
Mozambique is one of the few countries in Africa that have a clearly defined institutional framework for 
water services delivery based on the principle of separating roles and responsibilities. Four key institutions 
are in place as follows: 
i. The National Directorate of Water [DNA] in the Ministry of Public Works and Housing [MO PH] is 
responsible for all policy development and monitoring for water services as it is part of central 
govemment. The Department is also responsible for water resources management. 
ii. FIPAG was established as an asset holding and investment fund responsible for defining the 
management structures for the 13 largest urban centres including Maputo, Seira, Nampula etc. This 
was later increased to 20 in May 2009 
iii. The Conselho Astecimento de Agua [CRA]-is the economic regulator for urban water services in 
Mozambique 
iv. Operators -including AdeM for the 5 largest towns - Maputo, Seira, Nampula, Quilimane and 
Pemba and Vitens water from the Netherlands for the next 9 towns operating under Technical 
Assistance conlract. The management contract expired in 2008 and FIPAG has since been in the 
process of contracting new private operators .. 
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A delegated management framework was established as part of coordinating the water services in 
Mozambique. Though generally Municipalities are responsible for the provision of water services to those 
small towns that are outside of the delegated management framework, there have been some efforts to 
extend the DMF. The interrelationships between the different institutions are shown in the diagram below 
see figure 4.5. The Ministry of Finance [MPF) may borrow money from international funding agencies on 
behalf of government and on-lend it to FIPAG for investment in the water sector infrastructure. FIPAG had 
two contracts with ADM a lease contract for Maputo and a management contract for Beira, Quiliemane, 
Nampula and Pemba. Since 2008 FIPAG has one lease contract with ADeM in Maputo and Matola. The 
management contracts in the other towns were still being defined. There are no contractual relationships 
between the Municipalities and FIPAG or ADeM. 
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
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Figure 4-5: Institutional framework for urban water services in Mozambique 
[Source: eRA, 2002] 
The institutional framework for urban water services delivery in the 13 commercially viable cities in 
Mozambique is governed by the delegated management framework [DMF) established by the government 
decree No. 72198 (Government of Mozambique, 1998). Below is an organogram of the delegated 
management framework for urban water services delivery in Mozambique. The Delegated Management 
Framework was established as an Inter-ministerial body with members meeting at regular intervals. Members 
of the DMF include the Ministries of Public Works and Housing; Finance; State Administration; the National 
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Water Board; The Delegated Management Coordinating Forum; FIPAG; CRA; Local authorities and the 
Operator. The DNA provides the Secretariat functions. Under the DMF FIPAG is responsible for all water 
services towns considered to be financially viable. FIPAG then delegates the operations of these services to 
private operators. Services to an add~ional 8 towns are provided under a management contract with Vittens. 
CRA is responsible for the regulation of water services for the benefit of consumers as shown in the diagram 
below. 
DELEGATED MANAGEMENT 
FRAMEWORK 
I I 
I 
Water Regulatory I National Directorate for Water [DNA] 
Council [CRA] I 
--------
Investment Fund and Asset 
Holding Company [FIPAG] 
I 
Delegated management for Delegated Management 5 towns 
8 Towns under FIPAG to private operator -AdeM 
I I Maputo -15 yr Lease 
Management Contracts in contract 
4 other towns -
Beira, Quilimane, Pemba 
and Nampula 
~ 
URBAN AND PER I URBAN CONSUMERS 
Figure 4-6: Mozambique case - Delegated management framework 
Source: author 
115 
4.2.7 Sector Regulation: 
CRA has a three-member regulatory board and an executive secretariat for the water supply sector. The 
law grants it administrative and financial autonomy in Mozambique. 
Any tariff adjustment is first proposed by FIPAG but can only become effective after approval by CRA and 
published in the national gazette. CRA also acts as a forum for hearing of views and complaints from 
customers, and has responsibility for any pre-arbitration issues between FIPAG and the operating 
company. The role of FIPAG is essentially mobilisation of resources for investment in the sector and 
overseeing the implementation of all new projects. 
The decree institutionalising the delegated management framework for water supply also envisaged the 
creation of a regulatory body-the CRA that, through its independence and technical competence, guarantees a 
balance between the interests of the different key stakeholders in the public service including consumers, 
govemment, private operators, NGOs etc. 
There were a total of 20 respondents to the questionnaire of which 90% were in agreement that in order to 
have an efficient and effective water supply and sewerage sector it is necessary to introduce an 
autonomous regulator in the water sector. This is shown on the chart below [see fig 4-7 below]. 
Introduce an autonomous institution as a regulator 
• Stronglv agree • Agree Uncertain . Oisagree 
45% 
Figure 4-7: Level of agreement on establishment of CRA 
Source: Author's analysis of data 
All the respondents to the questionnaire were in agreement that establishment of an autonomous economic 
utility regulatory body would promote accountability. 
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There was a further 100% agreement of the 20 valid responses to the proposition that one of the roles of an 
economic utility regulator like eRA is to protect consumers from monopoly behaviour of water utilities i.e. 
protection against high tariffs for low quality of service. 
4.2.8 Regulatory roles of CRA 
The regulatory roles and functions of eRA were tailored towards regulating service provision by a private 
operator. The main regulatory roles for eRA were defined in the decree as follows: 
1. Ensuring sustainability of water services through setting and approving of tariffs in aooordance with the 
national tariff policy. 
2. Protecting consumer interests. 
3. Mon~oring the implementation of the lease and management contract between FIPAG and the private 
operators. 
4. Reconciling the interests of the lessor [FIPAG] and the private operator. 
5. Functioning and improvement of the delegated management framework: 
For each of these roles there were specific functions attached to them. 
Perception of respondents to questionnaire on roles of CRA 
The table below presents results from all the questions and sub-questions that sought to establish the roles 
of economic regulation of urban water services. The table has responses to questions related to why 
establish a regulator i.e. promoting economic regulation since urban water service provision is monopoly 
industry as well as to the actual roles or functions of the regulator. The results in the tables show general 
support for establishment of a regulatory framework that can lead to efficient and effective service 
provision. 
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Table 4-7: Questionnaire responses on the Roles of CRA 
Role/Level of agreement in % Strongly Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly No of Valid 
agree disagree Responses 
t Protecting the interest of consumers 95 5 0 0 0 20 
Setting standards for the performance of service 
2 providers 95 5 0 0 0 20 
3 Issuing licences 35 65 0 0 0 20 
4 Development of guidelines on setting of tariffs 25 75 0 0 0 19 
5 Correct any markel failure in the water sector 25 75 0 0 0 20 
Develop lhe operalional guidelines for the 
6 utilities. 25 75 0 0 0 20 
Keep an accurate value of the property or 
assets of the service providers. 
7 80 15 5 0 0 18 
Advise government on water and sanitation 
8 matters 35 60 5 0 0 20 
Ensure that government and any public 
9 
institution pays for the services they receive 
20 75 0 5 0 19 
Develop subsidy guidelines for services to the 
urban poor. 
10 80 10 10 0 0 20 
PartiCipate in any contract negotiations to do 
with the involvement of the private sector in lhe 
11 management of water service delivery. 5 85 10 0 0 20 
Ensure sustainability of the water sector in the 
12 country 0 85 15 0 0 20 
Protect the interests of service providers from 
arbitrary government intervention 
13 55 25 5 10 0 20 
14 Promoting competition among utility providers 25 10 65 0 0 20 
15 Provide guidelines on Governance structures 5 15 80 0 0 19 
Conducting studies related to economy and 
efficiency of the utilities 
16 0 10 90 0 0 19 
There is need to introduce adequate regulatory 
frameworks in order to promote competition 
because of monopolistic nature of urban water 
17 services 75 15 10 0 0 20 
Regulation of the provision of urban water 
supply and sanitation services would reduce the 
18 abuse of monopoly power. 25 75 0 0 0 20 
In order to have an efficient and effective water 
services sector it is necessary to introduce an 
autonomous regulator in the Water Supply and 
19 Sanitation Sector? 45 45 5 5 0 20 
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Role/Level of agreement in % Slrongly Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly No of Valid 
agree disagree Responses 
Regulation may be needed for various purposes. What type of regulation is mostly needed in developing 
20 counlries especially in Africa for the water suppl and sanitalion sector? 20 
a Economic regulalion including service quality 95 5 0 0 0 20 
Social regulation (access to water and 
b sanilation services) 10 25 65 0 0 20 
c Environmental regulation 70 30 0 0 0 20 
Water quality regulation (basically health 
d regulation) 80 10 10 0 0 20 
Technical standards regulation (standards 
e bureau) 0 90 10 0 0 20 
Countries in Africa need clear regulatory 
framework, because of poor transparency, 
21 accountability, and high corruption, etc. 25 75 0 0 0 20 
Adequate utility regulation should assist 
utilities secure financial and management 
23 autonomy 72 28 0 0 0 20 
Establishment of appropriate independent 
economic utility regulation promotes 
24 accountability of utilities? 30 70 0 0 0 20 
Establishment of Autonomous utility regulation 
25 promotes transparency of utilities 60 40 0 0 0 20 
Autonomous economic utility regulalors should 
ensure that utilities achieve commercial 
26 viability. 95 5 0 0 0 20 
Autonomous economic regulation should 
result in general performance improvements of 
27 utilities. 5 95 0 0 0 20 
The regulator should promote the social 
values of water with a need to ensure that 
utilities provide water services to the urban 
28 poor 5 95 0 0 0 20 
Utility regulators of the water sector should 
regulate the small-scale water providers 
29 directly 10 5 50 15 65 20 
Autonomous regulators should be party to 20 
negotiation of contracts with private operators 
Le. management, lease or concession 
30 contracts. 5 10 0 85 5 
Queslions seeking YES/NO answers YES NO 
31 In order to have improved and efficient provision of services, regulators should 20 
a Penalise utilities for non-compliance 100 0 20 
b Take utilities that do not comply to courts of law 10 90 20 
c Use the National police service to enforce the regulations 15 85 20 
32 How should regulators deal with issues of services to the urban poor 20 
a Develop tariff regime that encourages utilities to serve the urban poor 95 5 20 
b Develop and enforce regulalions that aim at protecting the urban poor 95 5 20 
c Encourage ulililies to provide services 0 100 20 
d Provide guidelines on innovative ways of providing services to the urban poor. 95 5 20 
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Questions seeking YES/NO answers YES NO No of Valid 
Responses 
33 How should small-scale Autonomous water providers be regulated? 20 
a Establish regulations specifically for small scale Autonomous water providers 80 20 20 
Develop technical standards which are only suited for the Small Water 20 
b Enterprises 85 15 
c Only regulate through the main utility operator 15 85 19 
What do you think would be the influence of utility regulation on the business strategies of the water 20 
34 utilities i.e. employment policies, tariff structures e.t.c. 
a Promote openness in recruitment and financial management 20 0 20 
b Reduction on the operational costs of utilities 20 90 20 
c Cut down on staff numbers 20 100 20 
Source: Author's analysis of data 
The column on the far right shows the valid number of responses to the particular assertion out of the total 
number of respondents to the questionnaire in Mozambique. 
4.2.8.1 Ensuring sustainability of the services through a better tariff regime 
A major role for eRA is to ensure the sustainability of the water services through approving cost reflective tariffs 
in line with the tariff policy. eRA developed a tariff policy (Government of Mozambique, 1998) which 
contains a number of elements related to cost recovery but also to safeguard the interests of the lowest 
income groups. The policy of eRA is to facilitate the sector to be able to reach stability or equilibrium 
between cost and revenue while at the same time balancing the affordability levels of the consumers 
especially the urban poor. The affordability levels are calculated based on the national tariff policy provision 
which states that a household's monthly expenses for water should not be higher than 4% of two minimum 
salaries; average household monthly costs based on the domestic and social tariff levels in Maputo are 
currently below this limit in all cases except for house connections (Evans, Tremolet and Thompson, 2008). 
There is evidence that eRA has made progressive tariff adjustments in real terms as shown in the charts 
below [see fig 4-8 and fig 4-9] for both the social tariff and the general average tariff. The social tariff is the 
fixed cost of water for the first 10m3 of water consumption per month. eRA applies a rising block tariff. The 
graph below [see figure 4-8] shows that the tariff has increased by between 60% for Maputo and 150% for 
the other towns where the tariff levels were very low in 2001. The second graph [see figure 4-9] shows the 
social tariff development since 2001. The tariff levels in both graphs were converted to US$ using the 
average exchange rate in the particular year. The application of the tariff policy started in 1999 however 
real tariff data was only available from 2001. The tariff policy is only applicable to the 13 towns under the 
delegated management framework. 
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According to the Chairman of CRA during a separate interview, all the five cities under the DMF have 
achieved 100% of the operational and maintenance costs. Maputo has started contributing to the full cost 
recovery cost and should attain 100% in the next three years. 
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During the focus group discussions, there was some confusion as to whether CRA has decision making 
powers on tariffs. This arose from a participant from CRA who felt that the decree should have given powers of 
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approving tariffs to the regulator. From the decree it seems the role of the regulator is advisory rather than 
actual approval of tariffs. Since the decree is not clear on the actual role of the regulator with regards to tariff 
adjustments, any tariff levels once negotiated and agreed upon with the asset holding company FIPAG are 
subject to a possible veto by the Prime Minister. The Chairman of CRA reports to the Cabinet and tariff 
adjustment can only be announced through a govemment gazette notice signed. In a separate interview, 
however the Chairman of CRA advised that the regulator is the final authority on tariff approvals. CRA does not 
have to consult anyone once a tariff adjustment has been approved. CRA publishes the approved tariffs in the 
Govemment gazette. However before approval of tariffs the Govemment as well as other stakeholders are 
consuijed to provide comments to a tariff adjustment request. The process followed is that FIPAG firstly agree 
with CRA on tariff projections for 4 to 5 years in relation to cost recovery. Then FIPAG formally submits this 
request to CRA. It is during this time that CRA requests for consuijations with Govemment, the operators, the 
price commission etc. Govemment set up a price commission to analyse and evaluate any potential negative 
impact on consumers of tariff changes in utility services including water. All this happens before CRA finally 
approves tariffs. Govemment is further informed on any approved tariffs through the annual report. 
The only potential interference on tariff issues is for Govemment to request a delay in implementing an 
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approved tariff. This happened in 2009 when elections were due and Govemment requested that new tariffs for 
water as well as other utility services be implemented in 2010. The respondents to the questionnaire were in 
general agreement that the economic regulator should not only approve tariffs but develop guidelines on the 
tariffs which the service providers should follow. This is as reflected in line number 4 in the table 4.7. 
4.2.8.2 Consumer protection 
CRA considers this role as one of the reasons for its existence. The CRA understood that with the involvement 
of the private sector in the Mozambican case meant that there was need for a strong, credible and transparent 
regulatory system. During the focus group discussions one of the participants from the consumer association 
was in agreement with the main roles of CRA as given. However the participant from the NGO -who came in 
the name of representing consumers, feij the regulator was more aligned towards regulating the private 
operator rather than regulating water services. He stated eRA is a regulator of ADeM and not for water 
services in Mozambique. "I am saying this because those people who live in Maputo but are not within the 
boundary of the service area for ADeM are not privileged to have access to the services of the regulator. The 
price of water from the small scale providers in most times is beyond reach. They charge according to the 
demand levels from the community -regardless of whether it is of good quality or nof'. He felt that there should 
be a specific requirement for the CRA to regulate the small scale providers who provide water to more than 
122 
30% of the residents in Maputo. He further felt the decree does not mention a single word that is close enough 
to the poor yet about 60% of the urban population in Mozambique comprises of poor people. The decree 
should have given provisions for eRA to develop special regulations for helping the poor. The regulator must 
be seen to have the poor at heart and not benefitting only those living in the service area of the private 
operator. Under the proposals of May 2008, it is now clear that eRA will develop regulatory mechanisms for 
small scale providers as well as small towns. 
Another interviewee during key informant interviews fe~ that the regulator has no obligation under the decree to 
design a consumer consu~ative mechanism. One of the functions of eRA is to protect consumers. One way 
eRA will appreciate the difficulties consumers face is through having a defined forum for them to express their 
views. The interviewee therefore suggested that eRA should see establishment of a consumer forum as one of 
its main functions. eRA will not easily understand the challenges faced by consumers if there is no forum to 
discuss with them. eRA should further design a complaints procedure. They should advise consumers who 
they should go to first when there is a complaint and at what level can a consumer go and complain to eRA. 
There was 100% agreement from the respondents to the questionnaire that one of the roles for economic 
regulation of urban water services should be protection of consumers against the effect of monopoly this is as 
reflected in the table 4.7 in line No. 1. 
There was therefore agreement from the three sources of data that one of the roles of economic regulation of 
water services is the protection of consumers. The functions under this role include: defining a clear consumer 
consultation mechanisms, making information on water services available to consumers. 
4.2.8.3 Monitoring the implementation of the lease contract 
Another role of eRA is the monitoring of the implementation of the lease contract. eRA is expected to 
undertake this role through analysing and giving of opinion on the operators implementation reports, 
presentation of an opinion on consumer complaints to govemment, undertake performance audits and 
publicising the results in an appropriate manner. Other activities include presentation of general information to 
the public on how the delegated management framework, proposing any amendments to the contract including 
elimination of any contract clauses that violate the rights of consumers. The performance indicators of the 
service providers show low operational efficiency. The non-revenue water [NRW] level is high with an 
average of 61 percent between 2002 and 2004, exactly double the African utility average of 30.5 percent 
(IBNET, 2006). The company puts most of the blame on illegal connections -50 percent of this UFW is lost 
during the distribution phase. Another 40 percent is lost through transmission; most of the network is more 
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than 30 years old (Shalt, 2006). Collections are also a problem, with only 70% of residential billed water 
being collected and only 44 percent of standpipe billed water is collected. This could be because clients 
see the billing system as disassociated from reality - only 14 percent of consumers had the impression that 
they were being billed for real consumption (Shalt, 2006). 
During the focus group discussions one participant from CRA stated that the decree was not spec~ic on the 
need to benchmark the performance of the private operator other utilities in the sub-region. He fett that the 
regulator should create a spirit of competitiveness in the water sector through developing monitoring tool and 
implementing a benchmarking exercise with utilities in the sub-region on agreed key performance indicators. 
This can be achieved through a number of actions including conducting studies related to economy and 
efficiency of the utilities as highlighted in line 16 of the table above. 
4.2.8.4 Know/edge base on urban water services in sub-Saharan Africa 
While there is no specific mention of CRA to be a knowledge base on urban water services, there is 
expectation that it will have a clear understanding of the delegated management framework. CRA is expected 
to propose regulatory norms, to be approved by the govemment, on the quality of the service provided under 
the Delegated Management Framework, which shall be binding on management bodies. It is also expected to 
disseminate information on the conception, implementation, management and operation of the public water 
services systems. 
An interviewee from govemment felt that CRA have a clear overview of urban water services in the country. 
One of its functions should be to provide advice and guidance to govemment, municipalities as well as any 
other stakeholder on the urban water services. 
From the questionnaire responses, this role did not seem to be a priority regulatory role. While there was 100% 
agreement that CRA should advise govemment on water services issues only 10% of the respondents agreed 
refer to line 16 of the table 4-7 that CRA should undertake any studies on the economy and efficiency of the 
service provider -may be this shows lack of a clear understanding on the roles of economic regulation by some 
of the respondents. Another possible role is the development of guidelines for the govemance arrangements 
for service provision. Only 20% of the respondents agreed with this suggestion. 
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4.2.8.5 Economic regulation for the benefit of the urban poor and the un-served in Mozambique 
There was no specific provision in the decree establishing CRA to extend the regulatory framework to 
include the areas not served by the ADeM or for regulating services provided by altemative service 
providers. This however will change with the current proposals to enlarge the mandate of CRA to include 
small towns and sanitation. The majority of the urban poor do not receive service from the ADeM either 
because they live outside the coverage area of ADeM, cannot afford the connection fees or there is just no 
service if they live within the coverage area. Their main source of water is usually alternative service 
providers including neighbour water re-selling. There is therefore a regulatory gap in the service provision 
to the urban poor and those that are not served. 
As a response to this regulatory gap CRA has since developed pro-poor regulatory tools with the support of the 
WSP of the World Bank (Evans, Tremolet and Thompson, 2008). The pro-poor regulatory tools suggest that 
the neighbourhood water reselling whiclh serves about 20% of Maputo's population should be legalised. CRA's 
mandate should extend to include areas where the main operator does not have service -these areas are 
mainly served by small scale providers. Further the recommendations based on the pro-poor regulatory tools 
are that CRA; 
i. Should adopt a minimalist approach to regulation in informal settlements [yard tap water resale, kiosks 
standpipe~, SSIPs]. This means that the regulator should intervene to guarantee a minimum service, 
with a fixed tariff and quality [hours of service, quality of water] for all. 
ii. Issue the regulatory norms and prinCiples which can be implemented locally through the municipalities 
as provided for in the decree [indirect regulation by CRA]. 
iii. The principle that inspires regulation in informal settlements areas is flexibility. It is possible to define 
regulatory functions but should be implemented allowing for flexibility as long as there is no 
compromise on quality and local tariffs. 
A key informant interviewee from an NGO fe~ that CRA should develop clear ways by whiclh ~ will require the 
service providers in Mozambique to serve the urban poor. At the moment most of the urban poor are left to the 
mercy of small scale providers -who undoubtedly are doing a good job but in unregulated environment. 
During the focus group discussions a participant from the DNA was also in agreement with the above and 
suggested that CRA should regulate the small scale providers under the same terms and cond~ions as for 
AdEM. His justification for this request is that the small scale providers are not really small. Some have as 
many as 600 connections implying they can serve up to 5,000 people -using an average household size of 5.3 
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people in Maputo. They must meet standards in terms of the drinking water quality, must submit monthly 
performance reports which must be verified by the regulator. Commun~ies are ready to work with CRA in 
implementing these regulatory functions. He felt that this function of regulating small scale providers is not 
provided for and must be included as one of the roles for CRA ij ~ is to be seen to be relevant to meeting the 
needs of the poor especially as the poor constitute more than 60% of the population of Maputo. 
Based on the questionnaire responses, there was 90% agreement that one of the critical roles of CRA 
should be to develop guidelines for utilities to extend services to the urban poor. This is certainly one of the 
critical roles of any regulator in a developing country situation. 
CRA had for a long time not seen it appropriate to extend its regulatory regime to small scale providers 
regardless of their size of operations. The feeling was that as long as the interventions from the small scale 
providers are within the service area of an operator, regulation must be undertaken by the main service 
provider which in this case is ADeM. Most of the respondents disagreed with the proposition that the 
regulator should directly regulate small scale providers. The chart below [see fig 4.10) shows at least 65% 
of the respondents strongly disagreeing to the possibility of CRA directly regulating the small scale 
providers. 
Small scale providers should be regulated directly 
• Strongly agree . Agree . Uncertain . Disagree . Strongly disagree 
10% 
15% 
Figure 4-10: Perceptions on regulation of small scale providers in Mozambique 
Source: Autho~s analysis of data 
Cross tabulation shows that there is no particular trend of the responses on perceptions to regulating small 
scale service providers. Whether the respondent is associated with the regulator, the asset holding 
company, government or indeed the operator there was a general disagreement. See table 4.8 below. 
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Table 4-8: Cross tabulation on results of regulation of small scale providers 
Level of agreement in Number of Strongly Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly Total 
%/Organisation to which respondents agree disagree 
respondent is associated with 
Asset holding Company 5 0 0 0 0 100 100 
Government Ministry 7 28 14 0 0 51 100 
Regulator 5 0 0 20 40 40 100 
Water Utility 2 0 0 0 50 50 100 
NGO 1 0 0 0 0 100 100 
Source: Author'S analysis of data 
All the 20 responses were valid for this question. The above table [see table 4-8] shows that all the 
respondents from the asset holding company and from the water utility were not in agreement with the 
regulator dealing directly with the small scale providers. There was no follow on question requesting the 
respondents to give reasons for their response so no reasons or explanations have been given why all the 
respondents from the asset holding company, the water utility and the NGO were not in agreement with the 
proposition that small scale providers should be regulated directly. The only respondent from an NGO was 
against regulation of small scale providers directly yet the NGO key informant was strongly in favour. This 
perhaps shows that the respondents represented their own personal views rather than a collective one for 
the NGOs. All the three respondents who were in agreement with the proposition were from the 
Government, which could perhaps point to an existing mismatch between policy and practice on this issue 
of services to the urban poor 
One approach that has been developed by CRA is experimenting on the use of local relays to monitor the 
performance of ADeM. The local relays are representatives of CRA and undertake some key aspects of 
service performance monitoring of the service provision - whether from the main supplier AOeM or 
alternative service providers. On the other hand, consideration and consultation is being made by CRA to 
possibly put the responsibility of registration, coordination, monitoring the performance of the alternative 
service providers under the auspices of FIPAG. FIPAG could then delegate authority to either AOeM or 
municipalities to formally sub-delegate service provision to the alternative service providers. In this case 
regulation of the small scale providers could be through FIPAG. A memorandum of understanding [MoU] is 
to be signed between the alternative service provider and AOeM or the municipality on the provision of 
water services in a particular locality. The MoU would spell out the conditions of operation, state the rights 
and obligations, and outline the monitoring process for water quality, priCing, minimum service levels to be 
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achieved etc. These are proposals which have been made by CRA as a way of providing for the regulation 
of small scale providers. 
The social tariff which is applied on the first 5m3 results into a total charge of about US$2.1 per five cubic 
metres based on 2007 tariff levels. Compared to the cost of water from ADeM, the water from the small 
scale providers costs much higher. The tariff that a small scale provider charges his or her customers is 
largely dependent on whether the provider uses meters or not. In some cases, providers even allow the 
customer to decide if they want a meter. Ninety-three percent of the approximately 250 providers in Maputo 
using a volumetric fee charge customers the same amount per cubic meter irrespective of volume 
consumed. They do not apply a rising block tariff. Conversely, 7% charge a decreasing block tariff where 
greater volumes consumed result in lower tariffs per cubic meter. The typical provider charges US$0.83 per 
cubic meter as opposed to the highest tariff of 0.58 US$/m3 from ADeM. A few providers charging high 
volumetric fees drive the average up. The average price per cubic meter up to 10 m3 is US$0.90, from 11 
m3 to 15 m3 it is also $0.90, from 16 m3 to 25 m3 there is a slight drop to US$0.89, and every cubic meter 
consumed after 25 m3 also gets charged an average of US$0.89 (Shalt, 2006). 
4.2.9 Institutional arrangements for eRA 
The decree defined CRA as a collective body of public law, endowed with legal status, and administrative and 
financial autonomy (Govemment of Mozambique, 1998). The reasoning behind this law is that CRA enjoys as 
much administrative and financial autonomy as possible. As a statutory body CRA is govemed by the 
provisions of the decree but also by the norms applicable to similar statutory public services bodies that have 
their own legal status and administrative and financial autonomy. 
Decisions made by CRA are final though an aggrieved party can appeal to govemment. However CRA 
promotes the culture of consultation before making any decision. In this way by the time a decision is arrived at, 
the other party may not be aggrieved any more. 
The decree does not only define the establishment of CRA but also outlines the composition of the collegial 
members, their appOintment mechanism and lists the generic roles and specific functions of CRA. The 
chairman of CRA reports to the Cabinet but has close working relationships with the ministry of public 
works and housing -the ministry responsible for water services in Mozambique. 
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4.2.9.1 Responses to questionnaire on institutional arrangements 
The table below presents the results to the questionnaire with respect to the institutional arrangements for 
the regulator. The results point to the possibly of having autonomous regulators as one way of assisting to 
achieve commercial viability, attain some levels of transparency and operate independently. The results 
from the questionnaire also point to the fact that regardless of the ownership structure of the service 
provider, establishment of an autonomous regulatory body is greatly encouraged. The agreement starts 
with all the 20 respondents agreeing with the fact that if the regulatory authority was within the political 
sphere of government there is likelihood that sector priorities can be manipulated to serve short-term 
electoral interests. 
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Table 4-9: Questionnaire responses on institutional arrangements: Mozambique 
Strongty Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly No of valid 
Institutional arrangementlLevel of agreement in % agree disagree Responses 
If regulatory authority lies within the political sphere of 
government, there is likelihood that sector priorities can 
1 be manipulated to serve short-term electoral interests. 85 15 0 0 0 20 
It is not necessary to establish a regulator in a situation 
where water services provision is entrusted to the private 
operator through a concession or lease contract as the 
2 regulatory issues can be included in the contract. 0 0 15 85 0 20 
There should be different regulatory mechanisms for 
different type of Private Sector Participation contracts i.e. 
3 for a management contract, lease contract, concession 0 5 10 85 0 18 
Where municipalities have contracted another 
organisation to manage the provision of services, there is 
no need to have a separate regulator as the regulatory 
4 functions can be carried oul by the municipality. 0 0 15 85 0 20 
In order to ensure independence in its operations, the 
5 regulator should be an autonomous statutory body. 90 10 0 0 0 20 
The regulatory body should have a two tier system of 
Governance. A regulatory CounciVcommission and the 
6 executing body or secretariat. 95 5 0 0 0 19 
The members of the regulatory council should be 
7 appointed by government. 5 95 0 0 0 19 
Employees of the executing body [the secretariat] 
including the Executive Director should be appointed by 
the Regulatory council through a competitive and 
8 transparent process. 85 15 0 0 0 19 
In order to have a well informed regulatory council the 
9 Executive Director must be a full member of the council. 5 95 0 0 5 20 
Consumers should be represented on the regulatory 
10 council. 95 5 0 0 0 20 
In order to have an effective follow up of the 
implementation of the regulations, consumer watch 
11 groups must established. 65 25 10 0 0 20 
Autonomy of the regulator is strengthened if he is 
resourced [financially] by a regulatory fee i.e. funded out 
of direct levies on ulilities or consumers, not from 
12 ministerial budgets subject to checks and balances 60 40 0 0 0 20 
For most African Countries, multi-sectoral regulatory 
framework is more appropriate as it is more cost effective 
13 and has reduced likelihood of industry regulatory capture. 5 0 5 90 0 20 
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Questions seeking YES/NO answers YES NO No of Valid 
Resoonses 
The institutional arrangements of the regulatory body have an effect on its operational efficiencies. What do you 
14 think should be the institutional framework for the economic regulator 19 
a Create a regulator as a Department within the "Ministry responsible for Water" 0 100 19 
Establish a totally new regulatory body (with own new resources) -whether single or multi-
b sector regulator. 100 0 19 
Contract out some elements of regulation to reputable, technically competent private sector 
c firms 0 100 19 
15 The utility regulator would enjoy greater autonomy in its operations if the regulator: 20 
a Reports to a sector Ministry 0 100 20 
b Reports to a completely non-sectoral Ministry Le. the Prime Ministers office 85 15 20 
c Reports to Parliament just like other statutory bodies like the auditor General 15 85 20 
If government was to establish a multi-sector regulator which other sector do you think the water regulator 
16 should be partnered with? 20 
a Telecommunication 90 10 20 
b Electricity 100 0 20 
c Banking 5 95 20 
d Railway 10 90 20 
Source: Author's analysis of data 
The question on the location of an institution undertaking regulatory functions was asked in a different way. 
A statement was made that the institutional arrangements of the regulatory body has an effect on its 
operational efficiencies. The question sought the perception of the respondents on what the institutional 
arrangement for the economic regulator should be. The three proposals were: 
• Create a regulator as a Department within the "Ministry responsible for Water" 
• Establish a totally new regulatory body [with own new resources]-whether single or multi-sector 
regulator. 
• Contract out some elements of regulation to reputable, technically competent private sector firms. 
The results are given in the table above lines 14 [a], 14 [b] and 14 [cl, in table 4.9. 
The above shows agreement that the more appropriate institutional arrangement for the regulator is to have 
an autonomous regulatory body with preferably its own financial resources. 
What all the above results show is that the Mozambican respondents to the questionnaire were in full 
support of the decision taken by government to establish an autonomous regulator. 
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4.2.9.2 Structure and composition of the council 
According to the decree CRA is a collegial body consisting of three personamies of recognised integrity and 
fitness, and with relevant experience in public sector. The three members of the CRA are appOinted by the 
council of ministers, which also names the CRA chainnan from among them. Each of the three members of 
CRA is appointed on three year renewable tenns. There is no lim~ to the number of tenns stated in the decree 
establishing CRA. The remuneration of the members of the CRA is detennined and fixed jointly by the 
ministers of public works and housing and of planning and finance. The decree further provides conditions for 
membership of the board including the fact that CRA members may not have financial interests or holdings in 
the public service's tttular or management body. They are protected from arbitrary removal from office before 
the expiration of their tenn of office except in cases of: 
i. Pennanent incapacity or supervening incompatibility of the member; 
ii. A serious and proven felony committed by the member in the perfonnance of his duties, or in 
complying with any obligation inherent to the pos~ion; 
iii. A member being found guilty by a court of a serious crime. 
iv. The death or resignation of the member shall also end his tenn of office. 
The Chairman of CRA reports to the Council of Ministers chaired by the Prime Minister. In this respect for 
nonnal consultations the Chainnan of CRA reports to the prime Minister. 
4.2.9.3 Secretariat and organisation structure of eRA 
The Secretariat of the CRA is headed by an executive secretary appOinted by the Chainnan. He in tum 
appoints the rest of the staff in the organisation. The executive secretary is generally empowered to ensure the 
administrative, financial and technical management of the CRA. Remuneration for staff in CRA is not according 
to govemment salary scales but according to the general market structure. This is in order to attract and retain 
highly qualified and experienced personnel in the sector. 
CRA has a staff complement of 34 full time staff in the fields of economic regulation, legal, technical and 
consumer affairs [see fig 4-11). This number includes part time and full time. Some of the key functions are 
combined i.e. legal and regulation in infonnal settlements is managed by one person. Monitoring the 
perfonnance of the service providers is handled by two people. CRA has very small regional offices 
occupied by only one person termed as a delegate per city of which currently there are 7 of them as shown 
in the figure below. 
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Figure 4-11: Current organisation chart of CRA 
Source: eRA, 2009 
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The decree defines four main funding sources for eRA however the main one is the regulatory fee that is levied on 
the operator through FIPAG. The four possible sources of income for eRA include: 
i. The Regulatory fee levied on the operator; 
ii. Subventions from the state; 
iii. Provision of services to outside bodies i.e. studies or consultancies; 
iv. Any other revenue, income or sums that derive from its activity or which, by law or by contract, belong 
or are attributed to it, as well as any gifts, subsidies or other fomns of financial support. 
The revenue deriving from the regulatOlY fee levied on the operator is paid, in advance, in quarterly 
instalments. The fee is fixed at US$99,000 per quarter (Evans, Tremolet and Thompson, 2008) and is part of 
the contract. This regulatory fee currently works out to approximately 1.8%. However this is indexed to the rate 
of inflation in realtemns. There are efforts that with the increased mandate of CRA, a regulatory levy will be 
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charged on all regulated enmies. This levy will be 2% of the tum over of the utility. For the fonnative years of 
operation, CRA survived only on the levy paid by the private operator. While the expansion of the mandate 
should result in increased revenue, the new towns are not commercially viable and may not have the capacity 
to pay CRA. In this respect govemment will be contributing 25% of the budget of CRA. 
4.2.9.5 Consumer participation in regulation 
Though there is no fonnal consumer council for water services in Mozambique, CRA is expected to 
maintain links with associations of users and to undertake consumer satisfaction surveys. These 
associations are concerned with general consumer issues i.e. utility services, municipal activities, election 
matters etc. Recently CRA approached the WSP of the World Bank to help them reflect, design and 
implement the establishment of a water consumer council. Consumers are usually vulnerable and without a 
dedicated forum for expressing their views, it would be difficult for the regulator to understand the 
challenges they face. Respondents to the questionnaire were in agreement to establishment of consumer 
councils as indicated in line 11 Table 4.9. CRA however organizes some consultation forums with 
consumers usually aimed at addressing a specific issue. But this is not institutionalised. 
4.2.9.6 Perception on the institutional arrangements of CRA based on focus group discussions 
During the focus group discussions there was general agreement with the current institutional set up of 
CRA. A Participant from CRA felt CRA had achieved a lot of respect from the key stakeholders because of 
the individual that is currently chairing it. They were wondering what would happen if someone that may not 
have as much knowledge, experience and stature was the chair of CRA. The guideline is clear in the 
decree that the chairperson shall be appointed from among the three and must be of high standing and well 
respected in the water sector. 
Another participant from CRA felt that it has sufficient autonomy for now. She felt the current autonomy 
should be guarded and should not be compromised. The current reporting mechanisms where the 
chairperson reports to the prime minister is sufficient as it gives CRA a higher level of status and also 
secures further respect. The participant was further happy that there is no large board of CRA. The three 
people are sufficient and have been working very effectively. It is not necessary to have different interests 
represented in the board. If there are issues affecting a particular interest group i.e. municipalities, the 
decree provides for the chairperson to invite such groups to a meeting with the CRA. 
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There was no debate on the method of appointing staff members of CRA. Participants felt that CRA follows 
what is the current norm in most organisations in Mozambique where vacant positions are advertised and 
those that meet the qualifications apply and the most qualified and experienced gets the appointment. 
4.2.9.7 Key informant interviewees perceptions on institutional arrangements for eRA. 
One interviewee from CRA felt that CRA is effective in its regulation because it mainly regulates the private 
operator. He felt that for countries that have services provided by state owned agencies they should have 
different regulatory arrangements -perhaps through a govemment department. The suggestion for this is 
the potential conflict between the requirements of a regulator and the ability of the regulated to address or 
meet those requirements. 
Another interviewee felt that if the Chairman reported to a minister then it could be very easy for such a 
minister to become trivial i.e. possibly wanting to micro-manage the regulator. The source of funding has 
also made the regulator be more autonomous from government. CRA does not have to plead for financial 
support from government. 
An interviewee from FIPAG felt that CRA had achieved a lot and contributed greatly to the Mozambican 
water sector. The establishment of a regulator in Mozambique led to a reduced direct intervention by the 
government or political system in the management of the utilities especially tariff setting. 
4.2.10 Subjective analysis of the eRA towards achievement of the regulatory principles for Africa 
A subjective analysis was undertaken on the level of adherence to the regulatory principles developed on 
the basis of the BRTF of economic regulation in sub-Saharan Africa. Below is a quick analysis which gives 
the researcher's perception of the level to which the CRA adheres to the principles. 
Scores for assessing levels level of achievement 4 is very high, 3 is high, 2 is limited and 1 is low. 
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Table 4-10: Analysis towards adherence of principles of economic regulation: Mozambique 
Regulatory Definition and points used for Level of Comments 
principle measuring level of achievement achievement 
of the principle 
The regulatory cost of 3 [high] The cost of regulation compares well in 
addressing the perceived relation to its effectiveness 
problem or risk as compared to 
the services being regulated 
Proportionality 'Severity' of interventions 2 [Iow] Number of connected consumers is low 
compared to the risks and costs compared to the those without 
of compliance connection 
Regulation should also seek to 4 [very high] eRA uses the approach of consultation 
be educational -rather than and negotiations before arriving at a 
based on a punitive approach. decision 
The regulator should or does clearly 3 [high] Though not clearly spelt out but CRA first 
explain to the regulated entities how consults with the regulated on what decision 
Iwhy certain decisions were taken. it is to take 
Is there a clear appeal procedure 2 [Iow] Not clearly spelt out but the Chairman 
with independent adjudication-if a advised of a procedure to be followed. CRA 
utility is not satisfied with a has avoided to reach the stage of appealing 
regulatory decision 
There should also be well 1 [very low] This is not clear in the legislation 
publicised, fair and effective 
complaints procedures for 
Accountability consumers 
The regulator should have clear 3 [high] The Chairman reports to the Prime Minister. 
lines of responsibility i.e. Ministers. But the role of the sector Minister not spelt 
Parliaments and the public provided out 
for in the law 
Is there a consumer consultative 1 [very low] Consumers not represented on the board of 
committee or council with CRA and there is no consumer consultative 
opportunity to hold the utilities and council in Mozambique 
regulator to account 
The regulator should have 4 [very high] This is a requirement provided for in the Act 
substantive reporting and and is also done in practice 
accounting audit obligations 
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Regulatory Definition and points used for Level of Comments 
principle measuring level of achievement achievement 
of the principle 
Over time [principles of precedence 3 [high] CRA has been consistent in its 
should apply as much as possible to decision making especially with 
enhance predictability and reduce respect to tariff adjustments 
uncertainties among the regulated] include at difficult times when 
the country was faced with 
Consistency elections 
Across service providers in -the 3 [high] It applies its regulatory 
country standards equally to all the 
regulated service providers -
Ad EM and Viltens managed 
schemes 
Clear objectives of regulation 3 [high] These are stated and available 
effectively communicated on the website 
Consultation with stakeholders 2 [Iow] There is no clear evidence that 
on major policy changes CRA consults stakeholders for a 
major policy change 
The regulated entities have a 3 [high] This is clearly stated in the 
clear understanding of their legislation 
obligations 
Clear decision making process 2 [Iow] The process is not clearly stated 
with all major decisions being in the Act. Major decisions not 
Transparency made public i.e. through being published except tariff 
websites adjustment approval 
Availability of documents and 1 [very high] Not evidently available 
information used for decision 
making for public inspection. 
Performance data of the 2 [Iow] Performance reports of service 
regulated entities also available providers not available. Plans 
publicly are there to make them 
available publicly 
Clear appointment processes of 1 [very low] This is not very clear. How the 
the regulatory commission three members of the collegiate 
members are identified is not clear 
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Regulatory Definition and points used for Level of Comments 
principle measuring level of achievement achievement 
of the principle 
Availability of an up-to-date Policy 4 [very high] There is a policy document on 
or strategy on regulating for the services to the urban poor. This is 
benefit of the urban poor in addition to a social tariff policy. 
Suitable incentives for serving the 2 [Iow] There is no special incentive for the 
poor leg. trust funds]. availability of utility to extend services to urban 
social connection programs [free or poor 
subsidised connections] 
Special programmes managed by 3 [high] No special programs yet on 
the regulator that would benefit the services to the poor in 
urban poor i.e. advocacy programs Mozambique 
Services to the Special tariff provisions which are 3 [high] There is a social tariff for the 
urban poor pro-poor benefit of the poor 
Evidence of ongoing improvements 2 [Iow] None except the delegation of 
to services in poor communities and regulatory power to the use power 
informal settlements 
Specific and effective 1 [very low] Targets have not yet been set 
performance measurement and 
targets for services in poor 
communities and informal 
settlements 
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Regulatory Definition and points used for Level of Comments 
principle measuring level of achievement achievement 
ofthe principle 
Separate regulatory agency with its 4 [very high] eRA is a statutory body 
own legal status separate from government 
operations with own legal status 
and independent funding 
arranqements 
Roles and functions of the agency 4 [very high] The roles and functions of the 
clearly stated in the law eRA are clearly stated in law 
Security of tenure of the regulatory 4 [very high] Security of tenure provided for 
commission members provided for in the legislation 
in the law 
Independence! 
Protection from dismissal of 4 [very high] None of the three members of 
autonomy commissioners and Director the board and the Executive 
without due cause provided for in Secretary can be dismissed 
the law unless as provided for in the law 
No requirement for regulatory 4 [very high] All regulatory decisions whether 
decision to be approved by a on tariff or any other rnatter are 
government department or implemented without reference 
ministry before being to anyone even government 
implemented. 
Regulator with full authority to 4 [very high] eRA approves tariffs and does 
set and approve tariffs not have to get authority from 
government 
Source: Author's analysis of data 
4.2.11 Mozambique case Summary 
The Mozambican regulatory framework was established primarily to respond to the engagement of a 
private operator to manage the urban water services under the delegated management framework. Based 
on the results research has found that the roles for the regulator include: 
[1] Approval of tariffs that ensures that the sector achieves sustainability 
[2] Protection of consumers 
[3] Monitoring the implementation of the lease contract between FIPAG and ADeM 
[4] Services to the urban poor and the un-served. 
There was no evidence that eRA considered a priority the role of being a knowledge bank on urban water 
services. 
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Most key stake holders in Mozambique favoured establishment of a single sector autonomous regulator. 
There was general agreement on the funding mechanisms of CRA as well as appointment mechanisms for 
the staff. Though there was general agreement on the appointment mechanisms for the collegial members 
of the board there was a suggestion that the identification of the three should be more transparent and 
possibly through public call for candidacy. 
The Mozambican case of a single sector regulator has shown that given the necessary autonomy, it is 
possible to gradually increase water tariffs towards cost recovery. It has however shown that having a clear 
regulatory mechanism for a private operator is not sufficient without the requisite investments. As already 
stated above, the Mozambican water sector infrastructure is not sufficient to meet the ever increasing 
demand. Other challenges include the old network making controlling of unaccounted for water rather 
difficult. All these are challenges faced by the operator and which the regulator is challenged to implement 
any performance improvement measures. The results have further shown that it is necessary for the 
regulator to consider supporting the establishment of a consumer council as this will give it an opportunity 
to have a formalised interaction with consumers. 
The reporting mechanism for CRA has clearly shown that it enjoys a high level of autonomy. Another 
opportunity for autonomy is created through its funding arrangements. It does not depend on government 
interventions. 
The case has identified a gap relating to the need to have a well defined regulatory mechanism for small 
towns which have urban solutions for their water problems. Currently CRA has only been regulating service 
delivery that is within the delegated management framework. The other gap is the regulation of services 
offered by small scale providers which account for more than 30% of the population in Maputo alone. 
The subjective analysis using the adapted BRTF framework of the CRA based on the regulatory principles 
has shown a number of strengths and weaknesses. 
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4.3 The National Water and Sanitation Council, ZAMBIA 
4.3.1 Introduction on the Zambian case study 
The urban water services in Zambia are regulated by the National Water and Sanitation Council 
[NWASCO] which is an autonomous statutory body established by an act of Parliament and started 
operations in 2000. The legislative framework also defines the institutional arrangements for urban water 
services delivery including rights and obligations of service providers and consumers (Governrnent of the 
Republic of Zambia, 1997). NWASCO's vision is "sound and sustainable water supply and sanitation 
services for al/' Zambians and operates on a three tier mission as listed below: 
i. Promotion of efficient and sustainable service delivery 
ii. Promotion of extension of service to un·served areas 
iii. Protection of consumers. 
4.3.1.1 Data sources 
The sources of the evidence in this case study were from documents [reports from the regulator, water 
companies especially Lusaka water and sewerage company], focus group discussions, key informant 
interviews and responses to the questionnaire. The researcher also spent nine months managing the 
Lusaka water and sewerage company hence part of the evidence was obtained through personal 
experience. 
There was only one focus group discussion held in Zambia. Key informant interviews were undertaken with 
three stakeholders from the regulator, two from one of the water companies [Lusaka Water and Sewerage 
Company], two from NGOs, one from the water board and two from the government. The list of the key 
informant interviewees is given in Appendix 5. 34 people responded to the questionnaire out of which 16 
were from the water utilities, 13 from the regulator and 2 each from government and NGO. One respondent 
was from the energy sector. 
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Figure 4-12: Data sources in response to research questions 
Source of the data 
Item Quest. Doc. FGD Interviews Self exe 
'0_ 
Population and population growth -V 
c: '" Poverty levels -V '" -cam 
:::> E Fragility level 
" 
xc:", 
Cl) 0 ~ 
"E'~ 0 0>(3 Policy framework -V -V -V -V uc:", 
Q) -
Protecting consumers and service providers 
" " " " Providing guidelines on tariff setting -V 
" " " Approval of tariffs -V -V 
" " 
-V 
c: 
0 
Monitoring standards of performance 
" " " 1ii Promoting competitive spirit in the sector -V 
" " " 
"5 
en 
~ Valuation of assets -V -V 
u 
'E Advising govemment and the general public on 
" " 
0 
c: 
0 water sector issues u 
Q) 
'0 Studies on economy and efficiency of water 
" '" Q) utilities 0 
a: Capacity building 
" " " " Information awareness on regulation and general -V -V 
service provision 
Incentives on services to the urban poor -V 
" 
-V 
Ensuring water utilities achieve commercial 
" " " viability 
Promotion of accountability of the utility 
" " " Transparency in service delivery -V -V 
en Autonomous regulatory institution -V -V 
'E Single sector regulatory body 
" " 
Q) 
E 
Q) Reporting mechanisms of the regulator 
" " " " 
0> 
c: 
~ Funding mechanisms for the regulator -V -V -V -V -V et; 
co AppOintment of council members -V -V 
" " 
c: 
0 
2 Appointing staff on competitive basis 
" " " " 
~ 
c: Involvement of consumers -V -V -V -V 
The columns in the table: Quest. refers to the questionnaire while Doc. refers to documents and FGD refers to the 
Focus Group Discussions, self exp refers to self experience -this column is only applicable in the Zambian case 
where the personal experience of the researcher in Zambia was used for data collection 
Source: Author 
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4.7.1.2 General Country information 
Zambia had a population of 9.8 Million people at the time of the last census held in 2000 (Government of 
the Republic of Zambia, 2001; UN-DESA, 2003) of which 36% live in urban areas (UNDP, 2006). The 
percentage of the urban population with household connections fell from 53% in 1990 to 41% in 2006 
(UNICEFIWHO, 2008). On the other hand average water supply coverage! in the urban areas increased 
from 86% in 1990 to 90% in 2006. This means the increase in coverage was a result of more people 
accessing water through other means i.e. kiosks and other protected sources. (UNICEFIWHO, 2008). 
DEMOCRAT C 
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Figure 4-13: Map of Zambia 
ZIMBABW 
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Source: http://www.mapsof.net/zambia 
Urban water services in Zambia were for a long time provided at usually low tariff. As an example, in urban 
areas the water sector developed as an almost 'free' service with very limited metering, no control on 
consumption, and maintenance was funded from general funds from the treasury rather than from user 
fees. 
1 Water supply coverage as defined by the Joint Monitoring Report of2008 refers to access to improved sources i.e. 
house connections, yard connects and other protected sources such as protected wells or springs 
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4.3.2 Existing political and socio-economic environmental context in Zambia 
Based on the definition given in the literature review, Zambia is not considered as one of the fragile states. 
It is a country that is facing neither war nor state collapse despite severe odds and stresses (Sekhar C.S.C, 
2006). 
An ambitious privatization program lead to the privatisation of more than 200 state owned Companies 
(Zambia Privatisation Agency, 2007). However the programme slowed due to a contraction in economic 
recovery in the mid to late 1990s. Govemment decided to commercialise utility services including water, 
electricity and telecommunications. Poverty, measured in terms of material deprivation, is high in ·Zambia. 
According to the poverty and vulnerability analysis report (Human Development Report, 2005), 56 percent 
of the population was poor in 2002103, 45 percent in urban areas. Like in many African Countries, about 
60% of the urban population lives in informal settlements with little or no access to basic services such as 
water, electricity, sanitation etc. Urban poverty is worrisome in these informal settlements since the 
absolute concentration of poor population is high. Urban population growth is, on average, double rural 
growth. 
4.3.3 Policy framework for Urban Water services 
The Zambian government initiated and implemented water sector reforms which were preceded by the 
adoption of the national water policy in 1994. (Government of the Republic of Zambia, 1994). This was later 
supported by the Water Supply and Sanitation Act (Government of the Republic of Zambia, 1997). The 
policy recognises water as an economic good and also outlines the institutional and legal framework for the 
water sector in its entirety i.e. including water resources management, water service delivery, irrigation, 
power generation etc. 
Before the reforms, the Zambian water sector was dogged with many operational and institutional 
problems. Service delivery was poor in part due to lack of a comprehensive and clear sector policy and 
strategy to guide the provision of services, lack of a legislative and regulatory framework. The water sector 
suffered from low investment, low cost recovery [being a result of low tariffs and low billing and collection 
ratios], overstaffing in the water services institutions mainly local authorities with people not adequately 
qualified etc. Responsibility for urban water services provision was shared between different government 
ministries and departments and local authorities (Water Sector Development Group, 1996). There was no 
regulatory framework which meant that there was no clear or transparent formula for tariffs. 
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The water sector reforms were implemented based on seven sector principles that were initially adopted by 
the Zambian government (Government of the Republic of Zambia, 1994). The seven sector principles are: 
• Separation of water resources management from water supply and sanitation 
• Separation of regulatory and executive functions within the WSS sector 
• Devolution of authority for service delivery to local authorities and private enterprises 
• Full cost recovery of service provision in the long-run 
• Human resource development leading to more effective institutions 
• Adoption of technologies appropriate to local conditions 
• Increased funding by the GRZ 
The 1994 sector policy also initiated the setting up of the regulator -The National Water and Sanitation 
Council (NWASCO) which began its operations in 2000 aiter the enacting of the enabling legislation. 
4.3.4 Institutional arrangements for urban water service in Zambia 
Urban water service provision in Zambia is mainly through municipal owned companies. Municipalities in 
the neighbourhood come together to establish a water company based on the provisions of the Water 
Supply and Sanitation Act. The companies are registered under the country's company laws. According to 
the Act all institutions supplying water and sanitation services to consumers are required to obtain an 
operating licence from the regulator -NWASCO (NWASCO, 2008). To date a total of 10 municipal owned 
water supply and sanitation service providers have been licensed and a further 6 private operators -mainly 
supplying water to residents living in estates belonging to huge corporations i.e. the Zambia sugar 
plantation (NWASCO, 2009). 
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4.3.5 Sector regulation 
NWASCO, the regulator is a statutory body established through an Act of Parliament No. 28 of 1997 
(Government of the Republic of Zambia, 1997). The law grants NWASCO administrative and financial 
autonomy in Zambia. One of the main roles of NWASCO is approval of cost recovery tariffs. NWASCO has 
also established a consumer consultative mechanism termed as the water watch groups [WWG]. The scope of 
economic regulation in Zambia is for all urban water supply and sanitation systems but does not include 
rural water supply. 
4.3.6 Roles of NWASCO 
The main role of NWASCO as defined in the Act is to regulate the provision of urban water supply and 
sanitation services in Zambia so it reaches sustainability. The establishment of the regulator in Zambia was 
seen as promoting the balancing of commercial and consumer interests, providing advice to the 
govemment and local authorities on matters of water supply and sanitation and commercially viable 
instruments of service delivery; licensing of utilities and other service providers; develop guidelines for 
water services provision. 
In this respect the roles of NWASCO include: 
i. Approval of tariffs that lead to commercial viability of the service providers 
ii. Protection of consumers of urban water services against monopoly effects 
iii. Monitoring and enforcing performance standards 
iv. Knowledge base of urban water services 
v. Promoting services to the urban poor 
4.3.6.1 Functions of NWASCO as provided for in the Zambian laws [the WSS Act No. 28 of 19971 
The NWASCO draws its specific functions from the water supply and sanitation act (Government of the Republic of 
Zambia, 1997) which has outlined them as follows: 
[a] Advise the government on water supply and sanitation matters; 
[b] Advise local authorities on commercially viable institutional arrangements for the provision of water 
supply and sanitation services. 
[cl License utilities and other service providers as well as other activities relating to the provision of 
water; 
[d] Develop sector guidelines for:-
[i] The provision of water supply and sanitation services; 
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[ii) The establishment of water supply and sanitation utilities; 
[iii) The technical and financial management of utilities; and 
[iv) The setting of tariffs for the provision of water supply and sanitation services; 
[e) Establish and enforce standards for:-
[i) water supply or sanitation services; 
[ii) The management of utilities and other service providers; 
[iii) The design, construction, operation and maintenance of water supply and sanitation 
facilities; 
[~ Advise utilities and other service providers on procedures for handling complaints from consumers; 
[g) Disseminate information to consumers on matters relating to water supply and sanitation services; 
[h) Carry out any other activities relating to the regulation of water supply or sanitation services which 
are necessary or conducive to the better performance of its functions under the Act. 
The act does not mention the reviewing and approval of tariffs as one of the functions of NWASCO. This is 
considered to be an oversight. 
Perception of respondents to questionnaire on roles of NWASCO 
The table 4.11 below presents results from all the questions and sub-questions in the questionnaire that 
sought to establish the roles of economic regulation of urban water services. The table has responses to 
questions related to why establish a regulator i.e. promoting economic regulation since urban water service 
provision is monopoly industry as well as to the actual roles or functions of the regulator. The results in the 
tables show general support for establishment of a regulatory framework that can lead to efficient and 
effective service provision. 
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Table 4-11: Questionnaire responses on roles of economic regulation: Zambia 
Strongly Agree Uncertain Disagree strongly No of valid 
RolelLevel of agreement in % agree disagree Responses 
1 Protecting the interest of consumers 68 32 0 0 0 34 
2 Development of guidelines on setting of tariffs 56 41 0 0 0 33 
Setting standards for the performance of service 62 32 0 3 0 
3 providers 34 
4 Issuing licences 62 29 3 0 3 34 
5 Promoting competition among utility providers 47 41 9 0 0 34 
Ensure sustainability of the water sector in the 59 26 6 3 0 
6 country 34 
Conducting studies related to economy and 44 41 6 3 0 
7 efficiency of the utilities 32 
59 24 0 6 3 
8 Advise govemment on water and sanitation matters 32 
Protect the interests of service providers from 53 29 9 0 3 
9 arbitrary govemment intervention 32 
Ensure that government and any public institution 50 29 15 3 0 
10 pays for the services they receive 34 
Participate in any contract negotiations to do with the 50 27 9 6 6 
involvement of the private sector in the management 
11 of water service delivery. 33 
12 Correct any market failure in the water sector 35 41 18 3 3 33 
41 35 9 12 0 
13 Develop the operational guidelines for the utilities. 33 
14 Provide guidelines on Governance structures 35 26 24 12 0 34 
15 Develop subsidy guidelines for services to the poor. 27 29 18 18 3 34 
Keep an accurate value of the property or assets of 35 21 21 18 26 
16 the service providers. 32 
There is need to introduce adequate regulatory 
frameworks in order to promote competition because 
17 of monopoly of water services provision. 50 44 0 6 0 
Regulation of the provision of urban water supply 
and sanitation services would reduce the abuse of 
18 monopoly power. 35 56 3 6 0 32 
In order to have an efficient and effective water 
supply and sanitation sector it is necessary to 
introduce an autonomous regulator in the Water 
19 Supply and Sanitation Sector? 60 34 3 3 0 34 
Regulation may be needed for various purposes. What type of regulation is mostly needed in developing 
20 countries especially in Africa for the water supply and sanitation sector? 
a Economic regulation including service quality 64 27 6 3 0 34 
Social regulation [access to water and sanitation 
b services] 41 40 16 3 0 34 
c Environmental regulation 42 40 9 6 3 33 
d Water quality regulation [basically health regulation] 49 42 6 3 0 32 
e Technical standards regulation [standards bureau] 32 39 23 3 3 34 
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Strongty Agree Uncertain Disagree strongly No 01 valid 
RolelLevel of agreement in % agree disagree responses 
Countries in Africa need clear regulatory framework, 
because of poor transparency, accountability, and 
21 high corruption, etc. 44 19 9 18 0 34 
Adequate utility regulation should assist utilities 
22 secure financial and management autonomy 33 58 6 3 0 34 
Establishment of appropriate independent economic 
23 utility regulation promotes accountability of utilities? 33 58 6 3 0 34 
Establishment of Autonomous utility regulation 
24 promotes transparency of utilities 30 64 3 3 0 34 
Autonomous economic utility regulators should 
25 ensure thal utilities achieve commercial viability. 36 58 3 3 0 34 
Autonomous economic regulation should result in 
26 general pertormance improvements of utilities. 32 59 6 3 0 33 
The regulator should promote the social values of 
water with a need to ensure that utilities provide 
27 water services to the urban poor 6 72 12 10 0 34 
Utility regulators of the water sector should regulate 
28 the small-scale water providers directly 6 36 21 31 6 33 
Autonomous regulators should be party to 
negotiation of contracts with private operators i.e. 
29 management, lease or concession contracts. 18 21 21 28 12 33 
Questions seeking YES/NO answers YES NO No 01 valid 
response 
30 In order to have improved and efficient provision of services, regulators should 33 
a Penalise utilities for non-compliance 91 9 34 
b Take utilities that do not comply to courts of law 53 47 34 
c Use the National police service to enforce the regulations 22 78 34 
31 How should regulators deal with issues of services to the urban poor 32 
a Develop tariff regime that encourages utilities to serve the urban poor 73 27 32 
b Develop and enforce regulations that aim at protecting the urban poor 46 54 32 
c Encourage utilities to provide services 42 58 32 
d Provide guidelines on innovative ways of providing services to the urban poor. 82 18 34 
32 How should smali-scale Autonomous water providers be regulated? 34 
a Establish regulations specifically for small scale Autonomous water providers 27 73 34 
b Develop technical standards which are only suited for the Small Water Enterprises 39 61 32 
c Only regulate through the main utility operator 42 58 33 
What do you think would be the influence of utility regulation on the business strategies of the water utilities 
33 i.e. employment policies, tariff structures e.t.c. 34 
a Promote openness in recruitment and financial management 79 21 34 
b Reduction on the operational costs of utilities 70 30 34 
c Cut down on staff numbers 21 79 32 
Source: Author's analysIs of data 
The last column in the above table [see table 4.11] represents the number of responses that were valid for 
that particular question. While the total responses to the full questionnaire received from Zambia were 34, 
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not all answered all the questions. Some of the questions sought a yes or no answer to the questions. The 
responses to this type of questions are also indicated in the table above. This table has shown that there 
was general agreement to some of the perceptions but there were some where there was no general 
agreement. Some of these are highlighted in the explanations below. For example there was no general 
agreement that utility regulators should regulate the small-scale water providers directly, or that regulators 
should be party to negotiation of contracts with the private operators i.e. management, lease or concession 
contracts. 
4.3.6.2 Approval of tariffs which would lead to commercial viability of the service providers in Zambia 
One of the seven sector principles of the water sector reforms is on achieving full cost recovery in the long 
run (NWASCO, 2004). The long run was not defined in the paper that led to establishment of NWASCO. 
NWASCO's role is not only to set tariffs to achieve full cost recovery but also promoting efficiency. This is 
done to ensure that inefficiencies of the service providers are not passed on to the customers through tariff 
hikes. This is achieved by defining the acceptable level of performance in terms of collection efficiency, 
NRW etc and factoring these in the costs to be recovered. Capacities of the service providers are also 
taken into account. 
While the policy of NWASCO is to assist utilities achieve full cost recovery, it also ensures that only justified 
costs of the service provider are passed on to customers (NWASCO, 2006). The other policy related to 
tariff is that utilities in Zambia must achieve 100% metering as this would not only assist in reducing non-
revenue water but improve collection efficiencies through better billing. 
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The figure below [see fig. 4-14] shows the progressive tariff adjustment trends since the establishment of 
NWASCO for 7 water utilities. 
0.70 
'" 0.60 VI 
=> 
.E 0.50 
~ 
." .. 0.40 
-~ 
'" 
- 0.30 ..~ 
'" 
"" 
0.20 .. 
~
'" ~ 0.10 
0.00 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Year 
Figure 4-14: Progression of average water tariff since 2002 
Source: Autho~s analysis of data 
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The graph reflects an upward tariff adjustment of more than 3 times since 2002. The tariffs as at 2007 
represented 80% of the operation and maintenance costs. The apparent deep in Tariff in 2006 was to a 
large extent attributed to the weak Kwacha [Zambian currency] in that particular year. 
During the focus group discussion it was clear that participants supported the need to ensure that utilities 
achieve commercial viability through charging economic tariffs. One of the participants who is a consumer 
in the focus group discussion felt that the regulator must develop clear guidelines and explain how tariffs 
were arrived at. The objectives of the tariff adjustment guidelines are to ensure that there is a balance 
between the utilities having sufficient revenues to enable them to operate on a sustainable manner and that 
the consumers are protected against overcharging or consumers paying for inefficiencies of utilities. The 
guidelines further aim at providing incentives for efficiency in the performance of the service providers while 
also promoting conservation of treated water through having a higher tariff for huge consumption. 
The focus group discussion commended the procedure adopted by NWASCO for approving tariffs. One of 
the participants [a consumer] however felt that the law should clearly give powers to NWASCO to approve 
tariffs. The consumer further stated that NWASCO should continue requiring utilities to undertake public 
hearings as this helps the public to understand the reasons behind any tariff adjustment. They were happy 
that all service providers were compelled to hold public hearings on their proposals to adjust tariffs and that 
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this has to be reflected in the service provider's application for tariff review. Consumers want improved 
services and in this respect will agree with tariff adjustments that have a clear basis. 
An interviewee from one of the water utilities in Zambia felt that NWASCO should be more supportive in 
undertaking regulatory functions. He felt NWASCO should not link approval of tariff adjustments to 
achieving targets which require investment. 
A role which was considered important in the regulation of water services is that of capacity building of 
service providers. NWASCO considers human resources development as core to any utility operations 
(NWASCO, 2004). In this respect NWASCO has developed policies to assist utilities build stronger human 
resources development programmes. NWASCO coordinates joint training for utility staff, facilitates 
exchange visits and assists in sourcing for extemal funds for training. It also recommends staff from the 
water utilities for various scholarships offered by international organisations (Mbilima, 2008). 
From Table 4.14 above there was full agreement from the respondents that regulators should develop 
guidelines on setting of tariffs as indicated in line 4. NWASCO should ensure the sustainability of the water 
sector in the country as indicated by the results in line 6. 
4.3.6.3 Protection of consumers 
While the Act does not specifically state this role, NWASCO itself has made this as one of their primary 
roles. The Director of NWASCO stated that '~he advice we received from the legal fraternity is that in 
undertaking the clearly stated functions i.e. enforcing the standards we are actually protecting consumers". 
NWASCO is also expected to provide advice to utilities on procedures for handling complaints from 
consumers as well as disseminating information to consumers on matters related to water supply and 
sanitation. These are all activities aimed at protecting consumers. 
During the focus group discussion one of the participants made similar observation on the lack of direct 
mention of protecting consumers in the Act as one of the main functions of NWASCO. It was felt that this is 
an important function that should be clearly stated in the Act. Consumers must be protected against poor 
services that Zambians have been subjected to for a long time. While this may be implied through the 
regulatory function of advising service providers on procedures on how to handle complaints, it is better 
that it is clearly spelt out in the legislation. One of the consumers clearly stated that "for a long time we 
have had no where to turn to for the poor services that we receive. We do not get any water and at the end 
of the month we receive a bill. If we cannot pay then the intermittent supply that we receive is even 
disconnected without any explanation. NWASCO should help us in this respect." 
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Another consumer agreed with the establishment of a consumer consultative framework which is separate 
from the public hearing mechanism conducted by the service providers. The consumer consultative 
framework is given later under the institutional framework of NWASCO [see 4.7.7.4]. They felt that though 
the water watch groups are not specifically mentioned in the act, the regulator should take the 
establishment of these as one of their key functions. This has provided a framework for the voice of the 
water consumers in Zambia to be heard. All the respondents to the questionnaire agreed that one of the 
key roles of utility regulation should be protection of consumers. 
4.3.6.4 Monitoring and enforcing standards of the performance of service providers 
NWASCO carries out service monitoring as a tool for developing the annual performance review. The idea 
of undertaking these physical monitoring activities is to verify the annual performance information provided 
by the service providers. Inspections are further done to ensure providers comply with the WSS Act, the 
directives given and the licence conditions and also to follow up on complaints. The annual reports 
provided by the utility use a format developed by NWASCO which is easy for all the service providers to 
follow (NWASCO, 2006). This has led to the utilities keeping as much key performance information as 
possible. NWASCO uses these reports to disseminate sector information to the decision makers and the 
public as a whole. With such information utilities are motivated to compete amongst each other, thereby 
promoting continuous improvements. Transparency enhances citizen awareness of local performance and 
provides the political leaders with important information for developing sector policy. The researcher's 
personal experience was that the weaker utilities did not feel so discouraged but motivated to improve so 
that the next time they are not among the worst three performing utilities. 
A utility performance comparative assessment report is produced every year showing the trend or 
development of water services delivery in the country. The report not only provides performance of the 
utilities but ranks the providers. The top three water companies are commended in the report and awarded 
during the launch of the report while the worst performing ones are reprimanded in the report. The first 
report was produced in 2002 covering the period from 2001 to March 2002. In 2004/5 report a ranking of 
the performance of the CUs was introduced (NWASCO, 2005). 
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4.3.6.5 Knowledge base on urban water services 
NWASCO has developed into being a repository of knowledge and experience in the urban water sector in 
Zambia. The regulator has most of the information one may require on urban water services in the country 
be it performance of the service providers, access levels to water services, services to the urban poor, 
institutional and policy framework for water service delivery. NWASCO set minimum service levels for 
eleven indicators which utilities should strive to achieve (Kayaga, 2004). 
During the focus group discussions a participant from government felt that one of the roles of NWASCO 
should be to advise government on urban water services. This advice may also be made available to any 
other person seeking such advice. 
4.3.6.6 Regulation of services to the urban poor 
During the key informant interviews there were strong views that the regulator should have a role to play to 
require utilities to extend services to the urban poor. NWASCO set up the devolution trust fund [DTF] 
specifically to address the potential neglect of the services to the urban poor. 
The issue was also supported during the focus group discussions that the regulator should be involved in 
one way or another in promoting service provision to the urban poor by the utilities. The only question is 
how to regulate for the benefit of the urban poor. Since the main sources of water for the urban poor are 
usually water kiosks, or stand alone community owned schemes in Lusaka. Respondents were requested 
to state their level of agreement to the statement that utility regulators should regulate the small-scale water 
providers directly. The responses are shown in line 28 of Table 4.11 above. There was no general 
agreement on how the small scale providers should be regulated. It was necessary to show this to verify if 
at all the responses were influenced by the institution to which the respondent belonged. The table below 
shows this [See table 4-12]. 
Table 4-12: Cross tabulation on regulation of services to the urban poor 
Unit of analysis/level of Number of Strongly Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly Total 
agreement in % respondents agree disagree 
Government Ministry 2 50 0 0 50 0 100 
Regulator 13 19 27 27 27 0 100 
Water Utility 16 24 40 18 12 6 100 
NGO 2 100 0 0 0 0 100 
Source: Authors analysis of data 
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The most common type of altemative service providers in Lusaka are the water trusts which supply to 
approximately 40% of the population living in informal settlements. The water trusts were established 
through the facilitation of an NGO [CARE Zambia] that received funding from the British government 
through DflD to accelerate service delivery to the urban poor in informal settlements in Lusaka (Water and 
Sanitation Programme, 2009). 
The community own and manage the infrastructure which was handed over to them in trust to supply water. 
Currently the water trusts are not regulated as NWASCO would rather regulate the large utility by giving it 
an operating license for the whole city or town. Then any other secondary providers like the water trusts 
within the city would be regulated by the main license holder which in this case is LWSC. As part of 
implementing this, an MoU was to be signed between the community owned water trusts and the LWSC on 
the management and monitoring the performance of the water trusts. 
There is therefore agreement that alternative service providers should be regulated. One question that 
needs further investigation is how to regulate their activities. Other researchers have equally recommended 
that altemative service providers should be regulated (Kayaga, 2008). 
One member of the focus group discussions stated that, Zambia has very high poverty levels hence the 
need for any institution dealing with such services as water to establish specific programmes aimed at 
addressing the needs of the poor. While NWASCO does not have specific unit to deal with regulatory 
services to the urban poor, a fund was established aimed at requiring utilities to serve the urban poor. 
NWASCO is of the view that the urban poor should be regulated through the licensed providers in order for 
the "alternative" service providers to have a responsible back up services of the licensed providers. The 
idea is to be able to apply the provision of the Act for non compliance on a service provider as opposed to a 
community. The trust fund works as an incentive to those utilities that show interest and promise to extend 
services to the urban poor (Devolution Trust Fund, 2005). The Devolution Trust Fund [DTF] is a basket 
fund established through Statutory Instrument No.65 of 2001. Though hosted by NWASCO, it now has its 
own Board and a separate decision making process. 
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4.3.7 Institutional arrangements for the regulator 
According to the legislation that established NWASCO it is a body corporate with perpetual succession and 
a common seal, capable of suing and being sued (Government of the Republic of Zambia, 1997). Though 
established by law in 1997 NWASCO only became operational in 2000. The legislation also outlines the 
composition of the council, appointment mechanisms for the councillors [council members] and lists the 
functions of the council. The chairman of the council reports to the minister responsible for water resources 
management. This is in line with the second principle of the water sector reforms in Zambia which 
advocated for the separation of executive and regulatory functions. NWASCO is required to provide audited 
accounts to the Auditor General within three months of the end of a financial year (Government of the 
Republic of Zambia, 1997) and for the minister to present such report to parliament. 
While different sources of data were used the table below [see table 4.13] presents the findings in relation 
to the institutional arrangements for the regulator. The table below presents the results to the questionnaire 
with respect to the institutional arrangements for the regulator. The results point to the possibly of having 
autonomous regulators as one way of assisting to achieve commercial viability, attain some levels of 
transparency and operate independently. The results from the questionnaire also point to the fact that 
regardless of the ownership structure of the service provider, establishment of an autonomous regulatory 
body is greatly encouraged. The table starts 91 % of the 34 respondents agreeing with the fact that if the 
regulatory authority was within the political sphere of government there is likelihood that sector priorities 
can be manipulated to serve short-term electoral interests. 
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Table 4-13: Questionnaire responses on institutional arrangements: Zambia 
Strongly Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly No of valid 
Institutional arrangementJLevel of agreement in % agree disagree Responses 
If regulatory authority lies within the political sphere of 
government, there is likelihood that sector priorities 
can be manipulated to serve short-term electoral 
t interests. 61 30 9 0 0 34 
It is not necessary to establish a regulator in a 
situation where water services provision is entrusted 
to the private operator through a concession or lease 
contract as the regulatory issues can be included in 
2 the contract. 3 3 3 52 39 32 
There should be different regulatory mechanisms for 
different type of Private Sector Participation contracts 
i.e. for a management contract, lease contract, 
3 concession 3 26 16 42 13 33 
Where municipalities have contracted another 
organisation to manage the provision of services, 
there is no need to have a separate regulator as the 
regulatory functions can be carried out by the 
4 municipality. 3 3 3 31 60 34 
In order to ensure independence in its operations, the 
5 regulator should be an autonomous statutory body. 74 23 0 3 0 30 
The regulatory body should have a two tier system of 
Governance. A regulatory CounciVcommission and 
6 the executing body or secretariat. 41 38 9 9 3 33 
The members of the regulatory council should be 
7 appointed by government. 9 41 9 29 12 33 
Employees of the executing body (the secretariaQ 
including the Executive Director should be appointed 
by the Regulatory council through a competitive and 
8 transparent process. 59 35 0 3 3 34 
In order to have a well informed regulatory council the 
Executive Director must be a full member of the 
9 council. 12 50 3 29 6 34 
Consumers should be represented on the regulatory 
10 council. 35 59 3 0 3 34 
In order to have an effective follow up of the 
implementation of the regulations, consumer watch 
11 groups must established. 29 56 12 0 3 30 
Autonomy of the regulator is strengthened if he is 
12 resourced (financially) by a regulatory fee 44 44 9 3 0 30 
For most African Countries, multi-sectoral regulatory 9 29 38 18 6 34 
framework is more appropriate as it is more cost 
effective and has reduced likelihood of industry 
13 regulatory capture. 
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Questions seeking YES/NO answers YES NO No of valid 
response 
The institutional arrangements of the regulatory body has an effect on its operational efficiencies. What do you 
14 think should be the institutional framework for the economic regulator 
a Create a regulator as a Department within the 'Ministry responsible for Water" 18 82 34 
Establish a totally new regulatory body (with own new resources) -whether single or 34 
b multi-sector regulator. 73 27 
Contract out some elements of regulation to reputable, technically competent private 30 
c sector firms 0 100 
15 The utility regulator would enjoy greater autonomy in its operations if the regulator: 
a Reports to a sector Ministry 12 88 32 
b Reports to a completely non-sectoral Ministry i.e. the Prime Ministers office 9 91 32 
c Reports to Parliament just like other statutory bodies like the auditor General 88 12 32 
If government was to establish a mUlti-sector regulator which other sector do you think the water regulator 
16 should be partnered with? 
a Telecommunication 29 71 33 
b Electricity 81 19 33 
c Banking 3 97 33 
d Railway 0 100 33 
Source: Author's analysis of data 
A member of the council felt that the issue of autonomy with accountability is often contentious and difficult 
for government to accept. He felt that the current reporting mechanism promotes autonomy as only the 
Chairman reports to the Minister. The reporting is for the purposes of fiducial responsibilities i.e. financial 
reporting and presentation of the annual report to parliament. He mentioned that the chairman never 
reported at anyone time where he was instructed by the minister or indeed anyone holding political 
position to sway a particular decision in any direction. Even when decisions of suspending licenses to 
operators were taken, these were taken purely on regulatory basis and without government intervention. 
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An interviewee from the council advised that NWASCO operates with accountability for its actions in mind. 
This requires it to report its activities and performance to parliament on a regular basis and be subject to 
parliamentary scrutiny. Regulatory decision-making should also be subject to openness, transparency and 
the due process mentioned above, including an appropriate appeal route which minimises the need for full 
judicial review. The appeal route for any aggrieved party is very clear and it goes to the Minister first. If not 
satisfied the aggrieved party may appeal to the High Court of Zambia. 
Another interviewee from one of the NGOs felt the establishment of a regulator in Zambia led to a reduced 
direct intervention by the govemment or political system in the management of the utilities especially tariff 
setting. The interviewee further gave an example where at one time before the establishment of NWASCO, 
the Lusaka Water and Sewerage Company announced adjustment of tariffs. Immediately after reading in 
the press, the then minister of local govemment announced the reversal of the tariffs saying they were very 
high and would not be affordable by average consumers. Since the establishment of NWASO such an 
incident has never happened. The commercialisation coupled with the existence of a regulator means that 
the govemment has recognised the need to run urban water services delivery as commercial entities. 
Based on responses to the questionnaire, there was a general agreement that if the regulatory authority 
lies within the sphere of government, there is always a danger that prices, service standards and 
investment priorities would be set to serve short term electoral interests. 91 % of the 33 valid responses 
were in agreement with this perception line 1 on table 4-13. In response to another question which stated 
that in order to ensure autonomy in its operations, the regulator must be an autonomous body, 97% of the 
34 valid responses were in agreement with the perception refer to line 5 table 4.13. This agrees well with 
the situation on the ground. 
What the above shows is corroboration of results from the three different sources of focus group 
discussions, key informant interviews and responses to the questionnaire. The agreement is the support to 
the government for establishing an autonomous regulatory institution for water services in Zambia. 
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4.3.7.1 Structure, composition and reporting mechanisms of the council 
NWASCO has an independent board or council appointed by government and the management led by the 
director responsible for carrying out the detailed work of regulation. The act recently underwent some 
amendments which resulted in the reduction of the number of council members from 16 to 7 members of 
which four are from the private sector and three from key Ministries. The new list of council members is as 
given below: 
i. A representative of the Consumer Protective Association of Zambia 
ii. A representative of the Zambia Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
iii. A representative of an association whose membership consists of water sector professional 
iv. A representative of private sector institution concerned with public health 
v. A representative of the Ministry responsible for water resources 
vi. A representative of the ministry responsible for local government and housing; and 
vii. A representative of the Attomey General 
During the focus group discussions there was general agreement with the current composition of the 
council. One participant however made an observation that the act is vague on which minister is 
responsible for NWASCO. In practice so far NWASCO's line ministry is responsible for water resources but 
this is not clear in the Act. 
The council of NWASCO is appointed by government based on nominations received from the respective 
institutions identified in the legislation as listed above. Council members are appointed on a three year 
rolling term of office with a maximum of two terms. The chairman is elected by members from among 
themselves. The council meets regularly [once every quarter] and in between working committees meet to 
deliberate on various issues (Kayaga, 2004). 
Some partiCipants during the focus group discussions felt that the appointment mechanisms for the council 
members were not transparent. Council members should not be appointed by the minister. Institutions 
named in the water supply and sanitation act should be requested to provide three names and their CVs. A 
committee appointed by government could then scrutinise the three CVs from the institutions and select 
one person from each institution. This would increase transparency in the appOintment mechanisms of the 
council members and hence will increase credibility in the council. Giving powers to the minister to appoint 
council members can easily lead to the minister selecting people of his choice but from the named 
institutions. One participant said "what would stop a minister from appointing a second hand clothes dealer 
who is a member of the association of commerce and industry but who is a girl friend or someone from the 
160 
same political party as the Ministe!'?" The appointment mechanism should be looked at so that there is no 
compromise in terms of quality and integrity of council members. A participant from NWASCO clarified that 
the Minister has no lUxury to appoint outside what nominating institutions pass on to him. So unless the 
nominating institutions are also compromised to include the minister's girl friend, it is not possible for the 
minister to do so. 
An assertion in the questionnaire was made that the members of the council must be appointed by 
government. There was no general agreement on this assertion as out of the 34 valid responses, 50% of 
the respondents were in agreement that government should be the appointing authority of the regulatory 
commission and 41 % were not in agreement. This is reflected in line 7 of the table 4-13 above. 
As stated above, NWASCO reports to the Minister for water resources. However based on the perceptions 
of the respondents, there was a general agreement that NWASCO should report to Parliament as opposed 
to a government ministry. The results of this are shown in the table 4-13 above lines 14 [a], [b] and [cl. 
What the results show is preference of the participants based on the perception that a non-sectoral ministry 
like Parliament would assure greater autonomy. Actual implementation of this would be difficult as there are 
many other factors that would have to be considered. None of the utility regulatory institutions in Zambia 
report to a non-sectoral ministry i.e. communications authority, energy regulatory board, environmental 
council of Zambia. 
The autonomy of NWASCO in its decision making was greatly tested in early 2006 when it agreed to a 
substantial tariff increases to service providers during period of presidential, parliamentary and local 
government elections. An effective 67% tariff increase was agreed to for the Lusaka Water and Sewerage 
Company in April 2006 -barely five months away from the elections. The government abided by this 
decision, despite the looming elections. 
Based on the above results autonomy of NWASCO is characterised by: 
• setting up the regulatory body outside the ministerial structure [Table 4.13 line 5]; 
• non-political - members of the NWASCO board are appOinted on merit 
• members of the NWASCO are appOinted for a specific term of 3 years with firm tenure of 
appointment even on change of government; 
• providing the regulator with a statutory ability to fund its work from regulatory fees [table 4.13 line 12]; 
and 
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• giving the regulator autonomy in its decision-making within a broader legal framework. 
4.3.7.2 Organisation structure of NWASCO 
NWASCO has within its staff compliment capacity in the fields of engineering, human resources, 
economiCS, and legal. This is portrayed on the organization chart given below: 
I NWASCO Council I 
I Director I 
: Personal Assistant / 
L L L 
/ Office Administration / I Secretary to the Council I I Chief Inspector I 
... 
+ + I Public relations officer I Inspector- /Inspector ·Technical I 
Finance/commercial 
! + 
Commercial Officer I I Technical Officer 
Figure 4-15: Organisation chart for NWASCO 
Source: Author's analysis of data 
I 
NWASCO has a total staff compliment of about 16 of which 10 are professional staff and the rest are 
support staff (Richards et aI., 2008) The chief inspector is responsible for all matters related to monitoring 
the performance of water utilities. 
The council is responsible for the appointment of the director of NWASCO through an open call for 
candidature. The director in tum is responsible for the appointment of the rest of staff (Richards et aI., 
2008). All the personnel in NWASCO are appointed on merit and are paid market salaries. The small 
number of staff makes selection and terms and conditions of employment manageable. 
One European consultant was quoted on the NWASCO website as saying ''NWASCO is the island of 
efficiency in the Water Sector' (NWASCO, 2006). In order to maintain this high level of expectation 
NWASCO developed an innovative performance monitoring and reward system [PMRS] for its employees. 
The aim of the PMRS is to enhance performance of personnel in NWASCO, promote excellence and 
innovation. 
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One of the interviewees felt NWASCO is now one of the high profile institutions in Zambia especially since 
2006. In 2006 the annual sector performance report was presented by the country's Vice President with the 
full participation of the media. This approach enhances competitiveness, improves the efficiency of the 
utilities in the socio-political environment they operate. 
During the key informant interviews, an interviewee who is also an employee of one of the service providers 
re-iterated the need for NWASCO to be supportive rather than punitive in implementing its regulatory 
functions. He further felt that water utilities in Zambia could pay some attention to services to the urban 
poor if clear incentives and targets to be achieved were developed by NWASCO for this. An incentive 
based regulation proposal was introduced in 2008 using a special fund -the Devolution Trust Fund [DTF] 
created in 2001 to provide investment support for services to the informal settlements [commonly known as 
peri-urban areas in Zambia]. Utilities can apply to this fund and DTF evaluates the application using the 
performance information from NWASCO as well as the merit of the application (Mbilima, 2008). The 
interviewee however felt that the current use of the devolution trust fund as not as efficient. Instead he took 
issue with the current organisational structure of NWASCO. He felt that NWASCO should establish a 
special unit to work with the DTF and the utilities on services to the urban poor. This unit should be 
reflected in the organisation chart. In this respect the regulator would have a sub-sectoral focal person or 
unit and would concentrate on issues of services to the urban poor. This comment arose because DTF is a 
separate institution from NWASCO. The proposal to have a focal person on unit would strengthen the close 
working relationships between NWASCO and DTF. 
One of the functions of NWASCO is to monitor the performance of service providers for quality and 
efficiency. This calls for staff to have fingertip knowledge of the same providers. In order to achieve this 
high level of professionalism and on-hand information, a desk officer approach to monitoring service 
providers was instituted (NWASCO, 2006). The Desk Officers [DOs] all based at the NWASCO head office 
are appointed among NWASCO staff to focus on particular service providers. This is for the purpose of: 
• Monitoring progress of various factors 
• Implementing directives issued 
• Keeping track of early warning indicators in case of under performance 
• Providing personalised advice to identified problems 
• Coordination of Water Watch Groups within the provider's area 
• Collecting license fees, etc 
163 
This also gives opportunity to the service providers to have a direct contact person within NWASCO who 
attends to all their issues. NWASCO on the other hand establishes close personal relationships with the 
providers that foster progress in service provisions and steer the sector towards sound and sustainable 
service provision for all. 
Part Time Inspectors [PT inspectors) 
As part of the structure of NWASCO, the Act further provides for the Council to appoint part time inspectors 
to monitor, inspect and enforce the provisions of the act. NWASCO is not decentralized and only has its 
offices in Lusaka and there are no plans currently to change this status. Part time inspectors undergo 
training and orientation to familiarize them with NWASCO work culture and ethics, and given identity cards 
that allows them to perform the work of an inspector. They also have powers of an inspector as provided for 
in sections 33 and 34 of the Water Supply and Sanitation Act (Government of the Republic of Zambia, 
1997). Since the use of part time inspectors is supported by legislation, service providers have therefore 
accepted them as part of the regulatory framework. 
This has been a cost effective way of decentralising the inspectorate of NWASCO. The perforrnance data 
that is obtained from the part-time inspectors has made it possible for NWASCO to produce the annual 
performance assessment reports on time. The remaining challenge is how to ensure that the part time 
inspectors pay as much attention to the regulatory work as they do to their normal day to day duties. 
Special Regulatory Supervision-SRS 
Special Regulatory Supervision [SRS] is an enforcement tool used on providers whose performance 
deteriorates beyond acceptable limits. NWASCO signs an SRS agreement with the provider in which it is 
stipulated that during the period of the SRS, NWASCO shall monitor closely all operations of the provider 
(Mbilima, 2008). Under the SRS, NWASCO can attend board meetings to monitor internal decisions. Such 
action may be seen to be clearly intrusive, but it enables NWASCO to closely monitor collection efficiency, 
quality of service, expenditure patterns, production operations and other activities that have a direct impact 
on the performance of the provider. 
At least 3 water companies have experienced SRS with a positive impact Le. their performance has 
improved. The first water company to be put on SRS was Nkana Water and Sewerage Company-NWSC 
which is now one of the better performing water companies in Zambia. In another case, North West Water 
and Sewerage Company [NWWSC] was placed under SRS. NWWSC is also now among the top three 
companies. 
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The figures below [see figure 4-16) show the performance improvements for the two companies which were 
a direct result of the influence of NWASCO (Mbilima, 2008) . Most of the indicators on the charts show a 
positive trend resulting from the SRS. For example North Western experienced a sudden high urbanisation 
resulting from the opening of new mines; Nkana water on the other hand merged with AHC-MMS, a private 
company that was supplying water and sanitation services to the former mining areas in the province. The 
merger was due to the poor performance of the privately operated company -but certainly diverted 
managerial attention from other objectives. Although both companies depend on government funds for 
capital investments, they now are able to meet all their operational and maintenance costs. 
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Figure 4·16: Performance improvement of two utilities 
In the figure above: NWWSC stands for North Western water and sewerage Company while NWSC stands for Nkana 
water and sewerage company 
Source: (Mbilima. 2008) 
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4.3.7.3 Funding mechanisms for the regulator 
The Act provides for five sources of funding for NWASCO. During the formative stage NWASCO relied a lot 
on government grants and donor funding for its operations. This was a great challenge as the grants were 
not received as requested and donor funding was for specific items rather than operations of NWASCO. 
NWASCO has achieved a self sustaining status as it is able to finance its annual operational budget from 
the license fees. In any case the five possible sources of funding include the following (Government of the 
Republic of Zambia, 1997): 
i. The funds appropriated by Parliament from government treasury; 
ii. Funds paid to the council by way of license fees, -utilities pay a monthly fee equivalent to 2% of 
their monthly turn over. 
iii. The Council may also accept monies by way of grants or donations from any source in Zambia 
and, subject to the approval of the Minister, from any source outside Zambia; in this regard 
NWASCO has received technical assistance mainly from the German government through the 
GTZ. 
iv. NWASCO can, with the approval of the Minister, raise funds by way of loans or otherwise, such 
monies as it may, require for the discharge of its functions; 
v. The fifth possible source of funding is through charging and collection of fees in respect of 
consultancy and other services provided by the Council; as well as charge and collect fees in 
respect of programmes and seminars conducted by the Council. 
During the focus group discussions there was some feeling expressed by one participant who felt that the 
current funding mechanisms for NWASCO are sufficient. However the method of calculating the license fee 
based on the return is rather unfair. The 2% monthly fee charged by NWASCO should be based on the 
actual monthly collection. Utilities keep record of all their monthly collections so NWASCO should use these 
records after making an independent verification. The current method of collecting the fee means the water 
companies are paying for the billing errors i.e. bills to properties that do not exist or unpaid bills especially 
from govemment. 
Respondents to the questionnaire on funding of the regulator were in agreement that NWASCO should be 
financed through a license fee. They felt this enhances the autonomy of the NWASCO. The results are 
indicated in line 12 of the table 4-13 above. 
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In 2003 annual report of NWASCO outlined as one of its major constraints insufficient funds to meet its 
operational costs. While for the first two years, NWASCO received a lot of support from the donor agencies 
and government grants, this was not sufficient to meet the operational costs. As shown in the figure below 
[see fig. 4-17] in 2003 the grants released from government were low though there was a slight increase in 
license fee collection. The graph below [see graph 4-17] shows the amount of contribution to the funding for 
NWASCO from different sources since 2000. The contribution from regulatory fee was low in 2005 [see fig 
4-17]. This was a time when government contribution reduced, and the license fee was still low at 1 % of the 
turnover of the utility. So even if the collected rate was higher the actual amount collection was low. The 
license fee was increased in 2006 to 2% of the turn-over. 
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Figure 4-17: Funding sources for NWASCO 
Source: Author's analysis of data 
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In later years the collection efficiency of the license fees increased partly due to the introduction of the 
performance management and reward system and reinforced by the concept of desk officer. The year 2005 
was particularly difficult for NWASCO as the collections from the license fees were rather low. However 
donor support helped to cushion the funding gap [about 43% of the total budget in 2005]. From 2006 the 
collection rate was quite high around 89% in 2006 and 85% in 2007 on average [see fig 4-17 above]. 
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4.3.7.4 Consumer participation in regulation 
During its formative years, NWASCO found it important to obtain the customers' perception on the quality 
of service they are getting and how their complaints are attended to. Therefore, in wanting to ensure that 
NWASCO is present on the ground from the pOint of view of consumers, for first hand information and 
addressing unresolved consumer complaints, Water Watch Groups [WWGs] were established, comprising 
customers from the service areas. The first WWG was established in Lusaka in 2002. Membership is 
voluntary but competitive. The only requirement is the interest and desire to work in the sector and 
members are appointed on a two year renewable term (Kayaga, 2004). Due to poor service delivery by the 
service providers and the increasing number of unresolved complaints, many people were willing to serve 
as volunteers as long as they received authority to deal with the service providers. Such authority was 
delegated to them by NWASCO. 
The main functions of the WWGs include (NWASCO, 2006): 
i. Follow up unresolved consumer complaints 
ii. Improve communication between consumers and providers 
iii. arbitrate in conflicts between consumers and service providers 
iv. Sensitise consumers [i.e. the poor] on their rights and obligations 
v. Educate consumers on the role and functions of the three Regulators 
vi. Collect information on performance of providers 
vii. Inform the Alliance on effectiveness of the regulations and propose possible adjustments 
viii. Create public awareness of CWGs existence - through public meetings, seminars, workshops, 
exhibitions 
ix. Publicise tariff adjustments locally 
The above functions are executed through a number of activities including: 
i. Holding public meetings with consumers 
ii. Engaging in outreach and publicity programs via sensitization meetings, TV and Radio broadcasts. 
iii. Submitting periodic reports to the Alliance including feedback from consumers 
iv. Participation at workshops, conferences etc. 
As of end of 2007 a total of 10 WWGs were established across the country. The watch groups have helped 
in improving communication between the service providers and the consumers. Once a watch group is 
established, NWASCO informs the service provider in that particular area. In order for the WWGs to fulfil 
their responsibilities effectively, the service provider has to name a senior employee as a contact person 
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who is authorised to deal with all issues brought forward by a respective WWG. The contact person should 
be available to the WWG whenever necessary. 
Figure 4·18: Consumer complaint mechanism in Zambia 
Source: (NWASCO, 2006) 
The watch groups have registered a number of achievements which include the following: 
i. Since establishment in 2002 the WWGs had received and handled more than 50,000 complaints 
as a result of increased public awareness. 
ii. Service providers have started resolving customer complaints expeditiously as they realise that any 
delays would result in the complaint going to the WWG and eventually to NWASCO. 
iii. Consumer knowledge on WSS issues has improved· empowerment on rights and obligations. 
iv. There is improved behavioural change by consumers - [e.g. willingness to pay, reduction of 
vandalism] as the consumers have become more aware of the challenges of water service 
provision. 
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Challenges of the water watch groups still remain however and these include: 
i. Some service providers have not fully accepted the WWG concept. Some service providers still 
view the WWGs with apprehension and suspicion rather than as partners and arbitrators with 
consumers. They view the WWGs as opponents or an extension of NWASCO. 
ii. To correct the impression created in the public that WWG membership is employment yet this is 
voluntary. Adverts have been clear on this but NWASCO has to continue stating this fact. 
iii. Operational funding for the WWGs is important. Currently NWASCO provides financial support to 
the WWGs but at a very minimal level. There is therefore need to have a clear and sustainable 
funding mechanism for the WWGs. 
4.3.7.5 Multi-sector regulatory mechanism 
A question was asked on the perception of the respondents to the establishment of a multi-sector regulator. 
38% of the respondents were in agreement with the proposal to establish a multi-sector regulator while 
24% were in disagreement -this is shown in line 13 of the table above [see table 4.13]. The rest of the 
respondents -38% were uncertain of their position in relation to this question. The wide variation in the 
results may be because multi-sector regulation is largely unfamiliar in Zambia. The results are shown as 
per the figure below [see figure 4-19]. 
Level of agreement on establishmet of a Multi-sectoral 
regulator 
• Strongly agree • Agree • Uncertain • Disagree • Strongly disagree 
Figure 4-19: Perception on establishment of a multi-sector regulator 
Source: Author's analysis of data 
One respondent felt it was too early to lump water services regulation with other utility service regulation. 
Having a water only regulator in Zambia may be an appropriate model, given the multiplicity of water 
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service providers in the country. Zambia has more than 16 service providers i.e. the commercial utilities, 
municipalities and the small private schemes which all fall within the regulatory framework of urban water 
services. 
During the focus group discussions, a participant from NWASCO felt that experience of regulation of public 
utility services was new in Zambia. In this respect he felt it would not be appropriate to immediately lump 
regulation of water with the regulation of energy and telecommunications. Few people know about multi-
sector regulation and Zambia is just learning single sector regulation. He therefore felt the current 
arrangement was sufficient where NWASCO only deals with water services regulation. Should there be 
need to consider multi-sector regulation then he proposed that the issue be re-visited after 10 years of 
NWACO's existence. This would allow sufficient time to understand the challenges of single sector 
regulation and perhaps share experiences with those that are in a multi-sectoral regulation situation. 
4.3.8 Subjective analysis of the level of achievement towards principles of the BRTF Framework 
A subjective analysis was undertaken on the level of adherence of NWASCO to the regulatory principles 
developed on the basis of the BRTF of economic regulation in sub-Saharan Africa. Below is a subjective 
analysis of NWASCO's adherence to the good principles of regulation, based on the perceptions of the 
stake holders in Zambia. 
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Scores for assessing levels level of achievement 4 is very high, 3 is high, 2 is limited and 1 is low 
Table 4-14: Analysis of level of achievement of principles of economic regulation: Zambia 
Regulatory Definitions or aspects used for Level of Comments 
principle measuring level of achievement achievement 
against the principle 
The regulatory cost of 3 [high] Cost of regulation is 2% of 
addressing the perceived turnover of regulated entity. Could 
problem or risk as compared to be achieved with lower % 
the services being regulated 
Proportionality 'Severity' of interventions compared 2 [Iow] The regulator uses conditions 
to the risks and costs of compliance given for tariff adjustments 
Regulation should also seek to 4 [very high] NWASCO has effective capacity 
be educational -rather than building programmes for the 
based purely on a punitive regulated. 
approach. 
The regulator should or does clearly 3 [high] NWASCO discusses and 
explain to the regulated entities how communicates reasons for decisions. 
and why certain final decisions were 
taken. 
Is there a clear appeal procedure 3 [high] Appeal procedures spelt out in the 
with independent adjudication-if a Act and is followed. 
utility is not satisfied with a 
regulatory decision 
There should also be well 3 [high] This is explained in the Act that 
publicised, fair and effective established NWASCO and is 
Accountability complaints procedures for followed. 
consumers 
The regulator should have clear 1 [very low] While the Act talks about the 
lines of responsibility i.e. Ministers, regulator being responsible to a 
Parliaments and the public provided Minister, it does not specify which 
for in the law Minister it refers to. 
Is there a consumer consultative 3 [high] Consumers are included in the 
committee or council with regulatory framework through the 
opportunities to hold the utilities and water watch groups. These have not 
regulator to account been established across the country 
The regulator should have 4 [very high] This is a requirement provided for in 
substantive reporting and the Act 
accounting audit obligations 
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Regulatory Definition and points used for Level of Comments 
principle measuring level of achievement achievement 
of the principle 
Over time [principles of precedence 3 [high] Based on the information 
should apply as much as possible to available, NWASCO has been 
Consistency 
enhance predictability and reduce consistent over time in their 
uncertainties among the regulated] regulatory decisions 
service providers treated 3 [high] It applies its regulatory standards 
consistently across the country equally to all the entities 
Clear objectives of regulation 3 [high] These are stated and available on 
effectively communicated the website 
Consultation with stakeholders 3 [high] NWASCO makes consultations 
on major policy changes with stakeholders when there is a 
major policy issue 
The regulated entities have a 3 [high] NWASCO conducts training on 
clear understanding of their the obligations of the utilities 
obligations 
Clear decision making process 2 [Iow] Process clearly spelt out in the 
with all major decisions being NWASCO regulatory tools. But 
Transparency made public i.e. through major decisions not clearly made 
websites public 
Availability of documents and 4 [very high] Regulatory tools are available on 
information used for decision the website and key documents 
making for public inspection. such as studies. 
Perfomnance data of the 4 [very high] Performance reports are produced 
regulated entities also available annually and available publicly 
publicly 
Clear appointment processes of 3 [high] Spelt out in the legislation. But 
the regulatory commission should be more competitive 
members 
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Regulatory Definition and points used for Level of Comments 
principle measuring level of achievement achievement 
of the principle 
Availability of an up to date policy or 2 [Iow] An evaluation report on services to 
strategy on regulating for the benefit the urban poor but no policy or 
of the urban poor strategy paper 
Suitable incentives for serving the 4 [very high] A trust fund [DTF] was established 
poor [e.g trust funds, making it targeted at the urban poor. Only 
easier to connect etc] utilities with innovative measures 
on services to the urban poor can 
access the funds 
Special programmes managed by 2 [Iow] Apart from the initiatives of the 
the regulator that would benefit the Trust Fund, there are no special 
Services to the urban poor i.e. advocacy programs programs to benefit the urban poor 
urban poor Special tariff provisions which are 3 [high] A social tariff for the first 6m3 
pro-poor 
Evidence of ongoing improvements 2 [Iow] Programs financed by the DTF for 
to services in poor communities and services to the urban poor 
informal settlements 
Specific and effective 2 [Iow] While NWASCO rewards utilities 
performance measurement and that have some initiatives in 
targets for services in poor services to the urban poor, there 
communities and informal are no clear targets or criteria on 
settlements how this is done 
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Regulatory Definition and points used for 
principle measuring level of achievement 
01 the principle 
Separate regulatory agency wilh its 
own legal status 
Roles and functions of the agency 
clearly stated in the law 
Security of tenure of the regulatory 
commission members provided for 
in the law 
Independence! Protection from dismissal of 
autonomy commissioners and Director 
without due cause provided for in 
the law 
No requirement for regulatory 
decision to be approved by a 
government department or 
ministry before being 
implemented. 
Regulator with full authority to 
set and approve tariffs 
Source: Author's analysis of data 
4.3.9 Zambian Case summary 
Political and socio-economic context 
Level 01 Comments 
achievement 
4 [very high] NWASCO is a statutory body 
separate from government 
operations with own legal status 
and independent funding 
arrangements 
2 [Iow] Role of tariff approval not clearly 
stated in the law only by 
inference 
4 [very high] Security of tenure provided for 
in the legislation 
4 [very high] No commissioner can be 
dismissed unless as provided 
for in the law 
4 [very high] Decisions made are final without 
any reference to government 
3 [high] While in practice NWASCO has 
full authority to approve tariffs, 
this is not explicitly provided for 
in the legislation 
In responding to the first research question, Zambia is politically stable and is not a fragile country. Its 
judicial system is quite independent and generally has high regard and respect for the rule of law. 
However the high poverty levels in the country means the regulatory framework has to have a slightly 
different approach than the normal regulatory focus. NWASCO has achieved this through establishment of 
a devolution trust fund to specifically augment the financing for services to the urlban poor. Zambia operates 
in a clear water policy framework. The low level of operational efficiency of the service providers however 
continues to be a great challenge for the regulator. 
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Roles of economic regulation in Zambia 
Based on the documents, focus group discussions, key informant interviews and the questionnaire the 
following emerged as the perceived roles or functions of the water services regulator in Zambia -NWASCO. 
L Approval of tariffs that will ensure commercial viability of utilities and capacity building of the 
service providers. This should be clearly enshrined in law. 
ii. Protection of consumers. However this should be clearly stated in legislation. 
iiL Monitoring and enforcing the performance of the service providers 
iv. A knowledge base on urban water services in Zambia including advising government, local 
governments and any other interested stakeholders on water supply and sanitation matters. 
v. Promoting services to the urban poor through developing pro-poor mechanisms, regulation of 
alternative small scale providers. However this should be provided for in the law. 
Institutional arrangements for NWASCO 
The results from the different sources of data Le. the focus group discussions, key informant interviews and 
the responses to the questionnaire are agreeing with the establishment of NWASCO as a single sector 
autonomous regulator in Zambia. There was general agreement on the funding mechanisms of NWASCO 
as well as appointment mechanisms for the staff. However there was no general agreement on the 
appointment mechanisms for the council members. 
The Zambian case of a single sector regulator has shown that given the necessary autonomy, positive 
impact can be registered in all areas of urban utility operations. This includes perfonmance improvement as 
indicated earlier on, tariff progressions towards cost recovery, requiring utilities to serve the urban poor. 
The regulator itself enjoys a high level of autonomy as strengthened through a dedicated funding through a 
license fee, establishment of consumer representative organisations in the regulatory framework. The case 
has shown however that it is necessary to re-look at the appointment mechanisms for the council members 
as well as the reporting mechanisms. The use of part time inspectors as a way of verifying performance 
reports presented by the service providers is more cost effective than opening up offices in different parts of 
the country. The appointment of desk officers among NWASCO employees also enhances closer and 
efficient communication with the service providers. The research has further shown that the CEO forum 
helps NWASCO to interact with the utilities to understand the challenges that they face in service delivery. 
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4.4 Findings from the Sub-Saharan context 
4.4.1 Introduction 
This section presents the analysis of primary data based on respondenfs perceptions from non-case Sub-
Saharan African countries. The main purpose of this analysis is to show corroboration with the results from 
the three case studies and also is important in contributing to the theory on economic regulation of urban 
water services in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
As stated in 3.10.3 this research used a questionnaire tool as one of the methods of collecting data. The 
main source of data for this section was the responses to the questionnaire. Questions in the questionnaire 
related to the general framework for urban water services, the perception of the respondents on the roles of 
economic regulation and institutional arrangements. The analysis for the quantitative results of the 
questionnaire was undertaken using simple descriptive statistics of the SPSS release 16.0 statistical 
package. Some of the qualitative responses from the questionnaire were also analysed. 
Respondents to the questionnaire were selected using the purposive sampling method. This was used on 
the basis that the sample was pre-defined before the survey started and is also in line with the case study 
research strategy where the emphasis is on replicability rather than generalisation (Maxwell, 1996). The 
target population were the policy makers mainly in government, utility executives, executives from utility 
regulators and NGOs. In this respect Questionnaires were sent to respondents working in key positions 
either in government, water utility, regulatory agencies, asset holding companies or NGOs. There were a 
total of 116 responses from respondents in 28 Sub-Saharan African countries and were mainly from the 
water sector. The chart below [see figure 4-20) shows the type of organisation where the respondents were 
from. 
Organisation associated with respondent 
_ Asset holding Company _ Government Ministry _ Regulator _ Water Utility _ NGO 
Figure 4-20: Organisation associated with respondent 
Source: Author's analysis of data 
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4.4.2 List of respondents to the questionnaire by country 
The table below gives a list of respondents by country to the questionnaire. 
Table 4·15: Respondents to the questionnaire by country 
Country No of Respondents 
1 Benin 4 
2 Botswana 2 
3 Burkina Faso 8 
4 Cameroun 2 
5 Central African Republic [CAR] 1 
6 Chad 1 
7 Congo, Republic of 3 
8 Cote D'ivoire 7 
9 Dem. Republic of Congo [DRC] 4 
10 Ethiopia 5 
11 Gambia 3 
12 Guinea [Conakry] 1 
13 Kenya 14 
14 Lesotho 2 
15 Malawi 6 
16 Mauritania 2 
17 Mauritius 1 
18 Namibia 3 
19 Niger 3 
20 Nigeria 9 
21 Senegal 5 
22 Sierra Leone 6 
23 South Africa 11 
24 Swaziland 1 
25 Tanzania 7 
26 Togo 2 
27 Uganda 2 
28 Zimbabwe 1 
Total Number of Respondents 116 
Source: Author's analysis of data 
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Percentage [%] 
3.45 
1.72 
6.90 
1.72 
0.86 
0.86 
2.59 
6.03 
3.45 
4.31 
2.59 
0.86 
12.07 
1.72 
5.17 
1.72 
0.86 
2.59 
2.59 
7.76 
4.31 
5.17 
9.48 
0.86 
6.03 
1.72 
1.72 
0.86 
100.00 
4.4.3 Existing Political and socio-economic environment 
The literature review in chapter 2 laid out the political and socio-economic environment that could affect the 
design and implementation of the roles and institutional arrangements of economic regulation of the urban 
water services. The factors include country governance, socio-economic factors and sector related factors. 
The main source of the evidence is from documents and reports. The questionnaires provided evidence on 
sectoral factors especially policy framework, performance of service providers, issues related to the urban 
poor. 
Even if the country governance level is generally satisfactory, this is not a guarantee that it will be 
successful in creating an effective regulatory system. Africa is a continent where sometimes the respect for 
the rule of law is easily compromised for the sake of political expediency. An example is one Executive 
Director of a regulatory agency who was fired because he did not implement what the Minister said "was 
government policY'. The Minister actually wanted the regulator to just reduce the water tariff without any 
basis for doing so. His reaction was "I have to go .... In Africa when you are not wanted by those in power 
you can just be removed irrespective of the law. There is nothing one can do .... ". Another case was in Mali 
where the President [then presidential candidate] had promised to his electorate to reduce the price of 
water and electricity if elected to power. When he won the elections, reduction of the utility costs was·the 
easiest to do as he just instructed the regulator to reduce the price of water and electricity by 15% [without 
any basis]. When the regulator started giving reasons like cost recovery, breach of contract with the private 
operator [there was a private operator at the time]-he was fired and replaced by someone who could 
implement the "government policy" without resistance. These are just two of possibly a number of examples 
of stable countries but where governance could be comprornised for the sake of propping political 
ambitions. 
Sub-Saharan Africa saw an unprecedented economic grow1h in 2005 after decades of economic 
stagnation. In 2005 Africa recorded a 5.7% economic grow1h while in 2006 it grew by 5.5%. The trend of 
economic grow1h was expected to be more than 4% in 2007. Challenges still remain however with most of 
the Sub-Saharan African countries not having enough resources to meet the water and sanitation MDGs by 
2015. Sub-Saharan African countries continue facing a perennial shortage of resources to finance public 
investments including water services, electricity, roads, schools and hospital infrastructure. 
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4.4.4 Roles of utility regulation 
Evidence in this section mainly came from responses to the questionnaire. The research question sought 
the perception of the different sector professionals based either on their experience or knowledge of the 
water sector in Sub-Saharan Africa on the roles of economic regulation of water services. The results of the 
perceptions of the respondents to the questionnaire on the roles of economic regulation of water services in 
Sub-Saharan Africa are similar to those of the different case studies. The table of the results is in Appendix 
10. The table reflects the general perception towards economic regulation of urban water services. Based 
on the results there is general support for the establishment of an autonomous regulatory body to regulate 
urban water service provision. The respondents were in general agreement that because provision of urban 
water and sanitation services tends to be monopolistic in nature there is need to introduce a regulatory 
framework. A total of 90% of the respondents were in agreement with this assertion. There was also 
general agreement with the proposition 'that establishment of autonomous economic regulators promotes 
transparency and accountability in the utility sector'. The respondents were also in general agreement that 
economic regulation promotes commercial viability of the utilities. This triangulates with the findings that 
one of the roles of economic regulation should be to support utilities to charge economic tariffs that will lead 
the utilities into becoming commercially viable. 
4.4.4.1 Tariff setting that leads to commercial viability of the service providers 
There was agreement from the questionnaire results from the non-case country respondents that one of the 
utility regulatory roles should be to help utilities to achieve commercial viability through setting tariffs at 
appropriate levels. This was in general agreement with the results from the three cases. The questionnaire 
sought the perception of the respondents to the assertion that utility regulation would help utilities achieve 
commercial viability. 
181 
[ 
-; 
i 
The results are shown in the chart below: 
Ensuring Commercial viability of the utilities 
• Strongly agree • Agree • Uncertain • Disagree 
10% 
48% 
Figure 4-21: Ensuring commercial viability of utilities 
Source: Author's analysis of data 
4.4.4.2 Consumer protection 
The general perception of the respondents was that the utility regulatory framework should protect 
consumers as well as service providers, provide operational guidelines on different key utility issues, and 
that the service providers must be provided with operational licenses. 
There was agreement with the results from the case as out of 116 valid respondents 85% of them agreed 
with the assertion that utility regulatory framework should protect consumers. 
4.4.4.3 Promotion of competition in the urban water services delivery 
According to the results of the questionnaire [based on quantitative analysis] most of the respondents were 
in agreement that it is necessary to introduce a regulatory framework in order to promote competitive spirit 
of the urban water services delivery. Below is a chart showing the descriptive statistics on this particular 
matter. 
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Regulatory framework promoting 
competition 
• Strongly agree • Agree • Uncertain • Disagree 
36% 
4% 
8%_-c ...... ID 
52% 
Figure 4-22: Regulatory framework reduces abuse of monopoly power by utilities 
Source: Author's analysis of data 
4.4.4.4 Services to the urban poor 
Respondents to the questionnaire were in agreement that the regulator has an important role to play on the 
issue of services to the urban poor. This is as shown in the figure below. 
Regulator motivating utility to serve the urban poor 
• Strongly agree • Agree • Uncertain • Disagree • Total 
40% 
Figure 4-23: Regulator motivating utility to serve the urban poor 
Source: Author's analysis of data 
While there was agreement on the need to have general tariff policy guidelines, there was no clear 
agreement on the need to develop special subsidy guidelines for serving the urban poor. This result agrees 
with the findings reported in the three cases. 
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These results are reflected in the table below: 
Table 4-16: Regulating for the urban poor 
Proposition Agree Disagree Uncertain 
Develop tariff regime that encourages utilities to serve the urban 65% 22% 13% 
poor 
Provide guidelines to utilities on innovative ways of providing 63% 24% 13% 
services to the urban poor. 
Develop and enforce regulations that aim at protecting the urban 44% 43% 14% 
poor 
Encourage utilities to provide services 38% 50% 12% 
Source: Author's analysis of data 
4.4.4.5 Regulating alternative service providers 
The urban poor usually access water services through alternative providers as already explained in the 
previous chapter. Firstly there was agreement based on the research results that the small scale providers 
should be regulated. There was also a 100% agreement that technical standards for the alternative service 
providers should not be the same as for the utility. Another question was as to whether the regulatory 
framework should therefore directly regulate these alternative service providers or not. While there was 
66% of the respondents agreeing that the regulator should not regulate the alternative service providers 
directly through the formal utility there was no clear agreement as to whether they should be regulated 
directly. This therefore implies no clear agreement from the research results how the alternative service 
providers should be dealt with by the economic regulator. This is reflected in the chart below 
Directly regulating Alternative service providers 
• Strongly agree • Agree 
Figure 4-24: Regulating SS Ps directly 
Source: Author's analysis of data 
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4.4.5 Institutional arrangements for the regulatory framework 
4.4.5.1 Continuum of possible regulatory frameworks 
Governments may consider establishing separate institutions to undertake the functions of policy making, 
regulation and service provision. If this principle of separation of functions is to be adhered to, it effectively 
promotes establishment of separate regulatory institutions. It is important to recognise that a continuum of 
institutional franiework for regulation exists. The type of regulatory institution, level of autonomy given to the 
regulatory framework and funding mechanisms are all dependent on the local situation. "Every country has 
to adapt principles of economic regulation to suit its own structure of governance" (Franceys and Gerlach, 
2008). 
The research questionnaire sought different possible regulatory arrangements but the results basically lead 
to the recommendation for governments to consider establishing autonomous regulatory institutions. The 
research results indicate that regulation by a unit within a government water department may not assure 
the full achievements of the anticipated benefits of economic regulatory. 
Responses to all the questions on the institutional arrangements in the questionnaire are given in the table 
given in Appendix 9: The results in the table show general support for the establishment of autonomous 
regulatory body from govemment operations. A total of 93% of the 105 valid respondents were in 
agreement that the regulatory authority should not lie within the political sphere of government shown in 
line 1. There was however no clear agreement on whether regulatory mechanisms should be different if 
service provision is undertaken by a private operator. An assertion that when municipalities entrust service 
delivery to other entities then there would be no need to have a separate regulatory body was not agreed to 
by 78% of the 105 respondents in line 5 of the chart. There was general support for the suggestion that 
employees of the executing body (the secretaria~ including the Executive Director should be appointed by 
the Regulatory council through a competitive and transparent process. However there was no clear 
agreement on whether the Executive Director of the regulatory body should be a full member of the council. 
87% of the respondents agreed with the assertion that autonomy of the regulator is strengthened if he is 
resourced [financially] by a regulatory fee i.e. funded out of direct levies on utilities or customers, not from 
ministerial budgets subject to checks and balances see line 12. There was a low level of agreement that for 
most African countries, multi-sectoral regulatory framework is more appropriate as it is more cost effective 
and has reduced likelihood of industry regulatory capture. In order to strengthen the autonomy of the 
regulator in terms of decision making, the respondents were in agreement that the regulatory body should 
report to a non-sectoral body like Parliament. While the intention may be good but reporting to Parliament 
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may not be an effective way of oversight. The regulator also needs some clear oversight mechanism and 
Parliament usually have their own way of dealing with accountability issues. 
90% of the valid respondents agreed that if the regulatory function lay within the political sphere of 
govemment there is a risk that water tariffs, service standards and investment priorities could be 
manipulated to serve the short term interests of the political systems -refer to line 1 in the table in the 
Appendix 10. 
4.4.5.2 Structure, composition and reporting mechanisms of the regulatory board 
The govemance structure of the regulatory body should enhance its autonomy in terms of decision making. 
Most of the respondents to the question on the intemal organisation of the regulatory body agreed with this 
point. They stated that simple institutional arrangement with full competence and autonomy is 
recommended. Autonomy assures better operations by the regulator as they do not have to think of 
someone to accept or reject their decisions. The regulator could be put in place in such a way that it works 
without interference from any government department. 
A number of options were suggested for appointing commissioners. These include appointment of the 
commission by a Committee of Parliament, by the minister to which the regulatory body reports to and 
lastly through advertising in the press calling for interested candidates to apply or indeed a hybrid of these 
possibilities. In this third variation, a selection committee would be appointed by government and 
recommend the names they feel most suit being appointed as commissioners. A number of respondents 
preferred that government only ratifies the appointments of the commissioners. Whichever method is 
chosen, the mode of appointment should be clear and transparent so that government is not seen to 
appoint people to the commission for political expediency but rather in view of their competencies. The 
appointment of the commissioners by government should not negate or dilute the autonomy of the 
regulator. 
In addition the commission members should have limited but secure tenure of office. The commissioners 
should be protected by law from indiscriminate dismissals or dissolution of the commission by government. 
Respondents were requested to give their perception in relation to whether autonomy would be more 
assured if the regulatory body had a two tier system of governance i.e. clearly separated roles between the 
Board/commission [or Council] and the Secretariat [executing arm of the regulator]. The results indicated 
that 74% were in agreement that there should be a two tier system of Governance while 20% were 
uncertain, see line 6 in Appendix 10. 
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4.4.5.3 Funding mechanisms 
Respondents were asked about their perceptions of how funding mechanisms affect the regulator's 
autonomy. Most respondents agree that autonomy of a regulator would be enhanced if its budget was 
financed through a regulatory fee, Le. direct levies on the utilities or customers, as shown in Figure 4.24. 
Funding mechanism of a regulator: regulatory fee 
• Strongly agree • Agree • Uncertain • Disagree 
:--__ 43% 
Figure 4-25: Funding of the regulator through a license fee 
Source: Author's analysis of data 
What the chart shows is that 82% of the 116 valid responses were in agreement that for greater level of 
autonomy of a regulatory body the funding mechanisms for its operations should be independent as well. It 
should not come from the annual government budgetary allocations as reflected in line 12 in the table 
above. The level of the regulatory fee may vary from country to country and also from different sectors. 
Some governments have allowed the regulators to charge one percent of the regulated utility tum over. 
4.4.5.4 Multi-sectoral regulatory body 
The advantages and disadvantages of either single sector or multi-sector regulatory framework were 
discussed in the literature review chapter. 
Respondents were requested to state if they were in agreement with the idea that for most African 
Countries, multi-sectoral regulatory framework is more appropriate as it is more cost effective and has 
reduced likelihood of industry regulatory capture. 
About half (Le. 51%) of the 105 valid respondents were in agreement with the proposition see line 6 in the 
table in the appendix 10. As stated in Chapter 2.9, of the nine countries of sub-Saharan Africa where 
autonomous water service regulation is in force, mUlti-utility service regulatory regimes have been 
established in six countries ( Le. Ghana, Burundi, Gabon, Mali, Rwanda and Madagascar), where water 
and electricity are provided by one company. 
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Summary of Africa results 
The results from Africa show general agreement with the findings from the three cases. The political and 
socio-economic situation in Africa varies from country to country. No one size fits all solution can therefore 
be recommended in view of the variations in the socio-political situations in the countries. However some 
guiding principles can be developed which can lead into establishment of an effective regulatory 
framework. It is in Africa where you find the failed states like Somalia and yet some of the most stable 
countries in the world are in Africa e.g. Botswana. Nonetheless it is clear from the questionnaire results that 
the common theme in most countries in Africa is how to secure access to water services by the urban poor. 
On the other hand for the stable countries which are ripe for establishment of regulatory institutions it is 
necessary to take into account some realities which include high poverty levels, huge number of people 
who are just not served even if they may not be poor. The challenge of regulating state owned companies 
needs careful consideration when establishing economic regulators. 
Most respondents suggested the roles of economic regulation to include setting tariffs that will ensure that 
the service providers achieve commercial viability, consumer protection, monitoring the performance 
standards and ensuring that the poor gain access to sustainable water services. In view of the high poverty 
levels in Sub-Saharan Africa, one key role, it is argued, is to ensure that all urban water services including 
those by alternative service providers are under regulated environment. 
There was a general agreement that subject to the local country political and socio-economic 
environmental conditions; an autonomous regulatory agency gives more promise to achieve the regulatory 
objectives. Such an arrangement should apply regardless of the institutional arrangements of the service 
provider. 
The regulatory body should be as autonomous as the country legal and govemance practices can give. 
The perception of most of the respondents is that autonomy of the regulator is enhanced if the regulatory 
body is not part of the govemment structure and has its own dedicated and secure funding. Most of the 
respondents were further in agreement that the commissioners [members of the goveming board of the 
regulatory body] should be nominated by government. However high-level nomination of decision makers 
must not mean politically dependant decisions. Though the preference from respondents is for the 
regulatory body to report to Parliament, the final recommendation is that it should report to a non-sector 
ministry or at the least a Prime Minister. 
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CHAPTER 5.0 CROSS CASE ANAL VSIS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1 Chapter introduction 
Chapter 4 presented the evidence from the three cases of the regulatory frameworks in Ghana, 
Mozambique and Zambia as well as from non·case study countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. This chapter 
discusses the findings as drawn from the three individual case studies, literature and findings from the rest 
of Africa. This is one other way of data analysis recommended in case study strategy (Yin, 2002). This 
chapter also presents a combined scoring on the level of achievement of the principles of economic 
regulation for the African water sector. 
The evidence provided by each case is not a stand-alone assessment of the situation but rather provides 
an insight into the particular research questions. The main research question was to determine what the 
roles and institutional arrangements of economic utility regulation for urban water services should be to 
enhance the effective and efficient provision of water services in Sub-Saharan Africa. Evidence on the 
political and socio-economic environmental context of a country was mainly from literature and locally 
based reports. 
5.2 Existing political and socio-economic environmental factors 
The first research question sought to establish the existing environmental and socio-economic 
environmental factors in a country that can influence on the roles and institutional arrangements of the 
economic regulation of urban water services in Sub-Saharan Africa. Some political and socio- economic 
environmental factors which exist in the case countries, as described in chapter 4, could affect the design, 
implementation and effectiveness of any regulatory framework. One basic principle however, for an 
economic regulator to be effective is to have well functioning governmental, legislative and judicial 
institutions. These institutions should be willing or able to support the development of an autonomous 
regulatory agency (Brown et aI., 2006). The factors are discussed in the proceeding paragraphs. 
The autonomous regulatory agency model may not operate effectively in countries with a centralised 
authoritarian state. Nor is it likely to be effective in countries where there is a high level of corruption or 
countries where govemance is highly compromised. Similarly, an autonomous regulatory agency may not 
easily be set up in ''weak'' or "fragile" countries based on the definition of fragility given in the chapter 2 -
literature review. These countries have limited governance and institutional capacity or a limited political will 
to implement an effective regulatory system. In such a situation it may be better to build capacity of a 
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govemment department to undertake regulatory functions (Franceys and Gerlach, 2008). Key informants 
proposed that in such countries, more attention needs to be directed at proposing the establishment of 
"good-fif' rather than "best-practice" regulatory systems. Effective regulation will more likely be viable if a 
country is, or is seriously trying to become, a constitutionally based govemment operating under rule of law 
and with a separation of powers-particularly between the legal and executive branches. The basis for this 
argument is that a regulatory framework should have a number of attributes which may easily be assured 
under the above conditions including transparency, accountability, public accessibility, regard for the 
opinions of those affected by regulatory decisions and relative isolation from short-term political 
considerations. 
The fact that all the three countries have established autonomous regulatory institutions implies that the 
governments were willing to cede regulatory decisions to an autonomous non-govemment and non-political 
organ -the regulatory agency. However govemment separation of power and political stability are 
necessary but not sufficient conditions for establishing an effective regulatory agency. 
5.2.1 Socio-economic factors 
High poverty and urbanisation rates, macroeconomic conditions [local, regional, and global], currency 
fluctuations, interest rates, political and social conditions, and global conditions of the regulated market are 
all factors which are beyond the control of the water sector let alone the regulator. This implies that, in 
many cases, sector outcomes are heavily driven and, in some cases, directly determined by external forces 
and events that regulators simply cannot control. 
Africa is home to one third of the world's poorest population (World Bank, 2006) and this ratio is expected 
to increase. There is therefore need to increase access to the water at affordable prices to the urban poor. 
The orientation of any economic regulator in Africa has to take the above reality into account. 
The high poverty levels in the three countries should lead the regulators to prioritise their regulatory 
activities towards the urban poor, aiming at achieving social objectives to the poor while at the same time 
pushing for efficiency in the utilities. The more than 60% urban population living in informal settlements can 
not be neglected. While regulation in the more developed countries is on utility service provision, hence 
protecting the interests of those connected, regulation in the three case countries should not be limited to 
the formal utility service areas but also in the informal un-serviced areas. The focus in the three countries 
should be to develop innovative ways of increasing accessibility, including affordability, for water services 
by the majority of the residents in the urban areas. This requires developing pro-poor regulatory tools which 
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are flexible enough to cover regulation of alternative service providers -whether directly or through a main 
service provider. 
5.2.2 Sectoral factors 
The research results have indicated that the regulatory framework should work within an environment of a 
clear water policy with separation of institutional roles and responsibilities in place. The water policy should 
not only define the global objectives of the water services but include institutional arrangements, roles and 
responsibilities. Lack of clarity in institutional roles and responsibilities can lead to potential interferences 
from government operatives. 
The three case countries all have policy frameworks for water services. The policy provides general 
direction of the water sector including defining principles of cost recovery, institutional arrangements, roles 
of the private sector etc. 
5.3 Comparison of progress on good regulatory practice 
As stated above a subjective analysis was made on the level of achievement of the principles of economic 
regulation for the African water sector, using an adapted BRTF framework. A summary of the combined 
subjective analysiS is given in the table below. 
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Table 5-1: Combined subjective analysis of level of achievement to the African regulatory principles 
Regulatory Definitions or aspects used for measuring level Ghana Mozambique Zambia Comments 
principle of achievement against the principle [PURC) [CRA) [NWASCO) 
The regulatory cost of addressing the perceived 1 3 3 Cost of regulation in Zambia met from regulatory 
problem or risk as compared to the services being fee of 2% of utility turn over, Mozambique it is 
regulated 1.5% Ghana is Govt budget 
Proportionality 
'Severity' of interventions compared to the risks 2 2 2 Cost of compliance very high in all the three cases 
and costs of compliance because massive investment required 
Regulation should also seek to be educational- 3 4 4 NWASCO and CRA use negotiation before taking 
rather than based purely on a punitive approach. regulatory decision. CRA no clear evidence of this 
The regulator should or does clearly explain to the 1 3 3 NWASCO discusses and communicates reasons 
regulated entities how and why certain final for decisions; CRA discusses and agrees with 
decisions were taken. regulated before decision being made. This 
procedure is less developed in Ghana 
Is there a clear appeal procedure with independent 1 2 3 Appeal procedures in the Act in Zambia. Not 
adjudication-if a utility is not satisfied with a clearly stated in CRA legislation. No clear 
regulatory decision previsions in the PURC for appeal. 
There should also be well publicised, fair and 3 1 3 Provided in legislation for PURC and NWASCO, 
Accountability effective complaints procedures for consumers nothing for CRA. 
The regulator should have clear lines of 1 3 1 Not clearly stated in the Act for PURC, while for 
responsibility i.e. Ministers, Parliaments and the NWASCO -Lack of clarity of which Minister 
public provided for in the law regulator reports to, CRA clear that the regulator 
reports to Prime Minister. 
Is there a consumer consultative committee or 2 1 3 Water Watch Groups established in Zambia as 
council with opportunities to hold the utilities and consumer consultative mechanisms, none exist in 
regulator to account PURC and CRA. 
The regulator should have substantive reporting 4 4 4 This is a requirement provided for in the Act for all 
and accounting audit obligations the three regulators 
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Regulatory Definitions or aspects used for measuring level Ghana Mozambique Zambia Comments 
principle of achievement against the principle [PURC] [CRA] [NWASCO] 
Over time [principles of precedence should apply 3 3 3 Based on the information available, all the three 
as much as possible to enhance predictability and seem to be consistent with their decisions over 
reduce uncertainties among the regulated] time 
Consistency Service providers treated consistently across the 4 3 3 PURC regulates only one national water utility 
Country while CRA has only been regulated service 
provision within the DMF. NWASCO regulates 16 
utilities and there is consistencv on all 
Clear objectives of regulation effectively 3 3 3 Stated in the laws for the three regulators and also 
communicated are hiahliahted on their websites 
Consultation with stakeholders on major policy 1 1 3 No mechanism for stakeholder consultation for 
changes PURC and CRA. Service providers not consulted 
by NWASCO to increase regulatory fee to 2% of 
utility turn-over but mechanisms exists through 
CEO forum or WWGs 
The regulated entities have a clear understanding 1 3 3 NWASCO conducts training on obligations of the 
of their obligations utilities; no information was available as to whether 
PURC does this. CRA does not do it 
Transparency Clear decision making process with all major 1 2 2 None of the regulators make public their major 
decisions being made public i.e. through websites policy decisions. Tariffs adjustments however are 
published by CRA but by service providers in 
Ghana and Zambia 
Availability of documents and information used for 3 1 4 Regulatory tools are available on the website for 
decision makinQ for public inspection. NWASCO, nothina for CRA and PURC. 
Pe/formance data of the regulated entities also 2 2 4 Pe/formance reports are produced annually and 
available publicly available publicly for NWASCO, PURC every 5 
years and for CRA annually but not available to 
the oublic 
Clear appointment processes of the regulatory 2 1 3 Spelt out in the legislation for all the three 
commission members reaulators. However not competitive 
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-Regulatory Definitions or aspects used for measuring level Ghana Mozambique Zambia Comments 
principle of achievement against the principle [PURC] [CRA] [NWASCO] 
Availability of an up 10 date policy or strategy on 4 4 2 PURC and CRA have developed policy papers on 
regulating for the benefit of the urban poor regulating for the urban poor. For NWASCO only 
an evaluation report on services to the urban poor 
but no policy or strategy paper 
Suitable incentives for serving the poor [e.g trust 2 2 4 A trust fund [DTF] in NWASCO was established 
funds, making it easier to connect etc], availability targeted at the urban poor. No special fund or 
of social connection programs [free connection or even social connection policy in CRA or PURC 
subsidised] 
Services to the Special programmes managed by the regulator 3 3 2 Externally financed programs in Ghana [World 
urban poor that would benefit the urban poor i.e. advocacy Bank funded] and Mozambique [GPOBA funded]. programs No special program for NWASCO 
Special tariff provisions which are pro-poor 3 3 3 Social tariff for first 6m3 in Zambia, 10m3 in Ghana 
and Mozambique 
Evidence of ongoing improvements to services in 1 2 2 Programs financed by the DTF for services to the 
poor communities and informal settlements urban poor -Zambia, WB funded program in 
Ghana and in Mozambique GPOBA 
Specific and effective performance 1 1 2 No clear targets set as a measurement of 
measurement and targets for services in poor performance of service providers in all the three 
communities and informal settlements regulators. 
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Regulatory Definitions or aspects used for measuring level Ghana Mozambique Zambia Comments 
principle of aChievement against the principle [PURC] [CRA] [NWASCO] 
Separale regulatory agency wilh its own legal 4 4 4 All three regulators are a statutory bodies, 
status established by law separate from government 
operations with own legal status 
Roles and functions of the agency clearly slated in 4 4 3 For NWASCO, role of tariff approval not 
the law clearly stated in the law only by inference but 
clearly stated in PURC and CRA law. In 
practice however all three approve tariffs 
Security of tenure of the regulatory commission 4 4 4 Security of tenure provided for in the 
members provided for in the law legislation for all the three regulators 
Independence! Protection from dismissal of commissioners 3 4 4 No commissioner can be dismissed unless as 
autonomy and Director without due cause provided for in provided for in the law -clearly stated in all the 
the law three legislations 
No requirement for regulatory decision to be 4 4 4 Regulatory decisions made within the 
approved by a government department or provisions of the laws do not have to receive 
ministry before being implemented. pre-approval before implementing in all the 
three regulators 
Regulator with full authority to set and approve 4 4 3 Though not clearly stated in law but NWASCO 
tariffs approves tariffs and no requirement to get 
prior approval. CRA and PURC also do not 
have to refer to Government before 
implementing tariff adjustments 
Source: Author's analYSIS of data 
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Based on the subjective analysis of the three regulators shown in the above table 5.1, limited findings are 
set out below against each of the main regulatory principles. 
Proportionality 
For any regulatory framework to be effective, the rules and regulations should be such that the cost of 
regulation does not exceed the benefits and that regulation should seek to be educational. All three 
regulators score well on seeking to be educational rather than purely punitive. CRA uses a negotiation 
approach before coming to any final decision. This approach reduces chances of the regulated being 
unsatisfied with the final regulatory decision. 
Accountability 
The regulatory institution must be accountable for the decisions they make and these should be made 
public. PURC and CRA did not score highly on this aspect especially in relation to having clear appeal 
procedures. NWASCO scored low on the need for a regulator to have clear reporting mechanisms because 
the law is not clear on which minister the regulator is accountable. PURC and CRA have room for 
improvement in working with consumer consultative committees. 
Transparency 
While all the three regulatory institutions scored highly on the need for a regulator to be transparent in its 
decision making process through clearly defining objectives of regulation to the regulated, they all scored 
lowly on making public the decisions made by the regulatory framework. NWASCO has made public its 
regulatory tools but these are not available publicly for PURC and eRA. NWASCO undertakes annual 
performance reviews of the service providers hence scored higher than the other two regulators. 
Services to the urban poor 
On services to the urban poor, there is room for improvement at all three regulators, particularly with 
respect to specific performance measurement and targets related to monitoring of services to the urban 
poor. PURe and eRA scored highly on policy and strategies on regulating for services to the urban poor, 
while NWASCO scored higher on incentives for service providers to serve the urban poor through 
establishment of a special fund. PURe scored lowly on incentives. All the three scored highly on special 
tariffs for low consumption. However special tariff provisions are not necessarily the most effective strategy 
for serving the urban poor, as special tariff provisions only benefit those with connections. 
196 
---------
Autonomy/independence 
Institutionally all the three regulators scored highly on the principles that would lead to greater autonomy of 
the regulatory framework, as laid down by specific laws. However, it is not entirely clear whether such 
levels of autonomy are always evident in practice. They all have security of tenure clearly stated in the law. 
All the three approve tariffs -it is important to note however that there is no direct legal provision for the 
Zambian regulator to approve tariffs though they are performing this function in practice. 
5.4 Roles of utility regulation 
The main rationale for economic regulation of water services is to assist utilities achieve commercial 
viability by approving economic tariffs. In this respect the economic regulators protect consumers against 
not only high prices which just finance inefficiencies but also poor services (Franceys and Gerlach, 2008). 
For Sub-Saharan Africa, the protection should also guard against consumers paying low tariffs for low 
quality or non-existent water services. Economic regulation should enable value for money provided by the 
utilities to the consumers. 
The roles of the regulatory framework may vary according to the country context and practices. However 
based on the research results, in principle the following have been identified as the main roles of the 
economic regulatory framework. 
i). Approval of tariffs that ensure commercial viability of the service providers 
ii). Protection of consumers against monopoly practices of service providers 
iii). Monitoring the performance of service providers 
iv). The regulator being a repository of knowledge and experience of water issues in the country. 
v). Helping the poor gain sustained access to water services 
The table 5-2 below presents the research findings on the main roles of economic regulation in the three 
country cases. The regulatory functions under each of these main roles are set out in Table 5-3. 
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Table 5-2: Roles of economic regulation of urban water services from the three cases 
Roles Ghana Mozambique Zambia 
1 Approval of tariffs i. Examine and approve rates i. Approve the consumer tariffs and the i. Approval of tariffs to ensure 
chargeable for provision of utility proposals for adjustments which commercial viability 
services; may be submitted to it by the lessor ii. Provide guidelines for the setting 
ii. Protect the interests of providers of ii. Identify the needs for the of tariffs for the provision of water 
utility services development and expansion of the supply and sanitation services; 
iii. Provide guidelines on rates service in accordance with the needs ii. Develop guidelines for the 
chargeable for provision of utility of current and future users provision of water supply and 
services; sanitation services; 
iv. Promote fair competition among v. And also for the technical and 
public utilities financial management of utilities 
v. Make such valuation of property of 
public utilities as it considers 
necessary for the purposes of the 
Commission 
vi. Maintain a register of public utilities 
2 Protection of Protection of consumers against high i. Undertake surveys among the users i. Advise utilities and other service 
consumers against prices and poor services so as to assess the quality of the providers on procedures for 
high prices and poor services handling complaints from 
services ii. Propose the suspension or consumers 
elimination of contractual clauses ii. Disseminate information to 
that violate the rights of consumers consumers on matters relating to 
iii. Maintain links wtth associations of water supply and sanitation 
users and undertake studies and services 
analyses that are regarded of 
interest 
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Roles Ghana Mozambique Zambia 
3 Monitoring the i, Monitor standards of performance i. Monttoring the lease and its i. License utilities and other service 
performance of the for provision of services implementation providers as well as other 
utility ii. Initiate and conduct investigations ii. Hold performance audits of the activities relating to the provision 
into standards of quality of service operator of water 
given to consumers iii. To analyse technical procedures ii. Establish and enforce standards 
and the Codes of Procedures for for water supply or sanitation 
the provision of the service services; the management of 
iv, Propose regulatory norms, to be utilities and other service 
approved by the govemment, on providers and the design, 
the qualtty of the service provided construction, operation and 
under the Delegated Management maintenance of water supply and 
Framework sanitation facilities; 
4 Knowledge base on i. Conduct studies relating to economy i. Advise the government on water 
urban water services and efficiency of public utilities supply and sanitation mallers; 
ii. Collect and compile such data on ii. Advise local authorities on 
public utilities as it considers commercially viable institutional 
necessary for the performance of its arrangements for the provision of 
functions water services, The 
iii. Advise any person or authority in establishment of water supply 
respect of any public utility and sanitation utilities 
5 Promotion of services Define regulatory framework for water Clear regulatory framework for Define regulatory framework for 
to the urban poor tankers and services to the urban poor alternative service providers community managed schemes, The 
regulator should play a lead role in 
this 
6 Other roles Reconciling the interests of the lessor 
and the operator: 
Source: Author's analYSIS of data 
199 
5.4.1 Approval of tariffs that ensure commercial viability of utilities 
The research findings from Sub-Saharan Africa agree that a key role for economic regulation is assist 
utilities achieve commercial viability by approving cost reflective tariffs. This can only be achieved if it is 
government's policy to allow utilities to achieve full cost recovery in the provision of urban water services, 
over a feasible time period. Only then will it be feasible for the regulatory agency to assist the water service 
providers to achieve commercial viability. The regulatory agency may then develop a tariff policy clearly 
outlining how the utilities will be supported to achieve commercial viability, whether there would be any 
subsidies. Based on the tariff policy the regulatory agency can develop tariff guidelines which the utilities 
may operationalise with tariff proposals. Utilities should be assisted to provide services that increase 
revenues, reduce operating costs and improve efficiency. On the other hand if there is a huge negative gap 
between revenues and costs, it is unrealistic to expect that the gap will be closed by a regulator. In such a 
situation, the fundamental problem is political and governments need to take the lead in bringing about a 
change in mindset. Little will be accomplished unless the government is willing to commit to a credible 
transition strategy for raising tariffs and support the regulator in implementing this strategy. 
Governments in the three country cases all have water policies that promote achievement of cost recovery 
of all urban water services. All the three regulators have tariff policies aimed at aSSisting utilities to achieve 
full cost recovery [Ref to sections 4.1.5.2, 4.2.8.1 and 4.3.6.2]. They all issue guidelines on tariff setting 
using the tariff policy as the basis. One of the underlying causes of poor utility performance is inadequate 
investment and operation and maintenance of system assets. 
A primary practice common in all the three regulators is tariff approval. The law establishing PURC and 
CRA in Mozambique clearly states that one of the functions of the two regulators is developing guidelines 
on tariff setting as well as approving them. For NWASCO the law ends at providing guidelines for the 
setting of tariffs only. This situation needs correcting so that NWASCO has legal powers of approving 
tariffs. 
Tariff adjustment should be done in a transparent and consultative manner. This approach is promoted by 
two of the regulators. Any service provider requesting a tariff adjustment from NWASCO and PURC is 
required to provide evidence that it has undertaken a public hearing as a consultation process on its 
proposals. This is not an explicit requirement in the regulatory framework of CRA. Public consultation on 
tariff adjustment is a necessary step as it helps the utility explain to its consumers the challenges it faces in 
providing the service and explain the basis for requesting a tariff adjustment. It also increases transparency 
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in tariff setting. Once the tariff is approved it is a requirement for the service provider to publicise this to the 
public. The regulator in Mozambique publishes tariff adjustment in the official govemment gazette while in 
Zambia and Ghana it is the service providers' responsibility to publicise the approved tariff. PURe also 
publishes the tariffs on its website. 
The three regulators have been making efforts to ensure that the tariff levels help the utilities achieve cost 
recovery. According to the Mozambican regulator, they have now achieved about 100% of the cost 
recovery for the five largest towns [Ref 4.2.8.1]. For the Zambian case, the tariff levels are at least 85% of 
the operation and maintenance costs. In Ghana the tariff is higher than the operation and maintenance 
costs by about 40%. 
The challenge however is not only on the regulators to allow for higher full cost reflective tariffs but on the 
efficiency to collect the bills by the service providers themselves. An example is the GWCL in Ghana 
above, where the tariffs are much higher than the operational and maintenance unit cost of water, yet 
because of low collection efficiencies, this benefit of a higher tariff cannot be realised [see 4.1.5.2]. The 
regulators should therefore not only provide for cost reflective tariffs but push for efficiency of operations. 
For developed economies especially those with significant private sector participation in the water sector, 
one of the core regulatory goals may be to keep tariffs down [that is, to constrain the provider from raising 
tariffs above the reasonable cost of service] and to keep service standards up. This is one of the lessons 
from the English and Welsh, Latvian and Jamaican regulatory frameworks where the main role is to push 
for efficiency and long term sustainability of services -see table 2.3. But in Africa the challenge is how to 
raise tariffs to reach the cost recovery levels while taking care of the questions of affordability and 
increasing operational efficiencies. The issues in the developed economies are more to do with promoting 
long term efficient and effective provision of utility services, while overcoming considerable socio-economic 
and governance constraints. One of the main weaknesses of state owned utilities in Sub-Saharan Africa is 
low commercial viability due in part to low tariffs which are not cost reflective but also operational 
inefficiencies. 
A lesson from the regulator in Jakarta is that it proposes tariffs on behalf of the service providers for 
approval by the State govemor, which does not seem to add much value to the overall process. In Jamaica 
and Latvia the tariffs are actually approved by the respective regulators. The English and Welsh regulatory 
framework establishes the maximum overall revenue that the companies can charge for against the 
agreed price structure. Whatever the case, tariff approval should be handled by a regulator without making 
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reference to any other bodies. This should be clear in the legislation and any govemment and regulatory 
policy papers. 
In this respect the function of tariff setting is aimed at ensuring that the utilities achieve commercial viability 
includes the following specific functions: 
i. Developing clear guidelines on tariff setting 
ii. Approval of tariffs which are aimed at assisting the service providers achieve commercial viability. 
iii. Capacity building of the service providers 
iv. Promoting economy and efficiency of the utilities 
5.4.2 Consumer protection 
One role that has been cited for economic regulation by most respondents is that of consumer protection. 
Lessons from international regulators have consumer protection as among the main roles of economic 
regulation and is even more important in the sub-Saharan countries' operating environment. Consumers 
must be protected against lack of competition arising from the water services being a natural monopoly and 
against poor services. This protection in most Sub-Saharan Africa would be against low tariffs for very poor 
services as most tariff levels are usually below cost of production. Consumers must further be protected 
from, non-perfonming or inefficient utilities, unjustified tariffs that would be profit motivated or indeed tariffs 
based on inefficient operations of the service providers. Consumers are the most vulnerable in the 
regulatory framework as they lack the information they need to counter any exploitative moves from a 
utility. 
Consumer protection is clearly stated in the legislative framework for the PURC and CRA but not in 
NWASCO as one of the roles for the regulators. Most of the regulatory functions are aimed at directly or 
indirectly ensuring that the consumer is well protected against poor services either by developing clear 
complaints mechanisms, setting appropriate tariff levels, monitoring the performance of the service 
providers or indeed advisory services to govemment. In terms of dealing with consumer complaints all the 
three regulatory institutions require service providers to develop customer charters which state the rights 
and obligations of the consumers, ensuring that the approved tariffs are displayed in all prominent places 
and helping utilities design transparent communication systems of dealing with complaints. 
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For complaints that are beyond the utility, all the three regulators have defined a consumer complaint 
mechanism. This may be directly or through an institutionalised mechanism i.e. water watch groups in 
Zambia. It is recognised that the first call in consumer complaints is the utility. If the utility does not resolve 
the complaint, it may then be raised with the regulator. eRA in Mozambique established a system of 
placing its representatives closer to the customers in order to improve feedback and increase links between 
the regulator and customers. PURe's complaint resolution is also clearly written down and is on its website. 
The PURe has opened regional offices to improve its contacts with customers. In Zambia this is done 
through the water watch groups that are responsible for ensuring that consumer rights are protected and 
that consumers are aware of their rights and obligations. 
The water watch group mechanism in Zambia is one that can be replicated in other countries on the 
continent. These consumer groups can be a useful resource for monitoring of the periormance of service 
providers. The requirement of service providers to develop customer charters is another important way of 
protecting consumers as the consumers have information on their rights and obligations. 
Based on the research results the following specific consumer protection functions for the regulator have 
emerged: 
i. Protection of consumers against exploitation by utilities through poor service 
ii. Designing appropriate consumer complaints mechanisms by the regulator. 
iii. Institutionalisation of consumer consultation mechanisms 
iv. Dissemination of all information on water services including periomnance of utilities and the role of 
the regulator 
v. Requiring utilities to develop customer charters and other relevant documents on rights and 
obligations of service providers and consumers 
vi. Advising service providers on procedures for handling complaints from consumers 
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5.4.3 Monitoring and enforcing the standards of performance of the service providers 
One way for a regulator to generate the necessary information to promote reforms for improved utility 
effectiveness and efficiency, is through monitoring the performance of utilities based on agreed key 
performance indicators and taking corrective measures to address any identified weaknesses. These 
indicators should as a minimum include service coverage, number of hours of service, non-revenue water, 
water quality, staff productivity, customer care and services to the urban poor. The regulator must also 
define standards of performance to be achieved by the utilities. 
All the three regulators in the case countries monitor the performance of the service providers. Monitoring 
the utilities will ensure that information on how utilities are doing on the pre-defined key performance 
indicators is available. The role of monitoring the performance of service providers is explicitly stated in the 
respective laws establishing the three regulators. The research has shown that in Zambia NWASCO uses 
part time inspectors to reinforce its monitoring role on the ground [see section 4.3.7.2] while PURC is 
decentralised and uses the regional offices to monitor the performance of the service provider's branch 
offices. CRA also has one person offices in the regions [see section 4.2.9.3] but also rely on the network of 
the asset holding company -FIPAG, to provide performance information the service providers within the 
delegated management framework. NWASCO produces annual service provider performance review 
reports showing the performance of all the regulated service providers based on agreed key,performance 
indicators. The utilities are ranked and the top three performers are commended and awarded while the 
bottom three are reprimanded with the hope that they would improve on their performance in the next year. 
NWASCO applies incentive regulatory system i.e. utilities are rewarded for better performance and this 
motivates the weaker ones to perform better the next time. This is one way by which a competitive spirit 
can be exerted on the service providers. The eRA and PURC legislation clearly states as one of their 
functions the promotion of competition in the sector. 
Another function to assist the regulator to achieve the role of monitoring the performance of utilities is 
through undertaking studies on economy and efficiency of utilities. This function is stated differently in the 
NWASCO legislation and the PURC legislation. The NWASCO legislation states that it shall develop 
guidelines for technical and financial management of the utilities to help them achieve sustain ability. 
Essentially what this advocates is that the regulator should be a repository of knowledge of urban water 
services in a country. The regulator should be knowledgeable of utility economics, technical management 
and indeed human resources development. All the performance data must be collated and analysed to 
produce the sector reports. The reports are then made available as stated above. 
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licensing is one of the regulatory instruments by which utilities are authorised to perform their service 
delivery functions. The license may be issued by a Minister or the regulatory agency or both -where the 
regulator provides advisory services to the minister. Practice in Africa varies even among the countries that 
have regulatory institutions. The research results show that in Zambia issuing of licenses is clearly stated in 
the law. NWASCO considers the issue of licensing as an important tool because all the regulatory 
guidelines which have been produced have to be adhered to before a licence can be approved. PURC and 
CRA do not issue licenses to the utilities. PURC does not see the issuing of licences as necessary since 
they only deal with one service provider. In Latvia the regulator issues the license for the provision of 
services while in Jamaica the regulator's role is to process the license applications and recommend to the 
responsible Minister for issuance of a license. In England and Wales, Ofwat is responsible, under the 
conditions of the various Acts of Parliament and following due consultation, to make modifications and 
variations to the License Conditions, following the initial issuance by the Secretary of State at the time of 
privatisation. 
Whichever way a govemment may choose to handle, it is important that service providers operate under 
some form of license. The license mayor may not be issued by the regulator. But the role of the regulator 
should to at the least be enforcing the license conditions. Licensing is therefore an important function to be 
clearly stated in legislation. 
The research results have shown [see section 4.1.5.4 and 4.4.6.4] the need to promote competition in the 
service providers. Utilities compete indirectly by benchmarking their operating and financial performance 
against each other. The issue of promoting competition in the utilities is clearly stated in the legislation for 
the PURC and NWASCO. The example of NWASCO in Zambia which uses incentive regulation could be 
more appropriate. Lessons from the Latvian, English & Welsh and Jamaican regulatory frameworks have 
clearly stated the promotion of competition as one of their roles [see figure 2-3]. 
The functions that may be undertaken by the regulator on the monitoring role may include the following: 
i. Development of guidelines on the utility operations and monitoring their implementation. 
ii. Licensing of service providers and ensuring license conditions are met. 
iii. Development and enforcement of standards for water services. 
iv. Undertaking of studies on economy and efficiency of utilities 
v. Benchmarking of utilities 
vi. Promotion of competition 
205 
5.4.4 Knowledge base for water services in urban areas 
Based on the research results from the three cases, it has been found that the regulator is the best placed 
institution for being a repository of information and knowledge on urban water services in any country 
where one exists. A regulator should have a clear overview of the institutional roles and responsibilities, 
performance of all the regulated service providers, statistics on coverage including information of those that 
do not have access to water and overview of the policies covering the urban water services. This therefore 
leads onto regulators being well placed to fulfil the role of advising government on issues related to urban 
water services. 
There is a requirement for NWASCO in the Act to disseminate information on matters relating to water 
supply and sanitation services to all the consumers. Zambia publishes annual water service provider sector 
performance review reports and these are available to the public [including on their website] without any 
restriction. On the other hand, while it is not a regulatory requirement in PURC and CRA, they are 
nevertheless undertaking the function through publishing some information on different aspects of water 
use. PURC undertakes five year performance reviews of the GWCL and the report is available to the public 
as well as on the website. PURC regularly publishes some brochures on effective use 01 water, how to 
reduce on water bills, water conservation methods etc. CRA has also recently made a decision to make the 
performance reports of the service providers available to the public but on request. The reports will only 
start being made available after approval by the minister. Clearly this is an important function to be 
undertaken by a regulator. 
5.4.5 Services to the urban poor 
What this research has shown is that the priorities for economic regulation of urban water services differ 
according to the existing local environment and the issues expected to be resolved by the regulatory 
framework. All the three regulators are operating in a socio-economic environment where the urban poverty 
levels are very high - more than 30%. At least 60% of the urban population lives in informal settlements in 
all the three countries. In this respect the regulatory focus has to be slightly different from that found in 
developed economies. 
Although none of the regulators' legal mandates specify their role in enhancing services to the urban poor, 
all three have activities on services to the urban poor as shown in the analytical table [see table 5.1]. CRA 
is developing pro-poor regulatory tools with the help from the World Bank [refer to the Mozambique case 
study]. The pro-poor mandate is probably strongest in Zambia as compared to the other two. NWASCO has 
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a fund -the DTF which the other regulatory frameworks could emulate. Since 2007 NWASCO decided to 
contribute the entire grant it receives from govemment for its operations to the devolution trust fund. 
NWASCO now requires utilities to have physical presence in the infonmal settlements either through branch 
offices or pay points as one way of encouraging utilities to get engaged on services to the urban poor. In 
Ghana PURC developed a social policy to guide its regulatory activities in relation to the urban poor. It is a 
result of this that PURC is working with the GWCL on a special project financed by the World Bank. There 
are no special regulatory efforts targeted at alternative service providers by the PURC. The tanker 
operators are numerous; the scale of household water reselling remains scanty and water vending remains 
too infonmal to be considered as a regulated business (PURC, 2005). 
The Universal Service principle can be a real instrument for the provision of services across the country. 
Regulatory authorities can have a role to play in facilitating the implementation of this (Gerlach, Franceys 
and Howsam, 2008). PUC in Latvia elaborates and detenmines the methodology for the universal service 
provision taking into account sector peculiarities. The English and Welsh regulatory framework has a 
relatively new responsibility to consider the needs of particular consumers, including the disadvantaged in 
society i.e. physically handicapped, individuals of pensionable age, individuals with low incomes and 
individuals residing in rural areas. 
The high poverty levels in the three countries call for regulation that seeks to meet two seemingly 
contradictory objectives. These are improving accessibility to water services for the urban poor and 
ensuring that the service providers achieve full cost recovery. 
Another way of improving services to the urban poor is through having a role on alternative service 
providers. Alternative providers serve as an important source of water for the urban poor in many African 
countries. Alternative service providers are in many different sizes and status. They can be as small as the 
young men selling 20 litre containers of water and as big as a small mini-utility servicing up to 600 house 
connections i.e. in Mozambique. 
The share of alternative service providers on urban water services is growing at different rates in the three 
case countries. In Maputo alone, it is estimated that there are more than 200 alternative service providers 
that have independent sources of water and can each supply at least 50 households by network connection 
(Bhatt, 2006) thereby serving at least 200,000 people. There are approximately 3,000 households engaged 
in water reselling to their neighbours and a further 400 standpipes (Tremolet, 2006). All these operate 
outside the regulatory framework since ADeM has exclusive rights over the urban perimeter of Maputo. 
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CRA has however recognised this regulation gap and is working to develop mechanisms of regulating the 
alternative service providers. The decree of May 2009 has also expanded the scope of eRA to include 
small towns, sanitation and Alternative service providers. 
In Zambia the regulator only regulates the main utility. For services provided by the community owned 
water trusts to be regulated, an agreement was signed for LWSC to have a management role of the 
community water trusts. Ghana on the other hand has numerous water tanker operators in the larger towns 
like Accra, Kumasi, and Tamale (PURC, 2005). The water tanker operators are self regulated through the 
tanker association to which they all belong. Their tariffs however remain unregulated except for those that 
get their water from the GWCL. The tariffs for those that get water from GWCL are regulated by PURC. 
Alternative service providers are not mentioned in literature from England and Wales, Latvia and Jamaica, 
and are therefore not provided for in their regulatory frameworks. On the other hand water vending is a 
thriving business in Jakarta (Gerlach and Anwar, 2008). Lack of alternatives either, because of distance to 
the nearest connection or poor quality of groundwater leads to consumers going for this source of water. 
Tariffs are fixed by the vendors themselves and there are no quality controls. Many research respondents 
thought market players should be regulated on quality of service, price as well as drinking water quality. 
Although it may not be an efficient use of resources to perform full economic regulation of these alternative 
providers (Sansom, 2006), the economic regulator can play some light regulatory roles such as developing 
mechanisms for recognising the alternative service providers, licensing their operations, monitoring their 
actions towards the poor, attainment of minimum service levels and regulation of market entry. 
The emerging lesson from the three regulatory cases is the need for regulators to play a major role on 
services to the urban poor. This role may be played through undertaking the following specific functions: 
i. There should be a clear legal mandate for regulators to be involved in services to the urban poor 
ii. Information gathering on access to services by the urban poor -both existing and potential 
consumers 
iii. Develop guidelines for subsidies [including possibly social connection policies] on services to the 
urban poor including performance indicators 
iv. Develop consultation mechanisms with the urban poor 
v. Support government in developing Universal Service Obligation policies. 
vi. Targeted performance measurement for services in poor communities and informal settlements 
vii. Licensing of alternative providers 
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The table below shows a summary of roles for economic regulation of urban water services and the 
requisite functions. 
Table 5-3: Roles and functions of an economic regulator in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Role Specific function 
1. Developing clear guidelines on tariff setting 
Approval of tariffs that would 2. Approval of tariffs 
ensure commercial viability of 3. Ensuring adequacy of infrastructure efficiency in short and medium term. 
the service providers 4. Capacity buildina as a reaulatory function 
5. Protection of service providers from government interference 
1. Designing appropriate mechanisms for receiving and resolving consumer 
complaints by the regulators 
2. Requiring utilities to develop customer charters and other relevant 
Protect consumers from poor documents on riahts and obligations of service providers 3. Dissemination of all information on water services including performance 
and inefficient services of utilities and the role of the regulators 
4. Advisina service providers on procedures for handlina-complaints 
5. Designing appropriate receiving and resolving consumer complaints 
mechanisms by the regulator 
1. Development of guidelines on the utility operations to achieved by the 
service providers including water quality, human resources development 
and general technical operations 
Monitoring and enforcing 2. Production and open dissemination of annual service provider 
standards of the performance of performance reports 
utilities 3. Developing and enforce standards for water services. 
4. Licensina of service providers 
5. Promotion of competition in the urban water services deliverv 
6. Benchmarking of utilities 
Being a knowledge base of 1. Undertaking studies on economy and efficiency of water utilities 2. Production and dissemination of annual utility performance reports 
urban water services 3. Providing advice to central and local governments and any others on 
institutional arrangements and performance of urban water services 
1. Information gathering on access to services by the urban poor -both 
existing and potential consumers 
2. Developing guidelines for subsidies on services to the urban poor 
including services to the urban poor. 
3. Developing consultation mechanisms with the urban poor 
4. Supporting government in developing Universal Service Obligation 
Promotion of services to the policies 
urban poor 5. Developing regulatory tools for alternative service providers including 
licensina procedures 
6. Developing general tariff mechanisms for all service providers including 
alternative service providers 
7. Targeted performance measurement for services in poor communities 
and informal settlements 
8. Licensina of alternative providers 
Source: Author's analysis of data 
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5.5 Institutional arrangements for the regulator 
The success of an economic regulatory framework depends to a substantial extent on the institutional 
arrangements and how much autonomy the political and local governance systems can give to the 
structure. There is no single best fit or design of the institutional arrangements for the regulatory framework. 
What the research sought and especially for Sub-Saharan African countries was an arrangement which 
would give a higher chance of achieving the regulatory objectives. 
All the three cases considered are autonomous regulatory institutions established by law [see 4.1.5.1,4.2.1 
and 4.3.6.1) and with their own legal status. The Zambian legislation not only establishes the regulator -
NWASCO but also defines the institutional arrangements for water service provision. In Ghana and 
Mozambique the legislation specifically establishes the regulator and defines the functions and composition 
of the regulatory board. 
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Table 5-4: Institutional arrangements for the three regulators 
Country Ghana Mozambique Zambia 
Name of regulator Public Utilities Regulatory Water Regulatory National Water and 
[case] Commission Council Sanitation Council 
Acronym PURC CRA NWASCO 
Type of regulator Multi-Sector [Water and Single sector -Water only Single sector -Water only 
Electricity] regulator regulator 
Legislation PURC Act Decree by government to Water Supply and Sanitation 
establish CRA Act which defines both 
regulatory and institutional 
arrangements of urban 
water services provision 
Legal status Statutory body but exists Statutory body but exists Statutory body but exists as 
as a legal entity as a legal entity a legal entity 
Composition and 9 members appointed by 3 man committee 7 member board appointed 
appOintment of board the State President [college] appointed by by the Minister of water 
the prime Minister resources 
Reporting mechanism Office of the State Prime Minister Minister responsible for 
President water resources -separate 
from the one in charge of 
water services delivery 
Funding of the government annual Fixed amount from the 2% of monthly billed 
regulator budgetary allocation operator's fees revenue paid monthly as 
licence fees by the service 
providers 
Structure of regulated One national public utility One private operator Commercial entities 
water services covering all the urban covering the five major generally owned by 
delivery centres in Ghana cities, Management municipalities -€ither one or 
contract for the next 8 more municipalities form 
largest towns one Company approx a total 
of 10 have been established 
Licensing of utilities Not done Not done All service providers in 
Zambia are required by law 
to obtain license from the 
regulator 
Number of personnel 30 including those working 20 15 
in the energy sector 
Source: Author's data analysis 
The table above shows the general characteristics of each of the th ree regulators in relation to the 
institutional framework of urban water services. 
Based on the evidence and experience from the three cases, it was clear that for the economic regulatory 
roles defined above to be undertaken effectively an autonomous regulatory institution should be 
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established within a conducive operating environment. For example it is unrealistic to expect that an 
autonomous regulatory agency or anything similar can readily be created in "weak" or '1ragile" countries, 
with limited governance and institutional capacity or a limited political will to implement an effective 
regulatory system. In such countries it may be appropriate for government departments to perform 
regulatory functions. Where the operating environment is conducive, the autonomous regulatory agency 
should operate at arm's length from govemment, be adequately financially resourced from a regulatory fee 
levied on the regulated entities and undertake its functions in a transparent manner. Regulators should be 
free to make decisions within their scope of authority without having to obtain prior approval from other 
officials or agencies of the government. Decisions made by a regulator should be consistent and made on 
any precedents and written rules while at the same time be credible to all the stakeholders. A regulator 
would be most useful if it would have decision making powers rather than advisory. All the three regulators 
have some decision making power in practice but not enshrined in law -at least for Zambia on tariff 
approval. 
5.5.1 Structure, Appointment, and reporting mechanisms of the regulatory board 
The structure, composition and reporting mechanisms of the regulatory board highly depend on existing 
country practices, legislative framework and governance arrangements. What is emerging from the case 
studies is that a regulatory commission is a state owned and government created body, meaning that 
governments have a role to play especially in the appointment of the commissioners. The decision-making 
body of the regulator [board, council, commissioners] has to make principled decisions that are in the 
interests of the country and society, to dispute with monopolies and incumbents and to oppose them. This 
arrangement is not to negate or dilute the level of autonomy that the regulator should enjoy in 
implementation of its functions. 
In Mozambique for example a college of 3 persons highly recognised for their professional conduct was 
thought to be more appropriate to comprise the board of the CRA while in Zambia the board is stake holder 
representatives. These members represent specific institutions. This is the same as in Ghana. 
In some cases, the legislation may state that the Chairman of the board shall be elected from amongst the 
members themselves -this is the Zambian case. While in some cases the Chairman is appointed by a 
higher appointing authority. When the Chairman is appointed from among the members, the board 
members feel equal importance because each member has the potential and possibility of becoming the 
Chairman if elected. In order to assure further stability to the regulatory framework the commissioners could 
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have a specified term of office. The term of office should be long enough for the commissioners to be able 
to perform the functions without uncertainty. The legislation should also have a security of tenure. As 
presented in the table above [ref to table 2.3] the Directors of OFWAT are appointed for a term of 5 years 
and can only be removed based on the provisions of the act. The respective laws in the countries that have 
regulatory frameworks give this security of tenure. In Ghana for example a commissioner can only be 
removed based on violation of a law, being declared bankrupt etc. The regulatory body would attract more 
respect, credibility, confidence, stability if the whole appointment process including duration of the term of 
office [and whether one can be re-appointed], who actually appoints and criteria for removal from office are 
clear in the legislation. There should be no ambiguity in this process otherwise credibility would be at risk. 
The level of accountability of a regulator depends on how much autonomy it has from government. One 
factor that could possibly affect the level of autonomy of the regulatory body is the reporting mechanism. 
The principle of separation of service provision and regulation would only be respected if the regulatory 
body does not report to the ministry overseeing service provision. The research results [see 4.1.6.1 and 
4.3.7.1] have shown preference to the regulator reporting to a parliamentary committee. While this may 
assure greater autonomy, this reporting mechanism disengages the regulator from sectoral issues. This is 
perhaps the reason the reporting mechanism is not applied in any of the studied cases. Lessons from the 
international regulatory frameworks also show this. The three cases are in agreement with the research 
results that the reporting mechanism should be to a separate institution from that which is responsible for 
provision of services. For instance, in England and Wales the regulator reports to the Secretary of State for 
Environment Food and Rural Affairs [OEFRA], in Latvia the PUC reports to the minister of economy. One 
great advantage of this is reduced likelihood for sectoral regulatory capture. Government in any case 
should be kept informed of any major decisions to be taken e.g. intentions to review tariffs and to what 
levels. This is necessary not for the sake of seeking government approval but in case of non acceptance of 
the tariffs by the consumers. If the consumers do not agree with a tariff adjustment their first call is the 
government and not the regulatory agency. 
5.5.2 Organisation structure of the regulator 
The structure of the regulatory body must be such that it will be able to perform its regulatory functions 
without constraints of human resources. However it must be lean in structure as it is not an operational 
body. 
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The three regulatory institutions are not large compared to the tasks that they have to handle, with PURC in 
Ghana having the highest number of staff of 30 - including staff working on economic regulation of 
electricity. Personnel in the three regulatory bodies are not on civil services conditions and enjoy market 
based salaries. 
Zambia uses part-time inspectors to reinforce its monitoring role on the performance of utilities while the 
other two regulators have some physical presence in the regions. In order to have personalized attention to 
the needs of the service providers, NWASCO has identified desk officers [staff of NWASCO] for each 
service provider. It organizes quarterly meetings with the CEOs of the regulated service providers. This 
provides an opportunity for the regulator and the service providers to exchange the challenges faced by 
each other not only in the provision of services but also in regulation. 
Based on the evidence from the three cases therefore, it is necessary that the regulator has a unit or 
individual that can work as focal person on issues to deal with services to the urban poor. Such an office 
would deal with designing appropriate mechanisms by which the urban poor can gain sustained access to 
water services at affordable tariffs. Such a unit or section of a regulator can also deal with developing the 
appropriate regulatory mechanisms for the alternative service providers. All these activities require some 
specialised mix of skills. None of the three regulators have a specific unit or individual focussing on 
services to the urban poor. It is therefore important for the regulators to portray their interest in the subject 
by defining an institutional framework on services to the urban poor and how the services to the urban poor 
would be regulated. 
Respondents concur that the regulatory agency should comprise of professionals with relevant and 
appropriate qualifications and experience. The qualifications should be in the relevant disciplines such as 
water engineering, commercial affairs, customer relations, social issues, economics and law. What is key 
however is the mode of appointment of the Executive Secretary or Director of the regulatory body. This 
position should be filled through an open and competitive process. The results further show a need to have 
the office of the executive Secretary protected by law. The provisions must be similar to the board 
members or commissioners with regard to clear statement on the term of office [duration of tenure] and 
possible reasons for termination of services. While government may be involved in the appointment of the 
Commission, it should not be involved in the identification of the executive secretary. The powers of 
identifying an appropriately qualified executive secretary should be entrusted in the Commission. 
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5.5.3 Single or multi-sectoral regulation 
Based on lessons from Latvia, the overriding reasons for promoting multi-sectoral regulatory agencies 
include the reduction in running costs for the regulatory agencies, improved coordination of regulatory 
functions. Economies of scale would be the main reason but also instead of funding two or so boards and 
chief executives, only one for each of these would have to be financed. Another reason for advocating 
multi-sectoral regulatory structures is reduced risks of sectoral regulatory capture. It would therefore be 
easier to assure higher autonomy from a multi-sector regulator than a single sector regulator. On the other 
hand it is important to note that there are some overriding advantages of single sector over multi-sector 
regulatory institutions. These include focus on the specific sector. NWASCO in Zambia, which is a single 
sector regulator, has shown evidence of focus on economic regulation of water services and is even more 
developed in dealing with issues of services to the urban poor. In countries with more utilities, like Zambia, 
it might be more appropriate to have a single sector regulator. 
Factors that may be considered before deciding whether to adopt the multi-sector regulatory framework 
include the size of the country, number of sector entities to be regulated, size of customer base, availability 
of resources etc. 
Before deciding on either multi-or single sector regulatory framework, a careful analysis of the advantages 
of each should be made but also conSidering general country legal and operating environment. In any case 
any structure that is selected should as much as possible assure the easy achievement of the regulatory 
goals at the least cost possible. Efficiency of undertaking utility regulation should not be compromised 
because of the regulatory structure that has been selected. 
5.5.4 Other special regulatory initiatives 
There should be some special regulatory initiatives to assist those service providers whose performance 
deteriorates beyond acceptable limits. The regulator can sign a special regulatory supervision (SRS) 
agreement with the service provider as is the practice in Zambia. In this way the regulator may not only just 
point out weaknesses but assists the service provider to improve on their weaknesses. The agreement 
could stipulate that during the period of the SRS, the regulator shall monitor closely all operations of the 
provider. 
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5.5.5 Funding mechanisms of the regulator 
A further important factor affecting the level of autonomy of a regulator is the funding mechanisms. How is 
the regulatory body resourced financially? The research results [see 4.2.9.4, 4.3.7.3 and 4.4.5.3] have 
shown that the autonomy of the regulator is enhanced if it is resourced from a reliable source of funding -
earmarked regulatory fee. This is also the most common sustainable source of funding. It is applied in the 
regulatory framework in Zambia and Mozambique. Lessons from England and Wales, Jamaica and Latvia 
also show this. Usually the regulatory fee [charged as a license fee in Zambia] is a percentage of the 
turnover of the regulated Companies based on water sales. In Zambia this fee is 2% while in Mozambique 
there is a proposal to have it at 2%. In England and Wales it is 0.15% and in Latvia it is 0.2% of the service 
provider's turn over. Another source of funding is the government budgetary allocation. PURC entirely 
depends on government budgetary allocation [Ref to 4.1.6.3]. Experience from the three cases and also 
lessons from the regulators outside Africa indicate that the regulatory agencies are still entitled to 
government budgetary allocation. Such allocation is based on a budget presented by the regulatory body to 
government. However, government allocation should be used as a fall back position rather than as the sole 
source of funding the regulator. The research results have shown that by depending on government 
budgetary allocations the regulator is at risk of being financially unstable, as experience in most African 
countries is that release of funds is usually intermittent. Regardless of whether the source of funding is 
regulatory fees or from the government treasury, the regulator should still be accountable to Parliament for 
the use of the financial resources through an annual financial reporting. In Zambia the regulator presents its 
annual audited accounts to Parliament for scrutiny and adoption. 
S.S.S Institutionalisation of consumer participation in regulation 
Involvement of consumers in regulation is an important factor towards autonomy and transparency. Zambia 
has institutionalised this involvement through the water watch groups. PURC has a consumer liaison office 
to develop mechanisms for involving of consumers. Consumers are encouraged to establish consumer 
committees. This also assures a closer follow up to the regulatory decisions directly affecting the 
consumers. The model of engaging with consumers followed by NWASCO seems more appropriate as it 
gives the consumers an opportunity to meet either on their own or with the utilities without the involvement 
of the regulator. They only meet the regulator when they have complaints which cannot be resolved 
between the watch groups and the utilities as shown in the case write up. The Zambian case has shown 
the benefits of institutionalising consumer involvement i.e. increased interactions with the service providers 
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and improvement in the number of unresolved complaints. In Latvia this is done through coordination of an 
independent organisation -a consumer rights organisation. What the research results have shown is that it 
would be good practice to give opportunity to consumers to express their concerns in a structured and 
possibly institutionalised manner as is the case in England and Wales and Zambia. 
5.6 Chapter summary 
The first research question assessed how the existing political and socio-economic environmental factors in 
a country can influence on the roles and institutional arrangements of the economic regulation of urban 
water services in Sub-Saharan Africa. Findings from this research point to the need to understand the 
existing political and socio- economic environmental factors which would influence the design, 
implementation and effectiveness of any regulatory framework. The level of influence depends on the 
nature of the factors which can be divided into three categories --country governance factors, socio-
economic and sector related factors. 
In responding to the second question on the roles/functions of economic regulation of urban water services 
in Sub-Saharan Africa the research has identified a framework of five roles. Under each of these roles are 
some specific functions given in table 5-3. The roles that have been identified are therefore listed below: 
• The approval of tariffs that would enable the utilities achieve commercial viability 
• Protection of consumers 
• Monitoring and enforcing standards for the performance of water service providers 
• Repository of knowledge and providing advice to stake holders on urban water services 
• Ensuring that the poor gain access to safe and affordable water supply. 
The findings of this research also show that it is important to consider the country's socio-political situation 
in order to come up with appropriate institutional setup for the regulator. The objectives of establishing a 
regulatory framework should also be very clear from the onset. The research has determined that some 
minimum conditions are required to consider before establishing an autonomous regulatory agency. These 
have been outlined above. 
In order to have an enhanced operational independent decision making process the regulatory agency 
should be established through a specific legislation with a clear but inclusive regulatory mandate -in terms 
of regulated entities and area of jurisdiction, outline the governance structure including qualifications and 
appointment process of the commissioners and the chief executive of the regulatory agency. The funding 
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for the operations of the regulatory body should come from a regulatory fee which is dedicated and reliable. 
Consideration should be made to have the regulatory fee as a percentage of monthly billing charged on the 
regulated industry or operator. The regulator should define special arrangements to support the service 
providers that deteriorate in their performance like the case in Zambia where closer monitoring is put in 
place. The regulator should define an institutional framework for consumer involvement in the undertaking 
of regulatory functions. Given that that many of the Sub-Saharan African economies are still small, it may 
be worthwhile considering establishment of multi-sectoral regulatory agencies comprising, for a start of 
water and electricity, if cost saving is an important sub-objective. 
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CHAPTER 6.0 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
6.1 Introduction 
This is the final chapter giving the conclusions on the research findings. It demonstrates how the research 
has successfully responded to the research objective and the subsequent research questions. This 
research did not only consider the roles but also the institutional arrangements for economic regulation. 
The results were based on three case studies of autonomous economic regulation of urban water services 
from Ghana, Mozambique and Zambia. Economic regulation of urban water services is a subject that 
needs to continue to be addressed in the African water sector. As the research unfolded, the weaknesses 
in the service delivery of urban water services could be traced through literature to the institutional 
arrangements, including lack of or insufficient regulatory framework. The chapter also gives implications for 
policy makers, regulators and water service providers in Sub-Saharan Africa. The conclusion of this 
research is presented according to the way the research questions were presented. The Chapter also 
highlights the main contributions to the body of knowledge and makes some recommendations in relation to 
further research. 
6.2 Existing political and socio-economic environmental factors 
As already stated this research used literature review and country-specific documents to assess what effect 
the existing factors could have on the roles and institutional arrangements of economic regulation of urban 
water services. There are some political and socio- economic environmental factors which would affect the 
design, implementation and effectiveness of any regulatory framework. These factors can be divided into 
three categories: [i] those based on general country governance; [ii] those external to the water sector; and 
[iii] those that the govemment and other sector players can have an influence over. Therefore, as 
discussed in Chapter 6, before considering establishing a regulatory framework, it is necessary to have a 
clear understanding of the political and socio-economic environment of a country. These can impact on the 
design and implementation of the regulatory framework. 
6.3 Roles of utility regulation 
Based on the research findings from the country cases, the Sub-Saharan African context and literature, the 
researcher concludes that any economic regulator for urban water services in a Sub-Saharan African 
country should seek to perform five main roles. These roles are briefly described in the proceeding 
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paragraphs. The first three roles may be considered to be traditional and expected to be undertaken by 
any economic water utility regulator. 
Firstly, the basis for economic regulation of the water utilities in sub·Saharan Africa should be to drive for 
efficiency, assist utilities achieve commercial viability, provide the services in a sustainable manner. The 
research has appreciated the fact that approving tariffs that are cost reflective may not be sufficient [see 
section 4.2.6.2] unless accompanied by other performance improvement measures·. Research findings 
show that for a typical Sub·Saharan Africa economic regulator, the focus should not necessarily be on 
constraining profit making by utilities, but developing and approving [see section 4.2.4.2.] tariffs that will 
assist the service providers to achieve full cost recovery. This may mean increaSing tariffs. Another way of 
achieving commercial viability of the service providers include ensuring adequacy of infrastructure 
efficiency both in the short and medium term, providing capacity building to utilities on various operational 
issues and providing protection of service providers from government interference. 
The protection of consumers from the monopolistic tenets that is intrinsic in the provision of urban water 
services is a second key role that has been ernphasised by the respondents. Consumers have to be 
protected against poor services with low tariffs. This can be achieved through driving for efficiency as 
stated above and secondly involvement of consumers. This can further be achieved through various ways 
including the design of appropriate mechanisms for engaging with consumers, provision of performance 
information of utilities, transparent mechanisms for taking regulatory decisions including tariff approvals, 
receiving and resolving consumer complaints by the regulators and advice to service providers on 
procedures for handling complaints from consumers. Economic regulators should design mechanisms and 
even institutional framework for the engagement of consumer voice in service delivery. Additional ways 
include requiring utilities to develop customer charters and other relevant documents on rights and 
obligations of service providers and consumers and having them displayed in open places, dissemination of 
all information on water services including performance of utilities and the role of the regulators. 
The third important role of economic regulation is that of monitoring and enforcing standards of the 
performance of utilities. This role can be achieved through the development of guidelines on utility 
operations including water quality, human resources development and general technical operations and 
licensing of service providers. This role can be further achieved through benchmarking of utilities thereby 
promoting competition in the urban water services delivery and production and open dissemination of 
annual service provider performance reports. This enhances a competitive spirit among the utilities. 
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The research has further identified the fourth role of economic regulation in Sub·Saharan Africa as that of 
being a custodian of knowledge of urban water services in the country. This includes undertaking studies 
on the economy and efficiency of water utilities, production and dissemination of annual utility performance 
reports; provide advice to central and local govemments and any others on institutional arrangements and 
performance of urban water services. Generally the regulator should have a clear overview of the urban 
water services situation in the country. 
The fifth role of economic regulation of urban water services is that it should promote sustained 
accessibility to water services by the urban poor. Based on the results from the three countries and indeed 
responses to the questionnaire, it is clear that the high poverty levels in Sub·Saharan Africa are a big 
challenge for economic regulators. Network services to informal settlements -which comprise more than 
60% of the urban population and where the majority of the poor live·, are usually insufficient or non· 
existent. This leaves the residents to depend on sometimes unsafe and expensive water from alternative 
service providers. Water services to informal settlements remain unregulated. There are a number of ways 
that a regulator can focus on enhancement of services to the urban poor, such as developing incentives 
that will motivate utilities to extend services to the informal settlements, supporting measures by 
government to have special programs for investment in the informal areas, special lifeline tariffs -though 
these usually benefit only those connected etc. Economic regulators should not devote all their resources in 
protecting the interests of the limited numbers of people who have their own utility connections, often at 
subsidised rates through lifeline tariffs. To achieve these objectives, it is necessary to provide a clear legal 
mandate to the regulator on services to the urban poor. Then the utility regulator should collect information 
on access to services by the urban poor -both existing and potential consumers and developing 
consultation mechanisms with the urban poor. The service area for the utility as defined by the regulator 
should include all the areas within the municipal area of a city therefore including informal settlements. 
Services provided by alternative service providers whether within the service area of the utility or not should 
be regulated. How to regulate alternative service providers was outside the scope of this research. 
For economic regulators to perform effectively they should have a clear and inclusive regulatory mandate-
in terms of regulated entities, area of jurisdiction - not limited to areas that are only served by the network. 
The research has concluded that alternative service providers are instrumental in filling the service gap left 
by the formal utilities. While they operate in a competitive environment, sometimes there is a tendency to 
collude between them in fixing the price for water and yet their quality remains unchecked. The research is 
recommending that alternative service providers operate within the regulatory framework. The research 
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was however inconclusive on the more appropriate way of regulating the alternative service providers and 
so mechanisms should be defined of how this should be done. 
An economic utility regulator in a typical Sub-Saharan African country is faced with a double challenge of 
striking a balance between two seemingly contradictory actions of helping commonly inefficient utilities to 
achieve full cost recovery and developing mechanisms for ensuring that the poor gain access to water 
services. 
The economic regulator should further support government in developing universal service obligation 
policies. 
The research therefore recommends that the weaknesses found in the three regulatory agencies be 
addressed while maintaining their strengths. Some of the weaknesses include the need to improve on 
some areas related to accountability, transparency, and services to the urban poor -these are as stated in 
the different case study sections 
6.4 Institutional arrangements for the regulatory framework 
Based on the perceptions, this research is recommending that there is a higher probability of achieving 
regulatory objectives though establishment of an autonomous statutory regulatory agency. The agency 
should be non-political and not linked operationally to any government department and should have its own 
sustainable funding and human resources policies. However, establishment of an autonomous statutory 
agency is subject to the existing political and socio-economic environment in a country. The research has 
found that there is a continuum of possible institutional arrangements that could be considered for a given 
socio-political and economic environment. 
The autonomy of the regulatory agency will be enhanced based on a number of safeguards including; 
establishing a regulatory body based on a clear legislative framework with a distinct legal mandate free of 
ministerial control, even though the commissioners should be apPOinted by government. There should be 
clear and transparent procedures for appointing the board or commissioners as well as key staff in the 
regulatory body. The legislation should provide protection of the commissioners as well as the chief 
executive of the regulatory agency from arbitrary removal and also giving them fixed terms of office. In 
order to attract and retain highly skilled, qualified and experienced staff, the staff of the regulatory body 
should be exempt from civil service salary structures. Another element that would enhance autonomy of the 
economic regulator is to have a stable and dedicated financial resources through a regulatory fee charged 
222 
on the regulated utilities. Reporting mechanisms for the chairman of the commission should be 
independent of the political influence. 
Cognisant of the advantages that multi-sectoral regulatory framework provides including increased 
possibilities of sharing of resources, facilitating learning process across industries, reducing the risk of 
industry and political capture, reducing the risk of economic distortions the research was inconclusive as to 
whether this is the most appropriate organisational arrangements for regulating the urban water services 
delivery in Sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed industry specific regulatory framework has its own advantages 
which include focus and specialisation in terms of expertise in the different fields and a closer possibility of 
liaising with govemment ministries and a higher possibility of focus on achieving solutions for the urban 
poor. 
6.5 General conclusion 
Based on the evidence in this research one can conclude that economic regulation is a necessary but 
perhaps not sufficient condition for improving urban water services in Sub-Saharan Africa. In other words 
regulation alone cannot solve the enormous problems of urban water services in Sub-Saharan Africa. The 
research has found that economic regulation has important roles to play but will not make a major impact if 
implemented in isolation. One role that should be enshrined in legislation is firstly approval of tariffs and 
then that of promoting access to water services by the urban poor. Altemative service providers should also 
operate under the economic regulatory framework. For Sub-Saharan Africa, establishment of an 
autonomous regulatory agency is seen to be most appropriate to undertake economic regulatory roles of 
urban water services. 
The framework containing the principles for economic regulation illuminates in a systematic way the 
strength and weaknesses of the existing regulatory institutions. This is an innovative way of understanding 
the status of any regulatory institutions. 
6.6 Implications for policy making 
This research has unveiled the important role that economic regulation has on the provision of urban water 
services in Sub-Saharan Africa. However no action will be taken unless govemment take the deliberate 
move to put in place a policy framework that recognises and supports the need for urban water services to 
achieve full cost recovery. While governments may be making efforts to address the other shortcomings of 
water service delivery the subject of economic regulation may have to take prominence especially in view 
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01 the potential added value it brings. Governments should put in place policies that recognise and promote 
establishment 01 autonomous regulatory agency. Such policies should not be seen or perceived to be a 
response to external donor inlluence but as a way 01 addressing some shortcomings 01 the performance 01 
the urban water services delivery. Govemment may also wish to put in place mechanisms that will reduce 
on its interference especially in the operations 01 the regulator. This calls lor political will lrom government 
that understands this position. Alrica has so many examples where the law is put in place and yet is not 
respected. II a government has established an autonomous regulator whose autonomy is clearly enshrined 
in the law, then let government respect this provision. This applies to tariff adjustment. Indeed the issue 01 
tariff adjustment can easily be an emotive issue yet il the regulator is allowed to perform its duties 
accordingly it need not be. 
In view 01 the high poverty levels in Alrica and especially the lact that the urban poor tend to receive water 
services Irom usually unregulated providers, it is necessary that any government considering establishment 
01 an autonomous regulatory authority considers catering lor this segment 01 the population. The legislation 
should give a clear mandate to the regulator to promote accessibility to services by the urban poor. 
The urban poor and the un-served get unregulated though sometimes competitive services. Policy makers 
should ensure that regulation extends to include the alternative service providers who are the source 01 
water lor the majority 01 the urban poor population. They may be enormous in numbers but this should not 
dilute the possible engagement 01 the regulators in the matter. 
Ultimately there must be political will in government to implement the recommended relorms including 
establishment 01 a regulatory agency. 
Economic regulation should be implemented regardless 01 the ownership structures 01 the service provider 
-whether state owned or privately owned or a mixture 01 both. Govemments should therelore be clear 
about this so that in policy making this is taken into account. 
6.6.1 Contribution to the body of knowledge on economic regulation of urban water services in 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
This research locussed on determining the roles and institutional arrangements 01 economic utility 
regulation 01 the provision 01 urban water services in Sub-Saharan Alrica. 
However there remain a number 01 areas that need to be taken into account in understanding economic 
regulation 01 urban water services in Sub-Saharan Alrica. Firstly water services is a technical and yet 
political matter. While the technical side may be easier to understand, any study 01 economic regulation 01 
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urban water services in Sub-Saharan Africa should appreciate the political and socio-economic contexts of 
the different countries. 
The important issues of the urban poor and generally high poverty levels should be one of the critical areas 
to be understood. Economic regulation in a typical Sub-Saharan African country calls for clearly 
understanding the influence of the poverty situation on the continent and the role of alternative service 
providers which include water reselling, water caterers and tankered water services. This research has 
highlighted the importance of ensuring that the regulator is involved in issues of services to the urban poor 
and that the alternative service providers can be brought into the regulated industries. 
The need to drive for efficiency from the state owned companies cannot be over emphasised. The regulator 
can play a pivotal role in this aspect. One school of thought has been that when services are provided by a 
state owned utility then it should not be subject to economic regulation. The research has shown to the 
contrary that regardless of the ownership structures of the service providers, economic regulation should 
seriously be considered. 
Regulatory principles 
This research has adapted the economic regulatory principles as developed by the Better Regulation Task 
Force to the African water sector. The knowledge addition is the development of two additional principles 
which may be used to assess how well a regulatory framework is doing. These two principles are [i] how 
well a utility regulator is doing towards services to the urban poor and [ii] how well a utility regulatory 
framework is doing on achievement of autonomy. A subjective test was carried out to assess how well the 
three utilities in Africa were doing towards the prinCiples. The analytical framework now has six prinCiples -
four of which were adapted from BRTF and two developed by the author. This framework is a suitable tool 
for assessing the effectiveness of a regulatory regime in sub-Saharan Africa. 
6.7 Possible limitations of the research 
The possible limitation of this research was on the identification of the respondents to the questionnaire. 
The research used conferences and seminars on water sector reforms within the continent to distribute the 
questionnaires to the participants. While this may be perceived to limit the key people to respond to the 
questionnaires, the conferences were a captive place especially as they brought together a number of 
water professionals in Africa. The use of conferences however was further complemented by focus group 
discussions in the country cases. But for those in senior government, utility or regulatory positions, the 
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researcher used key informant interviews to secure their perceptions on the roles and institutional 
arrangements. The limitations highlighted above therefore do not significantly affect the validity of the 
findings. 
6.8 Future research 
The researcher recommends future study into the following topics in order to move the agenda of economic 
regulation forward: 
• A study into which utility regulatory framework [single or multi-sector]would be the most appropriate 
arrangement of regulating water services in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
• There should be research to determine the most appropriate way of regulating alternative service 
providers. 
• This research has not addressed the subject of regulation of urban sanitation services in view of its 
own challenges. This includes on-site [pit latrines] and off-site [net-worked sewerage services]. 
• The subject of regulating water services to small towns is yet another area needing further study. 
Small towns have their own different challenges which include the fact that they are not rural areas 
and yet are not big enough to provide the numbers of consumers for possible cost recovery tariffs. 
The research did not address this specific topic. 
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Appendix 1 :Sample letter of invitation to Focus Group Discussions 
Dear ......... , 
05 BP 2642 
Abidjan 05 
COTE D'IVOIRE 
Tel: (225) 21 240828 
Fax: (225) 21 758656 
Email: ddmwanza@wupafrica.org 
Wednesday, 12 November 2003 
Invitation: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION ON ROLE AND INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS OF 
ECONOMIC REGULATION OF WATER SERVICES IN GHANA 
You are hereby invited to participate in a discussion on the role of economic regulation of urban water services: the 
case of Ghana. The discussions will take place on 27th November 2003 at the Novotel hotel starting at 16.00 Hours. 
This is part of the research I am undertaking with the University of Loughborough in the UK but also ties in with the 
work that the Water Utility Partnership has been doing in Africa. This work has to do with facilitating reforms of the 
water and sanitation sector in Africa. One of the thrusts of this is facilitating the establishment of independent 
regulatory frameworks. 
This invitation comes to you in view of your wide experience and knowledge of the issues affecting the provision of 
water services in Ghana. 
The major questions which we hope to discuss are as follows: 
1. What should be some of the conducive environment to be in place to have an effective regulatory system? 
We shall look at this from the point of view of policy framework and probably the issues of poverty. 
2. What should be the roles of economic regulation of water services in Ghana? You are fully aware of the 
operations of PURC in relation to Ghana Water Company Limited. How are the poor catered for in the 
regulatory framework. 
3. What are the most appropriate institutional arrangements that will assure efficient and sustainable provision 
of urban water and sanitation services in Sub-Saharan Africa? The idea is not to open a Pandora's Box in 
terms of whether or not to privatize Ghana water but basically to come up with principles that could assist 
any other Country in a similar situation as Ghana in the water sector reforms. 
The above questions are basically a guide of what will be discussed. An issues paper will be presented for about 20 
minutes and this will be followed by a discussion. 
Yours faithfully, 
~
Dennis D. Mwanza 
Managing Director, 
Water Utility Partnership 
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Dear. ........ , 
05 BP 2642 
Abidjan 05 
COTE D'IVOIRE 
Tel: (225) 21 240828 
Fax: (225) 21 75 86 56 
Email: ddmwanza@wupafrica.org 
Wednesday, 12 November 2003 
Invitation: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION ON ROLE AND INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS OF 
ECONOMIC REGULATION OF WATER SERVICES IN GHANA 
You are hereby invited to participate in a discussion on the role of economic regulation of urban water services: the 
case of Ghana. The discussions will take place on 27th November 2003 at the Novotel hotel starting at 16.00 Hours. 
This is part of the research I am undertaking with the University of Loughborough in the UK but also ties in with the 
work that the Water Utility Partnership has been doing in Africa. This work has to do with facilitating reforms of the 
water and sanitation sector in Africa. One of the thrusts of this is facilitating the establishment of independent 
regulatory frameworks. 
This invitation comes to you in view of your wide experience and knowledge of the issues affecting the provision of 
water services in Ghana. 
The major questions which we hope to discuss are as follows: 
1. What should be some of the conducive environment to be in place to have an effective regulatory system? 
We shall look at this from the point of view of policy framework and probably the issues of poverty. 
2. What should be the roles of economic regulation of water services in Ghana? You are fully aware of the 
operations of PURC in relation to Ghana Water Company Limited. How are the poor catered for in the 
regulatory framework. 
3. What are the most appropriate institutional arrangements that will assure efficient and sustainable provision 
of urban water and sanitation services in Sub-Saharan Africa? The idea is not to open a Pandora's Box in 
terms of whether or not to privatize Ghana water but basically to come up with principles that could assist 
any other Country in a similar situation as Ghana in the water sector reforms. 
The above questions are basically a guide of what will be discussed. An issues paper will be presented for about 20 
minutes and this will be followed by a discussion. 
Yours faithfully, 
~ 
Dennis D. Mwanza 
Managing Director, 
Water Utility Partnership 
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Appendix 2: Report of focus group discussion in Ghana 
HELD ON 27'1> November 2003 
Novotel Hotel, Accra, Ghana 
Facilitator: Mr. Kwabena Manu-Sarpong 
Rapporteur: Mr. Felix Addo 
The discussion was opened at 16.00 Hours with welcome remarks from the facilitator who also introduced 
the subject and the researcher -Mr. Dennis D. Mwanza. The participants were each given an opportunity to 
introduce themselves and state what they were doing. A total of 12 participants from six different institutions 
participated in the FGD. 
Mr. Mwanza further mentioned that the focus group discussion was part of the research on the role of utility 
regulation on the performance of utilities in Africa. The results of this research would be made available to 
those interested. But it is hoped that the research would prove useful to Govemments in Africa that are 
contemplating establishment of utility regulators especially in the water sector. 
By way of introduction Mr. Mwanza gave a brief presentation on general issues of regulation. This was 
basically for purposes of guiding the discussions. In order to ensure that the discussion proved relevant to 
the participants, specific reference was made to the Public Utility Regulatory Commission [PURC] and the 
Ghana Water Company Limited. 
The participants were carefully selected to ensure that all the main stakeholders were included. The 
participants therefore included the following organisations: 
.:. Public Utility regulatory Commission [PURC] 
.:. Ghana Water Company Limited 
.:. A representative from Ministry of works and housing 
.:. Consumers association 
.:. A representative from the Ghana Electricity Company [also being regulated by PURC] 
.:. An NGO -ISODEC 
.:. Two research students [one PhD student from WEDC] and the other is a PhD student from IHE-
Netherlands. 
At the end of the discussion an evaluation was made. Participants were advised that they were not obliged 
to provide their names or personal details. The results of the evaluation of the discussion are given 
separately. 
A copy of the presentation is also given separately including a copy of the programme and the invitation 
letter that was used. 
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THE ROLE OF UTILITY REGULATION: Discussion results 
.:. The regulator should be an intermediary between the suppliers and the beneficiaries -between 
the service providers and the consumers. The regulator should also play a coordination role 
between the two parties . 
• :. The regulator should facilitate education of consumers i.e. the PSP question in Ghana 
.:. The regulator should be committed to quality assurance and set benchmarks as well as setting 
of performance standards of the service providers 
.:. The regulator should approve tariffs proposed by the operators/service providers 
.:. In order to achieve this the independence of the regulator [in this case -PURCj is critical 
.:. The regulator should monitor the performance of GWCL 
.:. GWCL needs a lot of support. The regulator should therefore build the capacity of GWCL 
.:. PURC has all the information as a regulator. They should strengthen this and also should provide 
advice to govemment on how the services are being managed and what government intervention 
can do . 
• :. GWCL should regulate services to the urban poor especially these tanker operalors since they are 
the ones saving the poor. 
The regulator should not micro-manage institutions i.e. it is not necessary for the regulator to be involved in 
the organisational structures of the operators i.e. the size of the Board of Directors or who should be 
members of the Board. 
According to the Act that established PURC the role of PURC are: 
~ Protection of both consumers and service providers 
~ Ensure effective delivery of services at efficient and economic prices 
~ Prices should be faire and equitable, and ensure sustainability 
~ Promotion of competition 
The service provider as well as the regulator should be transparent and information should be made public 
as much as possible. 
The key factor is that the PURC is to make sure that utilities are operating within stipulated benchmarks. 
There must be adequate reporting mechanisms and ensure that accountability exists. 
Direct quotation from a participant from an NGO -ISODEC 
"One of the main roles of the PURC should be to ensure that the monopolistic tendencies by the provider 
are curtailed. Even though Ghana has only one national urban water service provider, there is need to 
introduce a kind of competitive spirit in the sector". The regulator must ensure that there is accountability in 
the service provision. While the management of the service provider may be answerable to the Board, they 
must also be accountable to their consumers. The regulator should develop an information system that 
shows transparency in terms of information related to performance of the service providers. There must be 
clear explanations on the tariff structures which most consumers do not know about. The consumers stated 
that they "are not against public utilities achieving cost recovery based on higher tariffs but they must be 
given the explanations of how the tariffs are arrived af' 
The PURC should not emphasise more on the protection of the consumers as opposed to the service 
providers. -a statement from one of the GWCL participant 
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INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE REGULATOR 
The monopolistic nature of the sector hence the suppliers makes regulating difficult 
The utilities are Government owned, which makes it difficult to enforce penalties, and regulate providers. 
How do you sanction non-compliance. The regulator has to achieve a balancing act -;:onsumers and 
providers. 
Thus the current system [where the regulator regulates a public operator] in a sense inhibits the 
independence of the PURC. 
The current activities of PURC are often skewed towards consumers. 
INDEPENDENCE OF THE REGULATOR 
How independent can a regulator be? Who should the regulator be independent from? 
OPERATIONAL INDEPENDENCE 
The regulator should suffer no operational interference -both political or from any other cycles. 
Though the PURC is under the office of the President and reports to some committees in Parliament, so far 
there is no evidence of operational interference from these offices -whether Parliament or the office of the 
President. 
It is OK that PURC is multi-sectoral but we need to learn from other regulators and see they are operating. 
Only problem is that PURC is biased towards electricity 
FINANCIAL INDEPENDENCE 
Financial independence -the regulator should not be dependent on financing from organisations that have 
the potential of influencing their performance [this assumes that funding would have an effect on 
independence of regulators]. PURC should therefore not depend on Government budgetary allocations 
If the regulator is to have financial independence, where would the funding come from to meet its 
operational costs? 
Financial sufficiency may not necessarily guarantee regulator independence. 
The regulator thinks that the attitude of the providers affects how it plays its regulatory role. 
The way regulation is enforced could have been different if the provider was a private operator. 
Utilities on the other hand think that the regulator is pro-poor and is more sympathetic to consumer's views. 
Operations of the service provider [GWCLj 
The lack of logistics, poor accounting systems e.t.c. makes the GWCL incapable of effectively serving the 
population. 
Punitive measures for non-compliance: 
Termination of services -not very applicable in the case of GWCL. 
Taking GWCL to court - a possibility 
Both are a bit difficult to enforce 
Difficult to apply any sanctions against public operators 
Sanctions are sometimes imposed by the State enterprise commission. 
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APPOINTMENT OF COMMISSIONERS 
The appointment of commissioners should not be by the office of the President 
Currently the law stipulates that appointments should be by the President in consultation wilh the Council of 
state [?] 
The commissioners need to be people of integrity and not prone to interference from those who appoint 
them. 
Job security of regulators could also affect independence 
They should be appointed by Parliament and report to Parliament 
The breaking of the monopoly and the involvement of the private operators [sector] could enhance 
independence of the regulator 
ECONOMY OR DUTIES OF REGULATOR 
So much emphasis is being placed on economic factors, but attention should be to environment and health 
factors as well 
PURC should in this case work with other regulators 
Institutional capacity of utilities should be improved and the regulator should assist in this aspect. 
Regulation should not just be restricted to enforcing some laws but assisting the utilities build capacity to 
perform what they are supposed to do. 
Communication between providers, regulators and consumers should be improved. 
PRO-POOR ISSUES 
Lifeline tariffs can work, but only a small percentage of the poor are connected hence may not easily 
benefit the poor. 
There should be progressive plans to expand network coverage 
All sectors should be involved in policy formulation 
Technical constraints inhibit extending services to the poor. 
Small scale providers are exploiting people especially the Tankered services so they should be regulated-
question is how 
EVALUATION OF THE FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION 
The participants for the Focus Group Discussion were selected by the main facilitator of the Discussion. 
The participants however represented all the major stakeholders in the water sector in Ghana and included 
representatives from: 
1. Ghana Water Company Limited 
2. Public Utility Regulatory Commission [PURC] 
3. Consumer Association of Ghana [CAG] 
4. Electricity Company of Ghana [ECG] 
5. Some two NGOs 
6. Labour movement representation 
When asked to comment on how they found the Focus Group Discussion, the participants gave varied 
answers from stimulating, lovely and very lively. One felt that the next time we should get an expert 
facilitator to facilitate the discussions while some felt there is need to have more time for discussions of 
problems and solutions. The participants also felt that the session was interesting and informative. 
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The timing was based on a recommendation that Focus Group Discussions should not be more than 2 
hours long. Already this one started at 16.00 Hours and ended up at 18.00 Hours. 
The participants felt that for the next Focus Group Discussions the following areas should be 
improved upon: 
~ Establish some kind of intensified dialogue with the utility providers especially towards capacity 
expansion to improve on their service delivery. 
~ The timing or duration of the Focus Group Discussion. More time should be allowed. 
~ How to make the regulators financially independent and their jobs secure Gob security) 
~ Effect of PSP in enhancing the efficiency of both the regulator and the provider 
~ Various stakeholders should be given the chance to present their perception of regulation. Case 
studies of other developing Countries should also be presented to have a broader view. 
The participants identified the following as other issues they felt should be taken into account the next time 
there is a Focus Group Discussion. 
~ Current capacity of utility regulators should direct expectation and not vice versa. 
~ Consider a subject on Private Sector participation in the provision of utility services in the rural 
areas 
~ Funding recommendations for the regulator -how should the regulators be funded? 
~ The role of other regulators to be discussed i.e. environmental, health regulators 
~ The need to create or strengthen interagency coordination 
Question 7: How did you find the Focus Group Discussion? 
Responses received: 
1.0 Stimulating 
2.0 Lovely 
3.0 Okay but more time needed to get more ideas in the problems and their solutions 
4.0 Reasonably good 
5.0 Quite good but very short of time 
6.0 Good 
7.0 Very lively. However in future there should be an expert to facilitate the discussions 
8.0 Very good. It allowed the stakeholders present to express their views on issues in a healthy 
manner 
9.0 Very interesting and informative. More time should be given to the discussions 
Question 8: Which specific areas should we improve upon in the next Focus Group Discussion? 
Responses received: 
1.0 Dialogue with the utility providers to be intensified towards capacity expansion of the providers to 
enable them provides the service. 
2.0 Timing 
3.0 How to make the regulators financially independent and their jobs secure Gob security) 
4.0 Effect of PSP in enhancing the efficiency of both the regulator and the provider 
5.0 Enough time for discussion 
6.0 In addition to a moderator we also need a facilitator with wide experience on the subject 
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7.0 Various stakeholders should be given the chance to present their perception of regulation. Case 
studies of other developing Countries should also be presented to have a broader view. 
Question 9: Any other issue you feel should be taken into account the next time. 
Responses received: 
1.0 Current capacity should direct expectation and not vice versa. 
2.0 Private Sector participation in the provision of utility services in the rural areas 
3.0 Funding recommendations for the regulator 
4.0 Other role of other regulators to be discussed Le. environmental, health regulators 
5.0 More time 
6.0 The need to create or strengthen interagency coordination 
When asked to comment on how they found the Focus Group Discussion, the participants gave varied 
answers from stimulating, lovely and very lively. One felt that the next time we should get an expert 
facilitator to facilitate the discussions while some felt there is need to have more time for discussions of 
problems and solutions. The participants also felt that the session was interesting and informative. 
The timing was based on a recommendation that Focus Group Discussions should not be more than 2 
hours long. Already this one started at 16.00 Hours and ended up at 18.00 Hours. 
The participants felt that for the next Focus Group Discussions the following areas should be 
improved upon: 
~ Establish some kind of intensified dialogue with the utility providers especially towards capacity 
expansion to improve on their service delivery. 
~ The timing or duration of the Focus Group Discussion. More time should be allowed. 
~ How to make the regulators financially independent and their jobs secure Gob security) 
~ Effect of PSP in enhancing the efficiency of both the regulator and the provider 
~ Various stakeholders should be given the chance to present their perception of regulation. Case 
studies of other developing Countries should also be presented to have a broader view. 
The participants identified the following as other issues they felt should be taken into account the next time 
there is a Focus Group Discussion. 
~ Current capacity of utility regulators should direct expectation and not vice versa. 
~ Consider a subject on Private Sector participation in the provision of utility services in the rural 
areas 
~ Funding recommendations for the regulator -how should the regulators be funded? 
~ The role of other regulators to be discussed Le. environmental, health regulators 
~ The need to create or strengthen interagency coordination 
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LIST OF PARTICIPANTS AT THE FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS HELD IN GHANA 
Date: Thursday 27th November 2003 
Venue' Novotel hotel 
NAME ORGANISATION Position in organisation 
KOFI BREW- [AG OPS] Ghana Water Company [GWC] Acting Operations Director 
A. WHAJAH- [Corp. Planning] GWC Corporate Planning 
Manager 
OBENG BOATENG- [commercial] GWC Commercial Director 
EMMANUEL NKRUMAH Water Sector Reform Secretariat Coordinator 
ABABIO Water Resources Commission Manager 
STEPHEN ADU PURC Executive Secretary 
MAAME DUFIE OFORI PURC Manager, Consumer Affairs 
Nil OKAI KOTEI PURC Manager, Water Services 
JERRY ADDO GWC Chairman, Ghana Workers 
Union [water] 
GEORGE ACOLOR GWC Manager, water services in 
informal settlements 
DR. TAY CONSUMER ASS. OF GH. Chairman 
BADU BROWN GH. NAT. CONSUMERS ASS Secretary 
KWABENA NYARKO KNUST Lecturer 
K.S. MANU MIME CONSULT L TD Facilitator of the FGD 
HARUNA MAAMAH ECAM CONSULTANCY Chief Engineer 
AnA FRIMPONG MANSO MIME CONSULT L TD Economist 
P.K. AMISSAH-ARTHUR CONSULTANT 
ODURO DONKOR PRONET Director 
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Appendix 3: Report of the Focus Group Discussions held in Mozambique 
DATE held: 26th April 2004 
Holiday Inn hotel, MAPUTO, MOZAMBIQUE 
Facilitator: Mr. Miguel Maghales 
Rapporteur: Clara Dos Santos 
The discussion was opened at 18.00 Hours with welcome remarks from the facilitator who also introduced 
the subject and the researcher -Mr. Dennis D. Mwanza. The participants were each given an opportunity to 
introduce themselves and state what they were doing. A total of 12 participants from six different institutions 
participated in the FGD. 
Mr. Mwanza further mentioned that the focus group discussion was part of the research on the role of utility 
regulation on the performance of utilities in Africa. The results of this research would be made available to 
those interested. But it is hoped that the research would prove useful to Governments in Africa that are 
contemplating establishment of utility regulators especially in the water sector. 
By way of introduction Mr. Mwanza gave a brief presentation on general issues of regulation. This was 
basically for purposes of guiding the discussions. In order to ensure that the discussion proved relevant to 
the participants, specific reference was made to the Regulatory Council for Water (CRA), FIPAG, the 
Government Department for Water (DNA) and the service provider ADeM. 
The list of participants is given in annex. Due to problem of language not many participants came. Only 8 
people participated in the meeting which was held in English. 
THE ROLE OF UTILITY REGULATION: Key Discussion notes 
.:. The current roles of CRA as read out are acceptable . 
• :. Participant from NGO: while agreeing to some of the roles for CRA, I feel that CRA is too aligned 
towards regulating the private sector rather than regulating water services. eRA is a regulator of AOeM 
and not for water services in Mozambique. "lam saying this because those people who live in Maputo 
but are not within the boundary of the service area for AOeM are not privileged to have access to the 
services of the regulator. The Price of water from the small scale providers in most times is beyond 
reach. They charge according to the demand levels from the community -regardless of whether it is of 
good quality or nof'. He felt that there should have been a specific requirement for the CRA to regulate 
the small scale providers who provide water to more than 30% of the residents in Maputo. He further 
felt the decree does not mention a single word that is close enough to the poor yet about 60% of the 
urban population in Mozambique comprises of poor people. The decree should have given provisions 
for CRA to develop special regulations for helping the poor. The regulator must be seen to have the 
poor at heart and not benefitting only those living in the service area of the private operator. He felt this 
was an oversight that government did not put this into place . 
• :. CRA should be seen to be a facilitator between the ADeM and consumers. They should help 
ADeM extend services even to those areas where there is currently no connection . 
• :. The decree should make it clear that the Prime Minister should only sign what ever is given to 
him/her. Currently it is not clear whether CRA makes a decision on the approving of tariffs. This is 
because the Prime Minister signs the gazette agreeing to the approval of tariffs by CRA. Why can't 
246 
CRA approve and request the ADeM to publish the tariff? The Prime Minister could one day refuse 
to sign the gazette if he/she does not agree with the recommendations . 
• :. CRA should regulate small towns as well. Currently no one is looking at them and there is so much 
problems in these areas . 
• :. CRA should assist by bench marking the utilities. Currently is so difficult to know whether ADeM is 
doing well or not compared to our neighbouring countries. Also CRA should develop clear 
performance indicators and share with the key stakeholders so that they can also have an input on 
this . 
• :. DNA representative felt that it is important to develop mechanisms of regulating these many small 
scale providers that are found especially in Maputo. They are serving a huge population in Maputo 
and are a key player in the water sector. 
.:. On the institutional arrangements: the particpants were generally in agreement with the current 
arrangements. Except no one was sure as to why only three people are in the Board . 
• :. Currently CRA commands a lot of respect because of the credibility of the current President of 
CRA. What will happen when a new person takes over? The current chairman has so much 
knowledge and experience in the water sector . 
• :. The current autonomy of CRA should be guarded jealously. Since the decree provides for it, it 
should not be changed. The participant was not in agreeme with the one who questioned having a 
small Board. This is because large boards are very expensive to run, it takes a long time to make 
decisions e.t.c . 
• :. One participant felt the appointment mechanism was not transparent enough. The government 
should establish a committee that brings together stakeholders and select applicants to be on the 
board. The current number of members of 3 is sufficient just the appointment mechanism which 
should be changed. 
Funding mechanisms 
The participants were happy with the current arraangment for funding. Even though the money ultimately 
comes from consumers, it does not bring an extra financial burden on them. This is also good because for 
now we can see some benefits of regulation. The tariffs are explained to us and we understand how the 
water sector works in Mozambique. 
Operations of the service provider [ADeM) 
There was a general comment that ADeM is not doing well. It is not as efficient as is expected of a "private" 
company. This company is not even private because it is a public company in Portugal. CRA should do 
something to help improve the situation at ADeM. They have to work much harder than they are currently 
doing. 
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LIST OF PARTICIPANTS AT THE FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS HELD IN MOZAMBIQUE 
Date: 26th April 2004 
V I h I M 0 OZAMBIQ enue: Holiday nn ote, APUT ,M UE 
NAME ORGANISATION Position in organisation 
1 Americo Muianga DNA Director 
2 Pedrito Paolo DNA Head of urban services 
3 Miguel Maghales CRA Head of technical 
4 Manuela Cadalamba CRA Consumer affairs 
5 Clara Dos Santos CRA Head of Legal Dept 
6 Christophe Nothombo Medecins sans frontieres Country rep (water) 
(NGO) 
7 Nelson Beete FIPAG Chairman 
8 Miguel Alves FIPAG Chief Executive 
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Appendix 4: Report on focus group discussions in Zambia 
TOPIC: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION ON ECONOMIC REGULATION OF URBAN WATER 
SERVICES IN ZAMBIA 
Date: 10th June 2004 
Venue: Pamodzi Hotel, Lusaka 
Time: 18:00 hours 
Chairman: Mr. L. Zulu 
Presenter: Mr. D. Mwanza 
Notes taken by: Mr Jonathan Phiri, Secretary, WASAZA 
The chairman who was Mr. L. Zulu welcomed all the participants and introduced the presenter. After a few 
remarks the chairman called upon Mr. D. Mwanza to make his presentation. 
Mr. D. Mwanza started his presentation by indicating that he was grateful to use the platform of WASAZA to 
make the presentations on his PhD in water utility. The presentation lasted 30 minutes and the rest of the 
time was used for discussions. 
The presentation gave out the possible roles of economic regulation and also institutional arrangements. 
The group then discussed these roles and institutional arrangements of economic regulation and more with 
reference to the NWASCO. 
He indicated that a regulator is needed to regulate the prOVision of serve due to monopolistic nature of 
water. 
Discussion on the roles: 
There was general agreement from the meeting on the roles of a regulator and especially those undertaken 
by NWASCO. 
Some points which also came up include: 
The WSS Act is silent on the role of NWASCO being consumer protection. This is an important function for 
NWASCO that it should not be implied. NWASCO is undertaking it anyway. 
Comment by George Manyele (consumer): As consumers we are happy that a regulator for water was 
established. Government took a right decision. This is because for a long time we have had no where to 
turn to for the poor services that we receive. We do not get any water and at the end of the month we 
receive a bill. If we cannot pay then the intermittent supply that we receive is even disconnected without 
any explanation. NWASCO should help us in this respect 
Questions by Or Nyambe: The Doctor wanted to know from some examples of regulators in Africa and how they are 
fairing e.g. Mali, Mozambique? The answer was to be used to compare with NWASCO on how they are fairing so far 
especially in terms of their roles. 
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Ans from Mr Mwanza: The regulators in Mali, Mozambique, Ghana have similar challenges like NWASeO. 
It is difficult to compare their operations or success without clear benchmarks. 
Dr Nkhuwa: The regulator like NWASeO tends to be biased towards consumer protection biases the 
regulator; the provider needs regulator protection as well. Need to indicate that regulator protects the 
consumer and provider. This should be clear in the Act 
Mr Gumbo (comment): I am happy that NWASeO established the water watch groups especially the one 
in Lusaka. We are now able to discuss with LWSe our problems with water. It is also good that LWSe 
undertakes its own public hearing independent of the Water watch groups. But how can we make sure that 
the poor people in Mandevu become members of the watch groups? 
Funding of regulator: It is very expensive to fund a regulator. Why not have only one regulator? 
There was an indication from some participants that there should be one regulator so that the more 
donated as a grant of funding can be used for its operations. It was indicated that Ihey should be one 
regulator to easy the funding mechanisms. . 
Mr. D. Mwanza answered by giving examples from that of Ghana, Mali, and Tanzania's experience. 
Ghana's case: Ghana has one regulator for both water and electricity. The regulator known as PURe is 
funded by the government. But this funding has a problem because it impacts on the operations of the 
regulator as Government sometimes does not release funds. The Zambian case is better where by the 
regulator gets money from the water companies. 
Ghana independent utility regulator is now the concept being considered. Ghana is an interesting situation 
since Ghana Water Limited covers the urban area. In Ghana there is actually one parastatal company. 
The want to reform the Ghanan water sector poses a challenging problem because the poor will be left out 
once the water sector is leases to the private sector. In Ghana the regulator is comprised of seven 
commissioners one of which is the chief executive. The president appoints the commissioners and they 
report to the office of the president. 
Kenya: there is a board for the regulator in place. 
Mali's case - was done for political interest. In Mali the provision of WSS services is by a private company. 
During presidential campaigns the water tariffs were reduced politically without the consent of the regulator. 
It was discovered that the regulator was not of the idea (reducing the tariffs) and some people lost jobs in 
the regulator. 
Regulators cannot work properly due to political interferences. 
Mozambique: In Mozambique there are four components. Operator, independent regulator, government 
and the international arbitration. The regulator reports to cabinet once a year. Tariffs are set through 
consultation with the other stakeholders. 
Kenya - there is a board for the regulator in place. 
Tanzania - the regulator is on paper. 
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Question: is it possible to form one regulator in the water sector since consumers need to be protected 
from exploitation? 
Answer: lan Banda; 
First and foremost lam happy with the explanation of funding arrangements for NWASCO. I think it is 
sufficient that they are funded through a small levy. The calculation method however is rather unfair. Why 
not charge the 2% on the collection rather than the billing? 
Secondly there is the issue of economic efficiency - utilities should provide the service at optimum costs. In 
Zambia there are ten CUs and other providers in the Local Authorities (LAs). Analysis of the sector report 
indicates that the performance of CUs has improved since the last report was published. From the sector 
reports recommendations can be made to the utilities concerning economic efficiency in service provision. 
The utilities should also be allowed to charge economic tariffs. Only NWASCO can help by making sure 
that the tariffs help the utilities achieve commercial viability. NWASCO should therefore develop guidelines 
to assist utilities on this matter. 
Comment by Peter Lubambo - he commented on consumer protection and the need for consumers to 
receive a reasonable service. The utilities should not slap its inefficiency on the consumers. He further 
stated that is good that NWASCO requires utilities to conduct public hearings before considering a tariff 
adjustment request. NWASCO should further not link approval of tariffs to the requirement for achieving 
targets to improve performance. We agree that performance must be improved but let the water utilities 
look for money from elsewhere like the programme in Lusaka which is now funded by the World Bank to 
meter all the consumers. 
NWASCO needs to understand that utilities face a lot of challenges. So it should be supportive in its 
dealings with the water utilities. 
Question by Mahesh Mishra: Zambia has very high poverty levels. What is the benefit of the NWASCO 
on the urban poor? I do not see any benefit of the regulator especially with regard to the urban poor that 
live in areas where there is no net work. The act is even silent on services to the urban poor. 
Comment by Mr Paul Banda: NWASCO has initiated a lot programmes to assist the urban poor. Even if 
this is not provided for in the Act. We must applaude NWASCO for the initiative. One initiative is the 
Devolution Trust Fund. Utilities can apply for funding to construct water kiosks. NWASCO also benchmarks 
utilities on how much they are doing in serving the urban poor. 
Comment by Dr. Z. Phiri - in Lusaka there is one company doing abstraction and distribution. This would 
pose a challenge to the regulator when there are more suppliers of water and sanitation in the water sector. 
Comment from participant - at times more costs have to be incurred at the abstraction or distribution 
levels. Some people or consumers may be stealing water by making illegal connections. 
Comment by O.M Chanda - Regulator: it is more challenging at the distribution and interaction with the 
customer. In Namibia the government has separated water distribution from water abstraction. NAWATER 
is responsible for abstraction, whilst distribution ends at the Municipal border. 
In Zambia the CUs are responsible for abstraction and distribution of water to the consumer point. 
Competition can be looked at the entry point. In term of protection of consumers and providers NWASCO 
speaks for both. For example there was a case where a customer wanted to provide his own water within 
the boundaries of the provider's license. Protection of consumers relates to service grant. 
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Comment by O. Mwanza: this focuses on economic regulation of the water sector. Water is available in 
the river, under ground and who pays for it? There is need to control how much water one gets from the 
ground. In Lusaka, Lusaka Water and Sewerage Company (LWSC) is deprived of revenues for water 
supply and sanitation due to people having their own boreholes. 
Before LWSC came on the scene the Local authorities used to regulate water supply and sanitation. All 
these within the jurisdiction of LWSC should be provided with water supply and sanitation. The service 
provider should also meet its targets. Once it fails people try to find alternatives 01 water supply and 
sanitation. 
Question by Dr. Z. Phiri: what type of regulation, health, environment, health; Are food and drugs 
considered as a regulator since the focus is on NWASCO. 
Comment and question by C. Maseka: Most of the water companies in Zambia need capacity. NWASCO 
should therefore develop capacity building programmes for the water companies especially in relation to 
the guidelines on operations of utility services. We have a big problem of human resources. 
Water resources regulation in Zambia is weak. There is no law on ground water abstraction. How long and 
to what extent will they go on? 
Answer by A. Mondoka: in terms of regulation, the legislation dates as far back as 1949. Only surface 
water is covered in the Water Act of 19949. WRAP also focuses on institutional setup; issues being 
considered are ground water and the regulation of ground water will not be undertaken by NWASCO. 
Answer by E. Zulu: (is Environmental council of Zambia a regulator?), Public Health Act talks about care 
for the contamination of food. The way these contaminated foods are disposed off of destroyed, ECZ takes 
interest. 
Question by P. Chimana: W has a monopolistic nature when we talk about competition in the water 
sector. Are we looking at competition between two utilities operating in different area or are we looking at 
utilities operating in the same area? 
Question by Chongo: Multi-sector regulators, independent concept, independent for what? 
Comment by Mr P. Banda: In Zambia NWASCO only regulates water and sanitation, energy has its own 
regulator. Since regulation is new concept in Zambia may be we should not talk so much about multi-sector 
regulation. Let us give NWASCO a chance. In this respect it may not be appropriate to immediately lump 
regulation of water with the regulation of energy and telecommunications. Few people know about multi-
sector regulation and Zambia is just learning single sector regulation. Should there be need to consider 
multi-sector regulation, the issue should be re-visited after 10 years of NWACO's existence. This would 
have allowed sufficient time to understand the challenges of single sector regulation and perhaps share 
experiences with those that are in a multi-sectoral regulation situation. 
Answer by O. M. Chanda: independence of a regulator - the government sets policies and the regulator is 
independent as the government wishes. Independence is in temns of deCision-making. Decisions made by 
NWASCO are final unless the utility is aggrieved than they can appeal to the minister. Financing of 
NWASCO is critical. 
Government appoints the NWASCO board. However the secretariat has autonomy. There is autonomy in 
selection of personnel. The regulator appoints the selection of personnel. 
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Multi-sector regulation and single sector regulator can both work. In Jamaica for example there is one 
regulator for electricity, telecommunication and water. There have three different departments but each 
department is independent in its regulation. 
The regulator must approve water tariffs setting. 
Comment by George Ndongwe: I do not think the appointment of the NWASCO board is transparent. The 
Council members should not be appointed by the Minister of Water. The Ministry should appoint a small 
selection committee that should scrutinize the CVs of those nominated by the different institutions. 
Comment by Rose Chimansa: In addition to what Mr Ndongwe stated, it is also easy for a Minister to 
appoint people of his choice. What would stop a minister from appointing a second hand clothes dealer 
who is a member of the association of commerce and industry but who is a girl friend or a party cadre?". 
Comment from Imasiku Nyambe: NWASCO should consider opening branches in the regions. Right now 
it is like it is only for Lusaka. Even if NWASCO has part time inspectors -those people have their own 
priorities. NWASCO should follow the Government approach of decentralising 
Comment by D. Mwanza on competition: As a consumer in a competitive market e.g. cell phone. 
Consumers are free to choose the service provider. In the water sector people are stuck with on service 
provider. The regulator then comes in. There is need to have a regulator in the water sector so that they is 
no influence. Independence is needed from political influence. In cases where the government provides 
grants to the regulator, it commands the regulator to increase the tariff in order to get more. 
Comment and Question by M. Kapipi and Ngoma: Government should be advised on urban water 
services. Propose that NWASCO provide advice to Government since it has all the knowledge of the urban 
water services in Zambia. 
Since NWASCO has been in existent for more than 4 years, who is responsible for rural water because this 
is where poor people are? 
Answer by O. M. Chanda: Rural WSS, the Act talks about defined boundaries. What else should be 
regulated in rural areas? The government promotes community management of water supply. If 
communities pollute the water they suffer themselves. 
Comment by A. Mondoka: he indicated that the answer given on rural water supply was not satisfactory. 
Question by Dr. I. Nyambe: Who regulates water quality, since most people die not because of a cost but 
because of water quality? 
Answer by O. M. Chanda: by law the Central Board of Health is responsible for water quality regulation. 
NWASCO work in collaboration with the CBoH and all the CUs carry water quality monitoring. CboH 
regulates bottled water. . 
Comments by A. Mwanza: The WSS Act defines the provision of services. In rural areas most of the water 
supply are water points. Rural water supplies are point sources and the communities are responsible for 
these facilities. 
Piped water on the other hand is not community based. 
The meeting ended at 19:49 hours 
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List of participants 
Name Organisation iTel E-mail 
E. H. Zulu ECZ 254023 ezulu@necz.ora.zm 
D. C. W Nkhuwa UNZA-Mines 294087 dnkhuwa@mines.unza.zm 
B.Gumbo 27117177140 bekithemba@tidasa.co.za 
J. Arntzem 2673903401 siohoka@botsnet.bw 
D. Schaefer GTZ 229281 latzwater@zamnet.zm 
K. Bruebach GKWConsult 
independent 095860260; 
C. Maseka Consultant 212860 
Mahesh Mishra Water Aid 290698 maheshmishra@wateraid.ora.zm 
Kelvin Chitumbo NWASCO 226141/2 chitumbk2002@vahoo.com 
Mulwmbwa Makumba NAZ 290486 mukumbwabrian@vahoo.co.uk 
Patrick Haambayi Mercury 255156 mittrade@zamtel.zm 
Ndongwe George LWSC 250457 QndonQwe@lwsc.com.zm 
250666;096 
P. Lipuka LWSC 455776 ml!lLaka@lwsc.com.zm 
Chimankata Kashimbaya LWSC 250666 ckashimbava@lwsc.com.zm 
Josepine Ngoma Water Aid 290698 ·oseohineaoma@wateraid.ora.zm 
Rose Chimansa Care International 221701/10 chimansa@carezam.ora 
Knoo Lauritzen WB Consultant kbl@ciaritv.ok 
Peter Lubambo MLGH 251128Iubamboo@vahoo.cam 
Fook Chuan Eng World Bank 12024738506 FenQ@worldbank.oro 
Jane Walker World Bank 202 45822703 nwalker@worldbank.oro 
Ngabo Muleba NWASCO 226941/2 nQabomkn@hotmail.com 
Peter Chikwampu Daily Mail 221364 zadama@zamtel.zm 
Kenny Mudenda Zulu Burrows 250436 k mudenda@hotmail.com 
University of 
Pakina Chileshe Newcastle 097442585 lo&chileshe@maileitv.com 
Imasiku Nyambe UNZAlZWP 095793600 nyambes@zamtel.zm 
K. Maninga Chainama College 097715318 mmaninQa@vahoo.co.uk 
Andrew Sikana E. H. College 097761850 andrewsikana@yahoo.com 
C. Machila E. H. College 097811446 
Paul M. Banda NWASCO nwasco@zamnet.zm 
Radio Christian 
Joseph Kunda Voice 096846530 
iTazawso Tembo Radio Five FM 221515 azas07@hotmail.cam 
Reformed Open 
Alika Mwale community School 097745797 rocs@zamnet.zm 
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Name Organisation Tel E-mail 
WASAZA Vice-
lan N. Banda chairman 095885865 msinie@zamtel.zm 
Z. Phiri WRAP 243543 
C.Mwila ZAMIM 02382672 
Doris Zyambo EHC 095435328 doriszvambo@vahoo.com 
Chinyama Syasyiipa E. H. College 097845370 
Amihi D'jouza GTZ 229281 latzreaulation@zamnet.zm 
Patrick D'jouza Economist 
George Manyele ZYWAT 097466756 lamanvele@exite.com 
Esther Nanda Mulaisho Shonga Steel Lld 248242 shonaa@zamnet.zm 
Andy Mondoka WRAP 095848122 mondoka@hotmail.com 
Daniel Sichombo LWSC 096755576 dmsichomo@lwsc.com.zm 
Mutinta Mulinda Everlyhone College 095784359 
Victoria C. Mweetwa Everlyhone College victoriamweetwa@vahoo.oom 
Festus Chipungu Anti Corruption Corn 097766879 accsod@zamnet.zm 
Astrid C. Banda LWSC acbanda@lwsc.com.zm 
Barbara K. Senkwe World Bank 252811 dkazimbavosenkwe@worldbank.ora 
Charles Chisanga WASAZA 095885667 wasaza@zamnet.zm 
WASAZA General 
O. M. Chanda Secretary 226941/2 omchanda@zamnet.zm 
D. Mwanza 
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Appendix 5: List of people that were Interviewed [Key informant interviews] 
Ghana 
From PURC 
Mr. Kwame Pianim - Chairman of the PURC 
Stephen Adu, PURC, Executive Secretary 
Maaeme Dufie OFORI, PURC, Manager, Consumer Affairs 
From the Water Company 
Jonathan Nunoo, Acting Managing Director, Ghana Water Company 
Millicent Rosalind Mensah, Manager, consumer Affairs, Ghana Water Company 
Charles Brempong-Yeboah, Manager Operations, Ghana Water Company 
From the NGO 
Emmanuel Sekoi, Member of the Union 
Ansa John Owusu -NGO, ISODEC 
Government 
Emmanuel Nkrumah, Manager, Water Sector Reform Secretariat, Ministry of Public Works and Housing 
Water Resources Commission 
Dr Daniel Adom, Executive Secretary 
MOZAMBIQUE 
Manuel Alvarinho, President of CRA 
Fernando Nyantumbo, Executive Secretary of CRA 
Miguel Maghaeles, Head of Technical Department 
FromFIPAG 
Nelson Beete, Chairman of FIPAG 
Miguel Alves, Executive Director of FIPAG 
From Government 
Manuel Pedrito, Head of Urban in DNA 
Odete Macario, Engineer in the Urban Department, DNA 
FromNGO 
Christophe Nothomb, Head of operations, Doctors without borders, Mozambique [NGO] 
ZAMBIA 
From the regulator 
Osward M. Chanda, Director of NWASCO 
Paul Banda, Chief Inspector, NWASCO 
Watson Lumba, Head of Financial inspections, NWASCO 
From the water company 
Charles Chipulu, Managing Director, Lusaka Water and Sewerage Company 
Daniel Sichombo, Director of Legal and Human Resources, Lusaka Water and Sewerage Company 
Innocent Chiliboy, manager Corporate Affairs 
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FromNGOs 
Catherine Mwanamwambwa, Manager, CARE 
Patrick Kampamba, Water Aid 
From Government 
Peter Lubambo, Director of Infrastructure and Support Services, Ministry of Local Govemment and Housing 
Adam Hussen, Director of the Department of Water Affairs, Ministry of Energy and Water Development 
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Appendix 6: List of people that commented on the draft questionnaire 
1. Norline Martin-PhD research student 
2. Tim Ndezi -PhD research student 
3. Felix Addo -PhD research student 
4. Brian J. Mhango -Lecturer, University of Witwatersrand, South Africa 
5. Kwabena Nyarko -Lecturer at the Kwame Nkrumah Univeristy of Science and Technology 
6. Or Maimuna Nalubega, Lecturer, Makerere University but also Consultant to the Water and 
Sanitation Programme, Kampala, Uganda 
7. Osward M. Chanda -Director of NWASCO -regulator in the Zambian water sector 
8. Miguel Maghales, Operations Engineer, Water Regulatory Council, Mozambique 
9. Kwabena Manu-Sarpong -Consultant on water policy and institutional reforms 
10. Dirk Schaeffer -GTZ member of staff, Zambia 
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Appendix 7: Questionnaire 
~ Loughborough 
• University 
DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL AND BUILDING ENGINEERING 
Dear colleague, 
Water Engineering for Development Centre [WE DC] 
John Pickford Building 
Loughborough University 
Leicestershire 
LE11 3TU 
UK 
August 2003 
Re: RESEARCH INTO INDEPENDENT WATER UTILITY REGULATION IN SUB·SAHARAN AFRICA 
This is to advise that I am undertaking a research economic regulation of water utilities in Africa. The main objective 
of the research is to detennine the roles and institutional arrangements for economic regulation of water 
services in Sub-Saharan Africa. This research is being undertaken as part of my PhD studies at the University of 
Loughborough in the UK. 
In order to help develop a clear understanding on this subject I designed a questionnaire to be filled in by senior 
professionals in the water sector like yourself. I am sure that your immense experience and knowledge of the water 
services in your country will contribute greatly to this research. I would therefore appreciate if you can spare a few 
minutes to thoughtfully answer the questions below. If you do not have much information on some of the questions 
do not answer them just go to the next question. 
I would appreciate receiving response to the questionnaire as soon as possible but not later than Saturday 29~ 
November 2003. You can either send the response by post on the address above or bye-mail [preferable] to 
ddmwanza@ddmwanza.com or d.d.mwanza@lboro.ac.uk . 
The responses received will be treated with utmost confidentiality and will solely be used for the research analysis 
purposes. No one will have access to your response except for myself as the researcher and members of the faculty 
in their supervising my work. If however you are interested in receiving a copy of the final results, do let me know and 
we can make arrangements for you to receive a copy. 
Thank you for your time and support 
Dennis D. Mwanza 
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RESEARCH ON ECONOMIC REGULATION IN THE URBAN WATER 
SERVICES 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
Name of respondent 
Organisation: 
Position 
How long have you been 
involved in the water sector 
Address: 
City ICountry I 
Tel: Fax No: 
e-mail: 
INTRODUCTION 
Most water utilities in Sub-Saharan Africa are performing poorly. One of the major reasons for the poor 
service delivery has been linked to institutional arrangements of the sector especially lack of clear 
regulatory frameworks, lack of clear policy direction and unclear roles for the different key stakeholders in 
the sector. [Water utility in this respect refers to any entity [public or private] charged with the 
responsibility of providing urban water supply and/or sanitation services on a cost recovery basis]. One of 
the resulting effects of the poor performance by the utilities is that Africa has the lowest water supply and 
sanitation coverage in the world. Lack of or inadequate accessibility to water and sanitation services can 
have far reaching health implications. This would further affect the economic productivity of people in the 
urban areas. 
The purpose of this questionnaire is to seek your expert views on water utility regulation in the African 
Water supply and Sanitation sub-sector. 
The questionnaire is divided into three parts: 
Part 1 is on general policy framework including justification for regulation 
Part 2: concentrates on questions related to the role that a utility regulator should play in a typical 
African water sector 
Part 3: the questions in this part are related to the institutional arrangements of the regulator i.e. 
should it be single sector or multi-sector, regional or national e.t.c. 
In the following, I have presented some statements, hypotheses and questions. Kindly indicate how you 
perceive their validity by checking the appropriate level of your perception either strongly agree; Agree; 
Uncertain, Disagree; or Strongly disagree 
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PART 1: POLICY FRAMEWORK 
The purpose of this part of the questionnaire is to seek your expert views on the basic requirement for an 
efficient water and sanitation service delivery system. Apart from an effective regulatory system, it is 
necessary to have an appropriate policy and legislative framework. Regulation draws its strength from 
good policy framework. The questions in this part vary from what kind of policies shoutd be in place, the 
need to separate poliCV makinQ from other functions like reQulation and service provision e.t.c. 
1 One of the reasons for the poor performance of the water and sanitation sector in many African 
Countries has been due to lack of clear and coherent policy framework 
o Strongly agree o Agree o Uncertain o Disagree o Strongly disagree 
2 A comprehensive and coherent policy framework should also be supported by a clear legislative 
framework. 
o Strongly agree o Agree o Uncertain o Disagree o Strongly disagree 
3 Does your Government have a single coherent policy addressing water supply and sanitation? 
DYes ONo 0 Don't know 
4 Does the Government policy address the issues of institutional framework as well as regulatory 
regime? 
DYes ONo 0 Don't know 
5 Government needs to give direction for the water sector including setting of objectives for the 
sector, setting social policies. Defining and developing targets i.e. accessibility; what level should 
be achieved by when, the levels of service i.e. piped water for all. 
o Strongly agree o Agree o Uncertain o Disagree o Strongly disagree 
6 In order to have an effective Water Supply and Sanitation Sector the following functions must be 
undertaken by three different institutions. 
i). Policy making 
ii). Utility regulation 
iii). Service provision 
o Strongly agree o Agree o Uncertain o Disagree o Strongly disagree 
7 Please provide reasons for your answer below 
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8 What is Government general pOlicy on the involvement of the private sector in provision of utility 
services? 
9 What is Government policy on utility regulation in general and specifically for water? 
10 Government should give leadership in the sector by creating a conducive environment for others to 
deliver water and sanitation services through developing and establishing appropriate policy and 
regulatory framework. 
D Strongly agree D Agree D Uncertain D Disagree D Strongly disagree 
11 Government attempts to improve perionnance of the water supply and sanitation sector have 
included involvement of the private sector. Do you agree that the situation would improve if a 
private operator was involved in the management and provision of water and sanitation services? 
D Strongly agree D Agree D Uncertain D Disagree D Strongly disagree 
12 Why do you think the provision of water supply and sanitation services are not as efficient as other 
utility services i.e. electricity, telephone e.t.c. 
13 Because water and sanitation service delivery is a critical social security sector, Governments 
should ensure that the services are provided by public utilities that will not be driven by profit 
making but the desire to serve all. 
o Strongly agree D Agree D Uncertain D Disagree D Strongly disagree 
14 Public utilities are not perionning as efficiently due to financial constraints caused in part by 
Government non payment for the services they receive 
D Strongly agree D Agree o Uncertain D Disagree D Strongly disagree 
15 Utilities must enjoy financial and human resources autonomy from Government in order to have 
more efficient operations. 
D Strongly agree D Agree o Uncertain D Disagree D Strongly disagree 
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16 Lack of adequate utility regulation somehow leads to low tariffs, low investment in the sector and a 
higher proportion of consumers not paying for the service and poor customer services. 
o Strongly agree o Agree o Uncertain o Disagree o Strongly disagree 
17 Give any additional comments for your answer. 
18 Some of the reasons for poor performance of most utilities in Africa include the following: [tick the 
appropriate level of your agreement] 
ID 
ID ~ Cl ~ 
"' Cl 
U) 
"' 
c: '6 
.2- '0; ID >-
Cl 1:: ~ 'Cl 
c: ID Q) Cl c: 
e ID <> "' e c, c: U) U5 « => Ci U5 
Lack of institutional autonomy from the Central Government systems 0 0 0 0 0 
Lack of investment by Government 0 0 0 0 0 
Lack of financial and management autonomy 0 0 0 0 0 
Lack of incentives to expand services to the unserved areas 0 0 0 iD I~ 
Unclear roles and responsibilities for provision of services 0 0 D ID I~ 
lack of adequate management skills 0 0 0 0 0 
lack of qualified personneVstaff 0 0 0 0 IL.....J 
Poor Governance structures 0 0 ID 0 I~ 
reasons [specify] 0 0 0 0 0 
PART 2: ROLES OF UTILITY REGULATOR ON SERVICE PROVISION 
The purpose of this part of the questionnaire is to seek your expert views on the roles that water utility 
regulation should play on the performance of the water supply and sanitation sector in the African setting. 
A number of Govemments in Africa have been undertaking broad institutional reforms leading to either 
new institutions being created or rearranging the existing ones but at least redefining the roles and 
responsibilities of the different key players. Introducffon of regulatory framework is becoming a key 
element in the better provision of water supply and sanitation sector in Africa. 
19 Because provision of urban water supply and sanitation services tends to be monopolistic in nature 
there is need to introduce adequate regulatory frameworks in order to promote competition. 
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o Strongly agree o Agree o Uncertain o Disagree o Strongly disagree 
20 Regulation of the provision of urban water supply and sanitation services would reduce the abuse 
of monopoly power. 
o Strongly agree o Agree o Uncertain o Disagree o Strongly disagree 
21 In order to have an efficient and effective water supply and sanitation sector it is necessary to 
introduce an autonomous regulator in the Water Supply and Sanitation Sector? 
o Strongly agree o Agree o Uncertain o Disagree o Strongly disagree 
22 Regulation may be needed for various purposes. What type of regulation is mostly needed in 
developing countries especially in Africa for the water supply and sanitation sector? [tick as 
appropriate] 
Cl> 
Cl> ~ en ~ Cl! 
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Cl! c '6 
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c Cl> Q) c::n c 
e ~ u Cl! e Sf c en u; => i:S u; 
Economic regulation including service quality 0 U 0 P 0 
Social regulation [access to water and sanitation services] 0 0 0 0 0 
Environmental regulation 0 0 0 0 0 
Water quality regulation [basically health regulation] 0 0 0 ID 0 
Technical standards regulation [standards bureau] 0 0 0 0 0 
Any other type of regulation [specify] 
23 The functions of an independent economic water utility regulator should include the following: [tick 
as many functions as you think appropriate}. 
Cl> 
Cl> ~ c::n ~ Cl! 
c::n en 
Cl! c '6 
.?;> '(ij Cl> >-
c::n 1:: ~ Cl 
c Cl> Q) en c: 
e ~ u Cl! e 
:f c en u; => i:S u; 
Protecting the interest of consumers 0 0 0 0 0 
Correct any market failure in the water sector 0 0 0 IU IL..J 
Ensure sustainability of the water sector in the country 0 0 0 0 0 
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Setting standards for the performance of service providers 0 0 0 0 0 
Conducting studies related to economy and efficiency of the utilities 0 0 0 D 0 
Promoting competition among utility providers 0 iLJ 0 D 1'-' 
Develop the operational guidelines for the utilities. 0 ID 0 D 1'-' 
Development of guidelines on setting of tariffs 0 0 0 D 0 
Provide guidelines on Governance structures 0 0 IU D 0 
Protect the interests of service providers from arbitrary Government 0 0 D 0 0 
intervention 
Ensure that Government and any public institution pays for the services they 0 0 D 0 0 
receive 
Participate in any contract negotiations to do with the involvement of the 0 0 D ,U 0 
private sector in the management of water service delivery. 
Develop subsidy guidelines for services to the urban poor. 0 0 D 0 0 
Keep an accurate value of the property or assets of the service providers. 0 0 D 0 0 
Advise Government on water and sanitation matters 0 0 D 0 0 
Issuing licences 0 0 D 0 0 
Conducting studies related to economy and efficiency of the utilities 0 0 D 0 0 
Promoting competition among utility providers 0 0 D 0 0 
Develop the operational guidelines for the utilities. 
.0 0 0 0 0 
Other [specify] 
24 Countries in Africa need comprehensive and independent regulatory system, because of poor 
transparency, accountability, and high corruption, etc. 
o Strongly agree o Agree o Uncertain o Disagree o Strongly disagree 
25 In order to have improved and efficient provision of services, regulators should use the following 
enforcement tools: [tick as many as you think appropriate] 
U Penalising utilities for non-compliance 
0 Taking utilities that do not comply to courts of law 
0 Use the National police service to enforce the regulations 
0 Other enforcement tools [specify] 
265 
26 Adequate utility regulation should assist utilities secure financial and management autonomy and 
also better and improved Governance structures. 
D Strongly agree D Agree o Uncertain D Disagree o Strongly disagree 
27 Establishment of appropriate independent economic utility regulation promotes accountability of 
utilities? 
D Strongly agree D Agree o Uncertain D Disagree o Strongly disagree 
28 Give reasons for your answer 
29 Establishment of independent utility regulation would promote transparency of utilities 
D Strongly agree D Agree o Uncertain D Disagree o Strongly disagree 
30 Independent economic utility regulators should ensure that utilities achieve commercial viability. 
o Strongly agree D Agree D Uncertain D Disagree D Strongly disagree 
31 Give reasons for your answer 
32 Independent economic regulation should bring about general performance improvements of utilities. 
D Strongly agree D Agree D Uncertain D Disagree D Strongly disagree 
33 How should regulators deal with issues of services to the urban poor? 
D Develop tariff regime that encourages utilities to serve the urban poor 
D Develop and enforce regulations that aim at protecting the urban poor 
D Encourage utilities to provide services 
D Provide guidelines to utilities on innovative ways of providing services to the urban poor. 
D Other ways [state any other ways] 
D Do not know. 
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34 The regulator should promote the social values of water with a need to ensure that utilities provide 
water services to the informal settlements [basically the urban poor]? 
D Strongly agree D Agree o Uncertain D Disagree D Strongly disagree 
35 Utility regulators of the water sector should regulate the small-scale water providers directly? 
D Strongly agree D Agree D Uncertain D Disagree D Strongly disagree 
36 How should regulators regulate small-scale independent water providers [you may tick as many as 
you think appropriate]? 
0 Establish regulations specifically for small scale independent water providers 
0 Develop technical standards which are only suited for the Small Water Enterprises 
0 Only regulate through the main utility operator [there should be no direct link with the small 
water enterprises]. 
0 Other ways [specify] ... 
0 No opinion 
37 What do you think would be the influence of utility regulation on the business strategies of the water 
utilities i.e. employment policies, tariff structures e.t.c. 
0 Promote openness in recruitment and financial matters 
0 Reduction on the operational costs of utilities 
0 Cut down on staff numbers 
0 Other areas [specify] 
38 What is the justification of having an independent utility regulator in a situation where services are 
provided by a public operator? 
39 In order for the independent regulator to be fully knowledgeable of contracts they must be party to 
operational contracts with private operators i.e. management, lease contracts or concession 
contracts. 
D Strongly agree D Agree o Uncertain o Disagree D Strongly disagree 
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PART 3: INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE REGULATOR 
A number of Governments in Africa have been undertaking broad institutional reforms leading to either 
new institutions being created or rearranging the existing ones but at least redefining the roles and 
responsibilities of the different key players. Introduction of regulatory framework is becoming a key 
element in the better provision of water supply and sanitation sector in Africa. One of the major issues 
therefore is the most appropriate institutional arrangements for the regulator. 
The purpose of this part of the questionnaire is to seek your expert views on the most appropriate 
institutional arrangements for the regulatory framework that would assure a more effective regulation of 
the urtJan water supply and sanitation services. The questions vary from why have autonomous 
regulatory institutions as opposed to having Government as regulator and policy maker, single sector or 
multi-sector regulatory bodies, reporting mechanisms for the regulator e.t.c. 
40 If regulatory authority lies within the political sphere of govemment, there is always a danger that 
prices, service standards, and investment priorities will be manipulated to serve short-term electoral 
interests. 
D Strongly agree D Agree D Uncertain o Disagree D Strongly disagree 
41 It is not necessary to establish a regulator in a situation where generally water services provision is 
entrusted in the hands of a private operator through a concession or lease contract as the 
regulatory issues can be included in the contract. 
D Strongly agree D Agree D Uncertain D Disagree D Strongly disagree 
42 Give reasons for your answer. 
43 The institutional arrangements of the regulatory body has an effect on its operational efficiencies. 
What do you think should be the institutional framework for the economic regulator? 
0 Create a regulator as a Department within the "Ministry responsible for Water" 
0 Establish a totally new regulatory body [with own new resources]-whether single or multi-
sector regulator. 
0 Contract out some elements of regulation to reputable, technically competent private sector 
firms. 
0 Other [specify] 
44 There should be different regulatory mechanisms for different type of Private Sector Participation 
contracts i.e. for a management contract, lease contract, concession and total divestiture. 
D Strongly agree D Agree D Uncertain D Disagree D Strongly disagree 
45 Where municipalities have contracted another organisation to manage the provision of services, 
there is no need to have a separate regulator as the regulatory functions can be carried out by the 
municipality. 
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D Strongly agree D Agree D Uncertain D Disagree D Strongly disagree 
46 Give reasons for your answer. 
47 In order to ensure independence in his operations, the regulator must be an autonomous statutory 
body. 
D Strongly agree D Agree D Uncertain D Disagree D Strongly disagree 
48 The regulatory body must have a two tier system of Govemance. A regulatory Council/commission 
and the executing body or secretariat. 
D Strongly agree D Agree D Uncertain D Disagree D Strongly disagree 
49 The members of the regulatory council/commission must be appointed by Government. 
D Strongly agree D Agree D Uncertain D Disagree D Strongly disagree 
50 Employees of the executing body [the secretaria~ including the Executive Director must be 
appointed by the Regulatory council/commission through a competitive and transparent process. 
D Strongly agree o Agree D Uncertain D Disagree D Strongly disagree 
51 In order to have a well infonmed regulatory commission/council the Executive Director must be a full 
member of the regulatory council/commission. 
D Strongly agree D Agree D Uncertain D Disagree D Strongly disagree 
52 For the above four questions please give any comments you may have on the internal organisation 
of the regulator. 
53 Customers must be represented on the regulatory commission/council. 
D Strongly agree D Agree D Uncertain D Disagree D Strongly disagree 
54 In order to have an effective follow up of the implementation of the regulations, consumer watch 
groups must established. 
D Strongly agree D Agree D Uncertain D Disagree D Strongly disagree 
55 Independence of the regulator is strengthened if he is resourced [financially] by a regulatory fee i.e. 
funded out of direct levies on utilities or customers, not from ministerial budgets subject to checks 
and balances 
D Strongly agree D Agree D Uncertain D Disagree D Strongly disagree 
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56 The utility regulator would enjoy greater autonomy in its operations if the regulator: 
D Reports to a sector Ministry 
D Reports to a completely non-sectoral Ministry i.e, the Prime Ministers office 
D Reports to Parliament just like other statutory bodies like the auditor General' 
D Don't know 
D Other reporting mechanism [specify] 
57 For most African Countries, multi-sectoral regulatory framework is more appropriate as it is more 
cost effective and has reduced likelihood of industry regulatory capture, 
D Strongly agree D Agree D Uncertain o Disagree o Strongly disagree 
58 Give any reasons for preferring multi-sectoral or single sector regulatory framework, 
o Strongly agree o Agree o Uncertain o Disagree o Strongly disagree 
59 If Government was to establish a multi-sector regulator which other sector do you think the water 
regulator should be partnered with? 
D Telecommunication 
D Electricity 
D Banking 
D Railway 
0 Other (specify) 
60 Give reasons for your answer 
61 Any further comments? 
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Appendix 8: Country Policy and Institutional Assessment [CPIA] for 2004 
2004 Conntry Policy And Institutional Assessment (CPIA) 
Onl-aU RatiDg 
Fil'st Quintile Armenia, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Grenada, Honduras, 
Maldives, Mali, Nitaragua, Pakistan, Samoa, Senegal, St_ Lucia, S1-
Vineent and the Grenadines, Tanzania, Uganda 
Second Quintile Albania, Azerbaijan, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Dominica, Georgia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Lesotho, Kenya, 
Mada~ascar, Serbia and Montenegro, Sri Lanka, Viel1lam 
Third QUintile Bangladesh, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Guyana, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Malawi, Moldova, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Republic 
of Yemen, Rwanda, Zambia 
FOUl'th Qnintile Camb()(\ja, Chad, Republic of Congo, Djibonti, The Gambia, 
Guiuea, Kiribati, Mauritania, Papua New Guinea, Sao Tome and 
Prineipe, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, Tonga, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu 
Fifth Qnintile Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Cote d'lvoire, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Comoros, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Haiti, Lao PDR, Nigeria, Solomon Islands, Sudan, Togo, 
Zimbabwe 
Cotmtries not rated in CPIA 2004 exercise: Afghanistan, Liberia, Myanmar, Somalia, and 
Timor-Leste. 
Note: Number of eountrles per qUllll1le vanes due to equal scores at cut-<)fflevels. 
Source: (World Bank, 2004) 
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Appendix 9: Results from the questionnaire responses from the rest of Africa 
Perception on the roles of economic regulation 
Strongly Agree Uncertain 
Function/Level of agreement in % agree 
Because provision of urban water supply and 
sanitation services tends to be monopolistic in nature 
there is need to introduce adequate regulatory 
t frameworks in order to promote competition. 48 42 6 
Regulation of the provision of urban water supply and 
sanitation services would reduce the abuse of 
2 monopoly power. 37 48 11 
In order to have an efficient and effective water supply 
and sanitation sector it is necessary to introduce an 
autonomous regulator in the Water Supply and 
3 Sanitation Sector? 46 43 7 
- - - - ---------
Disagree Strongly No of valid 
disagree Responses 
110 
4 
115 
3 1 
116 
3 1 
Regulation may be needed for various purposes. What type of regulation is mostly needed in developing 
4 countries especially in Africa for the water supply and sanitation sector? 
5 Economic regulation including service quality 66 26 1 7 110 
Social regulation (access to water and sanitation 116 
6 services) 44 26 22 8 
7 Environmental regulation 55 25 3 15 2 116 
8 Water quality regulation (basically health regulation) 53 33 2 11 1 116 
9 Technical standards regulation (standards bureau) 33 29 22 14 2 116 
Countries in Africa need clear regulatory framework, 110 
because of poor transparency, accountability, and high 
10 corruption, etc. 46 34 9 8 3 
Adequate utility regulation should assist utilities secure 110 
11 financial and management autonomy 46 42 11 1 
Establishment of appropriate independent economic 108 
12 utility regulation promotes accountability of utilities? 33 57 8 2 
Establishment of Autonomous utility regulation 108 
13 promotes transparency of utilities 41 46 11 2 
Autonomous economic utility regulators should ensure 114 
14 that utilities achieve commercial viability. 49 43 6 2 
Autonomous economic regulation should result in 116 
15 general performance improvements of utilities. 40 54 6 
The regulator should promote the social values of 116 
water with a need to ensure that utilities provide water 
16 services to the urban poor 21 62 12 5 
Utility regulators of the water sector should regulate 116 
17 the small-scale water providers directly 13 31 18 29 10 
Autonomous regulators should be party to negotiation 110 
of contracts with private operators i.e. management, 
18 lease or concession contracts. 22 26 10 36 6 
Questions seeking YES/NO answers 
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responses 
18 In order 10 have improved and efficient provision of services, regulators should 
a Penalise utilities for non-compliance 91 9 110 
b Take utilities that do not comply to courts of law 54 46 110 
c Use the National police service to enforce the regulations 22 78 110 
19 How should regulators deal with issues of services to the urban poor 
a Develop tariff regime that encourages utilities to serve the urban poor 76 24 110 
b Develop and enforce regulations that aim at protecting the urban poor 53 47 110 
c Encourage utilities to provide services 36 64 110 
d Provide guidelines on innovative ways of providing services to the urban poor. 80 20 110 
20 How should small-scale Autonomous water providers be regulated? 
a Establish regulations specifically for small scale Autonomous water providers 52 48 116 
b Develop technical standards which are only suited for the Small Water Enterprises 46 54 116 
c Only regulate through the main utility operator 38 62 116 
What do you think would be the influence of utility regulation on the business strategies of the water utilities 
21 i.e. employment policies, tariff structures etc. 
a Promote openness in recruitment and financial management 76 24 110 
b Reduction on the operational costs of utilities 57 43 110 
c Cut down on staff numbers 19 81 110 
Source: Author's analYSIS of data 
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Perception on the institutional arrangements for the regulatory agency: All Africa 
Institutional arrangementlLevel of agreement in Strongly Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly No of valid 
% agree disagree Responses 
If regulatory authority lies within the political sphere of . 
government, there is likelihood that sector priorities can 
1 be manipulated to serve short·term electoral interests. 58 35 5 2 0 105 
It is not necessary to establish a regulator in a situation 
where water services provision is entrusted to the private 
operator through a concession or lease contract as the 
2 regulatory issues can be included in the contract. 3 5 7 54 31 108 
There should be different regulatory mechanisms for 
different type of Private Sector Participation contracts Le. 
3 for a management contract, lease contract, concession 8 26 11 45 10 108 
Where municipalities have contracted another 
organisation to manage the provision of services, there is 
no need to have a separate regulator as the regulatory 
4 functions can be carried out by the municipality. 2 10 10 49 29 105 
In order to ensure independence in rts operations, the 
5 regulator should be an autonomous statutory body. 67 31 0 2 0 116 
The regulatory body should have a two tier system of 
Governance. A regulatory CounciVcommission and the 
6 executing body or secretariat. 44 30 20 5 1 116 
The members of the regulatory council should be 
7 appointed by government. 7 53 11 22 7 108 
Employees of the executing body (the secretariaQ 
including the Executive Director should be appointed by 
the Regulatory council through a competitive and 
8 transparent process. 52 39 3 5 1 116 
In order to have a well informed regulatory council the 
9 Executive Director must be a full member of the council. 25 38 10 25 2 108 
Consumers should be represented on the regulatory 
10 council. 48 42 6 3 1 110 
In order to have an effective follow up of the 
implementation of the regulations, consumer watch 
11 groups must established. 44 43 10 2 1 110 
Autonomy of the regulator is strengthened if he is 
resourced (financially) by a regulatory fee Le. funded out 
of direct levies on utilities or customers, not from 
12 ministerial budgets subject to checks and balances 49 38 9 3 0 110 
Strongl Agre Uncertai Disagre Strong No of valid 
yagree e n e Iy Responses 
disagr 
Institutional arrangemenVLevel of agreement in % ee 
For most African Countries, multi-sectoral regulatory 116 
framework is more appropriate as it is more cost effective 
13 and has reduced likelihood of industry regulatory capture. 12 39 24 22 3 
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Questions seeking YES/NO answers YES NO No of valid 
responses 
The institutional arrangements of the regulatory body have an effect on its operational efficiencies. What do 
14 you think should be the institutional framework for the economic regulator 
a Create a regulator as a Department within the "Ministry responsible for Water" 83 17 110 
Establish a totally new regulatory body (with own new resources) -whether single or 110 
b multi-sector regulator. 74 26 
Contract out some elements of regulation to reputable, technically competent private 116 
c sector firms 11 89 
15 The utility regulator would enjoy greater autonomy in its operations if the regulator: 
a Reports to a sector Ministry 13 87 112 
b Reports to a completely non-sectoral Ministry i.e. the Prime Ministers office 26 74 112 
c Reports to Parliament just like other statutory bodies like the auditor General 68 32 112 
If government was to establish a multi-sector regulator which other sector do you think the water regulator 
16 should be partnered with? 
a Telecommunication 38 62 116 
b Electricity 82 18 116 
c Banking 7 93 116 
d Railway 4 96 116 
Source: Author's data analysIs 
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Appendix 10: Published papers by the Researcher 
10.1 Promoting good governance through regulatory frameworks in African water utilities, published in water 
science and technology, Vol. 51 No. 8 pages 71-29 in 2005 
10.2 Reforming Africa's water and sanitation sector: Issues and challenges, 27'" WEDC conference, 2001, 
Lusaka, Zambia 
276 
Promoting good governance through regulatory 
frameworks in African water utilities 
0.0. Mwanza 
Water Utility Partnership, 05 BP 2642, Abidjan. Cote d'lvoire 
(E-mail: ddmwanza@wupafrica.org) 
Abstract Most public utilities in Africa are operating at very low efficiency levels. This is mainly a result 
of poor governance leading to a downward spiral in tenns of service to customers. Near1y in every case, 
studies have shown that the root cause of these problems is not necessarily lack of investment but poor 
choices with regard to sector policies, institutional and regulatory frameworks. 
The paper will seek to show the need for effective regulatory framework that promotes Good Governance 
of public utilities leading to their efficient performance. The paper will draw lessons from the Australian water 
services regulatory framework and apply it to the African water situation. The Australian regulatory framework 
has been instrumental in promoting Good Govemance in the public utilities hence being run efficiently. 
It is recognised that the African Water and Sanitation Sector where most public utilities are not operating 
under a clearly defined regulatory framework can learn a lot from the Australian experience. 
Keywords Accountability; autonomy; good governance; public utilities; transparency 
Introduction 
One of the challenges for the new millennium is how to meet the ever-increasing demand 
for water supply and sanitation services. A global framework for meeting this demand 
has been set out (United Nations 2000) by the Government leaders through the adoption 
of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The MDGs. among other issues, call for 
the reduction by 50% of the proportion of people without access to water supply and 
sanitation services. The MDGs together with the many efforts by Governments to 
increase accessibility to water and sanitation services are aimed at reducing the poverty 
levels which for many in sub-Saharan Africa averages 46.7% as opposed to the global 
average (1999 estimates, excluding China) of 22.7% (World Bank, 2001). Poverty in this 
respect referring to the number of people living on less than one US dollar per day. 
Indeed water is life, essential for health and human dignity. It is a key to sustainable 
development and is also crucial for socio-economic and environmental development. 
(GTZ, 2001). Yet accessibility, by a huge percentage of Africa's population, to 
this very critical resource is limited. In a continent where there is so much fresh water, 
only 62% of the popUlation has access to safe water (WHOfUNICEF, 2000). Behind 
these statistics are lives of people being unnecessarily lost due to low availability or poor 
quality of water. 
Africa stands at a crossroad. On the one hand Africa faces critical financial, technical 
and human resource capacity constraints to extend water and sanitation services of accep-
table quality to a majority of its people (Estache and Rossi. 2002). On the other, the pub-
lic utilities that have been charged with the responsibility of providing this basic service 
have been performing inefficiently (Smith and Kerf, 1996; Saghir et al., 2000; Palmer, 
et al., 2003). The inefficiency of public utilities is as a result of suppressed tariffs, over-
staffing, high unaccounted-for water, basically a totality of poor governance. The result 
of these two extremes is the statistics quoted above with the poor being the most affected 
(Gulierrez et al., 2003). 71 
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Governance of public utilities In Africa 
"The world water crisis is a crisis of governance-not one of scarcity. At the global 
scale, there is enough water to provide 'water security' for all, but only if we change the 
way we manage and develop it." (HRH the Prince of Orange, 2(02) 
Governance includes. according to the World Bank, public sector management, 
accountability, the legal framework, and transparency and information availability. 
The Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs defines 'good governance' as 'open, transpar-
ent, accountable, equitable and responsive to people's needs' (Larmour, 1998). Govern-
ance should also be seen to be the enforcement of law, accountability, transparency and 
implementation of government policies. A first principle of governance is that "the one 
who pays the piper calls the tune" (McJntosh, 2003), The exannples below show that 
when utilities lack autonomy, accountability, transparency etc, basically good govern-
ance, performance is highly compromised. Overstaffing, low tariffs, inadequate invest-
ment in capital and human resources, and poor governance have led to a downward spiral 
in terms of service to customers from public utilities. Nearly in every case, studies 
(WUP, 200 I) have shown that the root cause of these problems has been poor choices 
with regard to sector policies, institutional and regulatory frameworks. 
One of the most important considerations in operations is autonomy to run a utility 
efficiently and competently. The current situation in many African water utilities is, how-
ever, characterized by the interference of elected officials when utilities attempt to exer-
cise the autonomy granted to them on paper to set tariffs to recover costs. Utilities tend 
not to have clear-cut human resources policies including employment, salary structures 
etc, resulting in many utilities being overstaffed. In most cases the utility staff do not 
enjoy professional staff market rates of remuneration resulting in staff not having the 
motivation to perform better. 
Public utilities should therefore strive to promote good governance if they are to per-
form effectively. Governance is an all encompassing principle and as stated above 
includes issues of transparency, accountability, responsiveness and inclusiveness. 
~erformance of public utilities 
]n order to meet the MDGs of halving the unserved population by 2015, urban Africa 
will require an 80% increase in the numbers of people served (WHOIUNICEF, 2(00). 
At the current rate where pUblicly run utilities have been failing to provide efficient and 
sustainable services, the attainment of the goals within the time frame given would seem 
far fetched. 
Many governments in Africa have over the years been implementing water sector 
refonns aimed at establishing more appropriate institutional arrangements to ensure 
a more efficient provision of the services. One of the results of these institutional reforms 
has been establishment of independent regulatory institutions to generally regulate the 
provision of urban water and sanitation services, which should result in utilities being 
more autonomous to enable them to comply with government policies and legislation. 
Utility regulation should also promote good governance, promote accountability and 
improve availability of information to consumers. 
The water supply and sanitation sector in Africa like in many developing countries 
faces major challenges (Blokland et al .. 1999). As already stated, continuing population 
growth means that safe water and adequate sanitation must be supplied to more people in 
larger quantities and bener quality. This task is not easy to accomplish: many water 
supply and sanitation systems are in a deplorable state due to inappropriate choice of 
technology, sometimes over-design of facilities, poor quality of construction, and years of 
under-maintenance (Smith and Kerf, 1996). In spite of the huge investments, usually 
financed mainly by donor agencies andlor multi-lateral development banks, they have not 
resulted in much improvement in service coverage and sustained efficient operations of 
water and sanitation facilities in developing countries (Seppalla, 2(02). 
Until the present, the history of urban services globally has been focused or provided 
by public national or local institutions that are more or less specialized by sector of 
activity. Provision of water and sanitation services is rightly seen as a responsibility 
of governments, especially in recent years where governments have committed them-
selves to certain targets, i.e. the Milleimium Development Goals. 
As a result of the above, service provision for urban water supply and sanitation ser-
vices in most of Africa has usually been entrusted to state-owned monopolies tasked with 
multiple, sometimes poorly defined and often conflicting objectives, with weak incentives 
for efficiency i.e. poor human resources policies, unclear financing guidelines, poor 
governance (Kerf and Smith, 1996). Investment decisions are often driven primarily by 
political considerations rather than economic or areas of need. Tariff policies especially 
related to subsidy structures typically benefit only the more affluent in society who have 
access to service, and even when tariffs are reasonable, collection has been weak. Failure 
to cover costs through tariffs (Seppalla and Katko, 2003) leads to insufficient funds for 
investment, which is left to already over-burdened public budgets (Omar et al., 1999). 
Within enterprises, management is often appointed more on the basis of political loyalty 
than competence, and excessive staff is often employed to benefit favoured groups 
(Green, 1992). The poorest suffer the most from these policies, since they lack access to 
any services at all, or must bear the high costs of self-provision or supply from the infor-
mal sector who do it through water vending. 
Indeed the case of public services failing was also noted by D.F. Green as he men-
tioned the British public services ~eing "demoted, downgraded, negligently underfunded, 
at worst ignored and at best grudgingly accepted as a seemingly unavoidable necessity" 
(Green, 1992). 
Are public utilities In Africa really failing to deliver? 
At the core of many problems of the urban water supply and sanitation sector is the gene-
rally poor performance of many public utilities the World over but particularly in Africa. 
Many public utilities are indeed failing to deliver sustainable services in an efficient man-
ner. With the exception of very few cases, indicators for the level of service provision, 
technical efficiency and financial performance are much lower than in well-managed uti-
lities, while staffing levels are usually higher than necessary (Saghir et al., 2000). 
Yet on the other hand many publicly owned and run utilities in Africa have generally 
been known to fail because of some of the intrinsic internal problems. Firstly as stated 
above, the government responsibility should be that of policy making, creating a condu-
cive environment for the provision of services by others. It was an attempt to respect this 
thought that led most countries in Africa to establish seemingly autonomous public utili-
ties owned by government - termed as parastatal companies - to provide water and 
sanitation services. Unfortunately the problems in the parastatal companies tended to be 
a reflection of what would be in governments as service providers. 
Publicly owned utilities therefore have been said to be organisations where "decisions 
are not transparent, and consumers are not represented directly, but only in their capacity 
as voters" (Klein and Roger, 1994). Central Governments tend to want to have a full con-
trol over the provision of the services hence reducing on levels of governance. 73 
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Low connection fates to water supply network 
Public utilities have problems in meeting the demand for supply. The connectivity to water 
supply is usually very low (Rubambe, 2001). This is typical in utilities that are run by the 
public authorities. For example Conakry the capital of Guinea in West Africa with a total 
of about 800,000 residents had only 11,167 connections to Conakry's water system in 1984 
and additional 3,644 connections in secondary cities (Clarke and Menard, 2(00). In com-
parison, Abidjan, which was about twice the size of Conakry and had a long history of 
private participation in the sector, had over 90,000 connections (SODECl, 1988). 
In a number of cases a number of potential consumers who could be able to pay for the 
service are given free connections (Water and Sanitation Programme, 2002). It is usually 
the case for some level of politicians, senior civil Servants and employees of the public 
monopoly responsible for water supply to be entitled to legal, but unregistered and 
unbilled, connections. Unfortunately this also results in the public utilities having many 
illegal connections. In principle, water distribution may be metered and consumers charged 
according to consumption but, in fact, metering is usually very rare. The lack of metering 
makes it difficult to determine how high unaccounted-for water is; as can be seen below 
estimates for unaccounted-for water in most public utilities in Africa vary between 30% 
and 60%. This is a typical example of lack of accountability. Lack of accountability means 
meters are not replaced when they are no longer functioning properly. Low tariffs contrib-
ute to this situation. Annual reports on operations could easily be produced within 6 months 
of the end of a given financial year, but often such reports become official only about 2 or 
3 years later and are therefore of little use to the public in responding to performance. Con-
sumer satisfaction is a factor in good governance, but consumers have for so long been 
used to poor service that they regard it as normal. 
UtIlity de facto part of government ministry? 
In a number of cases the public agency, that is in charge of the sector is de facto a depart-
ment of a ministry in charge of the water sector. This is common in Nigeria where there 
are 36 state corporations (there are 36 states in Nigeria). In theory, the water companies 
(often termed parastatal companies) act as autonomous agencies and, under their statutes, 
would actually be registered under local company legislation. This means they would 
have a board of Directors which in most cases comprises representatives from several 
ministries. An example of the Water Distribution Company of Guinea (DEG at the time) 
had a board which in practice never met and the ministry treated it as any other depart-
ment. What this shows is that the framework for a possibility of implementing good gov-
ernance principles including separation of roles between policy making and executive 
functions is not there. Consequently, DEG had no autonomy and suffered from many of 
the problems that plagued the rest of the civil service including employment policies. 
For example, the government's policy of guaranteeing employment to university 
graduates meant that DEG, like the rest of the civil service, was extremely overstaffed. 
By 1984, DEG had 504 employees nationally, a ratio of 34 employees per 1,000 connec-
tions. This is a typical case of lack of good governance. Even compared to other public 
water utilities in West Africa this was high. Further, because salaries were low, and often 
not paid, DEG employees had little or no incentive to do their jobs (Clarke and Menard, 
2000)_ 
Poor state ot accounts 
It is very common to have public utilities have a poor state of accounts making it very 
difficult to assess accurately their financial perfonnance. Clarke (Clarke and Menard, 
2000) in quoting a consultant's report concluded that DEG's poor accounting practices, 
the non-availability of most relevant data, and the division of DEG's budget between sev-
eral different ministries, made it impossible to even perform an audit. Similarly, in 1989, 
the World Bank concluded the shortcomings of DEG's accounting systems were such 
that they largely precluded attempts to observe trends and base forecasts. Keeping in 
mind the limitations imposed by the poor quality of data, however, DEG financial per-
formance appeared to have been very weak. During 1961-89, DEG's revenues covered 
only about one-third of its operating costs. By 1984, DEG owed over US$4 million in 
unpaid interest and was over US$14 million in debt. Very few private customers will-
ingly paid for water and many were not billed at all. Since the private billing and collec-
tion rates were so low, DEG managed to continue to operate only because the 
government generally paid its water bill and sometimes provided large subsidies. Even 
this source of funds was unreliable and non-payment by the government led to frequent 
conflict with donors (Clarke and Menard, 2000). 
As stated elsewhere, even when the public utilities operate efficiently and collect 
billed amounts from customers, tariffs are usually too low to cover costs. According to 
the WUP survey, tariffs could be as low as $0.02lm' (Water Utility Partnership, 2001). 
These tariffs are usually lower than estimates of long-run marginal cost of providing the 
services. 
In summary, due to low tariffs, poor commercial habits and inefficient production, 
many public utilities are usually virtually bankrupt and sector infrastructure crumbling as 
there is no financing to rehabilitate the infrastructure. External support agencies (donors) 
are usually willing to assist but will normally demand sector refonn before granting 
further assistance. All these are cases which result from poor governance. 
Many governments have realized that there is a problem with service delivery by some 
public utilities. They are now making efforts to reform the water and sanitation sector 
(World Bank, 2002). The refonns are aimed at changing the institutional arrangements so 
that the sector is more accountable to its consumers, is more efficient in the service deliv-
ery and can do so sustainably - achieve full coverage and full cost recovery. 
While reforms in the water sector are not meant to be synonymous with private sector 
participation, the trend in Africa is that reforms tend to lead to the involvement of the 
private sector. 
Where the public sector failed 
As shown in the above example a number of publicly managed water utilities have 
shown similar patterns of performance as found out in a recent survey by the Water 
Utility Partnership (Water Utility Partnership, 2001). The efficiency levels are relatively 
low in areas of technical as well as human resources and are indicated by the following 
petforrnance indicators. 
Unaccounted-for water 
Poor maintenance due in part to most public utility financial positions and large illegal 
connections usually results in high unaccounted-for water (UFW). Unaccounted-for water 
is taken to include leakage and theft, but also unmetered provision of public water such 
as fire hydrants, etc. The indicator is therefore a measure of the amount of water pro-
duced over and above the amount of water consumed and the principal difference is 
likely to be leakage/system losses. 
UFW gives a general measure of efficiency levels of a utility. The petformance indi-
cators survey carried out by the WUP has shown a general trend of public utilities with 
high unaccounted-for water. Usually the UFW is in the range of 35% as compared 
to some utilities which are run by the private sector i.e. SODECI in Cote d'Ivoire 75 
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with about 18% (Water Utility Partnership, 2001), UFW levels are shown in Figure I for 
some selected public water utilities in Africa. 
Low cost recovery 
What also seems to be the trend of many public utilities is a low level of cost recovery. 
A sample of cost recovery levels for public utilities is shown in Figure 2. An efficient utility 
should aim to have at least 95% of cost recovery. Failure to do this is exacerbated by poor 
financial performance including poor accounting practices, non-availability or inaccurate 
data hence low billing and collection rates (Water Utility Partnership, 2001). As stated in 
the example of Guinea, above poor state of accounts makes it difficult to assess accurately 
the performance of a utility. Often the water sector is still seen only as a social service, not 
an economically viable endeavour. The poor performance of a number of public utilities is 
rooted in a policy of repressed tariffs. which leads to lack of investment, poor maintenance 
lagging coverage. and subsidized services reserved for the privileged who are connected to 
the network. The need to ensure the survival of African water utilities requires that there is 
suf~cient generation of internal cash flow to meet expected expenditure. 
Governments and regulators should offer utilities the tariffs that will provide sufficient 
revenues to meet their long-tenn marginal costs. In addition government agencies must 
pay the bills for the services that they receive from the utilities. 
The objectives of addressing the needs of the poor and ensuring cost recovery for uti-
lity companies are not in contradiction; well thought-out mechanisms for cross-subsidies, 
alternative service provision, and easing the cash flow demands upon the poor can allow 
the utility to survive whilst attending to their needs. 
Staffing 
One of the sources of inefficiencies of public utilities has been due to overstaffing. It is 
quite common to have utilities with staff per 1,000 connections over 20. The example of 
~li,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,l,i, 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Utility Identification 
Figure 1 Unaccounted·for water for sample African public utilities. Source: (Water Utility Partnership 2001) 
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Rgure 2 Cost recovery of some public utilities. Source: (Water Utility Partnership, 2001) 
DEG before reforms is a classical one. The general problem is not only overstaffing but 
also poor conditions of service including low salaries for the many employees. The utilities 
therefore tend to have a large number of demotivated staff thereby increasing chances of 
corruption (Pierre-Olivier, 2002). Figure 3 shows the general staff per 1,000 connections. 
As already stated above, most public utilities have not been able to deliver services to 
their consumers successfully let alone extend the services to the unserved. The cases indi-
cated above where productivity indicators such as high water losses, high number of 
employees per 1,000 connections or indeed the low cost recovery led to the need to re-
look at the institutional framework. 
Lessons from the Australian water sector 
Australia, huge as it is. provides great lessons to developing countries on how public uti-
lities can be run on the principles of good governance, promoting transparency and 
accountability to its customers using the principles of benchmarking to improve efficien-
cies. While each state has its own policy the general policy of the country is that the 
Australian water utilities will be kept in public ownership (Langford. 2003). While 
the general policy is for the water utilities in Australia to be kept in public ownership, 
Australia still remains with a great diversity of institutional arrangements for water man-
agement because no two States can agree to do the same thing. The utilities work on the 
principles of promoting Demand management and user pays water pricing principles. 
The performance of the utilities is enhanced by a number of factors which drive efficien-
cies by progressive establishment of regulatory framework - environment, health, service 
and price; structural reform - amalgamation of small rural and regional water authorities; 
and corporatisation of water utilities - operating licences. expert boards, current cost 
accounting, and strategic asset management, subject to trade practices law, payment of 
tax equivalents and dividends to government owners. 
Good governance is achieved through a clear means of supporting or assisting the dis-
advantaged in society. This includes the assistance of the disadvantaged through either 
targeted assistance from government welfare budget with pensioners and other disadvan-
taged groups (Health Card holders) paying lower water bills. water utilities subsequently 
reimbursed from taxpayer-funded government welfare budget or water utilities funding 
installation of water-efficient appliances for disadvantaged groups. 
Experience in Australia shows that targeted support is more cost-effective than redu-
cing water prices for everyone. What is required is a transparent system, a credible 
system which consumers would be happy to do business with. 
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Conclusion: Regulation as a tool for improved governance of public utilities 
One of the objectives of utility regulation is to ensure that water utilities have the auto-
nomy they need to operate effectively: autonomy from socia-political interference in the 
operations of the utility. It has been seen that autonomy of public utilities is a require-
ment for better performance of public utilities. 
Regulation also promotes transparency, accountability, equitability and efficiency. This 
is achieved through requiring utilities to disclose performance indicators to consumers. 
Consumers should know how their utility is perfonning. perhaps in comparison with other 
utilities in similar socio-economic conditions. One of the best tools for conSUmers is that of 
accountability. As already stated above, many public utilities lack accountability or see 
themselves as being accountable to politicians. 
Utilities will become more efficient if they are able to set their own tariffs or are 
allowed to charge economic tariffs. Charging of economic tariffs is only assured if an inde-
pendent regulatory framework exists. A Case in point is Zambia where the regulator 
approved a 100% tariff increase in a year of elections. Such would not happen if there was 
no regulator and any tariff increase was left to central government. What the Zambian case 
shows is that regulation would promote good governance. Tariffs are the lifeblood of any 
water utility. While it is not the role of regulators to set tariffs, they are however expected 
to approve tariffs taking into account the interests of both the consumers and the service 
providers. 
What the paper has shown is a clear relation between the poor performance of public 
utilities because of poor governance. It has also shown that public utilities can perfonn 
better and more efficiently if there is a clear regulatory framework that insists on transpar-
ency and accountability. The paper has also shown that there is a link between regulatory 
framework and improved governance of public utilities as in the case of Australia. 
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PEOPLE AND SYSTEMS FOR WATER, SANITATION AND HEALTH 
Reforming Africa's water and sanitation sector: Issues and 
challenges 
Dennis D Mwanza, Director, Water Utility Partnership (WUP), Cote D'Ivoire 
IN SPITE OF decades of government and donor-supported 
investments in water supply and sanitation (WSS), public 
utilities in many African countries have been unable to fully 
meet the demand for water and sanitation services. One of 
the resulting effeers of the poor service is that Africa has the 
lowest water supply and sanitation coverage in the world. 
More than 1 in 3 Africans do not have access to improved 
water supply and sanitation facilities. Current coverage 
levels stand at 62% for water supply and 60% for sanita-
tion. The reality is that the absolute number of people 
without access [0 water services is increasing and between 
now and the year 2020 the number will increase from 300 
million to 400 million!. The majority of these people will 
be those living in rural, informal and peri-urban communi-
ties. 
Nearly in every case, studies have shown that the root 
cause of these problems has been poor choices with regard 
to the systems related to sector policies and institutional 
and regulatory frameworks. Orren the water sector is still 
seen only as a social service, not an economically viable 
endeavour. Tariff levels tend not to recover costs and 
subsidies - justified in principle on the grounds of helping 
the poor- have actually made it financially unattractive for 
utilities to serve that segment of the population, while those 
most able to pay have enjoyed artificially low tariffs. At the 
same time many water utilities have been notoriously 
inefficient, at times wasting half of the water they produce, 
for technical reasons and through pilferage and poor 
account collections. Weak, unresponsive institutions that 
lack autonomy and accountability have been subject to 
pervasive political interference and have not had the incen-
tives or the means to provide adequate services to their 
existing customer bases, let alone expand and improve 
services. As a result, potential private investors and opera-
tors have stayed away from what they perceive to be a risky 
business. 
There is little prospect for improvement unless the water 
supply and sanitation sector engages in broad institutional 
reforms with the aim of increasing financial autonomy and 
providing greater transparency. These reforms should re-
sult in increased private sector participation in the water 
sector (both for access to private funding and access to 
management-expertise). 
This presentation therefore outlines issues and chal-
lenges facing the ongoing water sector reforms in many 
African countries especially as they affect people and the 
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systems they choose. These were identified during a re-
cently held regional conference on reforming the water and 
sanitation sector in Africa, where a total of 317 partici-
pants drawn from government, the utilities (including the 
private sector), financial institutions, external support 
agencies, and civil society took part in the conference. 38 
African countries, 6 of which were represented by Minis-
ters in charge of water and sanitation, participated. 
The conference was organized by a number of partners 
but led by the Water Utility Partnership (WUP) based in 
Abidjan, Cote D'Ivoire. The WUP recognizes the need to 
promote and facilitate water sector reforms in Africa -
promoting ownership, learning and identifying innovative 
ways for improving the quality of services. In response to 
these issues and challenges one of the goals of the WUP is 
to promote institutional reforms that result in good govern-
ance, accountability and transparency in water supply and 
sanitation utilities, in order to increase accessibility to 
water services as one effective strategy for poverty reduc-
tion. 
The link (people and systems) 
Any discussion of water supply can only be meaningful if 
we recognize the important role played by the people 
themselves. It is because the people are supposed to be 
beneficiaries of any reform programme. The systems which 
enable the people to have access to safe and adequate water 
and sanitation must be run in an efficient and sustainable 
manner. It is because currently the people have problems in 
terms of accessibility to water and sanitation and the 
systems have failed to deliver quality and efficient services. 
The resulting health and environmental problems (of lack 
of accessibility to water and poor sanitation services) take 
a tremendous toll, particularly on the poor, in terms of 
immediate human suffering -through premature death, 
disease and lost productivity, and in terms of ecological 
damage. The economic impacts are also great, estimated at 
several percentage points of GDP. 
Yet, increasing access to this most basic social service is 
one essential element to the strategies of poverty reduction, 
to deal with urban environmental problems and enhance 
the productivity of cities and towns. Given the lack of 
capacity of most municipal level providers, water utilities 
play the role of institutional anchors, not only for water 
supply but also for sanitation and environmental manage-
ment. 
MWANZA 
To meet these needs (the needs of the unserved) and to 
improve the quality of service to current water and sanita-
tion users, will require greater efficiency in the manage-
ment of existing systems, financial viability, and increased 
capital expenditure. Yet national and local government 
budgets for sector development have been dwindling. 
Under these conditions, governments must consider what 
financial, technical and managerial resources should be 
brought to bear on the problem from the private as well as 
the public sector, and to consider how best to define an 
appropriate partnership between the two. Policy makers 
must thus look beyond limited government budgets to 
consider the whole range of resources that could be mobi-
lized in a Public Private Partnership (PPP) for sustained 
development of the WSS sector. 
Over the last decade, most African governments have 
recognised the need to embark on reforms to address the 
problems of water and sanitation services and PPP has been 
a central feature of these reforms. Countries have had to 
deal with a number of issues on the reform of the sector. 
Some countries have been successful while others are still 
learning. It is on this basis that the following issues have 
been identified as emerging in the water and sanitation 
sector reform process. particularly in relation to urban2 
areas. 
The political economy of reform 
Reforms should not be considered synonymous with priva-
tization, but as a co-ordinated series of structural changes 
to provide better services to more and more people. For 
example, countries are realigning the nexus between rural 
and urban water supply to respond to different manage-
ment options (e.g. Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, etc.), adopting 
legislative and administrative measures to address the 
interests of the poor (e.g. South Africa), establishing new 
regulatory institutions (e.g. Ghana, Zambia) or strength-
ening existing ones to manage water resources and ensure 
consumer protection, among others. It is however the 
introduction of the private sector into the management of 
the production and distribution of water supply that has 
attracted the greatest attention. This is because it is a 
sensitive and more visible national issue, multi-disciplinary 
in context and is perceived as offering the panacea for 
addressing the problems inherent in the sector. Notsurpris-
ingly, it is in this area that there have been difficulties and 
in which the process of change seems to take much longer 
to achieve its objectives. The increased role of the private 
sector in WSS delivery has heen a dominant feature of the 
reform processes of African countries as it has been recog-
nized as a viable alternative to public service delivery and 
financial autonomy. Yet there are difficult processes to 
follow to ensure its success. 
A strong consensus exists over the need to involve all 
sections of society in the reform of water and sanitation 
services. Meaningful sector reform involves fundamental 
changes in the way we all work together to meet water and 
sanitation needs. Reform should not just be the concern of 
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sector technocrats, but also requires the strong and sus-
tained involvement of political leaders, national and local 
government officials, workers in water and sanitation, the 
private sector, NGOs and CBOs, community leaders, 
teachers, social researchers, traditional rulers, external 
support agencies, the media and the public at large. Reform 
cannOt survive without public support, which can only be 
earned through respectful attention to the legitimate inter-
ests of each of these stake holders. 
Reform must not be seen as a one-time event, but a 
continuous process that must be followed to adapt the 
water sector to changing conditions, and should be driven 
by local, rather than foreign, needs. 
True reform is thus best promoted with: 
• A strong and sustained political commitment; 
• Effective public communication of the issues and deci-
sions to be made; 
• The involvement of all stakeholders, with special atten-
tion to the interests of the poor; 
• Transparency; and 
• Adequate provision of incentives and avenues to pro-
mote and sustain local participation in the business of 
water. 
Addressing the interests of the poor in 
the reform process 
The needs of the poor are often overlooked in the design of 
various reform programmes and in the contractual rela-
tionship between the public and the private sector. These 
needs of the poor can best be served through the following 
processes: 
• Recognize that the poor are legitimate and significant 
stakeholders in the business of water and sanitation, 
and often pay far more than the rich per cubic metre of 
water consumed; 
• Take stock of the reality on the ground for the poor and 
learn about the systems by which their needs are met. 
Such systems may remain as credible alternatives to the 
utility, but may need legal recognition, regulation and 
management support; 
• Take note that the poor are willing and have the 
capacity to pay for services that are adapted to their 
needs; 
• Plan, from the beginning, to identify ways to ensure that 
the needs of the poor are reflected in the design, 
implementation, and follow-up to the reform process. 
The direct participation of the poor in the design, 
implementation and monitoring of the reform is the 
most effective way to protect their interests. 
Reform policies and laws should unam biguously include 
a definition of the pOOf, and provide regulations and 
guidelines for meeting their needs. These policies should 
accommodate other service providers where they are more 
effective than che utility. 
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Small-scale private providers, Non-Governmental and 
Community-Based Organizations (NGOs and eBOs) have 
played a leading role in service provision to the poor where 
public services have been inadequate. Their insights and 
experience in serving the poor, and their potential contri-
bution as experienced partners for the utility should be 
explicitly recognized. 
Women, children and men 
Women, children and men all need water and sanitation, 
hut their perspectives and involvement in the sector differ. 
Women and children bear a disproportionate burden from 
poor services; women and children fetch water from distant 
sources, children are most susceptible to disease resulting 
from poor service, and the care of sick children has tradi-
tionally been one of the many demands on women's time. 
While women's role in water and sanitation management 
has increased over the last twenty years, their needs and 
insights are still all too often neglected or misunderstood by 
(largely male) decision-makers. 
Women should be seen as a force to support reform. They 
stand to benefit from access to water and better environ-
mental sanitation. Their organizations are a key element of 
civil society to be mobilized to participate in the broad-
based coalition that is critical for the success of the reform. 
Labour and reform 
An informed and supportive labour front is an asset to the 
process of change. Opposition to the reform may either be 
the result of ignorance or in most cases a feeling of being left 
Out in the decision-making process. Very often policymakers 
have embarked on reforms and strategies, considered to be 
in the overall national interest, without adequately involv-
ing their social partners. This situation now seems to have 
changed, at least for the reforms in the sector; the leader-
ship of labour is increasingly identifying with the process 
and playing a constructive role. Yet this constructive role 
is only possible when the concerns of labour are adequately 
addressed in introducing a greater role for the private 
sector. 
With most African water utilities overstaffed, the advent 
of the private sector imposes the need to downsize at 
considerable financial and social cost to government. La-
bour redundancies, redeployment, retraining and compen-
sation for severance are all matters that can only be 
adequately handled if unions are well-informed and iden-
tify with the process of change. Nonetheless the manage-
ment of labour rationalization could be one of the most 
difficult aspects of the reform. Some African countries have 
handled this with considerable success (Senegal, Niger) and 
with support from development partners. While there may 
be peculiar national differences, no doubt there are areas of 
common ground in dealing with the concerns of labour, 
which could be shared with other countries. 
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Mobilizing finanCial resources for 
development of the sector 
Multilateral and bilateral agencies are keen to support the 
development of the WSS sector, as part of their commit-
ment to the eradication of poverty. Prospects for such 
suppOrt are enhanced where there is a clear commitment to: 
i) reforming the sector to bring in other actors, 
ii) ensuring transparency in the process, and 
iii) addressing the needs of the poor. 
Any price increases to cover costs and improve service 
should be gradual and should follow service improvements 
to maintain public support. In view of the limited budget-
ary resources in most African countries, external financing 
should be available to cover the operational deficit result-
ing from the lag between improved service and increased 
revenue during the initial years of PPP. 
Achieving cost recovery 
Improved cost recovery, to ensure sustainability and im-
prove service must be one of the cornerstones of water and 
sanitation sector reform. The poor performance of a number 
of public utilities is rooted in a policy of repressed tariffs 
which leads to lack of investment, poor maintenance 
lagging coverage, and subsidized services reserved for the 
privileged who are connected to the network. The need to 
ensure the survival of African water utilities requires that 
there is sufficient generation of internal cash flow to meet 
expected expenditure. Governments and regulators should 
offer utilities the tariffs that will provide sufficient revenues 
to meet their long-term marginal costs. In addition govern-
ment agencies must pay the bills for the services that they 
receive from the utilities. 
Addressing the needs of the poor and ensuring cost 
recovery for utilities are not in contradiction; well thought-
out mechanisms for cross-subsidies, alternative service 
provision, and easing the cash flow demands upon the poor 
can allow the utility to survive whilst attending to their 
needs. 
Regulation 
While the role of the private sector should increase in most 
cases, the public aspects of water and sanitation services 
should not be compromised. The creation of an independ-
ent regulator and corresponding legislation, before any 
major transfer of operational activity to the private sector, 
can help to ensure the priority of the public interestthrough 
increased fairness, transparency, accountability and better 
monitoring of contract performance. The exact form of 
utility regulation will of course depend upon the legal and 
administrative framework of each country; this will also be 
strongly influenced by the current and future extent of 
decentralization. 
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The challenges of sanitation and hygiene 
People are more willing to pay for water than they are for 
sanitation and hygiene promotion; however the health 
benefits of water supply can only be maximized where all 
three services are provided. Examples in Africa exist of 
effective sanitation cosc-recovery from water supply tariffs 
to ensure the integrated improvement of the entire sector. 
While sanitation and hygiene are easily overlooked during 
the reform process, they must be given a higher priority to 
achieve the greatest possible improvements in health and 
well being from sector reform. 
Water resources management 
Water is an economic, social and natural resource that 
must be managed in an integrated manner. Hitherto, the 
issue of water resources management has in most instances 
been ignored and relegated to the background in the water 
supply sector. However, water is a finite resource subject to 
increasing competition for its use. Sustainability of water 
supplies calls for a shift from an exclusive focus on water 
supplies to the broader approach of sustainable water 
resources management. The reform process must consider 
water and its management in a holistic way to assure a 
suitable balance between the agricultural, industrial and 
domestic use of water, ensure the protection of catchment 
areas and provide incentives for conservation. 
The way forward 
The issues and opportunities described above will not wait; 
unless we act forcefully now, the numbers of people 
without service will double within twenty years, and the 
quality of water and sanitation services will deteriorate 
further. These issues must be considered at the highest level 
if we are to achieve successful reform within the WSS 
sector. We must seek all opportunities possible to ensure 
that the political leadership in our countries receive the 
message on the poor service delivery and a vaila ble options 
for improving the services. 
Governments should provide sustained commitment to 
reform processes in order to ensure their success and long-
term sustainabiliry. The WUP will continue playing its role 
with other partners and also as parr of its current mandate 
to: 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Provide a continuous update of the progress of reforms 
in African countries, and disseminate this to utilities, 
governments and their partners, as well as sector pro-
fessionals. This shall include identifying both good 
practice and the lessons learned from less successful 
practice. 
Facilitate interaction between African water and sani-
tation utilities undertaking reforms and their various 
partners at bilateral and multilateral levels. 
Follow up on a number of specific issues highlighted 
above. WUP will facilitate a workshop on water, sani-
tation and the urban poor later this year (November to 
be specific); similar meetings should be organized by 
WUP and/or by other partners around a range of other 
critical issues raised above. These include such topics as 
gender, decentralization and regulation, sanitation, 
and the needs of small towns. 
Take the lead in working with other sector partners to 
organize learning and training activities on specific 
themes directly related to the theme of the conference 
namely: regulatory options, financing, use of local 
capacity and human resources in the context of reform 
and institutional options for sanitation delivery; 
Collaborate with sector partners in sponsoring regional 
workshops on broader subjects brought up in the 
conference, in particular water supply services in the 
context of decentralization. 
IWHOIUNI CEF, Global Water Supply and Sanitation Assessment 2000 Report, 
2000 and Kampala Statement of the Regional Conference on Reforms of the 
Water and Sanitation Sector in Africa 26th to 28th February 2001, Kampala, 
Uganda 
lUrban areas includes all the formal and informal settlements (peri-urban, urban 
poor, etc.) 
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